Some aspects of organisation and management of public enterprise with special reference to electricity supply industry by Barakat, Abdel-Moneim
Durham E-Theses
Some aspects of organisation and management of public




Barakat, Abdel-Moneim (1965) Some aspects of organisation and management of public enterprise with
special reference to electricity supply industry, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham
E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/9726/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Oﬃce, Durham University, University Oﬃce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
2
Some aspects of organisation and 
management of Public Enterprise 
with special reference to El e c t r i c i t y 
Supply Industry. 
by 
ABDEL - MONEIM B ARARAT 
B.Comm. CAIRO 
rA-fc. no .THESIS 
1965 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. 
No quotation from it should be published without 
his prior written consent and information derived 
from it should be acknowledged. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
T h i s study has been s u p e r v i s e d by Mr. S.. Moos 
to whom I am g r e a t l y indebted. I am a l s o v e r y 
g r a t e f u l to P r o f e s s o r E . A l l e n f o r h i s help and 
guidance. 
My thanks to the M i n i s t e r and s e n i o r o f f i c i a l s 
of the Egyptian T r e a s u r y f o r the s a n c t i o n of the 
unpaid l e a v e of §bsence to undertake t h i s study. 
I thank the B r i t i s h E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l and 
the E g y p t i a n E l e c t r i c i t y A u t h o r i t i e s and a l l 
i n d i v i d u a l s who s u p p l i e d me w i t h i n f o r m a t i o n . 
Thanks to my w i f e f o r her understanding. 
CONTENTS. D Page 
I n t r o d u c t i o n . 1 
Chapter I« The S t r u c t u r e of P u b l i c E n t e r p r i s e s . 
( a ) The s t r u c t u r e of p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s 3 
i n Egypt. 
Background. 3 
P u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s ' r o l e i n 7 
development. 
(b) The s t r u c t u r e of p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s 27 
i n B r i t a i n . 
I n t r o d u c t i o n and background. 27 
Types of p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e i n B r i t a i n . 31 
N a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s i n B r i t a i n . 37 
C o n c l u s i o n . k7 
( c ) The s t r u c t u r e of the E l e c t r i c i t y supply 1*9 
i n d u s t r y i n B r i t a i n and Egypt. 
Background. 49 
The p r e s e n t s t r u c t u r e . 60 
C o n c l u s i o n 76 
Chapter I I . The s t r u c t u r e of Boards. 80 
D i f f e r e n c e s i n aims* 80 
D i f f e r e n c e s i n s i z e . 83 
Q u a l i f i c a t i o n s f o r membership. 90 
Sources of membership» 97 
Workers* and consumers' r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . 105 
The work of f u l l and part-time members. 115 
S e l e c t i o n of members. 126 
Powers of the Boards. 137 
C o n c l u s i o n . 149 
page 
Chapter I I I . Problems of plan n i n g . 153 
( a ) E l e c t r i c i t y consumptionr g e n e r a l 158 
survey. 
Consumption per c a p i t a . l64 
Consumption by consumers' c a t e g o r i e s . l66 
Consumption e s t i m a t e . l82 
E l e c t r i c i t y supply p r o j e c t s . 190 
C o n c l u s i o n . 198 
(b) Manpower pl a n n i n g . 200 
S i z e of manpo\ver. 201 
The problem of s k i l l e d manpower. 208 
Education and t r a i n i n g . 213 
T r a i n i n g i n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply 219 
i n d u s t r y . 
P r o d u c t i v i t y of la b o u r . 227 
C o n c l u s i o n . 2 3 8 
( c ) F i n a n c i a l p l a n n i n g . 2kl 
The B r i t i s h e x p e r i e n c e . 243 
F i n a n c i n g E g y p t i a n p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e . 254 
C e n t r a l R a i l w a y s A u t h o r i t y . 262 
The E.D.O. 263 
F i n a n c i n g of B r i t i s h e l e c t r i c i t y 267 
supply p r o j e c t s . . 
F i n a n c i n g of E g y p t i a n e l e c t r i c i t y 276 
supply p r o j e c t s . 
R u r a l e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n . 28l 
C o n c l u s i o n . 2$6 
Page 
Chapter I V , Investment, p r i c e s and -wages p o l i c i e s . 290 
(a) Investment p o l i c y , 290 
The problem of c h o i c e , 291 
C o n c l u s i o n , 310 
(b) P r i c e P o l i c y , 311 
P r i c e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , 323 
Uniform p r i c e , J>2.Q 
The bulk supply t a r i f f i n B r i t a i n . 331 
The s t r u c t u r e of r e t a i l t a r i f f s . 334 
Costs and t a r i f f s i n Egyptian 341 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y . 
C o n c l u s i o n . 349 
( c ) Wages p o l i c y . 352 
The r o l e of Trade unions and the r o l e 368 
of the Boards. 
The r o l e of the Government. 373 
C o n c l u s i o n . 381 
Chapter V. C e n t r a l i s a t i o n and d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n . , 383 
D e f i n i t i o n s . 384 
C e n t r a l i s a t i o n or d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n 391 
i n p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s . 
C e n t r a l i s a t i o n and d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n 399 
of f u n c t i o n s . 
Advantages and disadvantages of 420 
c e n t r a l i s a t i o n and d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n . 
L i n e s of communication, 430 
C o n c l u s i o n , 435 
General c o n c l u s i o n s . 438 
ILLUSTRATION L I S T . 
1. The r e l a t i o n between index i n numbers of 
consumers and index of u n i t s of e l e c t r i c i t y 
s o l d between 1920 and 1962/3 i n B r i t a i n . 
2. E v o l u t i o n of energy g e n e r a t i o n i n Egypt from 
1954 to 1962 and estimate from 1962 to 1965. 
3 . The e l e c t r i c i t y consumption per c a p i t a i n 
some c o u n t r i e s . 
4. E l e c t r i c i t y consumption per c a p i t a i n B r i t a i n 
1950 to 1960. 
5. Per c a p i t a generated energy i n Egypt 1952 to 
1962 and estimated from 1962 to 1980. 
6. E l e c t r i c i t y s a l e s by c l a s s e s of consumers i n 
B r i t a i n 1954 to 1963A. 
7. C l a s s i f i c a t i o n of energy consumption a c c o r d i n g 
to purposes, (without chemical f a c t o r i e s i n 
Aswan) i n 1958 and 1962 and estimate f o r 1964. 
8. Domestic s a l e s of e l e c t r i c i t y : average s a l e s 
per consumer i n B r i t a i n . 
9. E s t i m a t e d maximum demand i n average c o l d 
s p e l l weather i n B r i t a i n . 
10. Percentage e r r o r i n f o r e c a s t s of demand f o r 
s i x t h w i n t e r ahead i n B r i t a i n . 
11. Development of e l e c t r i c a l energy g e n e r a t i o n 
requirements i n the U.A.R. (1952 - 1985). 
12.& E f f i c i e n c y i n the u t i l i s a t i o n of manpower i n 
13 e l e c t r i c i t y supply. 
Maps. 
Map 1. Expansion of the major g e n e r a t i n g power s t a t i o n 
i n Lower Egypt. 
Map 2 , Expansion of e l e c t r i c i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n i n Lower 
Egypt. 
Map 3 . E l e c t r i c i t y supply p r o j e c t s ended 1964 i n Egypt. 
Map 4. E l e c t r i c i t y supply p r o j e c t s ended 1967 i n Egypt. 










Recent o r g a n i s a t i o n of E g y p t i a n 
E l e c t r i c i t y supply. 
The law of e s t a b l i s h i n g the E.D.O. 
A f f i l i a t e d companies of the E.D.O* 
P r e s i d e n t i a l Decree of the n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n 
of banks and i n s u r a n c e companies i n 
the U.A.R. 
C l a s s i f i c a t i o n of the Egyptian p u b l i c 
e n t e r p r i s e s . 
O r g a n i s a t i o n c h a r t of the C.E.G.A-. 
Pl a n of e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n of the U.A.R.. 
Costs i n the C.E.G.A. 
T a r i f f s t r u c t u r e of the Eg y p t i a n 
E l e c t r i c i t y A u t h o r i t i e s . 
ABBREVIATION L I S T . 
E.D.O. Economic Development O r g a n i s a t i o n . 
B.B.C B r i t i s h B r o a d c a s t i n g C o r p o r a t i o n . 
B. T.C. B r i t i s h T r a n s p o r t C o r p o r a t i o n . 
I. R . I . , I s t i t u t o per l a R i c o s t r u z i o n e I n d u s t r i a l e . 
C. E.G.A.. The C a i r o E l e c t r i c i t y and Gas A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 
A.E.G.O* The Al e x a n d r i a E l e c t r i c i t y and Gas Org a n i s a t i o n , 
H. E.P.O. The H y d r o - E l e c t r i c Power Department. 
M.E.D- Mechanical and E l e c t r i c a l Department of the 
M i n i s t r y of P u b l i c l$orks. 
U.A.R. United Arab R e p u b l i c ( E g y p t ) . 
I . C.I.. I m p e r i a l Chemical I n d u s t r i e s . 
N.U.R„ N a t i o n a l Union of Railwaymen, 
N.U.M.. N a t i o n a l Union of Mineworkers. 
N.C.B. N a t i o n a l Coal Board. 
T.V.A.- Tennessee V a l l e y A u t h o r i t y , 
K.W.. K i l b w a t t . 
K.W.h. KiBowatt hour. 
M.K.W.h M i l l i o n K i l l o w a t t hour. 
M.W. Megawatt = M i l l i o n w a t t s . 
K.V. K i l l o v o l t . 
N.E.D..C. N a t i o n a l Economic Development C o u n c i l * 
U.N. United Nations. 
O.E.E.C.. O r g a n i s a t i o n of European Economic Corporation, 
G.B. B r e a t B r i t a i n , 
N.A.J.C. N a t i o n a l J o i n t Advisory C o u n c i l , 
N.B.E- National Bank of Egypt. 
£E Egyptian pound. 
£ S t e r l i n g pound. 
$> American d o l l a r . 
M i l l i m e s 1 ~p 
1000 
C.E.G.B. C e n t r a l E l e c t r i c i t y Generating Board. 
P i a s t e r 1 
100 
B.E.A. B r i t i s h E l e c t r i c i t y A u t h o r i t y . 
L.P.T.B. London Passanger T r a n s p o r t Board. 
T.U.C. Trades Union Congress. 
1 
INTRODUCTION. 
The i n c r e a s e i n the Government's r o l e i n the 
n a t i o n a l economy of most c o u n t r i e s has i n c r e a s e d the 
importance of p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s i n r e c e n t y e a r s . The 
r i s i n g number of p u b l i c undertakings i n v o l v e s many 
economic and managerial problems. 
The f i r s t aim of t h i s study i s to i n v e s t i g a t e 
some of these problems, to d i s c u s s the d i f f e r e n t views 
and suggest measures f o r the s o l u t i o n of these problems. 
P a r t i c u l a r r e f e r e n c e i s made to the problems of the 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y . 
The second purpose i s to compare, as f a r as the 
data w i l l permit, the B r i t i s h and the Egy p t i a n methods 
of d e a l i n g w i t h the problems of p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s i n 
ge n e r a l and the e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y i n p a r t i c u l a r * 
I t i s important to note t h a t as f a r as the Eg y p t i a n data 
i s concerned, the author has t r i e d s e v e r a l s o u r c e s . Some 
of the data r e c e i v e d was a r e s u l t of p e r s o n a l c o n t a c t , 
r e f e r r e d to i n the study as unpublished data* 
I t may a l s o be noted t h a t the s t r u c t u r e of the 
Egy p t i a n e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y d i s c u s s e d i n the 
study was i n e x i s t e n c e u n t i l March, 1964 when the i n d u s t r y 
was r e - o r g a n i s e d as shown i n Appendix ( l ) . I n making a 
comparison between B r i t i s h and Egyptian p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s 
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i t was hoped to f i n d how f a r experience i n one country 
can be adopted i n another* 
L a s t l y , i t should be noted t h a t most of the data 
used i n t h i s t h e s i s , was p u b l i s h e d or r e c e i v e d up to the 
beginning of 1964. 
CHAPTER I» 
THE STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES-
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THE STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN EGYPT, 
BACKGROUND. 
Many appear to be convinced, t h a t what p r i v a t e 
e n t e r p r i s e s i n the Western World accomplished i n the 
n i n e t e e n t h century, can now only be accomplished by 
p u b l i c a c t i o n . Governments i n a l a r g e p a r t of the 
underdeveloped world have a c t e d a c c o r d i n g l y i n the l a s t 
two decades. They have adopted and a p p l i e d p o l i c i e s to 
promote the development of t h e i r economies. T h e i r main 
aim i s to improve the standard of l i v i n g of the 
po p u l a t i o n . The r e l a t i o n of government to b u s i n e s s i n 
the p r o c e s s of economic development d i f f e r s among r e g i o n s 
mainly because of c u l t u r a l and h i s t o r i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s , 
but almost everywhere the r o l e of government i s l a r g e . 
However, i t i s n e c e s s a r y to r e a l i s e t h a t the e x t e n s i o n of 
the scope of s t a t e a c t i o n i n the economic sphere i s not 
conf i n e d to underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s . Even i n economically 
advanced c o u n t r i e s , governments a r e r e q u i r e d to o u t l i n e 
and execute comprehensive p o l i c i e s i n v o l v i n g a c o n s i d e r a b l e 
degree of d i r e c t i o n and r e g u l a t i o n of economic a c t i v i t i e s . 
The aim of t h i s chapter i s to i l l u s t r a t e t h i s f a c t i n two 
c o u n t r i e s : Egypt and B r i t a i n . 
I n t e r v e n t i o n by Egy p t i a n governments vras known from 
the a n c i e n t days of Pharaohs. As P r o f e s s o r I s s a w i put i t ( l ) 
(1) I s s a w i , C h a r l e s : Egypt a t Mid-Century, London, 1954. p.6 
"from the time of Pharaohs, through the r e i g n s of the 
Pt o l e m i e s , the Roman and Arab governors, and the T u r k i s h 
k i n g s and Pashas, a l l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was con c e n t r a t e d i n 
the hands of the r u l e r and a few chosen m i n i s t e r s and no 
i n i t i a t i v e whatsoever was l e f t to the p r o v i n c e s , except 
during the ei g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y when Egypt was i n e f f e c t 
p a r t i t i o n e d i n t o zones of i n f l u e n c e s among the beys and 
beudun Sheikhs"• The r e s u l t of t h i s has been g r e a t l y to 
weaken i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c f e e l i n g s and completely to suppress 
the s p i r i t of m u n i c i p a l e n t e r p r i s e . S e v e r a l milleniums 
of c e n t r a l i s e d a u t o c r a c y have accustomed E g y p t i a n s to 
look to the government to i n i t i a t e any b u s i n e s s 
whatsoever ( 2 ) . 
I n the f i r s t decades of the n i n e t e e n t h century, the 
s t a t e had sponsored the est a b l i s h m e n t of a number of 
i n d u s t r i e s i n c l u d i n g t e x t i l e s , s h i p b u i l d i n g and m i l i t a r y 
s u p p l i e s . 
Mohamed A l i , i n l 8 l 8 , embarked a programme of 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n i n c l u d i n g f a c t o r i e s of woollen and 
cott o n goods, sugar and g l a s s . Under the system imposed 
by Mohamed A l i , a l l p r o f i t s were r e s e r v e d by the 
government. The managers of the f a c t o r i e s were f o r the 
most p a r t s a l a r i e d government o f f i c i a l s , i gnorant and 
(2) I s s a w i C h a r l e s : O p . c i t , p.7 
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u n e n t h u s i a s t i c about the work they were c a l l e d upon to do* 
P r i o r to 1930* Egypt was f o r c e f u l l y reminded of her 
v u l n e r a b l e p o s i t i o n owing to her almost complete dependence 
on European i n d u s t r i e s . By 1930, government i n t e r v e n t i o n 
was obvious i n t a r i f f p r o t e c t i o n combined w i t h the 
development of b a s i c f a c i l i t i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y t r a n s p o r t , 
m u n i c i p a l water, s a n i t a t i o n and e l e c t r i c power, which 
proved to be s u b s t a n t i a l s t i m u l a n t s . One of the 
outstanding f e a t u r e s of governmental a c t i o n , during 1930, 
i n i n d u s t r i a l i s i n g the country, was the foundation of 
Bank M i s r . Although t h i s bank was a p r i v a t e l y f i n a n c e d 
concern, i t was of a semi-public c h a r a c t e r . The 
government co-operated w i t h the bank by p l a c i n g w i t h i t 
d e p o s i t s of p u b l i c a u t h o r i t i e s and made i t governmental 
agents f o r i n d u s t r i a l c r e d i t s . I t a l s o had t o guarantee 
the d e p o s i t s of the bank. Also 'The C r e d i t Hypothecaire* 
was founded by the government i n 1932 as a branch of the 
A g r i c u l t u r a l C r e d i t Bank and was made an independent 
i n s t i t u t i o n i n 1935 and put i n charge of some of the 
mortgage debts taken over by the government from other 
i n s t i t u t i o n s . I n 19^9 an ' I n d u s t r i a l Bank' was 
e s t a b l i s h e d . Of the c a p i t a l of £ E 1.5 m i l l i o n , the 
government s u b s c r i b e d 51 per cent, and banks and other 
i n s t i t u t i o n s 30 per cent, the balance having been 
6 
o f f e r e d to the p u b l i c ( 3 )« 
U n t i l n e a r l y the l a s t decade, t h e r e was no 
s t r i k i n g government i n t e r v e n t i o n . N e a r l y a l l the 
manufacturing e n t e r p r i s e s were p r i v a t e l y owned. Apart 
from the demonstration p l a n t s i n glass-making, f u r n i t u r e 
manufacturing and food p r e s e r v i n g , the major manufacturing 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t s w h o l l y owned by the government c o n s i s t e d 
of the petroleum r e f i n e r y a t Suez, the p r i n t i n g and 
p u b l i s h i n g f i r m s i n C a i r o . I n a d d i t i o n , the government 
owned and operated a few r e p a i r and maintenance shops, 
which s e r v i c e d o n l y the s t a t e owned e n t e r p r i s e s * 
I t i s worth no t i n g , t h a t i n 1951 the C e n t r a l Bank 
law was i s s u e d . Under t h i s law the bank was p r a c t i c a l l y 
under complete governmental c o n t r o l . The General Assembly 
chose the members of the Board of D i r e c t o r s . The Governor 
was appointed by a decree i s s u e d according to a proposal 
of the M i n i s t e r of Finance, the Deputy-Governor was 
appointed by a d e c i s i o n of the C o u n c i l of M i n i s t e r s on 
p r e s e n t a t i o n of two Egy p t i a n c a n d i d a t e s proposed by the 
Board of D i r e c t o r s . The General Assembly appoints, i n 
conformity w i t h the p r o v i s i o n s of the s t a t u t e s of the 
bank, two censors from among the names i n s c r i b e d on the 
(3) I s s a w i , C h a r l e s : 'Egypt i n R e v o l u t i o n ' An Economic 
A n a l y s i s , London 19&3* P«264 
The o f f i c i a l r a t e of the £ E i n May, 1962 was M 2.30 
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l i s t of censors approved by the M i n i s t e r of F i n a n c e . 
Above a l l , a Supreme Committee, an a u t h o r i t y which covers 
q u e s t i o n s of money, c r e d i t and exchange, and i s composed 
of the M i n i s t e r of Finance and Economy as a p r e s i d e n t and 
s i x members, three of them M i n i s t r y O f f i c i a l s (4)„ I t i s 
c l e a r from these r e g u l a t i o n s t h a t the bank was p r a c t i c a l l y 
under p u b l i c c o n t r o l * 
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES ' ROLE IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT» 
From 1951 t i l l 1953, p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the Eg y p t i a n 
Government i n the c a p i t a l of manufacturing e n t e r p r i s e s was 
n e g l i g i b l e . S i n c e then up to the present time the E g y p t i a n 
economy as a whole passed through four main s t a g e s J -
1, Development of n a t i o n a l r e s o u r c e s . 
2. C o n s o l i d a t i o n of n a t i o n a l economy. 
3» P a r t i a l p l a n n i n g . 
k. Comprehensive p l a n n i n g . (5) 
I am not concerned here w i t h the d e t a i l s of th e s e s t a g e s , 
and the s i g n i f i c a n c e of them to the development of the 
n a t i o n a l economy. But what may be of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t 
i s the importance of the p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e ' s ' r o l e through 
these s t a g e s . T h i s could be made r a t h e r c l e a r by g i v i n g 
the examples of the important machinery which c a r r i e d 
(4) E g y p t i a n Economic & P o l i t i c a l Review Vol.2. 1955-6 p.58 
(5) Hassan, Abdel Razek, A Review of Economic Development 
Egy p t i a n P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Review August, 1963, p.4. 
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out t h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . I t may be made c l e a r t h a t 
p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s i n Egypt have had a p a r t i c u l a r f e a t u r e 
e s p e c i a l l y the way of t h e i r c r e a t i o n , as we s h a l l see i n 
the second stage a f t e r the Suez c r i s i s , when a great 
number of f o r e i g n e n t e r p r i s e s were handed over to the 
government. The i n c r e d i b l e number of e n t e r p r i s e s 
a f f e c t e d by the 196l s o c i a l i s a t i o n laws has no s i m i l a r i t y 
i n the world during the s i x t i e s . Oscar Lange i n h i s paper 
'Economic Development, Planning and I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Co-operation' d e s c r i b e d the r o l e of p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s i n 
Egypt during the f i f t i e s - 1952 - 1961 - as t h a t i t g i v e s 
a l i v i n g p i c t u r e of modern n a t i o n a l r e v o l u t i o n s which aim 
a t developing s o c i e t y by a method d i f f e r e n t from the 
C a p i t a l i s t method which had been followed by most of the 
Western C o u n t r i e s a f t e r the F rench R e v o l u t i o n a t the end 
of the l 8 t h Century, and from the M a r x i s t method adopted 
by the E a s t e r n C o u n t r i e s a f t e r the S o v i e t R e v o l u t i o n a t 
the end of 1917.(6) 
The f i r s t s t a g e . 
The e s t a b l i s h m e n t of the N a t i o n a l P roduction 
C o u n c i l i n January, 1953 i s the example i n the f i r s t 
s t a g e . The C o u n c i l was a s s i g n e d the t a s k of c o - o r d i n a t i n g 
(6) Oscar Lange: Economic Development, Pla n n i n g and 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Co-operation ( C e n t r a l Bank of Egypt) 
Economic B u l l e t i n 196l, p.2 
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the work of the production M i n i s t r i e s and planning the 
long and short-term production p o l i c i e s . The C o u n c i l 
had a l a r g e t a s k to c a r r y out., i n n e a r l y a l l spheres of 
the n a t i o n a l economy. I n i n d u s t r y the C o u n c i l had t o 
i n i t i a t e p r o j e c t s to i n c r e a s e the n a t i o n a l output i n 
a d d i t i o n to the aim of i n c r e a s i n g output from the 
e x i s t i n g p r o j e c t s . The i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r a t t h a t time 
was unable to perform ag l e a d i n g r o l e i n economic 
development d e s p i t e the encouragement given i n the form 
of t a r i f f p r o t e c t i o n , ban on exports and f a c i l i t i e s f o r 
importing i n d u s t r i a l equipment. I n a g r i c u l t u r e the 
C o u n c i l was charged w i t h the study of the p l a n s to 
i n c r e a s e the c u l t i v a b l e l a n d , i r r i g a t i o n , l a n d r e c l a m a t i o n 
and animal breeding. I n a d d i t i o n to these two main s e c t o r s , 
i t was the duty of the C o u n c i l to p l a n f o r p a r t i c u l a r 
p r o j e c t s , such as the g e n e r a t i o n of e l e c t r i c power, road 
c o n s t r u c t i o n , p r o s p e c t i o n f o r o i l and other m i n e r a l s . 
Other t a s k s which have to be mentioned are those r e l a t i n g 
to the m o d i f i c a t i o n of the t a x a t i o n system i n order to 
r a i s e the n e c e s s a r y amount of c a p i t a l needed f o r the 
c o n s t r u c t i o n of new i n d u s t r i e s . I n t h i s r e s p e c t the 
C o u n c i l was a u t h o r i s e d to c o n t r a c t l o c a l and f o r e i g n l o a n s . 
How f a r was t h i s p u b l i c body s u c c e s s f u l ? 
The answer to t h i s q u e s t i o n may be i n two main p a r t s . 
F i r s t , as a policy-making body i t c a r r i e d out two f u n c t i o n s 
( 1 ) With a s u c c e s s f u l investment p o l i c y i t s f i r s t 
budget i n March, 1953 amounted L.E. 21,7 m i l l i o n , 
to be d i s t r i b u t e d over the y e a r s 1953/5^-55• The 
f i n a n c i n g was c a r r i e d out through r e - v a l u a t i o n of 
gold b a l a n c e s and c o n t r a c t i o n of l o a n s . I t a l s o 
c r e a t e d the ' A g r i c u l t u r a l Reform Fund' s u p p l i e d by 
revenues obtained from s e l l i n g wheat seeds, corn 
seeds and other a g r i c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s * 
( i i ) I t r e - o r g a n i s e d the management of j o i n t - s t o c k 
companies to be more e f f e c t i v e i n c o n s o l i d a t i n g 
the n a t i o n a l economy, which was w i t h i n the l i m i t s 
of i t s powers. I t l i m i t e d the number of the 
Board's members w i t h a maximum of seven members. 
I t was n o t i c e d t h a t the l a r g e number of d i r e c t o r s 
l e d to bad management of the a c t i v i t i e s of those 
companies and made i t d i f f i c u l t f o r the Board to 
take quick d e c i s i o n s . ( 7) 
Secondly, as an e x e c u t i v e Board, the C o u n c i l s t u d i e d and 
p a r t i c i p a t e d i n many p r o j e c t s considered to be e s s e n t i a l 
f o r modern i n d u s t r y , v i z . i r o n and s t e e l , f e r t i l i z e r s , 
c a b l e s , rubber b a t t e r i e s , p r o c e l a i n and ceramics and 
paper i n d u s t r i e s . I t a l s o c o n t r i b u t e d i n the High Dam 
(7) Hassan, A: Op.Cit. p.6 
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p r o j e c t s i n i t s f i r s t s t a g e. I n a d d i t i o n the C o u n c i l 
s u p p l i e d f o r the expansion of the Petroleum R e f i n e r y 
and i n s t a l l e d the p i p e l i n e s n e c e s s a r y f o r supplying both 
C a i r o and A l e x a n d r i a . I t should be noted t h a t the 
C o u n c i l ' s s u b s c r i p t i o n s i n the c a p i t a l of these p r o j e c t s 
was by 51 per cent or sometimes more. (8) 
Other p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s c h a r a c t e r i s i n g t h i s p e r i o d 
•were the S t a t e R a i l w a y s and Government R e f i n e r y a t Suez. 
These two o r g a n i s a t i o n s were given more autonomy and 
r e - o r g a n i s e d as s e p a r a t e e n t i t i e s , w i t h s e p a r a t e budgets 
and boards of management i n s t e a d of being managed by 
government departments. 
However, the p o s i t i o n of the Production C o u n c i l 
changed according to the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of the M i n i s t r y of 
I n d u s t r y and the Planning Commission founded i n 1955* but 
the main d u t i e s of the C o u n c i l were t r a n s f e r r e d to Economic 
Development O r g a n i s a t i o n e s t a b l i s h e d i n January, 1957. T h i s 
l e a d s us to the second s t a g e . 
The second s t a g e . 
The second stage had t h r e e main f e a t u r e s : -
( i ) The n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of the Suez Canal Company 
i n J u l y , 1956. 
( i i ) The E g y p t i a n i z a t i o n of f i n a n c i n g o r g a n i s a t i o n s , 
mainly banks and i n s u r a n c e companies. 
( 8 ) I s s a w i , C. Egypt i n R e v o l u t i o n 19&3. P.^5 
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( i i i ) The es t a b l i s h m e n t of the Economic Development 
O r g a n i s a t i o n • 
The Egyptian law n a t i o n a l i s i n g 'La Compagnie 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l e du Canal Maritime de Suez* introduced 
one of the major p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e s i n t o the p u b l i c 
s e c t o r . The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the Company was to be 
governed by an independent Board a t t a c h e d to the 
M i n i s t r y of Commerce. The composition of the Board, 
and a l l the r e l a t i n g problems concerning the members 
were to be decided by the P r e s i d e n t of the R e p u b l i c . 
A r t i c l e 1 of the law s t a t e d 'La Compagnie I n t e r n a t i o n a l e 
du Canal Maritime de Suez' ( S o c i e t e Anonyme Egyptienne) 
e s t n a t i o n a l i s e e . Son a c t i f e t son p a s s i f r e v i e n n e n t 
a l ' E t a t e t l e s C o n s e i l s e t Comites a c t u e l l e m e n t charge 
de son a d m i n i s t r a t i o n sont d i s s o u s ( S e c . A ) * 
A r t i c l e 2 s t a t e d the ' L ' a d m i n i s t r a t i o n du s e r v i c e du 
t r a f f i c par l e Canal de Suez s e r a a s s u r e e par un 
organisme independent qui aura q u a l i t e de personne 
moralet i l s e r a r a t t a c h e au m i n i s t e r e du commerce. 
Un a r r e t e du P r e s i d e n t de l a Republique determinera l a 
composition de c e t organisme et f i x e r a l'indemnite a 
s e r v e r a ses membres. Cet organisme aura tous l e s 
pouvoirs n e c e s s a i r e s pour d i r i g e r l e s e r v i c e et ne 
s e r a pas soumis a l a r o u t i n e e t aux reglements 
a d m i n i s t r a t i f s • 
Quoted from 'La Bourse Egyptienne' 27th J u l y , 1956. 
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The E g y p t i a n i z a t i o n of banks, i n s u r a n c e companies 
and other f o r e i g n trade d i d not i n f a c t a l t e r the 
p o s i t i o n of these i n s t i t u t i o n s as p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e s . 
They had taken the form of Egyptian J o i n t Stock 
Companies.(9), but they may be con s i d e r e d as semi-
p u b l i c o r g a n i s a t i o n s , f o r two r e a s o n s s -
( i ) The E g y p t i a n i z a t i o n of banks was intended to 
secure a banking system designed to s e r v e the 
proper i n t e r e s t of the n a t i o n a l economy. P r o f i t s 
w i l l n 6 t be the main goal of the I n s t i t u t i o n s . 
( i i ) Most of these banks were p r a c t i c a l l y c o n t r o l l e d 
by the Government-owned Economic Development 
O r g a n i s a t i o n , which bought a l l s h a r e s of these 
banks and managed them w i t h other Egyptian banks 
r e c e n t l y e s t a b l i s h e d , by the E.D.O. i t s e l f . ( 1 0 ) 
Thus the banks and i n s u r a n c e companies which were 
s e q u e s t r a t e d and managed through the E.D.O. may 
be c o n s i d e r e d as sem i - p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s because 
the E g y p t i a n i z a t i o n procedures caused the emergence 
of the government as the p r i n c i p a l owner of a g r e a t 
p a r t of the banking system. 
(9) Law No. 22/1957. 
(10) N a t i o n a l Bank of Egypt - Economic B u l l e t i n ITol. XIV 
no. 1. 196l p. 3^ 
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Apart from the obvious r e a s o n s f o r s e q u e s t r a t i o n 
i t was claimed t h a t the d i r e c t c o n t r o l of the government 
over the banking system i s c r u c i a l * I n the newly 
developing c o u n t r i e s the banking systems are c h a r a c t e r i s e d 
w i t h the s p e c i f i c emphasis given to banking to ensure the 
c o n t r i b u t i o n to the p r o c e s s of development* I t may be 
noted t h a t i n some of the advanced c o u n t r i e s , major 
changes have taken p l a c e to g i v e the s t a t e more c o n t r o l 
over the banking system to ensure e f f e c t i v e i n t e g r a t i o n 
between f i s c a l and monetary p o l i c i e s as i n Prance, ( l l ) 
Another f e a t u r e of governmental c o n t r o l on banks 
was the i s s u i n g of the Banks and C r e d i t s Law i n J u l y , 1957 
which determined the r o l e of banks i n the n a t i o n a l economy, 
as w e l l as t h e i r r e l a t i o n s w i t h the C e n t r a l Bank, which 
was granted the a u t h o r i t y to s u p e r v i s e a l l the bank's 
a c t i v i t i e s and given c o n s i d e r a b l e powers i n o r g a n i s i n g 
the c r e d i t p o l i c y . 
I n a d d i t i o n to the E g y p t i a n i s a t i o n laws which were 
promulgated, l e d to the a c q u i s i t i o n by the S t a t e of 
s u b s t a n t i a l i n t e r e s t s i n s e v e r a l banks and i n s u r a n c e , 
commercial and i n d u s t r i a l companies, the Government f e l t 
t h a t i t was n e c e s s a r y to e s t a b l i s h a p u b l i c body to 
( l l ) E i n a u d i , M., Bye M., and R o s s i , E. 
N a t i o n a l i s a t i o n i n France and I t a l y , New York 
1955. p.105 
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c o n t r o l the S t a t e ' s i n t e r e s t s i n v a r i o u s economic 
a c t i v i t i e s * T h i s i n c l i n a t i o n m a t e r i a l i z e d i n the 
c r e a t i o n of the Economic Development O r g a n i s a t i o n * 
The E.D.O. has been the s u b j e c t of c o n s i d e r a b l e 
d i s c u s s i o n s i n c e i t s i n c e p t i o n i n 1957* I t s i n s p i r a t i o n 
and c h a r a c t e r g i v e i t a p o s i t i o n of extreme importance 
not only as a dynamic economic body, but as an experiment 
i n socio-economics of wide i n t e r e s t . 
I t s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and f u n c t i o n s have been l a i d 
down by bye-law no. 138/1957 - (Appendix 2 ) . 
Of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t are the f o l l o w i n g 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h i s p u b l i c body. 
(1) I t has some s i m i l a r i t i e s to the B r i t i s h p u b l i c 
c o r p o r a t i o n . These a r e : -
( i ) I t s o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e belonged more 
to the f i e l d of independent e n t e r p r i s e w i t h a 
complete autonomy r a t h e r than to the r e s t r i c t i v e l y 
b u r e a u c r a t i c management of government machinery. 
The r u l e s and r e g u l a t i o n s to be f o l l o w e d i n 
managing the est a b l i s h m e n t i n c l u d i n g the f i n a n c i a l 
and accounts r u l i n g s are not bound by the 
government r e g u l a t i o n s i n f o r c e . (12) 
(12) A r t i c l e 23 Law No. 138/1957, Appendix ( 2 ) 
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( i i ) The Board prepares every y e a r a balance 
sheet and a p r o f i t and l o s s account. I t must 
a l s o prepare a r e p o r t of i t s a c t i v i t i e s during 
the f i n a n c i a l year and i t s f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n 
a t the end of the same y e a r . (13) 
( i i i ) The Board of D i r e c t o r s has f u l l r i g h t s 
to manage the work of' the o r g a n i s a t i o n . They 
p r a c t i c e a l l a c t i v i t i e s f o r managing the funds 
of the o r g a n i s a t i o n and to determine the means 
of investment. ( l 4 ) I t c o n t r a c t s l o a n s and 
i s s u e s s t o c k s i n conformity w i t h the law. 
Civ) Nomination of members of the Board, and 
the f i x i n g of t h e i r s a l a r i e s are by a d e c i s i o n 
of the P r e s i d e n t of the R e p u b l i c as i n the case 
of the Bank of England and the B.B.C. where these 
r e g u l a t i o n s a r e f i x e d by the Crown, 
( v ) The E.D.O. i s e s t a b l i s h e d as a Government 
agency to p a r t i c i p a t e d i r e c t l y i n the n a t i o n a l 
economic p l a n n i n g . I t has to c a r r y out the 
g e n e r a l p o l i c i e s l a i d down by the planning bodies, 
as i n the case of the B r i t i s h N a t i o n a l Economic 
and Development C o u n c i l and i t s r e l a t i o n w i t h 
p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e . 
(13) A r t i c l e 19. 
(14) A r t i c l e 17. 
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(2) The only d i f f e r e n c e from the B r i t i s h p u b l i c 
c o r p o r a t i o n i s t h a t the £«D«0. i s or g a n i s e d as a 
holding e n t e r p r i s e . I t p a r t i c i p a t e s i n the 
c a p i t a l of 57 companies w i t h v a r y i n g i n vestments.(15) 
Ten of these companies a r e wholly owned. I t s 
share i n other companies v a r i e s between 20% and 
j u s t l e s s than 100%. 
Before the end of the year 1957 the main 
production s e c t o r s of the s t a t e were i n the 
hands of Egyptian e n t e r p r i s e s s u p e r v i s e d by the 
S t a t e . 
As the p u b l i c s e c t o r grew f u r t h e r , two other 
holding e n t e r p r i s e s were c r e a t e d , namely Misr 
O r g a n i s a t i o n and E l Nasr O r g a n i s a t i o n , b e s i d e s 
the g e n e r a l p u b l i c o r g a n i s a t i o n s . These were 
the main f e a t u r e s of the t h i r d s t a g e . 
The t h i r d s t a g e . 
The t h i r d stage was c h a r a c t e r i s e d by the i n f l a t i o n 
of the p u b l i c s e c t o r i n the E g y p t i a n economy. When the 
M i n i s t r y of I n d u s t r y prepared f o r the f i r s t f i v e - y e a r 
p l a n i n 1957 the p u b l i c s e c t o r ' s share i n the pla n was 
estimated a t about 60% a g a i n s t k0% of the investments 
i n the p r i v a t e s e c t o r . I n f a c t t h a t Government decided 
to c a r r y out the e n t i r e p l a n r e s t r i c t i n g the c o n t r i b u t i o n 
of the p r i v a t e s e c t o r to l e s s important p r o j e c t s . 
(15) See Appendix ( 3 ) . ft tit i P 1 r 
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I n a d d i t i o n to the p u b l i c o r g a n i s a t i o n a l r e a d y 
i n e x i s t e n c e the Government had s e t up new p u b l i c 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s to c a r r y out the p l a n . The F e d e r a t i o n of 
I n d u s t r i e s and I n d u s t r i a l Chambers were r e v i v e d and t h e i r 
a c t i v i t i e s were r e - o r g a n i s e d to p a r t i c i p a t e d i r e c t l y i n 
the development of i n d u s t r i e s . An I n s t i t u t e of N a t i o n a l 
P l a n n i n g was founded i n 1960 to c a r r y out t r a i n i n g and 
r e s e a r c h . The r e - o r g a n i s a t i o n of the Suez Canal 
A u t h o r i t y , the High Dam O r g a n i s a t i o n and the Petroleum 
A u t h o r i t y which gave them more autonomy o u t s i d e the 
m i n i s t e r i a l framework, was a l s o an important f e a t u r e of 
t h i s p e r i o d . I n 1960 the Eg y p t i a n Government s t a r t e d a new 
economic p o l i c y f o r economic and s o c i a l development, i . e . 
t a k i n g the e f f e c t i v e s t e p s towards a complete s o c i a l i s t 
form. I t paved the way f o r i t by n a t i o n a l i s i n g Bank 
Misr and the N a t i o n a l Bank of Egypt. The importance of 
the former n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n law was due to the f a c t t h a t 
Bank Misr was the l a r g e s t Bank i n Egypt not s u b j e c t to 
S t a t e c o n t r o l . I t s a s s e t s amounted to n e a r l y one t h i r d 
of the a s s e t s of a l l other commercial banks, and i t s 
c o n t r o l covered a l a r g e number of i n d u s t r i a l companies, 
owing to i t s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e i r working c a p i t a l and 
the grant of l a r g e c r e d i t s to them. The N a t i o n a l Bank 
of Egypt was converted i n t o a c e n t r a l bank which 
s u p e r v i s e d a l l other banking e s t a b l i s h m e n t s . 
I t seems now i m p o s s i b l e f o r the Economic 
Development O r g a n i s a t i o n ( d i s c u s s e d i n the second s t a g e ) 
to c a r r y out a l l these government commitments. Thus 
two other p u b l i c o r g a n i s a t i o n s were e s t a b l i s h e d , they 
are the 'Misr O r g a n i s a t i o n * and the 'El-Nasr 
O r g a n i s a t i o n ' * The Misr O r g a n i s a t i o n was e s t a b l i s h e d 
on the 2nd March, 196l by a Republican Decree No. 
249/1961. I t s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and f u n c t i o n s can be 
b r i e f l y e x p l a i n e d as f o l l o w s : -
( i ) I t i s a p u b l i c economic o r g a n i s a t i o n having an 
independent e n t i t y and a t t a c h e d to the P r e s i d e n c y 
of the R e p u b l i c • 
( i i ) She c a p i t a l of t h i s o r g a n i s a t i o n i s to be found 
from Bank Misr C a p i t a l and i t s share i n the 
c a p i t a l of the j o i n t s tock companies, i n a d d i t i o n 
to the c a p i t a l of other p u b l i c o r g a n i s a t i o n s t o 
be f i x e d by a P r e s i d e n t i a l Decree. 
( i i i ) I t s main f u n c t i o n i s to a c c e l e r a t e the pace of 
economic development through i t s engagement i n 
commercial, f i n a n c i a l , a g r i c u l t u r a l and i n d u s t r i a l 
a c t i v i t i e s , p r e v i o u s l y c a r r i e d out by the Boards 
of Bank Misr Companies. 
( i v ) I t has to s u p e r v i s e on b e h a l f of the Government a l l 
the a c t i v i t i e s of Bank M i s r . 
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F i n a l l y the O r g a n i s a t i o n has to submit to the 
P r e s i d e n t of the R e p u b l i c , w i t h i n three months a f t e r 
the end of i t s f i n a n c i a l y e a r , a balance s h e e t , p r o f i t 
and l o s s account and a r e p o r t on i t s a c t i v i t y during 
the y e a r . Net p r o f i t s r e a l i s e d by the o r g a n i s a t i o n w i l l 
a ccrue to the T r e a s u r y a f t e r deductions have been made 
f o r r e s e r v e s or f o r the ex e c u t i o n of new p r o j e c t s . 
The E l - N a s r O r g a n i s a t i o n has more or l e s s the 
same shape and the same f u n c t i o n s as the Misr O r g a n i s a t i o n . 
The d i f f e r e n c e i s only i n the way t h i s body was s e t up.. 
The E l - N a s r O r g a n i s a t i o n has only been c o n f i n e d i n i t s 
d u t i e s to the i n d u s t r i a l p r o j e c t s . I t has to c a r r y out 
the f u n c t i o n s of other, preceding companies, s e t up 
mainly f o r the ex e c u t i o n of the f i v e - y e a r p l a n . The 
c a p i t a l of the E l - N a s r O r g a n i s a t i o n was formed from the 
c a p i t a l of these companies. 
F i n a l l y the O r g a n i s a t i o n has to submit to the 
P r e s i d e n t of the R e p u b l i c a t the end of every f i n a n c i a l 
year a r e p o r t on i t s a c t i v i t i e s coupled w i t h the balance 
sheet and p r o f i t and l o s s a ccounts. 
The f o u r t h s t a g e . 
I n the t h i r d stage we have seen t h a t the p u b l i c 
s e c t o r as w e l l as the p r i v a t e s e c t o r were c o n s i d e r e d as 
p a r t of a scheme to implement the p l a n ' s p r o j e c t s . I t 
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became apparent during the f i r s t y e a r of i t s a p p l i c a t i o n 
t h a t dependance on the p r i v a t e s e c t o r and i n d i v i d u a l 
i n c e n t i v e s would not h elp the Government to r e a l i s e i t s 
aims because of two reasons t-
( i ) The p r i v a t e s e c t o r would p r e f e r the i n d u s t r i a l 
s e c t i o n of the economy r a t h e r than other p r o j e c t s 
which were con s i d e r e d as p u b l i c u t i l i t i e s . 
( i i ) The p r i v a t e entrepreneurs were not w i l l i n g to 
g i v e e f f e c t to Government S o c i a l i s t P o l i c y . 
T h i s being the c a s e , i t was considered i m p e r a t i v e 
to adopt s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d s o c i a l i s t methods, i . e . 
t o n a t i o n a l i s e the s o u r c e s of production and to 
l i m i t as f a r as p o s s i b l e the power of p r i v a t e l y 
c o n t r o l l e d c a p i t a l . 
During the year 1961 the E g y p t i a n economy was 
completely reshaped as a r e s u l t of the o v e r a l l 
n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n laws which put n e a r l y 90% of the whole 
economy under s t a t e c o n t r o l , i n c l u d i n g a number of 
companies i n which the Government's share of c a p i t a l was 
50% or more. The wholly n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s were 
banks and i n s u r a n c e companies,(l6) f o r e i g n t r a d e , 
t r a n s p o r t and marine n a v i g a t i o n , m e t a l l u r g i c a l and 
chemical i n d u s t r i e s and the r e s t of the p u b l i c u t i l i t i e s . 
( l 6 ) Appendix 4• 
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Those which were p a r t l y n a t i o n a l i s e d i n c l u d e d bakery 
i n d u s t r i e s , r i c e and f l o u r m i l l s , d i s p e n s i n g drug 
l a b o r a t o r i e s and mining i n d u s t r i e s * 
T h i s s i t u a t i o n d i d not l a s t long, as the p a r t i a l l y 
n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s were f u l l y n a t i o n a l i s e d by the 
n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n laws i s s u e d i n 1962 and 1963* 
By the n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n laws, the p u b l i c s e c t o r 
had been organised and a d m i n i s t e r e d by 38 p u b l i c 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s w i t h a supreme c o u n c i l f o r p u b l i c 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s * (17) Examples of these o r g a n i s a t i o n s 
a r e many and i n c l u d e : -
( i ) The Egyptian P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n of Banks, 
f o l l o w i n g the n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of a l l banks* The 
Board of D i r e c t o r s of the E.P.O.B. i n c l u d e s the 
Chairmen of the Board of D i r e c t o r s of the major 
banks, the Under-Secretary of the M i n i s t r y of 
Economics as w e l l as the Sub-Governor of the 
C e n t r a l Bank of Egypt. T e c h n i c a l problems such 
as the r a t e of commission and i n t e r e s t e t c . , 
were handed t o a T e c h n i c a l Committee* 
( i i ) The P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r I n t e r n a l T r a n s p o r t 
which superseded the General Road T r a n s p o r t and 
C o n s t r u c t i o n O r g a n i s a t i o n and the General A u t h o r i t y 
f o r Road Tr a n s p o r t A f f a i r s . ( l 8 ) 
(17) Republican Decree No. 1899/1961 - and Appendix ( 5 ) 
(18) Republican Decree No. l614/1962. 
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( i i i ) The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r c o n t r a c t i n g 
and c o n s t r u c t i o n * I t s main f u n c t i o n was the 
execution of v a r i o u s housing and p u b l i c u t i l i t y -
p r o j e c t s , but i t was d i s s o l v e d and r e p l a c e d by 
t h r e e p u b l i c o r g a n i s a t i o n s , under the s u p e r v i s i o n 
of the M i n i s t e r of Housing and U t i l i t i e s . They 
are the E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r 
E n t e r p r i s e s f o r B u i l d i n g s and f o r U t i l i t i e s * 
( i v ) By v i r t u e of the Republican Decree No. 3317/1962 
i s s u e d on the 3rd of December 'The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c 
O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r Desert Land R e c o n s t r u c t i o n 1 was 
e s t a b l i s h e d . The aim of the O r g a n i s a t i o n i s the 
execution of d e s e r t development p r o j e c t s i n c l u d i n g 
l a n d r e c l a m a t i o n , improvement of means of t r a n s p o r t 
and i n d u s t r i a l p r o j e c t s i n the a r e a . 
I n a d d i t i o n to the four examples above we could 
name the f o l l o w i n g p u b l i c o r g a n i s a t i o n s : the E g y p t i a n 
P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r Mining, Petroleum, Spinning and 
Weaving, Chemical I n d u s t r i e s , F o o d s t u f f I n d u s t r i e s , 
B u i l d i n g M a t e r i a l s and Ceramics, M e t a l l u r g i c a l I n d u s t r i e s , 
Co-operative Production and s m a l l i n d u s t r i e s and 
E n g i n e e r i n g I n d u s t r i e s . 
A Supreme C o u n c i l f o r P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n s was s e t 
up by a Republican Decree No. 486/1961, to s u p e r v i s e and 
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l a y down the g e n e r a l p o l i c y of p u b l i c o r g a n i s a t i o n s i n 
accordance w i t h the g e n e r a l p l a n s of the Government* 
The formation of the C o u n c i l was determined by law a s : 
The f i r s t V i c e - P r e s i d e n t , Chairman and the M i n i s t e r s of 
Economics, A g r i c u l t u r e , A g r a r i a n Reform and Supply and 
s i x other M i n i s t e r s as members. Bach O r g a n i s a t i o n has 
to submit to the C o u n c i l p e r i o d i c r e p o r t s on i t s a c t i v i t y 
and a copy of the d e c i s i o n s taken by i t s Board of 
D i r e c t o r s , e s p e c i a l l y the investment p o l i c y , r e g a r d i n g 
the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of these o r g a n i s a t i o n s i n the c a p i t a l 
of companies and establishment of new companies* Some 
c r i t i c s f e a r t h a t t h i s C o u n c i l i s a s t e p towards a 
planned economy. 
I n a r e p l y the M i n i s t e r of I n d u s t r y , s t a t e d t h a t i n 
our country we have a planned economy, but, the new C o u n c i l 
i s to form a c o - o r d i n a t i n g o r g a n i s a t i o n between the 
v a r i o u s p u b l i c o r g a n i s a t i o n s to ensure harmony and 
c o - o r d i n a t i o n and proper f u l f i l m e n t of the t a s k s of 
these o r g a n i s a t i o n s . I t i s a c o - o r d i n a t i n g and pushing 
ahead o r g a n i s a t i o n f o r investment i n v a r i o u s p u b l i c 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s . (19) 
From t h i s p i c t u r e of the economic s t r u c t u r e i n 
Egypt, s e r i o u s c r i t i c i s m s may a r i s e , i . e . the i m p l i c a t i o n s 
(19) Egyptian Economic and P o l i t i c a l Review A p r i l 1 9 6 l . p.28 
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of a t o t a l i t a r i a n s o c i a l i s t i c s t a t e , which i n v o l v e s the 
d r a s t i c consequences of the c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of planning (20) 
and the b u r e a u c r a t i c management. ( 2 l ) 
Against these c r i t i c i s m s i t could be s a i d t h a t : -
( i ) Egypt i s not a t o t a l i t a r i a n s t a t e i n the u s u a l 
sense because of the important q u a l i f i c a t i o n 
t h a t t h e r e i s no one p a r t y o r g a n i s a t i o n extending 
to the lower l e v e l s of economic and s o c i a l 
a c t i v i t y . 
( i i ) The advocates of the p r e s e n t system c l a i m t h a t 
the c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of planning e x p r e s s e s a d e f i n i t e 
p o l i c y aiming a t p u t t i n g the r e i g n s i n the hands of 
the p u b l i c s e c t o r , which r e f l e c t s a f i r m tendency 
towards d i r e c t planning r a t h e r than planning through 
the manipulation of i n c e n t i v e s or any other method 
of i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r o l . Of course, c e n t r a l i s a t i o n 
of planning has many disadvantages, as i t w i l l be 
mentioned i n Chapter V of t h i s study, but i f we 
know t h a t newly c r e a t e d p u b l i c o r g a n i s a t i o n s and 
the g r e a t number of companies brought i n t o the 
p u b l i c s e c t o r i n Egypt a f t e r 196l, i t may be 
(20) See Mason, Edward S., Economic planning i n under-
developed a r e a s , New York 1961. 
(21) Mises, Ludwig von, Bureaucracy, Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y 
P r e s s 1944, p.57 
d e s i r a b l e to have a uniform p o l i c y a t l e a s t i n a 
t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d . 
( i i i ) As we have seen from the powers and f u n c t i o n s of 
most of the p u b l i c o r g a n i s a t i o n s } some of them 
have a s e p a r a t e economic e n t i t y w i t h boards of 
management having a degree of d i s c r e t i o n i n 
d e a l i n g w i t h a c t i v i t i e s of t h e i r o r g a n i s a t i o n s * 
THE STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN BRITAIN 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND. 
The aim of t h i s s e c t i o n i s to d e s c r i b e b r i e f l y 
the p r e s e n t s t r u c t u r e of the B r i t i s h p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s . 
T h i s w i l l give us the n e c e s s a r y comparison w i t h the 
Egy p t i a n p u b l i c s e c t o r . 
I t i s t r u e t h a t the s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n i n economic 
a c t i v i t i e s i s to be found not only on the under-developed 
c o u n t r i e s , but a l s o i n the advanced c o u n t r i e s of the West. 
I f we take the United S t a t e s as an example of 
developed c o u n t r i e s we see t h a t a t the end of the second 
World War, the F e d e r a l Government had owned a v a r i e t y of 
i n d u s t r i a l p r o p e r t i e s . I t a l s o from time to time under-
tak e s p u b l i c p r o j e c t s . The most s t r i k i n g example i n the 
United S t a t e s i s the Tennessee V a l l e y A u t h o r i t y . Other 
Western C o u n t r i e s b r i n g many examples such a s , I . R . I , i n 
I t a l y , ( S a l z g i t t e r ) , i n the F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c of Germany 
and many examples i n F r a n c e . 
Both i n developed and under-developed c o u n t r i e s , 
the Government's r o l e i s based on a n a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e 
w i t h the need f o r planned and r a p i d development. Types 
of i n d u s t r i e s which a r e agreed to be under p u b l i c 
ownership are c l a s s i f i e d as i n d u s t r i e s of b a s i c and 
s t r a t e g i c importance, secondly, i n d u s t r i e s of the nat u r e 
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of p u b l i c u t i l i t y s e r v i c e s or, t h i r d l y , i n d u s t r i e s which 
a r e e s s e n t i a l and r e q u i r e investment on a s c a l e which only 
the S t a t e could p r o v i d e . Many Governments have gone i n t o 
f i e l d s , which could not have been e x p l o i t e d by p r i v a t e 
e n t e r p r i s e . I t may be claimed t h a t i t i s d i f f i c u l t to say 
what i s e s s e n t i a l or what i s of b a s i c s t r a t e g i c importance, 
and many i n d u s t r i e s a r e e s s e n t i a l f o r the n a t i o n a l economy. 
Al s o many i n d u s t r i e s could be of h i g h l y s t r a t e g i c importance, 
but p u b l i c u t i l i t i e s a r e c l e a r l y d e f i n e d , e l e c t r i c i t y , gas, 
water supply, and t r a n s p o r t , a r e examples. Great C a p i t a l 
investment can be found i n p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e s , but the 
problem i s t h a t some i n d u s t r i e s must wa i t long enough f o r 
p r o f i t s t o occur, and the r i s k i n v o l v e d i s too gr e a t f o r 
p r i v a t e i n d u s t r i a l i s t s . 
B r i t i s h Government c o n t r o l over some i n d u s t r i e s has 
been a p p l i e d s i n c e the end of the l a s t c e n t u r y . The 
E l e c t r i c i t y Act 1882 l a i d down t h a t e l e c t r i c i t y f r a n c h i s e s 
were to r e v e r t to the l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s a f t e r a p e r i o d of 
twenty-one y e a r s . The High Court a f t e r 1880 r u l e d t h a t 
"telephones were a S t a t e monopoly, the Post O f f i c e s t e a d i l y 
extended i t s telephone s e r v i c e s a t the expense of those run 
by p r i v a t e companies under l i c e n c e , u n t i l i n 1912 a n a t i o n -
wide p u b l i c s e r v i c e had been e s t a b l i s h e d . I n 1908 a 
L i b e r a l Government passed the Act c o n s t i t u t i n g the Great 
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P o r t of London A u t h o r i t y " . (22) 
The demand of n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of the i n d u s t r i e s , 
which are now n a t i o n a l i s e d , had been expressed by the 
Labour P a r t y manifesto i n 1914. ^They p r e s s e d f o r n a t i o n a l 
ownership of the r a i l w a y s and c a n a l s , mines and e l e c t r i c 
power together w i t h the p o s t a l and t e l e g r a p h s e r v i c e s . 
They a l s o demanded the n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of harbours and 
r o a d s . (23) 
During the f i r s t World War the B r i t i s h Government 
c o n t r o l l e d the whole of the b a s i c i n d u s t r i e s , and t h i s 
was s t i m u l a t e d by the Great Depression of 1929-1932. (24) 
I n 19^5 the Labour P a r t y Government c a r r i e d out an 
o v e r a l l , n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n programme. T h i s i n c l u d e d the 
n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of the Bank of England, which had the 
Royal Assent i n February, 1946, and of the C o a l I n d u s t r y 
i n J u l y , 1946. 
I n 1947 E l e c t r i c i t y and T r a n s p o r t were n a t i o n a l i s e d 
and Gas and I r o n and S t e e l had the Royal Assent i n 1948 
and 1949 r e s p e c t i v e l y . I n a d d i t i o n , i t was the i n t e n t i o n 
of the Labour P a r t y to add water supply, a l l m i n e r a l s 
which a r e not a l r e a d y owned by the p u b l i c , meat w h o l e s a l i n g , 
(22) Hanson, A. H. (ed) N a t i o n a l i s a t i o n , A book of r e a d i n g s , 
London 1963 p.11 
(23) Keif-Cohen, R. N a t i o n a l i s a t i o n i n B r i t a i n . 
London 1961 pp 3-4 
(24) Durbin, E.F.M.. Problems of Economic Pla n n i n g 1955 
London 1949 p.58 
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l a r g e - s c a l e c o l d s t o r e s , beet sugar manufacturing and 
r e f i n i n g , cement, i n d u s t r i a l i n s u r a n c e and i f warranted 
by f u r t h e r examination, c e r t l i n s e c t i o n s of the chemical 
i n d u s t r y . Land could a l s o be n a t i o n a l i s e d . As "The 
Government w i l l , as the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t may r e q u i r e , use 
i t s powers to take l a n d i n t o p u b l i c ownership and put i t 
i n charge of the A g r i c u l t u r a l Land Commission f o r expert 
management. (25) 
Prom the above b r i e f h i s t o r y the f o l l o w i n g p o i n t s 
could be n o t i c e d t -
( i ) P u b l i c ownership i n B r i t a i n was known and r e c o g n i s e d 
from the end of the l a s t c e n t u r y . 
( i j l ) I t i s wrong to say t h a t o n l y the Labour P a r t y ' s 
S o c i a l i s t p o l i c y r e q u i r e s the p u b l i c ownerships 
and o p e r a t i o n of the b a s i c i n d u s t r i e s . I n a d d i t i o n 
to the High Court's d e c i s i o n a f t e r 1880, which 
r u l e d t h a t telephones were a S t a t e monopoly and the 
P o r t of London A u t h o r i t y Act 1908 by a L i b e r a l 
Government, C o n s e r v a t i v e Governments between the 
World Wars " s e t up the C e n t r a l E l e c t r i c i t y Board 
( r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the nation-wide d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
e l e c t r i c a l energy through the n a t i o n a l g r i d ) , , the 
(25) Lewis, Ben W, B r i t i s h P l a n n i n g and N a t i o n a l i s a t i o n 
New York 1951 p.42. 
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B r i t i s h B r o a d c a s t i n g Corporation ( w i t h a monopoly of 
b r o a d c a s t i n g s e r v i c e s ) the London Passenger Transp o r t 
Board, (which took over a l l the London Passenger 
Tr a n s p o r t S e r v i c e s p r e v i o u s l y run by m u n i c i p a l i t i e s and 
p r i v a t e Companies), and the B r i t i s h Overseas Airways 
Cor p o r a t i o n (by merger of the two p r i v a t e companies, 
I m p e r i a l Airways and B r i t i s h Airways. (26) 
( i i i ) B r i t i s h S o c i a l i s t ' s n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n programme 
i n c l u d e many i n d u s t r i e s c o n s i s t i n g of a c o n s i d e r a b l e 
p r o p o r t i o n of the n a t i o n a l economy. 
TYPES OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE IN BRITAIN. 
Three p r i n c i p a l forms of o r g a n i s a t i o n are now 
u t i l i s e d f o r the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s . 
These are ( i ) Government Departments, ( i i ) P u b l i c 
C o r p o r a t i o n s , ( i i i ) Mixed Ownership C o r p o r a t i o n s . 
The p u b l i c s e c t o r i n B r i t a i n , not only i n c l u d e s 
these t h r e e types, but a l s o some other p u b l i c bodies 
w i t h p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n s . For example the C o l o n i a l 
Development Corporation, whose main f u n c t i o n i s f i n a n c i n g 
p r i v a t e or mixed e n t e r p r i s e s , a l s o the Marketing Boards 
which r e g u l a t e these e n t e r p r i s e s . But the most important 
f e a t u r e of B r i t i s h p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e i s the p u b l i c 
c o r p o r a t i o n , which governs mainly the n a t i o n a l i s e d 
(26) Hanson, A.H. (ed) Op.Cit pp 11-12 
i n d u s t r i e s * Government departments and mixed ownership 
c o r p o r a t i o n have not the same importance i n B r i t a i n * 
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT. 
The c h i e f example of the Government department, 
i n B r i t a i n , i s the Post O f f i c e . I t s c o n t r o l i s e x e r c i s e d 
by a M i n i s t e r , (The Postmaster General),, by permanent 
o f f i c i a l s r e s p o n s i b l e to him and by the T r e a s u r y . The 
M i n i s t e r i s f u l l y r e s p o n s i b l e to the House of Commons 
f o r the department's a c t i v i t i e s . I n f i n a n c i a l matters 
and i t s a l l i e d s u b j e c t s , the department i s r e s p o n s i b l e 
to the T r e a s u r y . 
Following the r e p o r t of the Bridgeman Committee 
i n 1932 some important changes has been taken i n the 
department's i n t e r n a l management. The Committee 
int r o d u c e d a Board of s e n i o r c i v i l s e r v a n t s to modify 
management by the s e c r e t a r i a t . The s e r v i c e was d i v i d e d 
i n t o r e g i o n s which were given a l i m i t e d autonomy, and 
other changes were made i n the system of accounting and 
i n the form of t r e a s u r y c o n t r o l . (27) The 1961 Post 
O f f i c e Act, gave much g r e a t e r freedom of commercial 
o p e r a t i o n * Under t h i s Act the Post O f f i c e i s no longer 
r e q u i r e d to get s p e c i f i c p a r l i a m e n t a r y s a n c t i o n and 
T r e a s u r y approval f o r a l l e x p e n d i t u r e s . (28) 
(27) Clegg, H.A. I n d u s t r i a l Democracy and N a t i o n a l i s a t i o n 
Oxford 1951 p.38 
(28) Dow, J.C.R. The Management of the B r i t i s h Economy 
1945-60 Cambridge 1964 p.2l6 
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There a r e a l s o some i n d u s t r i a l undertakings run 
by Government departments* such as the Royal Ordinance 
F a c t o r i e s and the A d m i r a l i t y Dockyards* They belong to 
the M i n i s t r y of A v i a t i o n and the A d m i r a l i t y . They have a 
g r e a t e r autonomy i n o p e r a t i o n a l management than most other 
s e c t i o n s of Government departments. (29) 
MIXED OWNERSHIP* 
The B r i t i s h Government has not chosen the mixed 
ownership method to extend the p u b l i c s e c t o r , i . e . by 
t a k i n g up shares i n e n t e r p r i s e s organised as l i m i t e d 
companies. There a r e some examples, such as the B r i t i s h 
Petroleum Company L t d . , The Manchester Ship C a n a l , and 
The A g r i c u l t u r a l Mortgage Cor p o r a t i o n . The purpose of 
the l a t t e r example i s to grant long term loans a g a i n s t 
mortgages of a g r i c u l t u r a l l a n d and b u i l d i n g s i n England 
and Wales, e i t h e r to f a c i l i t a t e farm purchase or to 
f i n a n c e improvements i n farm b u i l d i n g s , e l e c t r i c i t y and 
water s u p p l i e s , drainage and equipment. The funds of 
the Corporation c o n s i s t p a r t l y of C a p i t a l s u b s i d i s e d by 
v a r i o u s banks and p a r t l y of money r a i s e d on l o a n from 
the Government. The Deputy Chairman i s nominated by the 
T r e a s u r y and two other d i r e c t o r s (out of a t o t a l of e i g h t ) 
a r e nominated by the M i n i s t e r of A g r i c u l t u r e . (30) 
(29) Hanson, A.H» Op.Cit p.12 
(30) Robson, N.A. N a t i o n a l i s e d I n d u s t r y and P u b l i c 
Ownership, London, 1962. p.26-27* 
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THE PUBLIC CORPORATION» 
The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f e a t u r e of p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s 
i n B r i t a i n i s t h a t most of them a r e managed by p u b l i c 
c o r p o r a t i o n s . I t i s claimed t h a t i t i s the b e s t medium 
of conducting p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s . 
The c r e a t i o n of the p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n i s 
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h Mr. Herbert Morrison when he s a i d i n h i s 
book " S o c i a l i s a t i o n and Transpo r t i n 1933"» t h a t , "we a r e 
seeking a combination of p u b l i c ownership, p u b l i c 
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y , and b u s i n e s s management f o r p u b l i c ends1.1 (31) 
The p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n may have d i f f e r e n t v e r s i o n s or 
d i f f e r e n t names. These d i f f e r e n c e s depend much upon the 
circ u m s t a n c e s of i t s c r e a t i o n , the nature of i t s work, 
i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n , methods of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and i t s 
i n t e r n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n . P u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n s a l s o are 
d i f f e r e n t i n the extent of t h e i r monopoly power. 
Examples could be c l e a r l y seen i n the v a r i o u s p u b l i c 
c o r p o r a t i o n s managing the B r i t i s h N a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s . 
The N a t i o n a l C o a l Board, the Airways C o r p o r a t i o n s and t&e 
Tr a n s p o r t Commission have g r e a t e r powers w i t h i n t h e i r 
i n d u s t r i e s than the Gas C o u n c i l and the E l e c t r i c i t y 
C o u n c i l . The Gas C o u n c i l i s , f o r i n s t a n c e , a f e d e r a l 
body. On the other hand, w h i l s t the Area E l e c t r i c i t y 
(31) Morrison, H. S o c i a l i s a t i o n and T r a n s p o r t , London 1933 
p. 149 
Boards and Gas Boards have a g r e a t e r degree of autonomy, 
the D i v i s i o n a l C o a l Boards are c r e a t i o n s of the Coal 
Board, and the T r a n s p o r t E x e c u t i v e s , though they a r e 
appointed by the M i n i s t e r , have no powers except those 
granted by the o l d Transport Commission. D i f f e r e n t 
names of the p u b l i c Corporations were given to them as 
Board, C o u n c i l , A u t h o r i t y , Commission or C o r p o r a t i o n . 
There i s no r e a s o n given why these names are d i f f e r e n t . 
D e spite the f a c t of these d i f f e r e n c e s the p u b l i c 
c o r p o r a t i o n has s p e c i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . These a r e : -
( i ) I t i s a p u b l i c ownership, but i t d i f f e r s from 
the Government Department i n the sense t h a t i t 
has the g r e a t e s t advantage of being f r e e from 
d e t a i l e d departmental and p a r l i a m e n t a r y c o n t r o l . ( 3 2 ) 
( i i ) I t i s not c o n t r o l l e d by the m i n i s t e r i a l r o u t i n e 
or by o r d i n a r y company law, but i t i s c r e a t e d by 
a s p e c i a l Act and managed by i t s r e g u l a t i o n s . 
( i i i ) These Acts intended to g i v e the C o r p o r a t i o n a 
b u s i n e s s f l e x i b i l i t y by c o n s i d e r i n g the Corporation 
as a s e p a r a t e l e g a l e n t i t y which can sue or be sued. 
I t can enter c o n t r a c t s and a c q u i r e property i n i t s 
own r i g h t . 
(32) Clegg, H.A. Op.Cit p.42 
( i v ) The p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n i s an independently-
f i n a n c e d body. I t can o b t a i n i t s funds by 
borrowing e i t h e r from the T r e a s u r y or from 
the p u b l i c and d e r i v i n g i t s revenue from the 
s a l e of i t s goods and s e r v i c e s . ( 3 3 ) 
( v ) Employees or workers are not C i v i l S e r v a n t s . 
They are r e c r u i t e d and remunerated on terms 
and c o n d i t i o n s which the p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n 
determines. F i n a l l y , the B r i t i s h p u b l i c 
c o r p o r a t i o n has a complete autonomy i n 
concluding i t s day-to-day a f f a i r s , and i t i s 
expected to behave commercially i n v e r y much 
the same way as a p r i v a t e company. T h i s , of 
course, i s a c o n t r o v e r c i a l i s s u e , as i t w i l l 
be d i s c u s s e d below.(34), but e x t e r n a l p o l i c y 
i s p r a c t i c a l l y under a wide s u p e r v i s i o n from 
the M i n i s t e r concerned. Every i n d u s t r y or 
group of i n d u s t r i e s a r e s u p e r v i s e d by a M i n i s t e r . 
For example, the M i n i s t e r of T r a n s p o r t s u p e r v i s e s 
the t r a n s p o r t i n d u s t r y , the M i n i s t e r of A v i a t i o n 
s u p e r v i s e s C i v i l Airways, and the M i n i s t e r of 
f u e l and power s u p e r v i s e s c o a l , gas and e l e c t r i c i t y . 
(33) T h i s has been changed c o n s i d e r a b l y , See Page 247 
(34) See Page 140 
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NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES IN BRITAIN. 
To complete the p i c t u r e of p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s 
i n B r i t a i n t h e r e should be a r e f e r e n c e to the s t r u c t u r e 
of some of the n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s , because of 
t h e i r major economic importance* More d e t a i l s w i l l be 
given about the E l e c t r i c i t y Supply I n d u s t r y * 
1. THE BANK OF ENGLAND. 
The Bank of England i s an a n c i e n t c h a r t e r e d 
c o r p o r a t i o n * I t has a p o s i t i o n of g r e a t power and 
importance, and engaged i n c l o s e and fr e q u e n t r e l a t i o n 
w i t h the T r e a s u r y and the C h a n c e l l o r of the Exchequer* 
The c o n s t i t u t i o n of the Bank's Board of D i r e c t o r s 
and t h e i r appointment i s d i f f e r e n t from most of the 
N a t i o n a l i s e d I n d u s t r i e s * The Board c o n s i s t s of a 
Governor, Deputy Governor and s i x t e e n d i r e c t o r s , 
appointed by the Crown. I n p r a c t i c e the appointment 
i s made by the C h a n c e l l o r of the Exchequer. The main 
f u n c t i o n s of the Bank a r e , managing the n a t i o n a l debt, 
and d i r e c t i n g the Government f i n a n c e and i t s r e l a t i o n 
w i t h the money market. I t i s s u e s notes f o r the 
T r e a s u r y . I t i s the Government's main t o o l of 
c o n t r o l l i n g employment p o l i c y . T h i s i s emphasised 
by an e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l of currency and c r e d i t . 
F u r t h e r i t a c t s as a banker of the Commercial Banks. 
THE COAL INDUSTRY. 
The C o a l I n d u s t r y has a long h i s t o r y of s t a t e 
i n t e r v e n t i o n . L e g i s l a t i o n s were put down to safeguard 
l i v e s , h e a l t h and w e l l being of the miners, to prevent 
women and c h i l d r e n from working underground and to 
l i m i t the working hours of men i n the p i t s . D e s p i t e 
s t a t e l e g i s l a t i o n s , the Coal i n d u s t r y was i n a 
desperate p o s i t i o n . There was always an acute 
shortage of investment, t e c h n i c a l a b i l i t y and poor 
management. N a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of c o a l i n 1946 was a 
n e c e s s i t y f o r these reasons and the r e - o r g a n i s a t i o n 
of the i n d u s t r y i n t o l a r g e r u n i t s which would enjoy 
the b e n e f i t s of l a r g e s c a l e p roduction. Thus a f t e r 
n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n s p e c i a l Committees were appointed to 
choose the best form of o r g a n i s a t i o n and management 
of the i n d u s t r y . 
At p r e s e n t the i n d u s t r y i s organised and managed 
by f i v e l e v e l s of management. These a r e i -
The N a t i o n a l Coal Board ( a s h e a d q u a r t e r s ) , D i v i s i o n a l 
Boards, Area, Group and C o l l i e r y . The o r i g i n a l 
N a t i o n a l Board - from 1947 - 51 - c o n s i s t e d of a 
Chairman, a Deputy Chairman, and seven other whole-
time members. The Second Board 1951 - 55 - f o l l o w i n g 
the Coal I n d u s t r y Act 1949 i n c r e a s e d the maximum s i z e 
of the Board to twelve members I n s t e a d of n i n e , 
provided t h a t not more than e i g h t should be f u l l - t i m e . 
I n 1953 the F l e c k Committee was appointed to r e p o r t on 
the o r g a n i s a t i o n of the i n d u s t r y . I n accordance w i t h 
the F l e c k recommendations the t h i r d Coal Board c o n s i s t e d 
of the Chairman, Deputy Chairman, s i x f u l l - t i m e members 
and four part-time members w i t h a t o t a l of twelve.(35) 
The main f u n c t i o n of the N a t i o n a l Board i s to give 
g e n e r a l d i r e c t i o n s to other l e v e l s i n the i n d u s t r y . 
D i v i s i o n s a r e run by d i v i s i o n a l boards; Areas, Groups, 
and C o l l i e r i e s a r e managed by g e n e r a l managers. 
The maintenance of the i n d u s t r y i s c a r r i e d out 
by s p e c i a l i s e d departments; these a r e Production, 
Marketing, C a r b o n i z a t i o n , Purchasing and S t o r e s , 
I n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , S t a f f , S c i e n t i f i c , Medical 
S e r v i c e s , F i n ance, R e c o n s t r u c t i o n , S e c r e t a r i e s and 
L e g a l . I t i s not n e c e s s a r y to f i n d a l l these 
departments a t each l e v e l of management. 
THE GAS INDUSTRY. 
The gas supply i n d u s t r y p r i o r to n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n 
c o n s i s t e d of a g r e a t number of mun i c i p a l undertakings 
and commercial companies. There were i n 19^8 some 680 
s t a t u t o r y undertakings, about t w o - f i f t h s belonging to 
(35) Report of the Advisory Committee on O r g a n i s a t i o n , 
N a t i o n a l C o a l Board Feb. 1955. p a r a . 67 
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l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s and t h r e e - f i f t h s tinder p r i v a t e 
ownership, i n a d d i t i o n to a number of s m a l l non-
s t a t u t o r y companies. T h i s r e s u l t e d i n the i n e f f i c i e n c y 
of the i n d u s t r y as a p u b l i c u t i l i t y . The forms of 
o r g a n i s a t i o n were not s u i t e d to the p r e v a i l i n g 
c o n d i t i o n s and l e s s l i k e l y to meet the needs of the 
f u t u r e . The proper s o l u t i o n to overcome t h i s d i f f i c u l t y 
was to organise the i n d u s t r y under one n a t i o n a l under-
t a k i n g . The n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of the gas i n d u s t r y i n 
1948 came to achieve t h i s aim. The Act provided a 
s t r u c t u r e of twelve Area Boards and a c e n t r a l Gas 
C o u n c i l . The Area Board c o n s i s t e d of a Chairman, 
Deputy Chairman and from f i v e to seven members. They 
are appointed by the M i n i s t e r and chosen as persons 
appearing to him to be q u a l i f i e d as having had experience 
of and shown a b i l i t y i n gas supply, l o c a l government, 
i n d u s t r i a l , commercial and f i n a n c i a l matters, a p p l i e d 
s c i e n c e , a d m i n i s t r a t i o n or the o r g a n i s a t i o n of workers. 
The f u n c t i o n s of an Area Board are to manufacture 
and a c q u i r e gas i n bulk and to maintain an e f f i c i e n t and 
economical system of supplying gas f o r i t s a r e a . The 
Area Board has to s a t i s f y as f a r as i t i s economical 
a l l r easonable demands w i t h i n i t s a r e a . An Area Board 
can a l s o develop and m a i n t a i n e f f i c i e n t methods of 
hi 
r e c o v e r i n g by-products i n c l u d i n g coke and s e l l i n g 
them, as w e l l as p r o v i d i n g gas f i t t i n g s f o r h i r e . 
The Area Gas Board i s t r e a t e d as a sepa r a t e 
f i n a n c i a l and managerial e n t i t y . ( 3 6 ) The Gas C o u n c i l 
i s v e r y l a r g e l y a f e d e r a l body. I t i s composed of 
the Chairmen of the twelve Area Boards. The C o u n c i l 
a c t s g e n e r a l l y as the a d v i s o r of the M i n i s t e r i n 
ques t i o n s a f f e c t i n g the gas i n d u s t r y . I t i s i t s 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to n e g o t i a t e w i t h trade unions i n 
labour a f f a i r s . I t i s a l s o the c e n t r a l f i n a n c i a l 
body. The C o u n c i l can a c t on b e h a l f of some of the 
Areas w i t h the consent of the Boards concerned, and 
i n t e r f e r e w i t h the a f f a i r s of any board which f a i l s 
to meet i t s commitments. 
TRANSPORT. 
Transport i n B r i t a i n has a l s o a long h i s t o r y 
of S t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n . Under the 1921 Act the r a i l w a y 
companies were amalgamated i n t o four main l i n e s . The 
Road T r a f f i c Act of 1930 r e g u l a t e d motorbus and motor-
coach s e r v i c e s , and the Road Haulage i n d u s t r y was 
brought under S t a t e r e g u l a t i o n i n 1933« The London 
(36) I t w i l l be shown l a t e r i n the study t h a t Areas 
Gas Boards enjoy much freedom i n d e a l i n g w i t h 
t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s than most of other B r i t i s h 
n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s . 
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Passenger Transport Board was e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1933 to 
c o - o r d i n a t e t r a n s p o r t f a c i l i t i e s i n the London r e g i o n . 
During most of the Second War the r a i l w a y s were operated 
under the s u p e r v i s i o n of the M i n i s t e r of War T r a n s p o r t 
a c t i n g through a r a i l w a y e x e c u t i v e committee. 
The n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of t r a n s p o r t was i n t r o d u c e d 
by the 1947 Act which t r a n s f e r r e d most of the t r a n s p o r t 
system to p u b l i c ownership. T h i s comprised r a i l w a y s , 
long d i s t a n c e road haulage i n d u s t r y , passenger road 
s e r v i c e s , c a n a l s and i n l a n d waterways and the London 
Passenger Transp o r t Board. The Tra n s p o r t Act, however, 
provided two types of o r g a n i s a t i o n : -
( i ) The B r i t i s h T r a n s p o r t Commission, w i t h a l l a s s e t s 
a c q u i r e d v e s t e d i n i t . " I t s g e n e r a l duty was to 
provide or s e r v i c e or promote the p r o v i s i o n of 
an e f f i c i e n t , adequate economical and i n t e g r a t e d 
system of p u b l i c i n l a n d t r a n s p o r t and port 
f a c i l i t i e s i n Great B r i t a i n , f o r passengers and 
goods w i t h due r e g a r d to s a f e t y of operation.(37) 
( i i ) The a c t u a l management of the s e v e r a l t r a n s p o r t 
s e r v i c e s was p l a c e d , by the Act, i n the hands 
of f i v e B x e c u t i v e s . These were R a i l w a y s , the 
(37) Clegg, H.A., and C h e s t e r , T.E. The f u t u r e of 
N a t i o n a l i s a t i o n , Oxford 1953» p.92. 
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the Docks and I n l a n d Waterways, the Road Tr a n s p o r t , the 
London Transpo r t and Hotels E x e c u t i v e s . Each c o n s i s t e d 
of f o u r to e i g h t members. I n f a c t i t was l e f t f o r the 
M i n i s t e r to f i x the number and names of the E x e c u t i v e s 
a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the Commission, but the Act 
s t a t e d t h a t u n l e s s the M i n i s t e r makes d i f f e r e n t p r o v i s i o n 
t h e r e must be E x e c u t i v e s f o r the r a i l w a y s , docks and 
i n l a n d waterways, road t r a n s p o r t , London Transpo r t and 
h o t e l s . (38) 
An important change i n the s t r u c t u r e of Transport 
i n B r i t a i n has been introduced i n the 1953 Act. The 
c o n s t i t u t i o n of the Transpor t Commission had to be 
i n c r e a s e d from n i n e to f i f t e e n members, two of whom 
must be appointed a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the S e c r e t a r y 
of S t a t e f o r S c o t l a n d . Also the d u t i e s of the Commission 
were s u b s t a n t i a l l y changed. I n s t e a d of p r o v i d i n g an 
adequate, economical and p r o p e r l y i n t e g r a t e d system of 
i n l a n d t r a n s p o r t and port f a c i l i t i e s , they had to 
provide r a i l w a y s e r v i c e s , a co-o r d i n a t e d passenger 
t r a n s p o r t system f o r London and such other t r a n s p o r t 
s e r v i c e s and c a n a l f a c i l i t i e s as the Commission c o n s i d e r e d 
expedient and port f a c i l i t i e s . (39) 
(38) T r a n s p o r t Act, 1947 P a r t ( I ) S e c t i o n 5 ( 3 ) . 
( 39) P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ; The Tr a n s p o r t Act 1'953 V o l . 31 
1953 p.401. 
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The other main f e a t u r e i n the 1953 Act was the 
p r o v i s i o n f o r and r e - o r g a n i s a t i o n of the r a i l w a y s * A 
scheme had to be prepared by the Commission which 
should i n c l u d e : -
( a ) the a b o l i t i o n ( i f i t has not a l r e a d y been 
a b o l i s h e d ) of the Ra i l w a y E x e c u t i v e , 
(b) the s e t t i n g up, f o r such a r e a s as may be 
s p e c i f i e d by or under the scheme of such 
a u t h o r i t i e s as may be so s p e c i f i e d . 
( c ) the d e l e g a t i o n to those a u t h o r i t i e s of such 
f u n c t i o n s of the Commission r e l a t i n g to t h a t 
p a r t of t h e i r undertaking as may be so 
s p e c i f i e d i n r e l a t i o n to these a u t h o r i t i e s 
r e s p e c t i v e l y and 
(d) the c o m p i l a t i o n and p u b l i c a t i o n as r e s p e c t s 
each of those a r e a s of such statements of 
oper a t i n g c o s t s and such s t a t i s t i c s as may be 
so s p e c i f i e d . ( 4 0 ) 
The main re a s o n f o r t h i s r a d i c a l change i n the 
o r g a n i s a t i o n of r a i l w a y s was t h a t i t had been much 
c r i t i c i s e d as o v e r - c e n t r a l i s e d . However, the Railway 
E x e c u t i v e was a b o l i s h e d and Area Boards were appointed 
by the Commission. P o l i c y and management f u n c t i o n s 
(40) The T r a n s p o r t Act 1953 Sec. l 6 . 
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were delegated to them under the scheme e x p l a i n e d above* 
The Government i n the 1960 "White Paper" found 
t h a t the a c t i v i t i e s of the B.T.C. were so l a r g e and 
d i v e r s e t h a t i t was im p o s s i b l e to run them e f f e c t i v e l y 
as a s i n g l e u n d e r t a k i n g . ( 4 l ) Thus the Government decided 
to r e p l a c e the B r i t i s h T ransport Commission and the 
e x i s t i n g o r g a n i s a t i o n by a new s t r u c t u r e designed to 
overcome the main d e f i c i t s and disadvantages of t$fe 
p r e s e n t o r g a n i s a t i o n . ( 4 2 ) 
Under the 1962 Transport Act the B.T.C. was 
d i s s o l v e d and r e p l a c e d by f i v e s t a t u t o r y bodies, four 
s e p a r a t e boards, each r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a s i n g l e p r i n c i p a l 
a c t i v i t y - r a i l w a y s , London Tr a n s p o r t , docks and i n l a n d 
waterways - and a Transport Holding Company f o r the 
remaining a c t i v i t i e s of the Commission's undertakings•( 4 3 ) 
Each Board and the Holding Company i s made 
d i r e c t l y r e s p o n s i b l e to the M i n i s t e r of T r a n s p o r t . The 
M i n i s t e r appoints the Chairman of each Board and a l s o 
the members a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the Chairman. 
With r e g a r d to the r a i l w a y s the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
i s p l a c e d i n the hands of the R a i l w a y s Board and s i x 
Re g i o n a l Boards to which the R a i l w a y s Board d e l e g a t e s 
(.41) R e - o r g a n i s a t i o n of the n a t i o n a l i s e d t r a n s p o r t Cmnd. 
1248 1960, pa r a . 9 . 
(42) l b . i d . para 2 . 
(43) T r a n s p o r t Act 1962 P a r t ( l ) S e c t i o n s 1 and 2 . 
c e r t a i n f u n c t i o n s of management* 
Ownership and management of other undertakings 
are e x e r c i s e d by the r e s p e c t i v e Boards* 
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CONCLUSION > 
I t may be seen from the h i s t o r y of p u b l i c 
e n t e r p r i s e s i n Egypt and B r i t a i n t h a t Government 
e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l over e s s e n t i a l i n d u s t r i e s i n Egypt 
i s as r e c e n t as 1956 and mass n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n took 
p l a c e i n 196l only. I n B r i t a i n Government l e g i s l a t i o n 
on e s s e n t i a l i n d u s t r i e s was e f f e c t i v e l y l a i d down much 
e a r l i e r than i n the Egyptian c a s e . 
I t i s only i n Egypt t h a t some of the p u b l i c 
e n t e r p r i s e s were owned,before n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n , by 
f o r e i g n companies. The c h i e f examples are the Suez 
Canal A u t h o r i t y and a great number of commercial banks 
and i n s u r a n c e companies. 
However, the main re a s o n s f o r n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n 
of some e n t e r p r i s e s i n both c o u n t r i e s were v e r y s i m i l a r . 
I t i s claimed i n both c o u n t r i e s t h a t the pr e s e n t p u b l i c 
e n t e r p r i s e s were f o r m e r l y i n a d i f f i c u l t f i n a n c i a l 
s i t u a t i o n and run by bad management. Under the pr e s e n t 
s t r u c t u r e of p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s i n both c o u n t r i e s the 
f o l l o w i n g p o i n t s could be noted r-
( l ) The s t r u c t u r e of some Egyptian p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s 
i s to a great extent s i m i l a r to the s t r u c t u r e of 
the B r i t i s h p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n s . Examples are 
the S t a t e R a i l w a y s , the Government r e f i n e r y a t 
Suez and the E.B.O. 
(2) I n some E g y p t i a n p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s t h e r e i s a 
s t a t u t o r y r e l a t i o n s h i p between the e n t e r p r i s e 
and the P r e s i d e n t of the R e p u b l i c . I n B r i t a i n 
s i m i l a r c a s e s are found i n the Bank of England 
and the B.B.C- I n each case the Crown appoints 
the members of the Boards. I n p r a c t i c e i t may 
be s a i d t h a t w h i l e i n B r i t a i n M i n i s t e r s concerned 
appoint the members, i n Egypt i t i s l i k e l y t h a t 
the P r e s i d e n t of the R e p u b l i c has a p e r s o n a l say 
i n these appointments. 
(3) The number of p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s i n Egypt i s 
much g r e a t e r than i n B r i t a i n . T h i s i s probably 
due to the i n e f f e c t i v e r o l e of p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e 
i n Egypt i n the n a t i o n a l development. I n a d d i t i o n 
i t i s r e c o g n i s e d t h a t i n a developing country the 
Government should p a r t i c i p a t e a g r e a t d e a l i n 
e s t a b l i s h i n g and conducting many e n t e r p r i s e s 
which i n B r i t a i n could s u c c e s s f u l l y be managed 
by p r i v a t e e n t r e p r e n e u r s . 
L a s t l y , i t has been shown t h a t t h e r e a r e few 
examples of B r i t i s h p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s d e a l i n g w i t h 
f i n a n c e , such as the C o l o n i a l Development O r g a n i s a t i o n 
and the Bank of England. I n Egypt the whole f i n a n c i a l 
system, i . e . Commercial Banks and I n s u r a n c e Companies, 
are owned and operated by p u b l i c o r g a n i s a t i o n s . 
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THE STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY 
A. comparative study between the p r e s e n t s t r u c t u r e 
of the i n d u s t r y i n B r i t a i n and the United Arab 
R e p u b l i c . 
BACKGROUND. 
From the e a r l y days of u s i n g e l e c t r i c i t y both 
governments r e c o g n i s e d t h a t e l e c t r i c i t y had a g r e a t roUe 
to p l a y as a form of power and t h a t i t should be under 
S t a t e c o n t r o l . 
I n B r i t a i n , P a r l iament had f i r s t attempted i n 
1882 to r e g u l a t e the i n d u s t r y . The 1882 Act gave the 
companies f r a n c h i s e s f o r twenty-one y e a r s , a t the end 
of which the l o c a l a u t h o r i t y could buy them out on 
f a v o u r a b l e terms. The 1889 Act lengthened the p e r i o d 
to forty-two y e a r s , because twenty-one y e a r s proved 
too s h o r t . 
As a r e s u l t of the F i r s t World War, i t wa» c l e a r 
t h a t the i n d u s t r y needed an urgent r e - o r g a n i s a t i o n . Thus 
the i n d u s t r y was i n v e s t i g a t e d from the standpoint of the 
economical use of f u e l s by the Committee on the 
C o n s e r v a t i o n of C o a l (1917)» and the Committee on 
E l e c t r i c a l Trades (1917) and the E l e c t r i c Power Supply 
Committee (1918). The purposes of these committees were 
to c o n s i d e r and r e p o r t the n e c e s s a r y s t e p s to be taken 
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to ensure an adequate and economical supply of 
e l e c t r i c i t y to v a r i o u s c l a s s e s of consumers. The 
f i r s t step of c o n t r o l l i n g the i n d u s t r y by a 
c o - o r d i n a t i o n of s i x hundred s e p a r a t e monopolies was 
the e s t a b l i s h i n g of the E l e c t r i c i t y Commission \n 
1919t i t was a c e n t r a l body which c o n s i s t e d of 
t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t s . I t s main f u n c t i o n was to regi t e 
and s u p e r v i s e the e l e c t r i c i t y i n d u s t r y . The comm ion 
found t h a t p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e and m u n i c i p a l undert i g s 
were v e r y d i f f i c u l t to persuade i n t o j o i n t schemes. 
Then the Weir Committee of 1926 was appointed to 
i n v e s t i g a t e the s i t u a t i o n of the i n d u s t r y , i t s 
recommendations were embodied i n the E l e c t r i c i t y 
Supply Act 1926. F o l l o w i n g t h i s Act the C e n t r a l 
E l e c t r i c i t y Board came i n t o being i n 1927* The main 
purpose of the Board was the e s t a b l i s h i n g of the 
G r i d i . e . the i n t e r c o n n e c t i n g of the s t a t i o n s to 
generate e l e c t r i c i t y a t a standard frequency. Although 
ownership and management of g e n e r a t i n g s t a t i o n s remained 
w i t h l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s and the companies concerned, the 
main f u n c t i o n s of the Board were to c o n t r o l production, 
purchase the a u t h o r i t i e s output and s e l l i t to the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n a u t h o r i t i e s . The Board a l s o planned the 
development of the system i n co-operation w i t h the 
undertakings and gave t e c h n i c a l approval to the power 
s t a t i o n p r o j e c t s planned by the a u t h o r i s e d companies. 
The main d i f f i c u l t y of the Board's power was t h a t the 
l a c k of c o n t r o l over the r e t a i l d i s t r i b u t i o n r e s u l t e d 
from the e x i s t e n c e of v a r i o u s other a u t h o r i t i e s whose 
f u n c t i o n s overlapped w i t h those of the Board. The need 
f o r improvement of t h i s anomalous p o s i t i o n was 
c onsidered by the McGowan Committee E l e c t r i c i t y 
D i s t r i b u t i o n 1936. The Committee recommended the 
adoption of one or other of the f o l l o w i n g a l t e r n a t i v e s : -
(1) Immediate and complete r e - o r g a n i s a t i o n on a 
r e g i o n a l b a s i s under p u b l i c c o n t r o l , by the 
s e t t i n g up of r e g i o n a l boards which would buy 
out a l l the e x i s t i n g u n d e r t a k i n g s . 
(2) The r e t e n t i o n and u t i l i z a t i o n , where p o s s i b l e , 
of the l a r g e r and more e f f i c i e n t of the e x i s t i n g 
u ndertakings, (both p u b l i c a u t h o r i t i e s and 
companies) and the a b s o r p t i o n by such under-
t a k i n g s of the s m a l l e r and l e s s e f f i c i e n t 
u ndertakings.(44) 
I n f a c t , no a c t i o n was taken on t h i s Report (45) 
and so the s i t u a t i o n was not changed u n t i l the 
(44) Report of the Committee on E l e c t r i c i t y 
D i s t r i b u t i o n , May 1936, para.88 
(45) Robson, W.A. Op.Cit p.36. 
n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of the whole i n d u s t r y i n 1947* The 
Act of 1947 s e t up the B r i t i s h E l e c t r i c i t y A u t h o r i t y 
as a n a t i o n a l organ and f o u r t e e n Area Boards. The 
Board of the C e n t r a l A u t h o r i t y composed of twelve 
members. Four of them were Area Boards Chairmen 
s e r v i n g i n r o t a t i o n , three being drawn from o u t s i d e 
the i n d u s t r y , the Chairman of the North of S c o t l a n d 
H y d r o - E l e c t r i c Board, the Chairman and the two Deputy 
Chairman of the A u t h o r i t y and the member r e s p o n s i b l e 
f o r labour r e l a t i o n s and w e l f a r e . The main f u n c t i o n s 
of the B r i t i s h E l e c t r i c i t y A u t h o r i t y s e t out i n the 
Act were to maintain an e f f i c i e n t , co-ordinated and 
economical system of e l e c t r i c i t y supply, and by 
p r o v i d i n g bulk s u p p l i e s of e l e c t r i c i t y to Area Boards. 
The A u t h o r i t y had s o l e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the 
g e n e r a t i o n of e l e c t r i c i t y i n the power s t a t i o n s and 
f o r the o p e r a t i o n of the n a t i o n a l G r i d . I n a d d i t i o n 
i t c o n t r o l l e d the g e n e r a l p o l i c y of the whole i n d u s t r y . 
The Act e s t a b l i s h e d f o u r t e e n Area Boards, 
c o v e r i n g England, Wales and the South of S c o t l a n d . Each 
of these Boards c o n s i s t e d of a Chairman and Deputy-
Chairman, who were f u l l - t i m e members and from f i v e to 
seven p a r t - t i m e members, one of w|iom was the Chairman 
of the Area C o n s u l t a t i v e C o u n c i l . The Area Boards were 
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r d i s t r i b u t i o n of e l e c t r i c i t y to v a r i o u s 
consumers i n a r e a s determined by the then M i n i s t e r of 
F u e l and Power. Each area covered something l i k e t h r e e 
of f o u r c o u n t i e s . Because they were l a r g e o r g a n i s a t i o n s 
so Headquarters cou l d only handle g e n e r a l questions of 
p o l i c y . They were d i v i d e d i n t o departments, each headed 
by a c h i e f o f f i c e r . The u s u a l p a t t e r n was:- C h i e f 
Commercial O f f i c e r , C h i e f Engineer, C h i e f Accountant, 
S e c r e t a r y and Purchasing O f f i c e r . Areas were d i v i d e d 
i n t o f i v e or s i x Sub-Areas each under a Sub-Area manager 
which had an o r g a n i s a t i o n more or l e s s s i m i l a r to t h a t 
of the Board i t s e l f . Below Sub-Areas the D i s t r i c t s 
which d i d not n e c e s s a r i l y p o s s e s s a D i s t r i c t Manager. 
I f t h e r e was no D i s t r i c t Manager r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s were 
d i v i d e d between the D i s t r i c t Commercial O f f i c e r and the 
D i s t r i c t Engineer, who can t u r n to the Sub-Area 
O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r guidance. 
Also, f o u r t e e n Generating D i v i s i o n s had been 
e s t a b l i s h e d by the C e n t r a l A u t h o r i t y w i t h i n a r e a s 
corresponding roughly to the a r e a s of the f o u r t e e n 
Area Boards. These D i v i s i o n s , each under the d i r e c t i o n 
of a D i v i s i o n a l C o n t r o l l e r , managed the power s t a t i o n 
and the s e c t i o n of the G r i d which comes w i t h i n t h e i r 
a r e a s . Each D i v i s i o n was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r supplying 
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e l e c t r i c i t y from the power s t a t i o n s and the G r i d ! 
C e n t r e s to the corresponding Area Board f o r d i s t r i b u t i o n * 
The D i v i s i o n s v a r i e d i n s i z e * Each D i v i s i o n a l 
c o n t r o l l e r was a s s i s t e d i n the engineering s i d e by f i v e 
e ngineers r e s p o n s i b l e f o r o p e r a t i o n , c o n s t r u c t i o n , 
t r a n s m i s s i o n , on the t e c h n i c a l matters and system 
o p e r a t i o n . On the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s i d e , he was a s s i s t e d 
by a S e c r e t a r y , Accountant and i n some c a s e s by a 
P u r c h a s i n g O f f i c e r . 
The Act a l s o e s t a b l i s h e d , l i k e other n a t i o n a l i s e d 
i n d u s t r i e s , c o n s u l t a t i v e c o u n c i l s whose main f u n c t i o n 
was t o r e p r e s e n t the i n t e r e s t s of the consumer. 
I n Egypt the e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y was 
r e g u l a t e d by s t a t e r u l e s from the e a r l y days of u s i n g 
i t . L a t e r i n the l a s t c e n t ury e l e c t r i c i t y was s u p p l i e d 
t o c i t i e s and towns mainly by p r i v a t e f o r e i g n companies. 
They were s u b j e c t e d to the r e g u l a t i o n s of the c o n c e s s i o n s 
given to them. The main items of these c o n c e s s i o n s were 
the p e r i o d which the company may s t a y i n the country and 
the a r e a s which would be s u p p l i e d by them. The French 
Lebon Company had the f i r s t c o n c e s s i o n to produce and 
d i s t r i b u t e e l e c t r i c i t y to the v a r i o u s consumers a t 
C a i r o and A l e x a n d r i a i n 1892 and 1893 r e s p e c t i v e l y . By 
1903 seven other settlements possessed power s t a t i o n s and 
c o u l d d i s t r i b u t e e l e c t r i c i t y w i t h i n t h e i r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
boundaries. These were i n c h r o n o l o g i c a l order; Mansura 
1899, Tanta 1901, Suez 1902, I s m a l l i e h 1903 and Port 
S a i d 1903. 
Concessions given to these f o r e i g n companies 
v a r i e d i n t h e i r p e r i o d of o p e r a t i o n . The m a j o r i t y of 
them were taken over by the Government i n the e a r l y 
f i f t i e s , o t h e r s , such as the Lebon Company of A l e x a n d r i a 
was n a t i o n a l i s e d as r e c e n t l y as 1961. The main reason 
given r e g a r d i n g the f i r s t c a s e was the grave s i t u a t i o n s 
of these companies i n running the i n d u s t r y . These 
companies were n e g l e c t i n g the n e c e s s a r y maintenance and 
r e p a i r s of power s t a t i o n s which r e s u l t e d i n the c u t t i n g 
o f f of the c u r r e n t many times. I n a d d i t i o n to the f a c t 
t h a t these companies were avo i d i n g any modernised methods 
i n supplying e l e c t r i c i t y . ( k 6 ) However, these companies 
were handed over to e i t h e r l o c a l m u n i c i p a l i t i e s or 
Government departments. Companies which were not taken 
over had been r e g u l a t e d by s p e c i a l agreements w i t h l o c a l 
a u t h o r i t i e s , p r o v i d i n g f o r the s u p e r v i s i o n by those 
a u t h o r i t i e s . Example of these c a s e s i s the Lebon Company 
i n P o r t S a i d which s u p p l i e d the c i t y under the agreement 
w i t h the l o c a l a u t h o r i t y , which was to be ended a f t e r 
15 y e a r s of o p e r a t i o n . 
46. Abdul A z i z , Ahmed, E l e c t r i f i c a t i o n of Egypt, C a i r o 
1955 p*ge 76 ( i n A r a b i c ) . 
The management of these p u b l i c a u t h o r i t i e s d i d 
not give a s u c c e s s f u l r e s u l t * The scheme developed v e r y 
s l o w l y . The r o u t i n e of the c i v i l s e r v i c e was the main 
d e f i c i e n c y of managing such a commercial b u s i n e s s as the 
a u t h o r i t i e s were c o n s i d e r e d to be branches of the 
M i n i s t r y of P u b l i c Works. 
Because of the desperate s i t u a t i o n of the i n d u s t r y 
economists were s t r o n g l y i n favour of n a t i o n a l i s i n g the 
i n d u s t r y . They put forward the f o l l o w i n g s u g g e s t i o n s : -
F i r s t , the i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n of a l l power s t a t i o n s 
i n the country e i t h e r thermal or h y d r o - e l e c t r i c a l i n t o 
one network. By such i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n the Government 
would be e a s i l y a b l e , through a c e n t r a l body, to t r a n s m i t 
power i n bulk to the m u n i c i p a l i t i e s i n the Governorates' 
C a p i t a l s and other c i t i e s or towns. These m u n i c p a l i t i e s 
i n t u r n could s e l l i n r e t a i l to d i f f e r e n t types of 
consumers• 
Second, a»s the Government would c o n t r o l e l e c t r i c i t y 
g e n e r ation, so they could d i s t r i b u t e power as they t h i n k 
i n the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t . An example was put forward 
whereby a bulk supply t a r i f f would guarantee the standard 
of t a r i f f which s u i t e d the standard of l i v i n g . I t was 
noted t h a t t h e r e were g r e a t d i f f e r e n c e s i n r e t a i l t a r i f f s 
f i x e d by the p r i v a t e e n t r e p r e n u e r s • 
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T h i r d , i t was known t h a t , when ge n e r a t i o n of 
e l e c t r i c i t y was i n p r i v a t e hands, l a r g e i n d u s t r i a l 
companies were o b l i g e d to e s t a b l i s h t h e i r own power 
s t a t i o n s to avo i d the mo n o p o l i s t i c e f f e c t of p r i v a t e 
companies. I t was estimated t h a t some of these 
i n d u s t r i a l f i r m s had been charged w i t h about 20 per 
cent or sometimes 30 per cent of the c a p i t a l to 
c o n s t r u c t a p r i v a t e power s t a t i o n . Thus, i t was 
claimed t h a t n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n would give these 
i n d u s t r i e s the p r i v i l e g e of t a k i n g the power they 
needed from the g e n e r a l network i n reasonable t a r i f f s . ( 4 7 ) 
A f t e r t h i s argument, the Government took a 
p r a c t i c a l s t e p i n c o n t r o l l i n g the i n d u s t r y by 
e s t a b l i s h i n g the E l e c t r i c i t y Commission i n 1954. 
THE ELECTRICITY COMMISSION. 
The E l e c t r i c i t y Commission was e s t a b l i s h e d i n 
1954, as a Government Department a c t i n g as a c e n t r a l 
a u t h o r i t y . Members of the Board, employees and workers 
were c i v i l s e r v a n t s . The Board of the Commission 
c o n s i s t e d of a Chairman and s i x f u l l - t i m e members 
appointed by the M i n i s t e r of P u b l i c Works. T h e i r 
appointment was s u b j e c t to a Cabinet S a n c t i o n . The 
appointment of employees and workers l a y w i t h i n the 
(47) Abdel A z i z , Ahmed. Op.Cit. p.76 
Board's d i s c r e t i o n except the S e c r e t a r y General who 
was appointed by the M i n i s t e r . 
The commission was d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e main 
departments, A d m i n i s t r a t i v e , S e c r e t a r i a l and T e c h n i c a l , 
w i t h each department under a C h i e f O f f i c e r . I n a d d i t i o n , 
the commission had the r i g h t by law to e s t a b l i s h 
r e g i o n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n s anywhere i n the country to 
c a r r y out i t s d u t i e s . I t had a l s o the r i g h t to s e t 
up sub-committees permanent or temporary to a s s i s t 
i n a c t u a t i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . 
The primary f u n c t i o n s of the commission were:-
(1) to d i s t r i b u t e the power i n bulk from a l l power 
s t a t i o n s i n the country, considered as one u n i t , 
to a l l u n d e r t a k i n g s . 
(2) to p l a n the e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n schemes i n Egypt 
and to s u p e r v i s e t h e i r e x e c u t i o n . 
(3) to c o n s t r u c t the g e n e r a l networks and i n t e r c o n n e c t 
both the e x i s t i n g power s t a t i o n s and those to be 
b u i l t throughout the country. 
(k) to examine, c o n t i n u a l l y , the e x i s t i n g power 
s t a t i o n s and to s e l e c t the most economic ones 
to connect w i t h the g e n e r a l networks. 
(5) to approve the a p p l i c a t i o n , from m u n i c i p a l i t i e s 
and p r i v a t e companies, f o r the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of 
59 
new power s t a t i o n s . I t d e f i n e s the c o n d i t i o n s 
which must be followed i n designing any new 
power s t a t i o n and i t has the r i g h t to p r o h i b i t 
any of them being b u i l t u n l e s s these c o n d i t i o n s 
a r e c a r r i e d out. 
(6) to s c r u t i n i z e bulk and r e t a i l t a r i f f s , and to 
study other t a r i f f s made by d i f f e r e n t 
m u n i c i p a l i t i e s before a p p r o v a l • 
(7) to s u p e r v i s e f u e l consumption to ensure economic 
usage of f u e l . 
(8) to s t a t e the t e c h n i c a l requirements f o r 
ge n e r a t i o n t r a n s m i s s i o n and d i s t r i b u t i o n . 
(9) t o s u p e r v i s e the c o n t r a c t e d c o n c e s s i o n s of 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply s t i l l i n e x i s t e n c e . 
(10) to l a y down the c o n d i t i o n s and t e c h n i c a l 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s f o r the es t a b l i s h m e n t and usage 
of any e l e c t r i c equipment i n f a c t o r i e s , houses 
e t c . , i n order to secure the s a f e t y of people 
from e l e c t r i c i t y h a z a r d s . 
(11) With r e s p e c t to h y d r o - e l e c t r i c power p r o j e c t s , 
the Commission had the s o l e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to 
undertake these p r o j e c t s . 
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(12) to apply to the T r e a s u r y f o r i t s c a p i t a l 
programmes, T r e a s u r y Advances or the i s s u e 
of p u b l i c l o a n s * D e t a i l s of these l o a n s 
should be approved by the M i n i s t e r of F i n a n c e 
and Economy and the C a b i n e t . 
As a Government Department, the Commission was 
o b l i g e d to submit i t s budget f o r planned p r o j e c t s and 
other a d m i n i s t r a t i v e expenditure f o r approval by the 
Cabinet and P a r l i a m e n t . L a s t l y the Commission had to 
submit an annual r e p o r t f o r i t s a c t i v i t i e s to the 
M i n i s t e r of P u b l i c Works. 
Egyptian E l e c t r i c i t y Departments w i l l be 
d i s c u s s e d below i n the p r e s e n t s t r u c t u r e because they 
were not r e - o r g a n i s e d . 
THE PRESENT STRUCTURE IN BRITAIN. 
The p r e s e n t s t r u c t u r e of the e l e c t r i c i t y supply 
i n d u s t r y i n both c o u n t r i e s was a r e s u l t of many e n q u i r i e s 
and i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . 
I n B r i t a i n , the Herbert Committee was appointed 
i n 1954, by the M i n i s t e r of F u e l and Power to "enquire 
i n t o the o r g a n i s a t i o n and e f f i c i e n c y of the e l e c t r i c i t y 
supply i n d u s t r y i n England and Wales, and made i t s 
recommendations." These gave use to the E l e c t r i c i t y 
Act 1957 which e s t a b l i s h e d the p r e s e n t o r g a n i s a t i o n * 
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A c c o r d i n g l y the s t a t u t o r y bodies c o n t r o l l i n g the 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y and covering England and 
Wales a r e the E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l , the C e n t r a l 
E l e c t r i c i t y Generating Board and twelve a r e a boards* 
THE ELECTRICITY COUNCIL, 
The E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l c o n s i s t s of the Chairmen 
of the Area Boards, the Chairman of the Generating Board 
and two other members designated by t h a t Board, and i n 
a d d i t i o n independent members who are the Chairman, two 
Deputy Chairmen and one other whole-time member p l u s 
one or two par t - t i m e members* 
The C o u n c i l s e r v e s as a c e n t r a l organ f o r the 
e l e c t r i c i t y i n d u s t r y i n England and Wales w i t h the 
purpose of c o n s u l t a t i o n and f o r m u l a t i o n of the g e n e r a l 
p o l i c y * The main f u n c t i o n s of the C o u n c i l a r e : -
(1) I t i s the a d v i s o r of the M i n i s t e r on a l l matters 
a f f e c t i n g the i n d u s t r y . 
(2) The C o u n c i l a s s i s t s the Generating Board and Area 
Boards i n developing and ma i n t a i n i n g t h e i r 
programmes to ensure an e f f i c i e n t c o - o r d i n a t e d 
and economical system of e l e c t r i c i t y supply. 
(3) I t performs s e r v i c e s f o r , or a c t s on b e h a l f of 
E l e c t r i c i t y Area Boards w i t h r e s p e c t to matters 
of common i n t e r e s t of those Boards. 
(4) I t i s the C o u n c i l ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to e s t a b l i s h 
and m a i n t a i n ; 
( i ) n e g o t i a t i n g machinery f o r s e t t l i n g d i s p u t e s 
and s p e c i f y c o n d i t i o n s of employment throughout 
the i n d u s t r y and 
( i i ) machinery f o r j o i n t c o n s u l t a t i o n , to promote, 
improve and encourage measures a f f e c t i n g the 
s a f e t y , w e l f a r e , education and t r a i n i n g of 
employees i n the i n d u s t r y and to provide f o r 
the d i s c u s s i o n of the matters of mutual 
i n t e r e s t to the C o u n c i l or Boards and t h e i r 
employees* 
(5) to undertake the f i n a n c e of c a p i t a l programmes and 
development, the p u b l i c a t i o n of c o n s o l i d a t e d 
accounts and c a r r y out programmes of r e s e a r c h * 
F i n a l l y , the C o u n c i l has to prepare an annual 
r e p o r t r e v i e w i n g the a c t i v i t i e s and progress of the 
i n d u s t r y as a whole* 
THE CENTRAL ELECTRICITY GENERATING BOARD. 
The Generating Board was c r e a t e d by the 1957 Act, 
I t s main f u n c t i o n of generating and t r a n s m i s s i o n was 
t r a n s f e r r e d by the former B r i t i s h E l e c t r i c i t y A u t h o r i t y , 
The Board c o n s i s t s of a Chairman and not l e s s than 
seven or more than nine members, one or two of the members 
are Deputy Chairmen, a l l appointed by the M i n i s t e r , 
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The Board's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , s t a t e d by the 1957 
Act, i s to develop and m a i n t a i n an e f f i c i e n t c o-ordinated 
and economical system of supply of e l e c t r i c i t y i n bulk 
to the Area Boards* For t h a t purpose the Board has to 
generate or a c q u i r e s u p p l i e s of e l e c t r i c i t y to be 
a c q u i r e d i n t u r n by Area Boards, f o r d i s t r i b u t i o n to 
v a r i o u s consumers i n England and Wales. The Generating 
Board, p l a n s the p r o v i s i o n of new generating and 
t r a n s m i s s i o n p l a n t , and i t i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the 
c o n s t r u c t i o n and o p e r a t i o n of g e n e r a t i n g s t a t i o n s , and 
the main t r a n s m i s s i o n system known as the G r i d . For 
the implementation of such p l a n s , the Board's t e r r i t o r y 
i s d i v i d e d i n t o f i v e o p e r a t i o n a l Regions - North 
E a s t e r n - North Western, Midlands, South E a s t e r n and 
South Western - each r e g i o n being managed by a Regional 
E x e c u t i v e Committee which i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the 
o p e r a t i o n of the power s t a t i o n s and t r a n s m i s s i o n system 
i n t h e i r a r e a s . Four of the f i v e Regions a r e sub-divided 
i n t o D i v i s i o n s each i n charge of an A s s i s t a n t R e g i o n a l 
D i r e c t o r . 
Major c o n s t r u c t i o n p r o j e c t s a r e i n charge of 
four P r o j e c t Groups. Three of these Groups d e a l w i t h 
the c o n s t r u c t i o n of power s t a t i o n s , the f o u r t h w i t h 
t r a n s m i s s i o n problems. The s t r u c t u r e of the Board 
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c o n t a i n s a l s o s p e c i a l committees f o r p a r t i c u l a r 
purposes* For example the S t e e r i n g Committees which 
were e s t a b l i s h e d to r e - i n f o r c e c o - o r d i n a t i o n of 
engineering and s c i e n t i f i c r e s e a r c h e s p e c i a l l y i n the 
n u c l e a r g e n e r a t i o n s t a t i o n s environments. The 
Headquarters T r a n s m i s s i o n Design Branch organised i n t o 
t h ree s e p a r a t e branches i n d i v i d u a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r 
the development of p l a n t design and system design* There 
are a l s o s p e c i a l committees r e s p o n s i b l e for the w e l f a r e , 
s a f e t y and h e a l t h of employees, such as the Medical 
Advisory Committee composed of the f i v e r e g i o n a l medical 
a d v i s o r s and Headquarters medical s p e c i a l i s t s under the 
Chairmanship of the C h i e f P e r s o n n e l O f f i c e r * The 
Committee i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r medical matters of concern 
to the whole of the Board's o r g a n i s a t i o n * ( 4 8 ) 
AREA BOARDS. 
Area E l e c t r i c i t y Boards i n the p r e s e n t s t r u c t u r e 
have been reduced to twelve i n s t e a d of f o u r t e e n . T h i s 
was a r e s u l t of the R e - o r g a n i s a t i o n ( S c o t l a n d ) Act i n 
1954 which a b o l i s h e d two of these Boards s e r v e d the 
South of Scotland* 
(48) C e n t r a l E l e c t r i c i t y Generating Board Annual Report 
and Accounts 1962 - 63 para 328. 
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E i t h e r the Area Boundaries or t h e i r i n t e r n a l 
o r g a n i s a t i o n have remained unchanged s i n c e the i n d u s t r y 
was n a t i o n a l i s e d , but the 1957 Act introduced a number 
of1 new p r o v i s i o n s and c o n f e r r e d a d d i t i o n a l powers and 
d u t i e s to Area Boards* 
The p r e s e n t C o n s t i t u t i o n i s t h a t each of the 
twelve Boards c o n s i s t s of a Chairman and not l e s s than 
f i v e or more than seven other members, i n a d d i t i o n , the 
Chairman of the Area E l e c t r i c i t y C o n s u l t a t i v e C o u n c i l 
i s e x - o f f i c i o a member of the Area Board* The Area 
Boards a r e now r e q u i r e d to purchase bulk s u p p l i e s of 
e l e c t r i c i t y from the Generating Board and c a r r y out the 
e f f i c i e n t d i s t r i b u t i o n . The Area Boards have a l s o had 
s i n c e the 1957 Act the power to generate themselves 
w i t h the approval of the M i n i s t e r . 
THE PRESENT STRUCTURE. IN EGYPT. UP TO MARCH* 1964. 
The s t r u c t u r e of the E l e c t r i c i t y Supply I n d u s t r y 
i n Egypt (up to March, 1964) has been re-shaped s e v e r a l 
times according to changes i n p o l i t i c a l c o n d i t i o n s and 
the s o c i a l i s t laws i n 196l. 
Before 1961, there were t h r e e main a u t h o r i t i e s 
undertaking the supply of e l e c t r i c i t y i n the country. 
These were the E g y p t i a n E l e c t r i c i t y Commission, a number 
of Government Departments and some p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e s . 
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The s o c i a l i s t laws of* 196l a b o l i s h e d completely a l l 
p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e s d e a l i n g w i t h e l e c t r i c i t y . The 
Egyptian E l e c t r i c i t y Commission was r e - o r g a n i s e d under 
the name of U.A..R. E l e c t r i c i t y Commission. Government 
Departments have not been changed. Most of these 
Departments r e l a t e d to the M i n i s t r y of P u b l i c Works, 
oth e r s are branches of d i f f e r e n t M i n i s t r i e s . 
T h i s s i t u a t i o n was s t i l l i n ope r a t i o n u n t i l the 
c r e a t i o n of the M i n i s t r y of E l e c t r i c Power l a t e i n 1964. 
Because of the l a c k of p u b l i s h e d data about the 
new M i n i s t r y our d i s c u s s i o n w i l l be mainly on the 
s t r u c t u r e which was i n e x i s t e n c e f i r s t b efore the 
c r e a t i o n of the M i n i s t r y of e l e c t r i c power. 
Beside the U.A.R. E l e c t r i c i t y Commission which 
served more or l e s s as a c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y , t h e r e are 
f i v e other Government Departments. Namely:-
(1) The C a i r o E l e c t r i c i t y and Gas A d m i n i s t r a t i o n (CEGA) 
(2) The A l e x a n d r i a E l e c t r i c i t y and Gas O r g a n i s a t i o n 
(AEGO) 
(3) The H y d r o - E l e c t r i c Power Department fHEPO> 
(4) The Mechanical and E l e c t r i c a l Department of the 
M i n i s t r y of P u b l i c Works, (MED) 
(5) The Mechanical and E l e c t r i c a l Department of the 
M i n i s t r y of Housing and P u b l i c U t i l i t i e s * 
These a u t h o r i t i e s supply a l l types of loads 
over the country, such as domestic u s e s , i r r i g a t i o n 
and drainage pumping s t a t i o n s , i n d u s t r i a l p l a n t s , 
p u b l i c u t i l i t i e s and t r a c t i o n * 
U.A.R, ELECTRICITY COMMISSION. 
The U.A.R. E l e c t r i c i t y Commission came i n t o 
being i n 1959 a f t e r the r e - o r g a n i s a t i o n of the o l d 
Egy p t i a n E l e c t r i c i t y Commission i n 1954. 
The new Commission was e s t a b l i s h e d , as a 
Government Department by a P r e s i d e n t i a l Decree. The 
Decree appointed the M i n i s t e r of P u b l i c Works as the 
Chairman and having as members t-
(1) D i r e c t o r s of the power producing Departments 
of the M i n i s t r y of P u b l i c Works, the M i n i s t r y 
of Housing and P u b l i c U t i l i t i e s . 
(2) The Deputies of the M i n i s t e r s of P u b l i c Works, 
Tr e a s u r y , Communications, I n d u s t r y and P u b l i c 
U t i l i t i e s . 
(3) The D i r e c t o r of the R a i l w a y s o r g a n i s a t i o n . 
(4) The D i r e c t o r of the E l e c t r i c i t y Department of 
the M i n i s t r y of Pl a n n i n g . 
(5) The l e g a l C o u n c e l l o r of the M i n i s t r y of P u b l i c 
Works• 
(6) The P r e s i d e n t of the O r g a n i s a t i o n of Chemical 
I n d u s t r i e s • 
68 
The new Commission was f a c e d w i t h new d u t i e s 
to c a r r y out i n a d d i t i o n to those s t a t e d i n r e l a t i o n 
to the o l d E g y p t i a n Commission. These d u t i e s were 
n e c e s s a r y because of the growing i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r i n 
the country and the f i r s t f i v e year p l a n . These 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s a r e : -
(1) Planning the e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n and the promotion 
of e l e c t r i c a l energy u t i l i s a t i o n i n the U.A.R» 
(2) Proposing the e l e c t r i c a l p r o j e c t s to be executed 
e i t h e r by the d i f f e r e n t e l e c t r i c i t y a u t h o r i t i e s 
or the new i n d u s t r i a l p u b l i c o r g a n i s a t i o n . 
(3) G i v i n g a d v i c e to the e l e c t r i c a l power o r g a n i s a t i o n s 
concerning the s e l e c t i o n of the b e s t tenders f o r 
the c o n s t r u c t i o n of g e n e r a t i n g s t a t i o n s , 
t r a n s m i s s i o n l i n e s and s u b s t a t i o n s of v o l t a g e 
higher than 66 kv. 
(4) A s s i s t i n g the e l e c t r i c i t y o r g a n i s a t i o n i n 
f i n a n c i n g the new p r o j e c t s of the f i v e y e a r p l a n 
out of i t s budget. 
(5) Studying e l e c t r i c i t y supply t a r i f f s and proposing 
changes. 
(6) C o l l e c t i n g data and i n f o r m a t i o n on e l e c t r i c i t y 
and the p r e p a r a t i o n and study of the accumulated 
s t a t i s t i c s • 
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The Commission i s d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e main 
departments; A d m i n i s t r a t i v e , S e c r e t a r i a t , and T e c h n i c a l * 
The L a t t e r , as i t i s c a l l e d the T e c h n i c a l Bureau, i s 
headed by the S e c r e t a r y General of the Commission, and 
i t i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t e c h n i c a l problems of the i n d u s t r y . 
For example, i t i s e n t r u s t e d a t pre s e n t w i t h the planning 
and execution of the High Voltage i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n system 
and the c o n s t r u c t i o n of some generating s t a t i o n s and 
d i s t r i b u t i o n l i n e s . 
EGYPTIAN ELECTRICITY DEPARTMENTS. 
There are f i v e main Government departments which 
generate and supply e l e c t r i c i t y i n Egypt. I n c o n t r a s t 
w i t h the B r i t i s h E l e c t r i c i t y Area Boards, the f u n c t i o n s 
of each of these Departments a r e wi d e l y d i f f e r e n t . For 
example the C.E.G.A. and the A.E.G.O. supply a l l types 
of consumers i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e a r e a s . But the 
Mechanical and E l e c t r i c a l Department of the M i n i s t r y of 
P u b l i c Works s u p p l i e s only the e l e c t r i f i e d i r r i g a t i o n 
and drainage s t a t i o n s i n the country. 
There are two M i n i s t r i e s w i t h the f u n c t i o n of 
c o n t r o l l i n g the i n d u s t r y . F i r s t , the M i n i s t r y of P u b l i c 
Works and second, the M i n i s t r y of Housing and P u b l i c 
U t i l i t i e s . There i s no evidence of c o - o r d i n a t i o n between 
the two M i n i s t r i e s . However, the former c o n t r o l l e d t h r e e 
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Departments, the C.E»G.A., the M»E..D., and the H.E.P.D* 
and the l a t t e r i s i n charge of the A.E.G.O. and the 
M.E.D. "of the M i n i s t r y of Housing and P u b l i c U t i l i t i e s . " 
The f i r s t t h r e e Departments a r e : -
1. C a i r o E l e c t r i c i t y and Gas A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 
I t i s a Government Department supplying the c i t y 
of C a i r o and some of i t s suburbs i n c l u d i n g the i n d u s t r i a l 
a r e a s a t He1wan and Abu-Zaable. I t i s the l a r g e s t 
e l e c t r i c i t y o r g a n i s a t i o n i n the U.AJR.., s e r v i n g more than 
3.5 m i l l i o n people. O r i g i n a l l y i t was a p r i v a t e company 
owned by the French f i r m Lebon which had s u p p l i e d most 
of C a i r o f o r about 42 y e a r s . The Government took over 
a l l the company's power s t a t i o n s a t the end of 1947 and 
have s i n c e operated the o r g a n i s a t i o n through t h i s 
Department. Under Law No. 145 - 1948 and i t s amendment 
by Laws No. 384 - 1953, and 404 - 1954, the i n t e r n a l 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s and the f u n c t i o n s of the Department were 
l a i d down. (49) The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the Departments 
i s the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the f o l l o w i n g a u t h o r i t i e s . 
(A) The Board which i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r running the 
o r g a n i s a t i o n according to the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
and f i n a n c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n f o l l o w e d by the 
o r d i n a r y Government Departments, except when 
(49) Appendix (6) shows a c h a r t of the O r g a n i s a t i o n a l 
s t r u c t u r e of the CE..G.A.. 
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i t i s s p e c i f i c a l l y w r i t t e n down by i t s 
governing laws* The main f u n c t i o n s of the 
Board a r e : -
( a ) planning f o r supplying e l e c t r i c i t y requirements 
i n the a r e a f o r every f i v e y e a r s ahead* 
(b) the s a n c t i o n of the annual budget e s t i m a t i o n s 
before submission to the M i n i s t e r . 
( c ) the suggestions of pro p e r t y s e q u e s t r a t i o n s f o r 
the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t * 
(d) the f i x i n g of p r i c e s to d i f f e r e n t a u t h o r i t i e s 
and consumers f o r every f i v e y e a r s s u b j e c t to 
any m o d i f i c a t i o n s during t h i s p e r i o d . 
( e ) the c o n t r a c t i n g f o r s e l l i n g and buying 
e l e c t r i c i t y to and from other a u t h o r i t i e s . 
( f ) the s a n c t i o n of other c o n t r a c t s v a l u e d more 
than £E1,000. 
(g) the Board l a y s down the i n t e r n a l l e g i s l a t i o n i n 
the o r g a n i s a t i o n and a l s o a l l matters a f f e c t i n g 
wages and s a l a r i e s of the workers and employees 
i n the o r g a n i s a t i o n * 
(B) General Manager who i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r 
managing the O r g a n i s a t i o n and d e a l i n g w i t h 
many of the day-to-day a f f a i r s * Some of 
these f u n c t i o n s a r e : -
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( a ) the appointment and the e x c e p t i o n a l promotion 
of employees up to a c e r t a i n grade and the 
t r a n s f e r of any of them. 
(b) a l l other problems of employees such as 
h o l i d a y s and punishments* 
( c ) i t i s h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to d e a l w i t h 
commercial and f i n a n c i a l problems not w i t h i n 
the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of the Board. 
(C) Department O f f i c e r s who a s s i s t the General 
Manager i n s u p e r v i s i n g t e c h n i c a l and economic 
problems of the O r g a n i s a t i o n . The CE.G.A* 
a l s o c o n t a i n s t h r e e I n s p e c t o r a t e s , headed 
by t h r e e General I n s p e c t o r s , f o r r -
( a ) i n s p e c t i n g the ge n e r a t i o n of e l e c t r i c i t y . 
(b) i n s p e c t i n g the networks and the a t t a c h e d 
p r o j e c t s of e l e c t r i c i t y . 
( c ) i n s p e c t i n g incomes and expenditures of the 
O r g a n i s a t i o n . 
There are a l s o other I n s p e c t o r a t e s i n every power 
s t a t i o n d e a l i n g w i t h l o c a l problems^(50) 
(50) Nezam-EL-Amal Be E d a r t E l Kahraba walgas wa. 
Aksamha E l Moukhtalfa wa Ta Wzia E l - E k h t e s a s a t wa 
El-Ma S o u l i a t t Beha. S p e c i a l Report on the work 
of the C.E.G.A. departments. Unpublished data 
C a i r o ( I n A r a b i c ) . 
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I n 196l when the S o c i e t e Egyptienne d • E l e c t r i c i t e 
was n a t i o n a l i s e d , i t was co n s i d e r e d as a p a r t of the 
C.E.G.A. supplying the suburb of H e l i o p o l i e s near C a i r o , 
Tramway Company and a l a r g e i n d u s t r i a l a r e a i n the n o r t h 
of C a i r o . 
2. The Mechanical and E l e c t r i c a l Department (MED) of 
the M i n i s t r y of P u b l i c Works. 
T h i s Department s u p p l i e s a l l e l e c t r i f i e d i r r i g a t i o n 
and drainage pumping s t a t i o n s i n the country, some 
m u n i c i p a l i t i e s and i n d u s t r i a l p l a n t s , waterworks and 
p u b l i c u t i l i t y p r o j e c t s i n the same a r e a s . The i n t e r n a l 
o r g a n i s a t i o n of t h i s Department i s not known, but i t 
i s a p p a r e n t l y s i m i l a r to o r d i n a r y Government Departments. 
3. The H y d r o - E l e c t r i c Power Department. 
T h i s Department i s i n charge of the Aswan Hydro-
e l e c t r i c power s t a t i o n which i s con s i d e r e d as the second 
l a r g e s t power s t a t i o n i n the U.A.R.. I t s main consumers 
are the Kima F e r t i l i z e r F a c t o r y a t Aswan, the High-Dam 
c o n s t r u c t i o n s i t e and the e l e c t r i c a l power requirements 
of the i r r i g a t i o n , l a n d r e c l a m a t i o n and i n d u s t r i a l 
p r o j e c t s a t Aswas and Quena Governates. There i s a l s o 
no evidence about i t s i n t e r n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n . 
The second M i n i s t r y ' o f Housing and P u b l i c 
U t i l i t i e s ' c o n t r o l s the remaining two e l e c t r i c i t y 
Departments. They a r e : -
1. A l e x a n d r i a E l e c t r i c i t y and Gas O r g a n i s a t i o n (A.E.G.O.) 
I t i s v e r y s i m i l a r to the C.E.G.A., supplying the 
c i t y of A l e x a n d r i a and some of i t s suburbs. I t s 
power system was o r i g i n a l l y owned and operated by 
the Lebon Company. I t came under p u b l i c ownership 
i n 196l a f t e r the end of i t s c o n c e s s i o n i n 196l. 
I t s e r v e s a population of n e a r l y 2 m i l l i o n . 
2. The Mechanical and E l e c t r i c a l Department 
( m u n i c i p a l i t i e s ) . 
Though t h i s Department c a r r i e s the same name as 
the (MED) of the M i n i s t r y of P u b l i c Works, i t i s 
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r d i f f e r e n t a c t i v i t i e s , and i t belongs 
to another M i n i s t r y . I t i s i n charge of supplying 
a g r e a t number of towns and v i l l a g e s w i t h a l l types 
of c u r r e n t i n d i f f e r e n t m u n i c i p a l i t i e s . 
Apart from the E l e c t r i c i t y Departments examined 
above, t h e r e a r e s e v e r a l r e s o u r c e s of g e n e r a t i n g 
and supplying e l e c t r i c i t y . They are mainly l a r g e 
i n d u s t r i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n s which own and operate 
power s t a t i o n s f o r t h e i r own u t i l i s a t i o n . Examples 
of these o r g a n i s a t i o n s a r e , the Suez Canal A u t h o r i t y , 
the Kom-Ombo Land Company, the A l e x a n d r i a Water 
Company, r a i l w a y s , tranways which are not s u p p l i e d 
by S„E.E., b r o a d c a s t i n g s t a t i o n s and the Maadi Land 
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Company* The importance of mentioning these 
r e s o u r c e s of supplying e l e c t r i c i t y i s t h a t they 
are s u b j e c t to the s u p e r v i s i o n ( e s p e c i a l l y 
t e c h n i c a l ) of the U.A.R. E l e c t r i c i t y Commission, 
but they are owned and operated by the s a i d 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s . ( 5 1 ) 
(51) Information about the s t r u c t u r e of the Egyptian 
E l e c t r i c i t y Supply I n d u s t r y are p a r t l y based on 
unpublished d a t a . 
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C o n c l u s i o n * 
I t may be seen from the d i s c u s s i o n above t h a t 
i n B r i t a i n as w e l l as i n Egypt the two Governments 
have taken measures to keep the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y under p u b l i c c o n t r o l . I n 
both c o u n t r i e s the i n d u s t r y has been r e - o r g a n i s e d 
s e v e r a l times. 
However, i t could be concluded t h a t the s t r u c t u r e 
of the e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y has some s i m i l a r i t i e s 
but d i f f e r s w i d e l y i n many p o i n t s * 
The E gyptian E l e c t r i c i t y Commission e s t a b l i s h e d 
i n 195^ had many f u n c t i o n s to the s i m i l a r C e n t r a l 
E l e c t r i c i t y Board i n B r i t a i n e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1927. The 
main d i f f e r e n c e between the two s t r u c t u r e s i s t h a t 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n B r i t a i n i s managed by p u b l i c 
c o r p o r a t i o n s w h i l e i n Egypt i t i s managed by Government 
Departments. 
The r e l a t i o n s h i p between the c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y i n 
the B r i t i s h e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y and the Area 
Boards under e i t h e r of the two systems ( t h a t of 19^7 or 
1957) i s much more organised and c l o s e r than i n the 
Egyptian c a s e . I t seems d i f f i c u l t t h a t one c e n t r a l 
a u t h o r i t y , the U.A.R. E l e c t r i c i t y Commission, to s u p e r v i s e 
the g e n e r a l f u n c t i o n of v a r i o u s Government Departments 
a t t a c h e d to d i f f e r e n t M i n i s t r i e s . Lack of t h i s 
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r e l a t i o n s h i p may r e s u l t i n n o n - u t i l i s a t i o n of the 
advantages of a c e n t r a l i s e d planning system i n the 
i n d u s t r y . 
I n Egypt the E l e c t r i c i t y supply Departments 
undertake wi d e l y d i f f e r e n t f u n c t i o n s between them. 
I n B r i t a i n E l e c t r i c i t y Area Boards undertake s i m i l a r 
f u n c t i o n s . For example:- the M.E.D. of the M i n i s t e r 
of P u b l i c Works i n Egypt i s mainly r e s p o n s i b l e f o r 
e l e c t r i c i r r i g a t i o n and drainage p r o j e c t s w h i l e the 
C.E..G..A.. supply e l e c t r i c i t y to a l l types of consumers. 
I t i s obvious from the d i s c u s s i o n of the two 
s t r u c t u r e s t h a t the g e n e r a t i o n f u n c t i o n i s more h i g h l y 
o r g a n i s e d i n B r i t a i n than i n Egypt. There should be an 
a u t h o r i t y which would be r e s p o n s i b l e only f o r g e n e r a t i o n 
and main t r a n s m i s s i o n . 
I t may be noted i n the s t r u c t u r e of the E g y p t i a n 
i n d u s t r y t h a t the C.E-G.A. and A»E.G*0. are r e s p o n s i b l e 
f o r supplying e l e c t r i c i t y as w e l l as gas to consumers. 
T h i s i s due to the s m a l l consumption of gas i n the two 
c i t i e s a s compared w i t h the r e s t of the country. But as 
e l e c t r i c i t y and gas consumption i s i n c r e a s i n g r a p i d l y , 
t h e r e should be separate Departments f o r each i n d u s t r y . 
L a s t l y , i t may be u s e f u l f o r the Egyptian e l e c t r i c i t y 
supply system, i n any f u t u r e o r g a n i s a t i o n , to adopt a 
method which ensures t h a t the e l e c t r i c i t y supply 
a c t i v i t i e s a r e managed i n such a way as to av o i d 
the Government Departments* r o u t i n e . I t seems 
t h a t commercial a c t i v i t i e s of the e l e c t r i c i t y supply 
i n d u s t r y cannot be s u c c e s s f u l l y undertaken by c i v i l 
s e r v a n t s • 
CHAPTER I I . 
THE STRUCTURE OF BOARDS-
8o 
The S t r u c t u r e of Boards. 
The governing boards of p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s , 
indeed, deserve the f i r s t p l a c e i n any d i s c u s s i o n of 
the v a r i o u s a s p e c t s of o r g a n i s a t i o n and management of 
the p u b l i c s e c t o r . I n t h i s chapter an i n v e s t i g a t i o n 
of the f o l l o w i n g questions w i l l be made: i n what 
a s p e c t s are p u b l i c boards d i f f e r e n t ? , who runs these 
boards?, what i s the work of f u l l - t i m e and part-time 
members?, who s e l e c t s and appoints the members?, and 
l a s t l y the question of, i n what a c t i v i t i e s should 
boards have freedom of a c t i o n ? 
The f i r s t question i n c l u d e s two main p o i n t s : 
d i f f e r e n c e s i n aims and i n s i z e . 
D i f f e r e n c e s i n aims. 
I t i s well-known t h a t p u b l i c boards a r e e n t r u s t e d 
w i t h d i f f e r e n t spheres of economic a c t i v i t y . Some of 
them govern i n d u s t r i e s of a p u r e l y commercial n a t u r e . 
For example, the nationally-owned p r o d u c t i v e e n t e r p r i s e s 
such as c o a l , e l e c t r i c i t y , gas and t r a n s p o r t i n B r i t a i n . 
They a r e of major economic importance i n the whole 
economy, c a r r y i n g out the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of producing 
products and s e r v i c e s which are b a s i c to the B r i t i s h 
economy. T h e i r production i s est i m a t e d a t about 12 per 
cent of the gros s n a t i o n a l product, ( l ) I n Egypt boards 
( l ) Hanson, A.H. (Ed.) N a t i o n a l i s a t i o n , a book of 
r e a d i n g s , London, 1963 p«ll 
w i t h the same aims c o n t r o l n e a r l y the whole i n d u s t r i a l 
s e c t o r . For example, manufacturing and mining are 
overwhelmingly under government c o n t r o l . P u b l i c 
t r a n s p o r t i s a l s o e n t i r e l y owned and operated by the 
Government. I t i n c l u d e s r a i l w a y s , country and c i t y 
bus l i n e s , tramways, r i v e r n a v i g a t i o n , s h i p p i ng and 
a i r l i n e s . 
There are a l s o p u b l i c boards which are only 
concerned w i t h the f i n a n c i n g of p r i v a t e or mixed 
e n t e r p r i s e s . I n B r i t a i n the C o l o n i a l Development 
Corpo r a t i o n and the Bank of England, commercial banks, 
i n s u r a n c e companies and other f i n a n c i a l c o r p o r a t i o n s 
are w h o l l y owned and operated by p u b l i c b o d i e s . 
Some of the c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s are a l s o run 
by p u b l i c boards. The c h i e f examples are* B.B»C» i n 
B r i t a i n and the Egyptian B r o a d c a s t i n g C o r p o r a t i o n i n 
Egypt* 
The aims of p u b l i c boards may i n c l u d e both 
commercial and c u l t u r a l ones. An example i n Egypt i s 
the 'Egyptian P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r News, P u b l i s h i n g , 
D i s t r i b u t i n g and P r i n t i n g ' which has no e q u i v a l e n t i n 
B r i t a i n . The t a s k s and main f u n c t i o n s of t h i s 
O r g a n i s a t i o n a r e l a i d down by a Republican Decree as 
being 'to d i r e c t i t s e f f o r t s to t a k i n g p a r t i n the 
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g e n e r a l guidance of the n a t i o n , e l e v a t i o n of the popular 
c u l t u r a l , s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l l e v e l , a c q u a i n t i n g p u b l i c 
opinion w i t h l o c a l and f o r e i g n news, e n l i g h t e n i n g i t on 
the p r i n c i p a l c u r r e n t of world a f f a i r s and propagating 
i n f o r m a t i o n to f o r e i g n c o u n t r i e s on the U n i t e d Arab 
Repu b l i c and the Arab world.(2) The way of a c h i e v i n g 
these aims i s based on the commercial methods of the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of newspapers, magazines and f i l m s of a 
n a t i o n a l and p o l i t i c a l c h a r a c t e r i n Arab C o u n t r i e s and 
elsewhere. 
Another type of p u b l i c body i s the development 
c o r p o r a t i o n . I t i s found i n Egypt and some other 
c o u n t r i e s , but t h e r e i s no evidence t h a t i t e x i s t s i n 
B r i t a i n . A.H. Hanson d e s c r i b e s the form of these 
development a u t h o r i t i e s as "the most r a d i c a l method 
of attempting to s h o r t - c i r c u i t the normal government 
machinery, i n a r e s e a r c h f o r developmental d r i v e and 
coherence." (3) I n Egypt t h e r e are three examples, 
the Economic Development O r g a n i s a t i o n , E l - N a s r 
O r g a n i s a t i o n and Misr O r g a n i s a t i o n . T h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
i s s t u d y i n g , i n i t i a t i n g and o p e r a t i n g the p u b l i c s e c t o r . 
(2) Republican Decree No. 1813 of 1961 A r t i c l e 2. 
(3) Hanson, A.H. P u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e and economic 
development, London, 1959 p.210. 
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I t combines planning w i t h e x e c u t i v e and a d v i s o r y 
f u n c t i o n s . Examples i n other c o u n t r i e s are the 
'Chi l e a n C orporation de formanto de l a Produccion' 
and the * Ixraqui Development Board. • (4) 
The d i s c u s s i o n above shows, f i r s t , t h a t the aims 
of p u b l i c boards by whatever names they bear, are 
d i f f e r e n t both i n B r i t a i n and Egypt. Secondly, t h e r e 
are some p a r t i c u l a r boards, i n B r i t a i n and Egypt, w i t h 
s i m i l a r aims. Some are found only i n Egypt and others 
e x i s t i n Egypt and other developing c o u n t r i e s , but not 
i n B r i t a i n . 
The importance of t h i s a n a l y s i s i s t h a t 
d i f f e r e n c e s i n aims may be one of the main f a c t o r s 
d e c i d i n g the c o n s t i t u t i o n of the board and may a l s o 
a f f e c t other problems a t t a c h e d to the members of these 
boards, which w i l l be examined i n t h i s c h a p t e r . 
D i f f e r e n c e i n s i z e . 
There i s no dogma i n f i x i n g the s i z e of p u b l i c 
boards. The number of members does not only d i f f e r 
from one i n d u s t r y to another, but a l s o the same board 
could change from one year to another. D i f f e r e n c e s i n 
s i z e between one board and another i s q u i t e c l e a r from 
the f o l l o w i n g examples. I n B r i t a i n the Court of the 
(4) I b i d pp. 211, 219. 
Bank of England c o n s i s t s of eighteen members, the 
Governor, Deputy-Governor and s i x t e e n D i r e c t o r s . 
The B.B.C has seven Governors i n a d d i t i o n to the 
Chairman and Vice-Chairman. The boards of B.O.A.C. 
and B r i t i s h European Airwgys have each not l e s s than 
f i v e or more than e l e v e n members i n a d d i t i o n to the 
Chairman. The o l d B r i t i s h T r a n s p o r t Commission had a 
Chairman and between four and f o u r t e e n other members. 
The p r e s e n t N a t i o n a l Coal Board c o n s i s t s of twelve 
members. I n Egypt the board of the C e n t r a l Bank of 
Egypt c o n s i s t s of f i f t e e n members i n c l u d i n g the 
Chairman. The board of each of the p u b l i c j o i n t s tock 
companies ( a f f i l i a t e d to the Economic Development 
O r g a n i s a t i o n ) c o n s i s t s of seven members. I n c o n t r a s t 
w i t h the above examples some f o r e i g n p u b l i c boards 
have f i x e d s i z e . F o r example, E l e c t r i c i t e de France, 
Gaz. de France and Carbonnage de France each has f i f t e e n 
members on i t s board. 
The disadvantage of f i x i n g the number of members, 
as i n the French example, i n v o l v e s a l o s s of f l e x i b i l i t y 
r e q u i r e d to accord w i t h d i f f e r e n c e s i n the a c t i v i t i e s 
of the i n d u s t r i e s , w h i l e i n B r i t a i n n e a r l y a l l the 
productive p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s a s s u r e d t h i s f l e x i b i l i t y 
i n the s i z e of t h e i r boards. The danger of a dogmatic 
f i x i n g of the number of members comes from the 
consequences of a board being too l a r g e or too s m a l l . 
I f the board i s too l a r g e i t w i l l l o s e the s p i r i t 
n e c e s s a r y f o r j o i n t d e l i b e r a t i o n . On the other hand, 
i f i t i s too s m a l l , i t w i l l not have the n e c e s s a r y 
d i v e r s i t y of outlook and experience f o r a comprehensive 
view of a l l major a s p e c t s of p o l i c y . T h i s s t r i k e s 
P r o f e s s o r Robson i n the case of the Damoder V a l l e y 
C o r p o r a t i o n i n I n d i a and the Tenessee V a l l e y A u t h o r i t y 
i n the U.S.A., which have boards c o n s i s t i n g of only 
t h r e e members.(5) Thus the argument may conclude t h a t 
g i v i n g a range between minima and maxima of number of 
members can a s s u r e the f l e x i b i l i t y and c o - o r d i n a t i o n 
n e c e s s a r y i n a p u b l i c board. To apply t h i s method, a 
wide d i s c r e t i o n f o r the appointing a u t h o r i t y to add more 
members must be g i v e n . But t h i s wide d i s c r e t i o n i s a 
r i s k except i f t h e r e i s some assurance t h a t the c h o i c e 
of such a d d i t i o n a l members i s l i k e l y to be good. 
However, t h i s i s a minor disadvantage a g a i n s t t h i s 
method i n order to c o n s t i t u t e a board of an optimum s i z e . 
G e n e r a l l y speaking the s i z e of the board may be 
i n f l u e n c e d by two main f a c t o r s . 
(5) Robson, W.A. N a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r y and p u b l i c 
ownership, 1962 p.2l4 
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(A) The t e c h n i c a l complexity of the i n d u s t r y . T h i s 
means, the need f o r more of l e s s t e c h n i c a l 
personnel may be a guide f o r widening or l e s s e n i n g 
the s i z e of the board. 
(B) The dimension of the i n d u s t r y and the a c t i v i t i e s 
c a r r i e d out by the board. I n t h i s connection i t 
i s important to remark t h a t i n Egypt the board 
of the E.D.O.. i»_ d i r e c t i n g a l a r g e number of 
d i f f e r e n t i n d u s t r i e s and p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the 
management of many p u b l i c and semi - p u b l i c 
companies. The Board of the E.D.O. c o n s i s t s of 
only e i g h t members, w h i l e i t seems n e c e s s a r y f o r 
such a board to be r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e . A suggestion 
of not l e s s than twenty members could be made i n 
order to ensure t h a t d e c i s i o n s are taken w i t h wider 
v i e w s . The importance of these two p o i n t s i s t h a t 
they a r e the only a l t e r n a t i v e working a g a i n s t the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n of a board on a s p e c i a l agreement or 
s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s . 
The second a s p e c t of the problem of s i z e i s t h a t 
t h e r e i s a v a r i a t i o n i n the number of members on the same 
board a t d i f f e r e n t p e r i o d s . T h i s was obvious i n the 
B r i t i s h B a t i o n a l C o a l Board s i n c e i t s c r e a t i o n . The 
o r i g i n a l Coal Board c o n s i s t e d of a Chairman, Deputy-
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Chairman and seven other f u l l - t i m e members* The 19^9 
Act i n c r e a s e d the maximum s i z e of the board to twelve 
members i n s t e a d of n i n e provided t h a t not more than 
e i g h t should be f u l l - t i m e . " T h i s higher maximum was 
doubtless i n t r o d u c e d to enable the M i n i s t e r t o 
strengthen the board without i n f r i n g i n g the r i g h t s of 
the p r e v i o u s l y appointed members."(6) 
Turning to the e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y , again 
the e l e c t r i c i t y boards are d i f f e r e n t i n aims and i n 
s i z e . I n B r i t a i n the E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l i s a p o l i c y -
making body, as could be seen from i t s f u n c t i o n s . ( 7 ) 
The Generating Board i s e n t r u s t e d w i t h g e n e r a t i o n and 
bulk t r a n s m i s s i o n . The Area Boards are mainly the 
d i s t r i b u t o r s of e l e c t r i c i t y to v a r i o u s consumers. I n 
Egypt the U.A.R. E l e c t r i c i t y Commission i s to a g r e a t e r 
extent s i m i l a r to the B r i t i s h E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l i n 
i t s aims except t h a t i t i s a Government Department. I t 
i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r drawing up the g e n e r a l p o l i c y f o r the 
i n d u s t r y and studying the problems of the e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n 
of Egypt. There i s no board i n Egypt s i m i l a r to the 
B r i t i s h Generating Board, u n l e s s , but to a l e s s e r e x t e n t , 
we c o n s i d e r the T e c h n i c a l Bureau which i s charged w i t h 
(6) Robson, W.A. Op.Cit p,21k 
(7) See p. 62 
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t e c h n i c a l problems i n the i n d u s t r y . However, i t i s 
not by any means a generating board. 
Although Area Boards i n B r i t a i n and E l e c t r i c i t y 
Departments i n Egypt are s i m i l a r i n t h e i r main f u n c t i o n , 
i . e . d i s t r i b u t i o n , t h e r e a r e two d i f f e r e n c e s worth 
n o t i n g . 
(1) W h i l s t Area Boards i n B r i t a i n have the same 
c h a r a c t e r , E l e c t r i c i t y Departments i n Egypt 
d i f f e r from each o t h e r . Some of them 
d i s t r i b u t e e l e c t r i c i t y to a v a r i e t y of consumers, 
others a r e charged w i t h supplying s p e c i f i c 
f i e l d s as i n the case of the M.E.D- which 
s u p p l i e s only i r r i g a t i o n and drainage systems 
i n the c o u n t r y . ( 8 ) 
(2) E l e c t r i c i t y Departments i n Egypt have f u l l power 
to generate as w e l l as to supply e l e c t r i c i t y . 
Regarding g e n e r a t i o n i t i s p r a c t i c a l l y i m p o s s i b l e 
f o r them to r e l a y on a c e n t r a l bulk supply, 
because some of them a r e g e o g r a p h i c a l l y remote, 
as the H.E.P.D., and the c o n s t r u c t i o n of an 
e f f i c i e n t g r i d system i s not y e t i n e x i s t e n c e . 
I n B r i t a i n Area Boards have a l s o the power to 
generate e l e c t r i c i t y but w i t h the p e r m i s s i o n of 
(8) M.E,D. of the M i n i s t r y of P u b l i c Works. See p. 73 
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the M i n i s t e r . However, generating i s not one 
of t h e i r main f u n c t i o n s as i n the E g y p t i a n c a s e . 
D i f f e r e n c e s i n s i z e a l s o e x i s t between d i f f e r e n t 
e l e c t r i c i t y a u t h o r i t i e s . The B r i t i s h E l e c t r i c i t y 
C o u n c i l c o n s i s t s of twenty-one members, the Generating 
Board has ten members on o t s board and each Area Board 
c o n s i s t s of only n i n e members. I n Egypt the U.A.R. 
E l e c t r i c i t y Commission i s comparatively s m a l l e r i n s i z e 
than the E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l . I t c o n s i s t s only of 
t h i r t e e n members. But i f we take i n o t c o n s i d e r a t i o n the 
d i f f e r e n c e i n population, consumption per c a p i t a , 
standard of l i v i n g and d i f f e r e n c e s i n the degree of 
usage of e l e c t r i c i t y i n i n d u s t r y , a g r i c u l t u r e and 
households, the Commission's Board i s r e a s o n a b l e i n s i z e . 
There i s no data a v a i l a b l e about the number of the 
Board's members of E l e c t r i c i t y Departments i n Egypt. I f 
the s i z e of an e l e c t r i c i t y Board i s determined by the 
t e c h n i c a l complexity and dimension, the B r i t i s h 
E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l i s a v e r y w e l l balanced board. T h i s 
i s c l e a r from the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the twelve Area 
Board Chairmen, the Chairman and two members of the 
Generation Board and s i x other independent members. 
T h i s makes the C o u n c i l an e f f i c i e n t body f o r c o n s u l t a t i o n 
and f o r m u l a t i o n of g e n e r a l p o l i c y of the i n d u s t r y as a 
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whole. I n Egypt the U.A.R.. El«;tricity Commission i s 
re a s o n a b l y c o n s t i t u t e d . The Board combines the Under-
S e c r e t a r i e s of S t a t e of E l e c t r i c i t y Departments, the 
Chairman of the T e c h n i c a l Bureau - who i s a l r e a d y the 
S e c r e t a r y General of the Commission - pl u s 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of l a r g e i n d u s t r i a l consumers i n the 
country, such as the Railway O r g a n i s a t i o n and the 
F e d e r a t i o n of Chemical I n d u s t r i e s . 
The second question to be answered i n t h i s 
chapter i s who runs the boards. T h i s q u e s t i o n may 
be examined under two main headings: the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s 
of the members and whether they a r e f u l l - t i m e or 
p a r t - t i m e . 
( 1) Q u a l i f i c a t i o n s of Members hip.-
The s u c c e s s of any e n t e r p r i s e depends on many 
f a c t o r s , one of which i s the s t a f f i n g of the 
e n t e r p r i s e . To take the example of manufacturing 
p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s , t h e r e a r e th r e e c a t e g o r i e s 
of employees. Men 'at the top' who formulate 
the g e n e r a l p o l i c y , employees who s u p e r v i s e the 
exec u t i o n of t h i s p o l i c y , and workers who c a r r y 
out the o p e r a t i o n s . 
There i s no doubt t h a t the s u c c e s s of the 
e n t e r p r i s e depends more on the f i r s t category than the 
othe r . T h i s might be i l l u s t r a t e d i f we assume t h a t a 
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mistake has been made. The e f f e c t of mistakes made a t 
the top i s more damaging than those which happen a t any-
other l e v e l . For example, a wrong d e c i s i o n to i n v e s t 
s e v e r a l m i l l i o n s of pounds on a p r o j e c t i n the 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y w i l l have s e r i o u s 
consequences on the p r o s p e r i t y of the i n d u s t r y . The 
g e n e r a l wages or p r i c i n g p o l i c i e s have a l s o a s i m i l a r 
e f f e c t i f they were not to be decided w i t h g r e a t c a r e * 
For these r e a s o n s , members of the board must be s e l e c t e d . 
S e l e c t i o n of members must, f i r s t of a l l , s a t i s f y one 
important c o n d i t i o n , namely, what s o r t of a b i l i t y i s 
i t t h a t we are lo o k i n g f o r ? T h i s q u e s t i o n has been 
answered by F . C Hooper as "a g r e a t a d m i n i s t r a t o r above 
a l l has judgement, p e r s o n a l i t y and common sense judgement 
t h a t makes h i s d e c i s i o n s r i g h t more o f t e n than they a r e 
wrong."(9) I n a d d i t i o n to t h i s g e n e r a l d e s c r i p t i o n of 
p e r s o n a l i t y , the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s n e c e s s a r y to be h e l d 
by any member may be broadly c l a s s i f i e d i n t o two: 
(1) T e c h n i c a l , t h a t i s men who have a wide experience 
i n c e r t a i n f i e l d s of a p p l i e d s c i e n c e and 
technology. 
(2) P r o f e s s i o n a l s , these are men who hold n o n - t e c h n i c a l 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s such as accountants, lawyers and 
economists• 
(9) Hooper, F.6. Management i n the p u b l i c s e r v i c e s , 
P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n V o l . 23 19k&. p.2l8 
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According to d i f f e r e n c e s i n the aims of boards, 
p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s engaged i n production of goods and 
s e r v i c e s must have on t h e i r boards a combination of 
these two q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . An example of a w e l l - b a l a n c e d 
board of t h i s type, i s the o r i g i n a l Coal Board formed 
i n 19^6 from e x p e r t s i n d i f f e r e n t f i e l d s . They were: 
the Vice»*Chairman, a former C i v i l Servant, and other 
members were: 
(a ) a mining engineer, (b) a l e a d i n g p h y s i c i s t , 
( c ) an accountant, (d) a s p e c i a l i s t i n marketing, 
( e ) the s e c r e t a r y of the Mine Workers Union and 
( f ) the s e c r e t a r y of the Trades Union Congress. 
But i t should be noted t h a t the c o n s t i t u t i o n of such a 
board must not f o l l o w any f i x e d formula. What i s 
needed i s a combination of p e r s o n a l q u a l i t i e s and of 
s p e c i a l e x p e r t s i n p a r t i c u l a r f i e l d s . ( 1 0 ) P u b l i c 
e n t e r p r i s e s engaged i n c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s may be 
governed only by the second category, i . e . by non-
t e c h n i c a l p r o f e s s i o n a l s , the B.B.C i n B r i t a i n and 
the Egyptian B r o a d c a s t i n g Corporation i n Egypt are 
examples. But P r o f e s s o r Robson s t r e s s e d the need f o r 
t e c h n i c a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n s on the B.B.-C's board. He 
(10) Cole, G.DvM. N a t i o n a l Coal Board, P o l i t i c a l 
Q u a r t e r l y V o l . 17 19^6, p.3l8 
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ex p l a i n e d t h a t the Board of Governors, occupying a 
p o s i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y towards the p u b l i c and of 
a u t h o r i t y over major p o l i c y should have moral c a l i b r e , 
i n t e l l e c t u a l equipment, p o l i t i c a l o p i nions, s o c i a l 
assumptions and g e n e r a l c a p a c i t y . ( 1 1 ) He went on to 
say t h a t the governing body of the B.B.C provided the 
poorest example mainly because t e c h n i c a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n s 
are c o n s i d e r e d unimportant i n s e l e c t i n g the governors*(12) 
I t may be t r u e t h a t t e c h n i c a l a b i l i t i e s a r e important 
even i n the boards of c u l t u r a l aims such as the B.B.C*, 
but they do not have the same importance as i n 
e l e c t r i c i t y , gas or c o a l boards. Although P r o f e s s o r 
Robson argues f o r the need f o r t e c h n i c a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n 
i n a board of c u l t u r a l aims, one of the Egyptian p u b l i c 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s , which p r a c t i c a l l y need these t e c h n i c a l 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , does not have them on o t s board. T h i s 
i s the 'Egyptian P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r News, 
P u b l i s h i n g , D i s t r i b u t i n g and P r i n t i n g ' . I t i s an 
e n t e r p r i s e of c u l t u r a l and commercial c h a r a c t e r . I t s 
present board of D i r e c t o r s i s composed only of people 
of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and p o l i t i c a l q u a l i t y . These a r e , 
(11) Robson, W.A, (Ed.) P u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e , London 
1937 p.86 
(12) I b i d . p.370. 
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the M i n i s t e r f o r Information A f f a i r s , as a Chairman, 
the D i r e c t o r of the Broadcasting O r g a n i s a t i o n the 
D i r e c t o r of the Information Department, the D i r e c t o r 
of the Tourism Department and a Member of the S t a t e 
C o u n c i l as members. (13) T h i s type of board would 
need a t l e a s t one member of t e c h n i c a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n s 
to d e a l w i t h t e c h n i c a l problems concerning f o r example 
p r i n t i n g • 
An example of an Egyptian p u b l i c o r g a n i s a t i o n 
which g i v e s a reaso n a b l e c o n s t i t u t i o n of i t s board, 
i s the Economic Development O r g a n i s a t i o n which f u n c t i o n s 
i n the study i n g , i n i t i a t i n g and operating an important 
p a r t of the whole p u b l i c s e c t o r . I t s board i s 
composed of persons who have had a long experience i n 
planning, f i n a n c i a l and l e g a l m a t t e r s . The Board's 
members are t 
( 1 ) A r e t i r e d o f f i c e r as Chairman. 
(2 ) A former Deputy M i n i s t e r of F i n a n c e . 
(3) The Sub-Governor of the N a t i o n a l Bank of Egypt. 
(4) The S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l of the N a t i o n a l Planning 
Committee• 
(5) A former Company D i r e c t o r . 
( 6 ) C o u n c i l l o r a t the P r e s i d e n c y . 
(13) Republican Becree No. l 8 l 3 of 1961 A r t i c l e 3. 
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(7) D i r e c t o r General of S t a t e Budget. 
(8) D i r e c t o r a t the M i n i s t r y of I n d u s t r y . ( 1 k ) 
The above examples show the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s 
r e q u i r e d or a l r e a d y e x i s t i n g i n some of the B r i t i s h 
and E g y p t i a n p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s . Apart from t h i s , 
the g e n e r a l p a t t e r n l a i d down by the v a r i o u s Acts 
c o n s t i t u t i n g the B r i t i s h p u b l i c board s e l e c t those 
who a r e c o n s i d e r e d to have had wide experience on 
and shown c a p a c i t y i n s p e c i f i e d f i e l d s . The types 
of experience v a r y between c o r p o r a t i o n s but they 
n e a r l y a l l i n c l u d e i n d u s t r i a l , commercial and 
f i n a n c i a l m atters, a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and the o r g a n i s a t i o n 
of workers. One of the pre-war n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n boards, 
i n B r i t a i n , the London Passenger T r a n s p o r t Board, 
c o n s i s t e d of seven members, two of whom were r e q u i r e d 
to have had not l e s s than s i x y e a r s l o c a l government 
ex p e r i e n c e . (15) A l s o post-war Acts of gas, t r a n s p o r t 
and c o a l r e q u i r e d s p e c i f i c q u a l i f i c a t i o n s r e l a t e d to 
each i n d u s t r y ' s s c i e n t i f i c f i e l d . I n the e l e c t r i c i t y 
supply i n d u s t r y , the 19^7 Act s t a t e d t h a t the Chairman 
and other members of the C e n t r a l E l e c t r i c i t y A u t h o r i t y 
(14) Egyptian Economic and P o l i t i c a l Review March, 1957 
p.215. 
(15) Morrison, H. How London i s governed, London, 19^9 
p.129. 
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should be s e l e c t e d from amongst persons appearing to 
the M i n i s t e r concerned as having had experience of 
and having shown c a p a c i t y i n ge n e r a t i o n and supply of 
e l e c t r i c i t y , i n d u s t r i a l , commercial and f i n a n c i a l 
m a t t e r s , a p p l i e d s c i e n c e , a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and the 
o r g a n i s a t i o n of workers, Reference to ge n e r a t i o n has 
been omitted and experience i n l o c a l government or 
a g r i c u l t u r e i s added as an a c c e p t a b l e q u a l i f i c a t i o n . 
T h i s i s a l s o a p p l i e d i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n of Area 
Boards. To s a t i s f y these requirements the M i n i s t e r 
t r i e s to make a balance between the t e c h n i c a l and 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . I t has been claimed 
i n the evidence of the S e l e c t Committee on N a t i o n a l i s e d 
I n d u s t r i e s t h a t 'as a rough r u l e , i f the Area Board 
Chairman i s an engineer then h i s Deputy-Chairman would 
probably need to be somebody more on the commercial 
or a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s i d e or v i c e - v e r s a ' . ( l 6 ) 
I n Egypt, the f i r s t E g y p t i a n E l e c t r i c i t y 
Commission c o n s i s t e d of only s i x t e e n e n g i n e e r s • ( 1 7 ) 
The l a c k of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e q u a l i t y and other p r o f e s s i o n s 
(16) S e l e c t Committee on N a t i o n a l i s e d I n d u s t r i e s , 
E l e c t r i c i t y Supply I n d u s t r y , Minutes of Evidence 
H.C. 236 - 11 May, 1963 0.55. 
(17) N a t i o n a l Planning Committee memorandum No. 233 
Report of the C e n t r a l Committee f o r I n d u s t r i e s 
and E l e c t r i c Power ( i n A r a b i c ) . 
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on the board l e a d to the r e - o r g a n i s a t i o n of the 
commission. The U^A*R». E l e c t r i c i t y Commission 
e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1959 has a reasonable combination 
of engineering and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . 
The a d m i n i s t r a t o r s a r e , namely, the Deputy-Minister 
of the T r e a s u r y and the D i r e c t o r of the R a i l w a y s 
A u t h o r i t y , an economist, but i n g e n e r a l e l e c t r i c a l 
engineers provide a great p r o p o r t i o n of the 
q u a l i t i e s of the e l e c t r i c i t y boards. ( l 8 ) 
Sources of Membership. 
A problem which i s c l o s e l y connected w i t h the 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ' i s s u e i s , where to f i n d these people. 
W i l l they be promoted from w i t h i n the i n d u s t r y or 
r e c r u i t e d from other sources? T h i s w i l l l e a d to 
the c o n t r o v e r s y about workers and consumers' 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n on the boards of p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n s . 
Also the question of whether members of Par l i a m e n t 
or M i n i s t e r s should be board members, could be r a i s e d 
i n t h i s c o n t e x t . 
With r e g a r d to the conception of ' w i t h i n the 
i n d u s t r y ' , i t i s the ge n e r a l p r a c t i c e i n p r i v a t e 
e n t e r p r i s e s t h a t n e a r l y a l l f u l l - t i m e members a r e 
(18) See Chapter I p. 67 
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r e c r u i t e d and appointed from w i t h i n the company.(19) The 
main reason given i s t h a t these men have been t r a i n e d and 
have gained experience of the problems of the i n d u s t r y . 
I n B r i t i s h p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s , a l s o , most of the f u l l - t i m e 
members have had previous experience of the i n d u s t r y 
before n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n . ( 2 0 ) But the p r i n c i p l e of 'w i t h i n 
the i n d u s t r y * i n p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s i s s t i l l a c o n t r o v e r s i a l 
i s s u e . I t has been advocated by Simon and by the F l e c k 
Report. Both c o n s i d e r t h a t f u l l - t i m e members should be 
drawn from w i t h i n the i n d u s t r y . Although Simon excludes 
the appointment of the Chairman i f he was a d i s t i n g u i s h e d 
o u t s i d e r , he; emphasises the p r i n c i p l e by s a y i n g ' t h i s 
w i l l c e r t a i n l y not improve the morale of the i n d u s t r y i f 
the a b l e s t men i n i t have no confidence t h a t top posts 
w i l l be a v a i l a b l e to men from w i t h i n the i n d u s t r y ' . ( 2 1 ) 
P r o f e s s o r Robson does not f u l l y agree w i t h the p r i n c i p l e . 
He s a y s , t h a t i n the f u t u r e men who w i l l d i r e c t the 
p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n s w i l l have been t r a i n e d and w i l l have 
grown up i n the n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r y i t s e l f butt 'we must 
(19) Simon of Wythanshaws Lord: The boards of n a t i o n a l i s e d 
i n d u s t r i e s • 
Hanson, A.H. (ed.) N a t i o n a l i s a t i o n , p.l87 
(20) Hanson, A.H. Managerial problems i n p u b l i c 
e n t e r p r i s e s , New York 1962 p.50 
(21) Simon, Op.Cit. p.194 
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n e v e r t h e l e s s take c a r e not to imply t h i s p r i n c i p l e too 
r i g i d l y or too soon*.(22) He g i v e s the example of 
r a i l w a y s and coalmining i n d u s t r i e s as they had been under 
mismanagement f o r a long time and they s t i l l need men of 
higher a d m i n i s t r a t i v e q u a l i t y from other occupations 
r a t h e r than those a v a i l a b l e i n the s a i d i n d u s t r i e s . The 
P o l i t i c a l Q u a r t e r l y commented on 'the F l e c k r e p o r t ' s 
conception t h a t f u l l - t i m e members would normally come 
from w i t h i n the i n d u s t r y * by s a y i n g t h a t i f t h i s p r a c t i c e 
were to be adopted i n the n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s the 
board would s u f f e r from a shortage of experience i n other 
walks: of l i f e . (23) I t was again e x p l a i n e d t h a t t h i s 
shortage i s the major d e f e c t of both c o a l and r a i l w a y s 
i n B r i t a i n . 
I t c ould be concluded from the argument about the 
p r i n c i p l e of 'within the i n d u s t r y ' , t h a t even the 
advocates of t h i s conception could exclude a d i s t i n g u i s h e d 
o u t s i d e r . I t i s t r u e that a complete n e g l e c t of o u t s i d e 
e x p e r t s i s a l o s s f o r the n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r y concerned. 
But, as a normal p r a c t i c e , the appointing a u t h o r i t y must 
t r y f i r s t to s e l e c t members r e q u i r e d from w i t h i n the 
i n d u s t r y , secondly, from another n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r y 
and t h i r d l y , from out s i d e p r i v a t e i n d u s t r i e s which have 
(22) Robson, W.A., N a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s and p u b l i c 
ownership p.221 
(23) Op.Cit. V o l . 26 1955 p.99 
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s i m i l a r management problems* T h i s device would be 
a p p l i e d to f u l l - t i m e members. The advantages of 
f o l l o w i n g t h i s l i n e a r e , f i r s t , i f the member i s 
appointed from the i n d u s t r y , he w i l l be aware of most 
of the problems concerning the i n d u s t r y which w i l l enable 
him to c o n t r i b u t e i n a c o r r e c t p o l i c y . Second, i f the 
member comes from another n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r y he w i l l 
a t l e a s t have knowledge about the common problems 
concerning the whole p u b l i c s e c t o r . He w i l l e a s i l y adapt 
h i m s e l f to become f a m i l i a r w i t h the i n d u s t r y concerned. 
I f these two ways f a i l t h e r e i s no a l t e r n a t i v e except to 
appoint a member from the p r i v a t e s e c t o r . But i n t h i s 
case he. must come from a l a r g e - s c a l e o r g a n i s a t i o n . The 
i n t e r e s t i n g argument about the appointment of Dr. Beeching, 
a former Chairman of the I . C . I . , as a Chairman of the 
B.T.C.. i n 196l, shows the importance of t h i s d e v i c e . 
There has been much s a i d about the c a s e . To summarise, 
the opponents of t h i s appointment accused the M i n i s t e r 
of not having made any s e r i o u s attempts to f i n d a man 
w i t h the n e c e s s a r y q u a l i f i c a t i o n s who had a l r e a d y been 
i n the r a i l w a y s s e r v i c e . Such a man would have had 
enormous advantages, as t h i s promotion w i t h i n the 
o r g a n i s a t i o n would have s t i m u l a t e d morale among railwaymen 
i n s t e a d of de p r e s s i n g i t . They a l s o accused the M i n i s t e r 
101 
of not se a r c h i n g among the able s t a f f of other l a r g e 
n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s . The M i n i s t e r ' s r e p l y was, 
f i r s t , t h a t t h i s appointment a s s u r e d the r a p i d remedy 
f o r the urgent need of the r a i l w a y s , t h a t was to f i n d 
a man who has proved h i m s e l f i n top management of one 
of the most s u c c e s s f u l i n d u s t r i a l concerns. Secondly, 
the i n t r o d u c t i o n of new blood from time to time w i l l 
be of a b e n e f i t to any l a r g e o r g a n i s a t i o n be i t 
n a t i o n a l i s e d or n o t . ( 2 k ) 
One can c r i t i c i s e t h i s r e p l y by s a y i n g , t h a t an 
able man e i t h e r w i t h i n the Rail w a y ' s O r g a n i s a t i o n or 
any of the other n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s could be found 
to be promoted to the post of Chairman. Even w i t h i n 
the R ailway's O r g a n i s a t i o n , i f i t i s c o n s i d e r e d 
u n p r o f i t a b l e by the p r o f i t and l o s s account measurement, 
i t i s known t h a t the r a i l w a y s e r v i c e s work as a commercial 
undertaking as w e l l as f o r the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t . Thus 
i f i t i s considered u n p r o f i t a b l e i t does not n e c e s s a r i l y 
f o l l o w t h a t i t does not have a man w i t h the a b i l i t y to 
be a Chairman. Moreover an ab l e member of the Board's 
O r g a n i s a t i o n who may prove h i m s e l f to be a s u c c e s s f u l 
Chairman should be promoted. I f t h i s was not the case 
i n the r a i l w a y s , t h e r e must be another member i n other 
(24) H.C. Debates (1960-61), Hanson, A.H. (ed) 
N a t i o n a l i s a t i o n a book of r e a d i n g s . p . l 8 l 
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s u c c e s s f u l n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s . The e l e c t r i c i t y 
and gas i n d u s t r i e s are examples. 
The second p o i n t i s not convincing, because new 
blood from other l a r g e n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s i s more 
b e n e f i c i a l than any other from the p r i v a t e s e c t o r . I t 
i s a t l e a s t of the same type. 
So f a r as the E g y p t i a n p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s are 
concerned the problem must be examined under three types 
of o r g a n i s a t i o n ! 
( l ) N a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s which were a l r e a d y w e l l 
e s t a b l i s h e d under p r i v a t e ownership as i n the 
B r i t i s h n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s . The problem 
was e i t h e r to appoint the former d i r e c t o r s of 
these e n t e r p r i s e s or o u t s i d e r s . The main 
o b j e c t i o n to appoint the former d i r e c t o r s could 
be expressed i n the words of the l e f t - w i n g 
s e c t i o n of the labour movement i n B r i t a i n quoted 
by A.H. Hanson. They a r e d e s c r i b e d as 'The same 
o l d gang i s i n c o n t r o l ; we expected to have a 
new moral world, t h a t the wicked o l d c a p i t a l i s t s 
would depart and b r i g h t new s o c i a l i s t managers 
come i n t o power. T h i s has not happened and 
consequently what we have on our hands i s not 
s o c i a l i s m but c a p i t a l i s t ' s n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n . ' ( 2 5 ) 
(25) Hanson, A.H. Managerial problems i n p u b l i c 
e n t e r p r i s e New York 1962 p.51 
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To a greater extent t h i s c r i t i c i s m was taken 
into consideration i n appointing the former 
di r e c t o r s of the Egyptian i n d u s t r i e s . The 
au t h o r i t i e s only appointed those d i r e c t o r s who 
could adapt themselves to the new s o c i a l i s t 
methods of the country. Of course the r e s t of 
the members were outsiders. 
(2) Government Departments which run some of these 
i n d u s t r i e s . There i s no acute problem here. 
Appointment of members follows the State 
regulations• 
(3) Newly created i n d u s t r i e s brought into the public 
sector. The problem here was the lack of experts 
to manage these i n d u s t r i e s . They mainly came 
from Senior o f f i c i a l s i n the C i v i l Service who 
had had long experience and s p e c i a l reputation 
i n managing large-scale organisations and from 
the other important category, U n i v e r s i t y s t a f f . 
I n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply industry, i n B r i t a i n , 
the normal source of appointments of a f u l l - t i m e member 
i s by promotion from the industry i t s e l f . This applies 
within the whole of Area Boards, but not n e c e s s a r i l y 
from within the same Area Board, and include both 
techn i c a l and administrative q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . Appointments 
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are made from within the industry not only for f u l l - t i m e 
membership of an Area Board but also for the posts of 
Deputy-Chairman and Chairman of the E l e c t r i c i t y Council 
Headquarters. I n f a c t the industry has not gone very 
much outside the industry for any appointments. I t i s 
the exception rather than the r u l e . Two examples only 
were given. They are the Chairman of the South Western 
Board who came from the a i r c r a f t industry and the 
Chairman of the South Wales Board who came from the 
Uganda E l e c t r i c i t y Board.(26) 
This would be the normal practice which should 
be followed by a l l other n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s i n 
B r i t a i n . Apart from reasons given above the e l e c t r i c i t y 
supply industry i s involved i n p a r t i c u l a r economic and 
techni c a l problems which seem to be impracticable for 
an outsider to deal with s u c c e s s f u l l y . Although i t 
seems that economic theories can be applied to any 
industry and by any economist, but when we come to the 
p r a c t i c a l application of these theories, a member of the 
board must have a p r a c t i c a l background to contribute i n 
formulating a general policy. Planning and pr i c i n g 
p o l i c i e s i n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply industry are examples. 
(26) Select Committee on Nationalised I n d u s t r i e s 
E l e c t r i c i t y Supply, May 1963 Q 331. 54, 56 and 58. 
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In the Egyptian E l e c t r i c i t y Departments, they 
also have the same r u l e , simply because they follow 
State regulations of recruitment and promotion which 
normally imply that appointments are from within the 
industry* But i n the case of the U.A.R. E l e c t r i c i t y 
Commission some of the members are outsiders* These 
are, the representatives of large consumers, Deputy-
Ministers of the Treasury, Communications and Industry, 
and the Legal Councellor of the Ministry of Public 
Works.(27) In the future, and p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r the 
creation of the Ministry of E l e c t r i c Power i n 1964, 
i t i s expected that a l l f u l l - t i m e members w i l l be 
chosen from within the industry. 
Workers' and Consumers' Representatives. 
In B r i t a i n representation of workers at board 
l e v e l i n the nat i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s has been a 
controversial i s s u e for a long time. D.N. Chester 
gives a b r i e f h i s t o r y of the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of workers 
i n the management of nationalised industries»(28) Two 
dif f e r e n t views have been expressed on t h i s problem. 
G.D.H. Cole believes that i n d u s t r i a l democracy means 
(27) See page 67 
(28) Chester, D.N. Management i n the nat i o n a l i s e d 
in d u s t r i e s Public Administration Vol.30 1952 p.27 
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that when a worker receives orders he must, i f he i s 
to be free, f e e l that these orders come from himself, 
or from some group of which he f e e l s himself to be a 
part, or from some person whose r i g h t to give orders 
i s recognised and sustained by himself and by such a 
group.(29) an annual Labour Party conference i n 
1933 i t was declared that wage earners have a r i g h t 
•which should be acknowledged by law' for d i r e c t 
representation through t h e i r trade unions on the boards 
di r e c t i n g nationalised industries.(30) A.H. Hanson 
states that workers' representatives w i l l normally be 
nominated by the most representative trade unions i n 
the industry i n such a way as to secure representation 
for the main categories into which the labour force i s 
divided. He went on to say that t h i s i s not always 
easy: ' i t may be rather d i f f i c u l t , p a r t i c u l a r l y i f there 
i s a large number of r i v a l overlapping trade unions.(31) 
I t i s true that representation of workers on the boards 
of the nat i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s i s a d i f f i c u l t problem* 
Even trade unions have d i f f e r e n t views. 
(29) I b i d . p.69 
(30) Robson, W.A. (ed) Public enterprise 1937 London, 
p.370. 
(31) Hanson, A.H. Managerial problems i n public 
enterprise, p.49. 
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G.D.H. Cole (32) states that the N-U.R. have the view 
that trade unions 1 representatives must have seats on 
the boards without being obliged to resign from t h e i r 
trade union r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . Against t h i s view the 
N.U.M. preferred to be independent of the N.C.B. They 
suggested that the government had better be l e f t to 
appoint the boards without any dir e c t representation 
of the workers. 
The main c r i t i c i s m against workers' representatives 
i s that t h i s w i l l endanger the e f f i c i e n c y of the industry 
and i n p a r t i c u l a r the i n t e r e s t s of consumers. The 
report of post-war reconstruction i n 19^4 explained 
that the problems which would r i s e from the p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
of the unions and workpeople at a l l l e v e l s of control 
could perhaps not even be foreseen. The tru t h of t h i s 
statement comes from the f a c t that we cannot foresee 
the extent to which the forces of a high s t a f f l e v e l 
i s going to succeed. Nor could we assess what the 
actions of organised labour might be i n the event of 
success. However, the Report made one point quite 
c l e a r t that i t would not be i n the i n t e r e s t s of workers 
of a nationalised industry to have as d i r e c t 
(32) Cole, G.D.H. Labour and s t a f f problems under 
n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n , P o l i t i c a l Quarterly Vol.21, 1950 
p . l 6 l . 
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representatives of them, members of the controlling 
board who would be committed to j o i n t decision. I t 
w i l l be e s s e n t i a l , they added, not only for the 
maintenance and improvement of the standards and 
conditions of the workpeople but because of the power 
of independent c r i t i c i s m that they can exert, that the 
trade unions s h a l l maintain t h e i r complete independence. 
From the di f f e r e n t views discussed above, one 
could conclude that d i r e c t representation of workers' 
representatives may lead to undesirable e f f e c t s upon 
the general p o l i c y of the board. F i r s t , the danger 
feared for consumers' i n t e r e s t s which can be summed up 
i n the question, 'higher wages or lower p r i c e s . ' 
Secondly, i t could be argued that a board member should 
be concerned f u l l y with a l l problems i n the industry 
including workers and consumers problems. I t may be 
expected that a workers' representative w i l l be i n 
favour of human problems even i f i t i s against other 
i n t e r e s t s . I t has been claimed that even ex-trade 
union leaders, should they be members, are expected 
to behave as though they were s t i l l employed by the 
union. The reasonable solution to t h i s problem i s 
that which i s c l e a r l y stated i n the n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n 
Acts. Among the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s accepted for membership 
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i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n i n the organisation of workerw. One 
should add that such a member should not n e c e s s a r i l y 
be an ex-trade unionist, but i n any case he should be 
a member who has had q u a l i f i c a t i o n s i n the organisation 
of labour and other problems of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . 
I n addition he should be a member whom the workers are 
s a t i s f i e d that he w i l l look a f t e r t h e i r problems. 
In Egypt, the problem can be examined within 
two types of boards. There are boards which carry 
o v e r a l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for building the whole economy 
and for supervising the public sector and secondly, 
boards of public companies and organisations which 
manage the various i n d u s t r i e s . There i s no evidence 
that workers are represented on boards of the former 
type. Those of the l a t t e r type, workers and employees 
are granted the p r i v i l e g e of being represented on the 
boards of directors of each public company or 
organisation by two members elected by a secret ballot.(33) 
This r i g h t prevents the trade union's intervention i n 
the matter. They have thus been described as "they are 
no longer groupings for the se i z i n g of r i g h t s or defence 
of i n t e r e s t s i n opposition to employers but have become 
(33) National Bank of Egypt, Economic B u l l e t i n Vo.XTV 
No.2 1961 p.11. 
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centres of or the concentration of workers and 
parliaments for the expression of t h e i r opinions; 
unions are no longer charitable s o c i e t i e s helping the 
dis t r e s s e d and treating the s i c k - they must become 
centres of revolutionary instruments for pushing the 
wheels of production. n(3^) 
I t i s too earl y to foresee the economic 
consequences of the Egyptian experiment of giving two 
seats to the workers on every board of public companies 
consisting of seven members only. The general d i r e c t i o n 
on the problem i n the B r i t i s h case stated above cannot 
be applied on the Egyptian case, because of completely 
di f f e r e n t environments. But one may think that 
representation of workers here i s merely a s o c i a l i s t 
view to give the workers some of t h e i r r i g h t s . But 
from the managerial point of view i t may be against 
the autonomy of the board required to formulate a major 
policy. 
Consumers' Associations as a source of membership 
presents a more d i f f i c u l t problem. The main d i f f i c u l t y 
l i e s between two points of view. One i s that the 
consumer's councils should have one or more o£ t h e i r 
(3k) Al-Ahram a l - i g t i s a d i . 1. December 196l Quoted by 
Issawi, C. Egypt i n revolution, New York 1963 p.196 
I l l 
executives as members on the board, the other i s that 
complete independence of these councils ensures the 
effectiveness of th e i r r o l e to safeguard the consumer's 
i n t e r e s t s . The Herbert Committee investigating the 
problem i n the B r i t i s h e l e c t r i c i t y supply industry f i n d 
a value from the presence of the consumer's council's 
chairman i n the Area Board. They state that t h i s 
'enables him to appreciate the background of the 
board's p o l i c i e s and to influence these p o l i c i e s on 
the consumer's behalf i n t h e i r formative stages.(35) 
Against t h i s view A.B. G r i f f i t h s t ates that one of 
the main defects i n consumer councils' r e l a t i o n s h i p 
with the boards i s that they are too c l o s e l y linked 
which i s a weakness i n the suggestion that consumer's 
representatives should s i t on the boards of the 
corporations.(36) Also Professor Robson r e f e r s to the 
recommendation of the Chambers Committee that the 
Secretary of the Transport User's Consultative 
Committee for London should not be from the s t a f f of the 
London Transport Executive. This w i l l ensure the 
(35) Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the 
E l e c t r i c i t y Supply Industry Comd./9672 January, 1956 
para. k5k 
(36) G r i f f i t h , L.A.G* The voice of the consumer The 
P o l i t i c a l Quarterly 1950, Vol. 21, p.178. 
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independence of the committee. He also r e f e r s to the 
Labour Party statement on the same problem which w i l l 
r e s u l t i n a c o n f l i c t of the Secretary's i n t e r e s t , a 
c o n f l i c t between h i s career and fighting the board on 
behalf of the consultative c o u n c i l . He f i n a l l y suggests 
that 'one way of avoiding these d i f f i c u l t i e s i s to 
appoint able c i v i l servants on l o c a l government o f f i c e r s 
e i t h e r shortly before or soon a f t e r they have r e t i r B d ' .(37) 
A.H. Hanson's view on the problem i s that consumers of 
the product of a n a t i o n a l i s e d industry are not an 
organised body. The various organisations such as 
chambers of commerce, l o c a l government a u t h o r i t i e s , 
i n d u s t r i e s which purchase the products, co-operative 
s o c i e t i e s and so on are not s a t i s f a c t o r y representatives. 
He quotes Bye's opinions saying 'under these circumstances, 
the law either designates the categories of consumer to 
be represented, or leaves i t to Governments to name, 
at i t s d i s c r e t i o n , the representatives of the consumers. 
The disadvantage of the former procedure i s that i t i s 
a r b i t r a r y , while the disadvantages of the l a t t e r i s 
that i t permits the Government to increase the number 
of i t s own representatives.(38) The question I am 
(37) Robson, W.A. Nationalised industry and public 
ownership, p.264 
(38) Hanson, A.H. Managerial problems i n public 
enterprise p.49-50 
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concerned with, regarding t h i s problem, i s whether to 
adopt the device that the consumer council's chairman 
should s i t on the board, and whether t h i s would 
strengthen the voice of the consumer regarding any 
complaint; or should consumers' councils be independent 
for the sake of t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , from whatever categories 
they are formed into? 
The present management i n the B r i t i s h 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply industry, i n which the chairman of 
the Consumer Consultative Council, i s a part-time 
member i n the Area Board, does not prove that the 
consumer has any power. This i s made cl e a r from an 
answer by R.H.M. Barkham, Deputy Chairman of Yorkshire 
E l e c t r i c i t y Board, given i n 1962. The question was, 
what power has a consumer to force the E l e c t r i c i t y 
Authority to supply e l e c t r i c i t y within the statutory 
voltage l i m i t s of plus or minus 6%.. In the long answer 
to t h i s question, he stated ' I do not think, i f we are 
honest, (the consumer) has any r e a l power at a l l . ' ( 3 9 ) 
But t h i s does not mean that we should abandon the idea 
of representing Consumers' at the board. I n f a c t , the 
evidence above shows that i t i s important to strengthen 
the Consumer's voice i n the board e s p e c i a l l y where 
worker's i n t e r e s t s are already represented. 
(39) Summer school, E l e c t r i c i t y Council publications, 
1962 p.72 
Ilk 
In Egypt, there i s nothing mentioned i n the 
na t i o n a l i s a t i o n Republican Decrees about consumers' 
representation on the board. Nor i s there enough 
known about consumers' councils as a whole. 
The question of whether members of Parliament 
and Ministers should s i t on the board or not, i s 
d i f f e r e n t l y answered between B r i t i s h and Egyptian 
public enterprises. While i n B r i t a i n Members of 
Parliament are d i s q u a l i f i e d from s i t t i n g on public 
boards, i n Egypt there i s no statutory l e g i s l a t i o n 
which indicates that they should not. Also while 
Ministers i n B r i t a i n are not allowed to be members 
of public boards, i t i s already practised i n Egypt 
as we have seen i n the case of the E.D.O. and the 
U..A.R. E l e c t r i c i t y Commission. With regard to Members 
of Parliament, they are not i n a position to be useful 
as board members. One of the reasons given by A.H. 
Hanson i s 'from the very nature of h i s job, he i s 
susceptible to pressures from i n t e r e s t groups, from 
h i s constituency and even from individuals who want 
jobs for themselves or t h e i r r e l a t i o n s . ( 4 0 ) For t h i s 
reason one should say that t h i s p r i n c i p l e must not be 
applied i n the Egyptian public enterprises. 
(40) Hanson, A.H. Managerial problems i n public 
enterprise p.53 
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For Ministers i t i s a d i f f e r e n t matter - while 
i n B r i t a i n , the p r i n c i p l e w i l l reduce the autonomy of 
the boards they are fighting for, i n Egypt i t w i l l not 
p r a c t i c a l l y make any difference. The r e l a t i o n between 
public enterprises and Ministers concerned i n Egypt i s 
f a r greater than that i n B r i t a i n . Also i t may be of 
n e c e s s i t y to some types of public enterprises that the 
Minister should be a chairman as i n the Development 
Organisations. This w i l l f o s t e r decisions of national 
economic planning which are the main functions of these 
organisations• 
The work of f u l l - t i m e and part-time members. 
In the l a s t section sources of membership were 
discussed. The f i r s t part, i . e . from within the 
industry or from other sources was mainly applied to 
f u l l - t i m e members. The second part, i * e . for workers 
and consumers associations, was applied to both f u l l -
time and part-time members. In t h i s section the work 
of both categories of members w i l l be examined. 
In a pamphlet by the Acton Society Trust 'the 
men of the boards', i t i s shown that the twelve boards 
under review were manned by 47 f u l l - t i m e and 48 part-
time members.(4l) Of course the proportions between 
(41) Op.Cit. No.4 1951 p.4 
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these two c l a s s e s d i f f e r from one public board to 
another. While the Coal Board consists of eight 
f u l l - t i m e and four part-time members, the Gas Council 
consists of two fu l l - t i m e and twelve part-time members. 
The l a t t e r are the twelve Area Board's chairmen. 
This difference depends on the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between the functional board and the policy-making 
board. In B r i t a i n , there i s no purely functional 
board or purely policy-making board among the public 
boards. But the assumption i s , i f the majority of 
the members are fu l l - t i m e appointees, the board i s 
nearly functional, and policy-making i f the majority 
of the board are part-time members. Again t h i s 
p r i n c i p l e i s not universal.. For instance the T.V.A. 
Board i n the U.S.A. consists of three f u l l - t i m e 
members none of whom has functional r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . ( 4 2 ) 
However, the main i n t e r e s t here i s to examine the work 
of these members within t h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . To s t a r t 
with the fu l l - t i m e members: i n a functional board a 
fu l l - t i m e member i s ultimately responsible for a 
p a r t i c u l a r department or group of departments i n the 
industry according to the various aspects of the 
(42) Hanson, A.H. Managerial problems i n public 
enterprise p.40 
117 
industry's work. For example i n the constitution of 
the National Coal Board recommended by the Fleck 
Report, every f u l l - t i m e member except the Chairman 
and the Deputy-Chairman i s responsible for a s p e c i f i c 
department. There are f u l l - t i m e members for production 
and reconstruction for marketing, for purchasing and 
stores, for finance, for i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , f or 
s t a f f and for s c i e n t i f i c a f f a i r s . Such a functional 
board can be c r i t i c i s e d on the following points: 
F i r s t , the f u l l - t i m e members w i l l bring too much 
d e t a i l to discussion at the top which may be a waste 
of the board's time. Secondly, a s p e c i a l i s e d member 
may be unable to take a broad view on the general 
p o l i c y of the enterprise and, t h i r d l y , there i s a 
p o s s i b i l i t y that decisions w i l l be made by a process 
of rather unprincipled compromise along the l i n e s of 
' I w i l l support what you want i f you w i l l support 
what I want.' (43) Thus the whole concept of 
functionalism could be damaged i f these c r i t i c i s m s 
appear or have any force. A lesson from private 
enterprise can be given from one of the most successful 
private enterprises i n B r i t a i n , Unilever Limited. In 
t h i s company the maximum number of direc t o r s i s 
(43) Hanson, A.H. Managerial problems i n public 
enterprise p.39 
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twenty-five. A l l members o f the board are f u l l - t i m e , 
each with a managerial appointment i n the enterprise 
i n addition to t h e i r post on the board. But to avoid 
the f i r s t c r i t i c i s m , above, there i s a s p e c i a l 
committee appointed by the board consisting of a few 
members who are freed from a l l routine executive 
duties.(44) The idea here i s based on the assumption 
that a fu l l - t i m e member who s i t s on the board table 
to discuss the general policy must not i n practice 
be the head of the department or departments which 
he supervises. There must be an executive, at the 
head of each department, responsible for i t s day-to-day 
management. Limitation of the duties of the fu l l - t i m e 
member must be s p e c i f i e d to ensure that a c l e a r policy 
i s l a i d down to cover the whole work of the departments 
coming within h i s sphere of i n t e r e s t . He would also 
have to be s a t i s f i e d with the organisation of s t a f f i n g 
and progress of such departments.(45) 
The work of the f u l l - t i m e member i n a policy-
making board i s d i f f e r e n t . He has not a functional 
(44) Bonham, A.D. The case of Unilever Limited, Business 
enterprise by Edwards, R., and Townsend, H. 
London, 1958 p.338. 
(45) Robson, W.A. Nationalised industry and public 
ownership p.227. 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . His duty on the board i s to deal w i t h 
s p e c i f i c problems concerning the i n d u s t r y beside the 
ge n e r a l p o l i c y . I n t h i s case he should come from 
w i t h i n the i n d u s t r y . For example i n the t r a n s p o r t 
i n d u s t r y f u l l - t i m e members should be p r o f e s s i o n a l 
t r a n s p o r t men who have to come up i n the s e r v i c e . They 
are a l s o expected to be exper t s i n some f i e l d s of 
t r a n s p o r t . 
I n doing h i s work, a f u l l - t i m e member i s 
expected to g i v e up a l l h i s o u t s i d e jobs such as 
d i r e c t o r s h i p s and other p a i d commercial or trade union 
p o s t s . H i l d a Kahn emphasised the importance of t h i s 
statement by s a y i n g t h a t the I r o n and S t e e l Act of 
1953 foreshadowed the p o s i t i o n which s t a t e s t h a t 
•the whole concept of f u l l - t i m e s e r v i c e has thus 
become r a t h e r e l a s t i c and the l i n e between f u l l and 
pa r t - t i m e has become f u r t h e r b l u r r e d by the c r e a t i o n 
of what may w e l l become a new category of most-of-
the-time p o s t s . ( k 6 ) 
Turning to e l e c t r i c i t y , i t seems t h a t the 
p r i n c i p l e of f u n c t i o n a l i s m i s a p p l i e d i n the C e n t r a l 
E l e c t r i c i t y Generating Board i n B r i t a i n . Apart from 
(46) Kahn, H.R. Payments f o r p o l i t i c a l and p u b l i c 
s e r v i c e , P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n v o l . 32, 195^ p.190. 
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the chairman who e x e r c i s e s an o v e r a l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , 
a l l f u l l - t i m e members have f u n c t i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . 
There are f u l l - t i m e members r e s p o n s i b l e f o r en g i n e e r i n g , 
f o r o p e r a t i o n s and personnel, f o r f i n a n c e and 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and f o r r e s e a r c h and development. Even 
the Deputy-Chairman i s f u n c t i o n a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r 
commercial t r a d i n g and n u c l e a r h e a l t h and safety.(47) 
The ' B r i t i s h ' E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l and the Area 
Boards are d i f f e r e n t . The former, as a policy-making 
body, has only one f u l l - t i m e member apar t from the 
Chairman and Deputy-Chairman. He has no departmental 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . An Area Board too has only the 
Chairman and Deputy-Chairman as f u l l - t i m e members, w i t h 
no f u n c t i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 
The r o l e of part-time members i n the boards of 
p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s i n B r i t a i n i s an important one. 
They a r e n e a r l y equal i n number to f u l l - t i m e members. 
I n B r i t i s h n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s , i t i s a u n i v e r s a l 
p r a c t i c e t h a t the M i n i s t e r appoints a group of p a r t -
time members to each board. The g e n e r a l i d e a about 
the p a r t - t i m e post i s to b r i n g to the board from the 
ou t s i d e world f r e s h i d e a s and wide experience i n 
(47) Turner, E . J . The Generating Board - o r g a n i s a t i o n 
and development, summer sch o o l E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l 
London, 1962 p.8. 
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p u b l i c a f f a i r s . The work of the part-time members 
was c o n s i d e r e d by the Herbert Committee as of g r e a t 
n e c e s s i t y to the e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y . The 
Report d e s c r i b e d them as being men who can b r i n g f r e s h 
i d e a s and uncommitted minds to bear on the problems of 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply; men who may not know a l l the answers 
but who w i l l ask the r i g h t q u e s t i o n s , men whose 
presence w i l l s t i m u l a t e a h e a l t h y d i s c i p l i n e on the 
e x e c u t i v e and s e c u r e t h a t any p r o j e c t which may have 
been i l l - c o n s i d e r e d i s r e j e c t e d . ( 4 8 ) I n j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
of t h i s p r i n c i p l e the Committee recommended t h a t the 
Chairmen of the Area E l e c t r i c i t y Boards should be 
appointed f o r part-time duty only.(49) I n f a c t , t h i s 
recommendation cannot be accepted because i t works 
a g a i n s t the p r i n c i p l e of 'from w i t h i n the i n d u s t r y ' 
exam-ied i n the l a s t s e c t i o n . Also the Chairman of 
the Area Board must devote a l l h i s time to major 
p o l i c i e s i n the board, without being committed to other 
occupations o u t s i d e the e l e c t r i c i t y supply f i e l d , as i s 
mentioned above i n the I r o n and S t e e l A ct. 
(48) Op.Cit. £mnd.' - 9672 1956 para. 277 
(49) I b i d p a r a . 2 8 l 
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The Committee i t s e l f was not sure of the 
s u c c e s s of t h i s recommendation. They say i n the same 
paragraph t h a t 'we do not suggest t h a t a l l Area Board 
Chairmen's posts could be converted to p a r t - t i m e 
appointments overnight; but we c o n s i d e r t h a t an e a r l y 
s t a r t should be made i n one or two boards as opportunity 
o f f e r s . ( 5 0 ) However, the recommendation was not 
adopted by the 1957 Act although there i s no s t a t u t o r y 
requirement t h a t the Chairmen of Area Boards s h a l l be 
f u l l - t i m e members. The importance of the work of p a r t -
time members i s a l s o r e c o g n i s e d by other a u t h o r i t i e s . 
For example, i n a Report of the S e l e c t Committee on 
N a t i o n a l i s e d I n d u s t r i e s , B r i t i s h R a i l w a y s 1960, the 
Commission j u s t i f i e d the p r i n c i p l e of appointing p a r t -
time members on Area Boards on the ground t h a t such men 
w i t h t h e i r wider experience w i l l be able to b r i n g to 
the r a i l w a y s * a f f a i r s the v a l u e of t h e i r c o n t a c t w i t h 
other i n d u s t r i e s . ( 5 1 ) The F l e c k Report on the Coal 
i n d u s t r y a s s i g n e d an important r o l e to pa r t - t i m e 
members, t h a t i s a p a r t from a d v i s i n g the board t h a t 
they would a d v i s e the M i n i s t e r on the s e l e c t i o n of 
f u l l - t i m e members. T h i s p r i n c i p l e w i l l be examined i n 
(50) I b i d p a r a . 2 8 l 
(51) op.cit. H.C. 254 a 1776 
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the next s e c t i o n . 
I f the r o l e of part-time members has t h i s 
importance, they a r e expected i n c a r r y i n g out t h e i r 
job to give much of t h e i r time to the board. T h i s 
was remarked by the Report on the N a t i o n a l i s e d 
I n d u s t r i e s , B..O.A.C. 1964, t h a t a part-time board 
member who j u s t comes to one meeting a month and is3 
not seen again u n t i l the next board meeting i s q u i t e 
u s e l e s s . Members, on j o i n i n g the board, should give 
50 days a year i n d i s c u s s i n g the board's a f f a i r s . T h i s 
would enable them to take a g r e a t e r i n t e r e s t i n the 
c o r p o r a t i o n and a t the same time they would be a v a i l a b l e 
f o r committee meetings.(52) Supporting t h i s view 
Kelf-Kohen says t h a t partr*time members could p l a y a 
v a l u a b l e p a r t i l l the f u n c t i o n of the board on c o n d i t i o n 
t h a t they give up some of t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o u t s i d e 
the board. But comparing them w i t h the f u l l - t i m e 
members, he concluded t h a t part-time members would not 
have a s u f f i c i e n t knowledge about the problems of the 
i n d u s t r y because of t h e i r l a c k of d e t a i l e d knowledge. 
T h e r e f o r e they a r e not of g r e a t v a l u e to the board. 
They w i l l only have a marginal i n f l u e n c e and the ' p u b l i c 
w i l l be m i s l e d i f they assume t h a t the presence of th r e e 
(52) Op.Cit. H.C. 240-1 a 453 
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of f o u r part-time members on a board w i l l make any 
d i f f e r e n c e to the p o l i c y of a n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r y . ( 5 3 ) 
One should agree t h a t i f part-time members do 
not g i v e much of t h e i r time to the board they a r e 
s e r v i n g , they would not be of g r e a t v a l u e . T h i s i s 
l o g i c a l l y a p p l i c a b l e to any other j o b . A l s o , i t i s 
t r u e t h a t they a r e not comparable w i t h the f u l l - t i m e 
members re g a r d i n g t h e i r valie to the board. But t h i s 
would not reduce t h e i r important r o l e assuming t h a t 
they give s u f f i c i e n t time to the i n d u s t r y ' s problems. 
An example of the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s of p a r t - t i m e members 
working i n the C e n t r a l E l e c t r i c i t y Generating Board i n 
B r i t a i n g i v e s us an i n d i c a t i o n of t h e i r v a l u e to the 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y . They a r e : 
(1) the pa s t p r e s i d e n t of the Royal I n s t i t u t e of 
B r i t i s h A r c h i t e c t s who has a wide r e p u t a t i o n and 
a p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t i n questions of amenity 
and who may give a g r e a t d e a l of help on matters 
of s i t i n g power s t a t i o n s and t r a n s m i s s i o n l i n e s . 
(2) a member of the I . C I . who has a s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t 
i n f i n a n c e problems.. 
(3) sax e x - r e g u l a r s o l d i e r w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l e 
i n d u s t r i a l and b u s i n e s s e x p e r i e n c e , 
(53) Kelf-Kohen, R. N a t i o n a l i s a t i o n i n B r i t a i n , 
London, 1958 p.205 
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(A) a member of the N a t i o n a l Coal Board who has a 
wide experience and knowledge of labour r e l a t i o n s 
and r e p r e s e n t i n g an i n d u s t r y whose op e r a t i o n s a r e 
so c l o s e l y connected w i t h the Generating Board.(54) 
There i s no doubt t h a t these members can give 
a v a l u a b l e c o n t r i b u t i o n i n d i s c u s s i n g the board's 
a f f a i r s . 
Also i n the E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l or any of the 
Area Boards, part-time members a r e expected to b r i n g 
to the board's t a b l e t h e i r o u t s i d e experience i n 
d i f f e r e n t economic and t e c h n o l o g i c a l spheres, and the 
views of d i s t r i b u t i o n t r a d e s , housewives, t r a d e unions 
e t c . But they should not r e p r e s e n t any p a r t i c u l a r 
i n t e r e s t or s e c t i o n i n the community.(55) 
The whole problem of f u l l - t i m e and pa r t - t i m e 
members i n the Egyptian p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s can be 
d i s c u s s e d w i t h i n two main types of boards. Development 
O r g a n i s a t i o n s which are mainly policy-making i n 
c h a r a c t e r , u s u a l l y c o n s i s t of part-time members only. 
These a r e M i n i s t e r s , Senior o f f i c i a l s i n C i v i l S e r v i c e , 
U n i v e r s i t y S t a f f , and D i r e c t o r s of other o r g a n i s a t i o n s . 
(54) S t a f f o r d , A.H. The Generating Board and i t s work, 
Summer school E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l , 19&3 p.12 
(55) S e l e c t Committee on N a t i o n a l i s e d I n d u s t r i e s , 
E l e c t r i c i t y Supply Vol.11. Minutes of Evidence 
H.C. 256-11 May, 1963 &. 71 and 78 
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The t h r e e main examples are the E.D.O., E l - N a s r 
O r g a n i s a t i o n and Misr O r g a n i s a t i o n . The second type i s 
p u b l i c companies which have boards c o n s i s t i n g wholly of 
f u l l - t i m e members. T h i s i s understood from the 
Re p u b l i c a n Decree which s t a t e s t h a t no-one i s allowed 
i n h i s p e r s o n a l c a p a c i t y or on b e h a l f of another person, 
to be a member of more than one j o i n t s t o c k company. 
I n the Egyptian e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y , 
i t i s found t h a t members of the U.A.R. E l e c t r i c i t y 
Commission are working on a par t - t i m e b a s i s , but there 
i s no evidence about the members of boards of the 
E l e c t r i c i t y Departments. 
S e l e c t i o n of members. 
I n the previous s e c t i o n s examination has been 
made of the problems a t t a c h e d to board members both 
f u l l - t i m e and p a r t - t i m e . I f the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s of 
proposed members and the work which they have to c a r r y 
out are known, the question which a r i s e s here i s who 
appoints them and how they should be appointed. 
True, the r o l e of the appointing a u t h o r i t i e s , 
concerning p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s i s of major importance. 
On t h e i r choice of the competent members of the 
e n t e r p r i s e ' s board depends to a g r e a t e r extent the 
s u c c e s s of the e n t e r p r i s e . 
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From the B r i t i s h e xperience, a d i s c u s s i o n w i l l 
be made of the g e n e r a l procedures which have been 
suggested and o t h e r s whereby the s e l e c t i o n of members 
might be made. 
I t i s c l e a r , i n B r i t a i n , t h a t the a p p r o p r i a t e 
M i n i s t e r i s n e a r l y the s o l e power of appointing p u b l i c 
boards' members. Even i n the case of the o l d London 
Passenger T r a n s p o r t Board, the o r i g i n a l B i l l of 
s e t t i n g up t h i s board provided t h a t the appointment 
of members should be done by the M i n i s t e r of T r a n s p o r t , 
but, as Morrison s a y s , the a n t i - s o c i a l i s t views of the 
n a t i o n a l government caused them to provide f o r an 
appointing body c a l l e d the Appointing T r u s t e e s . T h i s 
was introduced i n the L.P.T.B. Act of 1933.(56) The 
Appointing T r u s t e e s procedure was overwhelmingly 
c r i t i c i s e d from a l l s i d e s . Other formal exceptions 
are the boards of the B.B.C and the Bank of England 
of which the Chairman and Governors of the former 
and Governor and D i r e c t o r s of the l a t t e r are appointed 
by the Crown. I n p r a c t i c e these appointments are made 
by the Government of the day. For example, the 
C h a n c e l l o r of the Exchequer i n the case of the Bank of 
England and the Postmaster General i n the case of the 
B * B . C » 
(56) Morrison, H. How London i s Governed. London, 19^9 
p.129 
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The procedure by which the M i n i s t e r should 
s e l e c t the members of p u b l i c boards has been suggested 
by d i f f e r e n t a u t h o r i t i e s . The F l e c k Report on the 
o r g a n i s a t i o n of the coalmining i n d u s t r y suggests t h a t 
the M i n i s t e r before appointing the Chairman, Deputy-
Chairman and the f u l l - t i m e members should seek the 
a d v i c e of pa r t - t i m e members. And before appointing 
part-time members he should c o n s u l t some expe r t s i n 
d i f f e r e n t f i e l d s such as the P r e s i d e n t of the F e d e r a t i o n 
of B r i t i s h I n d u s t r i e s , the Chairman of the T.U.C. and 
the P r e s i d e n t of the B r i t i s h Employees Confederation 
and one or two other persons.(57) T h i s scheme i s 
intended to help the M i n i s t e r i n making the proper 
s e l e c t i o n . But i t can r i g h t l y be c r i t i c i s e d on the 
f o l l o w i n g grounds: 
(1) I n c o n s u l t i n g part-time members, i t w i l l make an 
u n d e s i r a b l e d i s t i n c t i o n between part-time and 
f u l l - t i m e members. I t w i l l a l s o undermine the 
a u t h o r i t y of the Chairman and other f u l l - t i m e 
members and r e s u l t i n d i v i d i n g the board r a t h e r 
than u n i t i n g i t . 
(2) I f p a r t - t i m e members are to be c o n s u l t e d because 
they know those who w i l l be s e l e c t e d , the 
(57) Report of the Advisory Committee on o r g a n i s a t i o n , 
N.C.B.. Jan. 1955 para 62 and 63 
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weakness i s t h a t n a t u r a l l y the Chairman, Deputy-
Chairman and other f u l l - t i m e members are expected 
to know those i n d i v i d u a l s b e t t e r than p a r t - t i m e 
members, s i n c e f u l l - t i m e members spend t h e i r 
whole time s e r v i n g the e n t e r p r i s e and knowing 
c l o s e l y those i n d i v i d u a l s * The c r i t i c i s m i s 
p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e i f the p r i n c i p l e of 'from 
w i t h i n the i n d u s t r y ' i s a p p l i e d , u n l e s s the 
M i n i s t e r t h i n k s of appointing an o u t s i d e r i t 
could be d e s i r a b l e to c o n s u l t any of the p a r t -
time members* But as a r u l e i t i s c e r t a i n l y 
u n a d v i s a b l e * The P o l i t i c a l Q u a r t e r l y concludes 
i t s c r i t i c i s m of the method by say i n g ' i t i s 
strange indeed t h a t the v o i c e of the part-time 
members should be sought i n making the h i g h e s t 
appointments•(58) 
The proposal of c o n s u l t i n g a group of exper t s 
i n appointing part-time members i s based on the i d e a 
t h a t such i n t e r m e d i a t e channels are supposed to make 
up, i n view of the M i n i s t e r ' s l i m i t e d knowledge, a panel 
of names submitted by the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the 
consuming p u b l i c , trade unions e t c * The Acton S o c i e t y 
T r u s t , w h i l e i t d i s a g r e e s w i t h the Appointing T r u s t e e s 
(58) Op.Cit. Notes and comments V o l . 26 1955 p.103 
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of the L.P-T•B., suggested a permanent appointing 
commission to help the M i n i s t e r i n t h i s t a s k * The 
concept i s s i m i l a r l y based on the i d e a t h a t the 
M i n i s t e r who i s f u l l y occupied i s bound to be l i m i t e d , 
both i n h i s knowledge of p o s s i b l e c a n d i d a t e s , and i n 
the number of such candidates he has time to approach.(59) 
A more p r a c t i c a l method i s given by Simon. He 
say s t h a t i f the M i n i s t e r i s to make a wise appointment 
i t i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t he should, w i t h the help of h i s 
a d v i s o r s , know r a t h e r i n t i m a t e l y the p e r s o n a l i t i e s and 
the problems of the board. T h i s may happen by c l o s e 
r e l a t i o n s between the M i n i s t e r , h i s s e n i o r o f f i c i a l s , 
the Chairman and l e a d i n g members of the board, not only 
by formal meetings, when n e c e s s a r y , but by a good d e a l 
of i n f o r m a l c o n t a c t . 'In appointing a f u l l - t i m e member 
the M i n i s t e r should ask the e x i s t i n g board f o r advice 
no doubt through the chairman. I f he f i n d s t h a t the 
whole boards - Chairman, e x e c u t i v e and p a r t - t i m e -
a r e unanimously i n favour of a c e r t a i n nomination, then, 
so long as he has confidence i n the Board, he would 
n a t u r a l l y accept t h a t nomination.(60) 
A s i m i l a r method i s proposed by a Labour P a r t y 
p u b l i c a t i o n by which the M i n i s t e r should seek the a d v i c e 
(59) Op.Cit. The men on the boards No. k. 1951 p . l 8 
(60) Simon of Wythenshawe, Lord The boards of 
n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s 1957 Hanson, A.H.(ed.) 
N a t i o n a l i s a t i o n p.l93« 
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of the Board i n s e l e c t i n g a new f u l l - t i m e member, 
because the M i n i s t e r who appoints the chairman and 
members should have s u f f i c i e n t confidence i n t h a t 
board to ask t h e i r a d v i c e . I n t h i s r e s p e c t P r o f e s s o r 
Robson t h i n k s t h a t i t may or may not be t r u e t h a t the 
M i n i s t e r who appoints the chairman and members should 
have s u f f i c i e n t confidence i n t h a t board. The M i n i s t e r 
i n o f f i c e i s not often r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the e x i s t i n g 
members of the board concerned or some of them. And 
even i f he does appoint them he may not be s a t i s f i e d 
w i t h the r e s u l t which may change h i s op i n i o n . For 
these reasons the M i n i s t e r should be l e f t f r e e to 
c o n s u l t whoever he c o n s i d e r s w i l l g i ve him the b e s t 
a d v i c e . (.61) 
To t h i s s c hool of thought belongs the Herbert 
Committee which c o n s i d e r s the s t a t u t o r y requirement 
under the E l e c t r i c i t y Act of 19^7 to c o n s u l t the 
C e n t r a l A u t h o r i t y before making the appointment of the 
f u l l - t i m e members as 'unnecessary, damaging to morale 
and suggests t h a t i t should be a b o l i s h e d . The Committee 
a l s o recommends t h a t the M i n i s t e r should be l e f t f r e e to 
c o n s u l t any a u t h o r i t y or i n d i v i d u a l he c o n s i d e r s 
n e c e s s a r y f o r nominations.(62) 
(61) Robson, Op.Cit. - p.220 
(62) Op.Cit. para 319. 
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The d i s c u s s i o n above shows a wide d i f f e r e n c e 
among p o i n t s of view. From the a n a l y s i s of these 
views one could argue t h a t the concept of c o n s u l t i n g 
p a r t - t i m e members i n appointing f u l l - t i m e members 
seems to be u n p r a c t i c a b l e owing to the disadvantages 
examined above. Other permanent i n t e r m e d i a t e channels 
as suggested by the Acton S o c i e t y T r u s t are a l s o 
unfavourable, because they are not expected to be f u l l y 
aware of the i n d u s t r y ' s problems, e s p e c i a l l y i n t e r n a l . 
But, on the other hand, the M i n i s t e r cannot be l e f t 
c ompletely f r e e to s e l e c t the members. The reason i s 
t h a t the numbers nominated by him are so g r e a t t h a t 
no one i n d i v i d u a l can know i n t i m a t e l y such numbers to 
s e l e c t the most s u i t a b l e person. Thus the method of 
Simon which i m p l i e s t h a t the M i n i s t e r should c o n s u l t 
the e x i s t i n g board f o r f u l l - t i m e nomination can be 
adopted. The only m o d i f i c a t i o n to t h i s method i s t h a t 
i t i s not n e c e s s a r i l y t h a t the board should be 
unanimously i n favour of the new member, because i t i s 
not p r a c t i c a l l y easy to f i n d the whole board unanimously 
i n favour of a c e r t a i n i n d i v i d u a l . T h i s i s one of the 
human problems. Thus i f the m a j o r i t y of the board a r e 
i n favour of a c e r t a i n appointment, the author t h i n k s 
i t w i l l work w e l l . 
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I t i s r i g h t t h a t the M i n i s t e r i n appointing a 
f u l l - t i m e member may c o n s u l t i n f o r m a l l y the Chairman 
of the board concerned. The Chairman i n t u r n may take 
the a d v i c e of the other f u l l - t i m e members. The e f f e c t 
of t h i s method i s t h a t the Chairman and f u l l - t i m e 
members know from the r e p o r t s of the s e n i o r o f f i c e r s i n 
the i n d u s t r y the b e s t man who could be promoted and 
t h i s w i l l to a g r e a t e r extent ensure a harmonious board. 
The Chairman, the f u l l - t i m e members and s e n i o r o f f i c e r s 
i n the i n d u s t r y would know v e r y w e l l the new member and 
be happy wi t h h i s views and t a l e n t . 
For part-time members, one could adopt what i s 
a l r e a d y a p p l i e d i n the B r i t i s h e l e c t r i c i t y supply 
i n d u s t r y . The Chairman of the board makes a suggestion 
to the M i n i s t e r of one or two people who w i l l provide 
the n e c e s s a r y balance of q u a l i f i c a t i o n s a t the board.(63) 
T h i s i s emphasised by the evidence of the S e l e c t 
Committee which shows t h a t the m a j o r i t y of recommendations 
f o r s e l e c t i n g p a r t - t i m e members comes from the 
Chairman.(64) 
I n Egypt the procedure of s e l e c t i n g board members 
of p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s has a d i f f e r e n t h i s t o r y and a t 
(63) S e l e c t Committee on N a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s 
E l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y , Minutes of Evidence 
May, 1963 a.71 
(64) I b i d . CL.81 
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pr e s e n t i s l a i d down by d i f f e r e n t l e g i s l a t i o n from 
the B r i t i s h methods. 
When most p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e s came under p u b l i c 
ownership i n 19-61, i t was d i f f i c u l t f o r the a p p r o p r i a t e 
M i n i s t e r s to undertake the appointment of the members 
of the whole p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s * boards. So i t was 
s t a t e d i n the n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n laws t h a t the P r e s i d e n t 
of the R e p u b l i c would i s s u e a Republican Decree 
i n d i c a t i n g the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a competent A d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
A u t h o r i t y . One of the f u n c t i o n s a u t h o r i s e d to t h i s 
A u t h o r i t y was to r e l i e v e the o l d managing d i r e c t o r , 
Chairman of the board of d i r e c t o r s and some or a l l 
members of the board of any of these newly n a t i o n a l i s e d 
undertakings and appoint a p r o v i s i o n a l board, a 
managing d i r e c t o r or a delegate having the powers of a 
board of d i r e c t o r s pending the appointment of a new 
board. The A u t h o r i t y was a l s o a u t h o r i s e d to r e l i e v e 
any of these new D i r e c t o r s or boards and appoint another. 
The o b j e c t i o n a g a i n s t t h i s method may be the 
same as t h a t made a g a i n s t the permanent i n t e r m e d i a t e 
channels suggested i n the B r i t i s h c a s e . But, i t may be 
claimed i n supporting t h i s method t h a t the l a r g e number 
of companies which had to be n a t i o n a l i s e d made i t 
i m p o s s i b l e f o r the M i n i s t e r concerned to do the 
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nominations even w i t h the assistance o f advisors he 
wanted t o c o n s u l t . The A d m i n i s t r a t i v e A u t h o r i t y was 
the o n l y s o l u t i o n t o deal w i t h a long l i s t o f companies 
of v a r i o u s types, aims and s i z e s . A f t e r the 
r e - o r g a n i s a t i o n of p u b l i c undertakings which c l a s s i f i e d 
them under groups, each group o f i n d u s t r i e s concerned 
w i t h one economic a c t i v i t y , and supervised by a 
competent M i n i s t e r , ( 6 5 ) i t may be d e s i r a b l e t o give the 
M i n i s t e r the power t o s e l e c t the members a f t e r 
c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the e x i s t i n g board o f the i n d u s t r y 
concerned, as suggested i n the B r i t i s h example. But i t 
would be i m p r a c t i c a b l e t o apply t h i s method on such a 
case where the M i n i s t e r supervises n i n e p u b l i c 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s c o n t r o l l i n g 168 p u b l i c companies,(66) each 
having a board of D i r e c t o r s c o n s i s t i n g o f seven members. 
I n t h i s case a permanent committee i s i m p o r t a n t . 
I n o t h e r examples i n the Egyptian p u b l i c 
e n t e r p r i s e s the a p p r o p r i a t e M i n i s t e r has a s t a t u t o r y 
power t o nominate or sanction the appointment of members. 
For example, i n a Decree amending law No. 71 o f 1961 
o r g a n i s i n g the Cotton Exporting O r g a n i s a t i o n , the M i n i s t e r 
o f Economy w i t h regard t o the s a i d O r g a n i s a t i o n can 
(65) Appendix g 
(66) Appendix £ as i n the case of the M i n i s t e r o f 
I n d u s t r y . 
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r e l i e v e the managing d i r e c t o r s from t h e i r duty and 
appoint a temporary board or a managing d i r e c t o r or a 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e w i t h a l l the powers of the board o f 
d i r e c t o r s . Another example i s found i n the case o f 
the f i r s t Commercial Bank e s t a b l i s h e d by the 
Government. The law concerning t h i s bank s t a t e s t h a t 
a t l e a s t t h r e e members o f i t s board must be Government 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . The nomination o f them, the managing 
d i r e c t o r s and the pr e s i d e n t o f the board are sanctioned 
by the M i n i s t e r o f Finance. There i s no evidence about 
the procedure of t h e i r appointment. 
The President of the U.A.R. i s another a u t h o r i t y 
i n a p p o i n t i n g members o f some p u b l i c boards, f o r 
example, members o f the E.D-O.-'s board are chosen by 
him. Also p u b l i c companies i n which the E.D.O. owns 
more than 25% of the c a p i t a l , the present o f each of 
the company's boards or the managing d i r e c t o r s or 
d i r e c t o r general are nominated by the President of the 
Republic. The procedure o f nomination i s t h a t the 
President o f the Republic s h a l l take h i s d e c i s i o n from 
among three candidates chosen by the board of the 
p u b l i c company, and also he s h a l l take the o p i n i o n of 
the E»D.O.'s board.(67) I t would not be p r a c t i c a b l e 
(67) Appendix % A r t i c l e 12. 
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f o r the President o f the Republic t o have the time t o 
exercise t h i s a u t h o r i t y . Perhaps the Chairman o f the 
E.D.O., who i s a M i n i s t e r , makes these appointments. 
But i n the case o f the E.D.O.. i t s e l f , the President of 
the Republic may s e l e c t a t l e a s t the Chairman who i s 
a M i n i s t e r . 
Whatever happens i n p r a c t i c e i t i s shown here 
t h a t c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the e x i s t i n g board o f the 
i n d u s t r y concerned, no doubt through the Chairman, i s 
adopted i n some of the Egyptian p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s . 
One should conclude t h a t t h i s i s the best method o f 
s e l e c t i o n of members. 
Powers of the boards. 
Once the Board i s appointed by any o f the methods 
discussed i n the previous s e c t i o n , the question a r i s e s 
whether the board w i l l be f r e e i n e x e r c i s i n g i t s 
f u n c t i o n s , and why i t should or should not be f r e e . 
I n B r i t a i n , i t was thought t h a t the c r e a t i o n of the 
p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n would ensure the autonomous o p e r a t i o n 
of the boards, f r e e from m i n i s t e r i a l and p a r l i a m e n t a r y 
comprehensive c o n t r o l . I n f a c t , from the v e r y s t a r t the 
l e g i s l a t i o n which c o n t r o l s p u b l i c boards had n o t given 
complete independence t o the management o f these 
e n t e r p r i s e s . One exception could be recorded, t h a t i s 
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the case of the P o r t o f London A u t h o r i t y which was immune 
from such c o n t r o l . The pre-war c o r p o r a t i o n s such as the 
London Passenger Transport Board or the C e n t r a l 
E l e c t r i c i t y Board had not much more autonomy than the 
post-war ones. The general reason, however, which may 
be given f o r such c o n t r o l i s the d e s i r e of the 
Government through the M i n i s t e r t o use these i n d u s t r i e s 
t o " a s s i s t - x n ~ t h e pl^ihnihg^of " n a t i o n a l " "investmentT or t o 
p a r t i c i p a t e i n the economic s t a b i l i t y of the country.(68) 
The n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t i s an important f a c t o r i n t h i s 
i n t e r v e n t i o n . 
This growing l i m i t a t i o n on the board's economic 
a c t i v i t i e s has narrowed the gap o f the t r a d i t i o n a l 
d i f f e r e n c e between the Government department and the 
p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n . Another reason f o r narrowing the 
gap i s the r e l a t i o n s between the M i n i s t e r and the 
Chairman of the p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n ' s board, i f i t i s as 
c o n f i d e n t i a l as between the M i n i s t e r and h i s Under-
Secretary. Professor Robson observes t h a t there must 
be something s e r i o u s l y wrong because a s i m i l a r i t y 
between the board's Chairman and a permanent head of 
a Department has never been intended.(69) 
(68) Discussed i n d e t a i l i n Chapters 3 and k. 
(69) Robson, W.A* Op.Cit. p . l ^ 
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The main reason f o r these f e a r s about the 
autonomy of the B r i t i s h p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n s i s the 
i n c r e a s i n g powers o f the M i n i s t e r concerned. The 
M i n i s t e r has s t a t u t o r y powers s p e c i f i e d by the Acts 
as w e l l as powers given t o him under the term n a t i o n a l 
i n t e r e s t which can use whenever he wants. I n a d d i t i o n 
the M i n i s t e r also uses i n f o r m a l contact w i t h the 
Chairman of the board t o whom he wants t o g i v e 
d i r e c t i o n s . The r e s u l t of these powers w i l l leave 
v e r y l i t t l e t o the board's d i s c r e t i o n . A.H. Hanson 
s t a t e s i n t h i s context t h a t a l i s t i n g o f the formal 
powers, general and s p e c i f i c might gi v e the impression 
t h a t there was l i t t l e t h a t the i n d u s t r y could do w i t h o u t 
c o n s u l t i n g the M i n i s t e r or o b t a i n i n g h i s approval a t 
one stage or another.(70) 
Fo l l o w i n g the argument about comparison between 
the p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n and Government department, there 
are the day-to-day a f f a i r s i n which i t may be claimed 
t h a t the p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n s have complete freedom or 
a t l e a s t more freedom than a Government department. 
For example, i n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y , the 
d e c i s i o n whether t o i n s t a l l a c e r t a i n k i n d o f t u r b o -
generator or a c e r t a i n k i n d of switchgear or other 
(70) Hanson, A.H. Parliament and p u b l i c ownership 
London 1961 p.39 
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matters a f f e c t i n g the l o c a t i o n o f power s t a t i o n s should 
be r e s i d e d w i t h i n the Board's d i s c r e t i o n . But even 
here t h e r e i s a f e a r t h a t the M i n i s t e r i n t e r f e r s i n the 
day-to-day a f f a i r s o f the p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n . This has 
been, observed by the Economist when d i s c u s s i n g the 
expected r e l a t i o n s h i p between the Chairman o f the 
r a i l w a y board and the new M i n i s t e r . They say t h a t 
n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s are managed from day-to-day by 
p r o f e s s i o n a l s s e v e r a l of whom have been s p e c i a l l y p icked 
f o r t h e i r known i n t o l e r a n c e o f outsi d e i n t e r f e r e n c e . 
Although the Economist emphasised t h a t the Chairman of a 
n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r y ' s board i s v i r t u a l l y immune from 
m i n i s t e r i a l i n t e r f e r e n c e i n day-to-day a f f a i r s , they 
show the strong p o s i t i o n o f the M i n i s t e r r e g a r d i n g these 
a c t i v i t i e s by saying ' i n a c l a s h o f views on p o l i c y a 
M i n i s t e r has o n l y two ways open t o him o f making the 
Chairman of a n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r y do what he does not 
want. One i s t o gi v e the Chairman a w r i t t e n order t o 
do i t , the other i s t o f i n d a new Chairman.(71) 
However, the question now i s , why M i n i s t e r s have 
t h i s s t r o n g p o s i t i o n over the a c t i v i t i e s of the p u b l i c 
boards i n B r i t a i n . There i s a school o f thought which 
s t r o n g l y favours the complete independence o f a p u b l i c 
(71) The Economist 24.10.1964 
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board* They re g a r d the M i n i s t e r as a layman who i s 
u n l i k e l y t o compete w i t h the board and i t s o f f i c e r s 
i n the expert knowledge of t h e i r o p e r a t i o n . According 
t o Frank M i l l i g a n , t h i s o p i n i o n under-estimates the 
i n f l u e n c e of the permanent o f f i c i a l s who advise the 
M i n i s t e r , and they over-estimate the f o o l h a r d i n e s s o f 
the M i n i s t e r s . ( 7 2 ) The r o l e o f the M i n i s t e r i s proved 
by the general philosophy o f n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n which i s 
based on the assumption of p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n these 
u n d e r t a k i n g s . I t may concern investment, employment 
p o l i c y or the e f f e c t of the p u b l i c board's a c t i v i t i e s 
on h e a l t h and p u b l i c w e l f a r e or s t r a t e g i c questions 
i n v o l v i n g output c a p a c i t i e s and s e r v i c e s . I f the 
shareholders i n p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e s look a f t e r these 
i n t e r e s t s , t h e o r e t i c a l l y or i n p r a c t i c e , we have t o 
have somebody t o r e p l a c e the shareholders. This must 
be the M i n i s t e r . I n s e r v i n g the p u b l i c and c o n t r i b u t i n g 
i n the decisions o f p o l i c i e s mentioned, the M i n i s t e r 
has powers, l i m i t i n g the board's movements which could 
be c l a s s i f i e d din three c a t e g o r i e s . 
(72) M i l l i g a n , Frank. M i n i s t e r i a l c o n t r o l o f the B r i t i s h 
n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s , Canadian J o u r n a l o f Econ. 
and P o l . Science 
Hanson, A.H. (e<±) N a t i o n a l i s a t i o n , p. 283 
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(1) S t a t u t o r y powers c l e a r l y d e f i n e d i n the va r i o u s 
Acts* 
(2) Powers expressed as the r i g h t o f the M i n i s t e r 
t o g i v e general d i r e c t i o n s i n the n a t i o n a l 
i n t e r e s t , and 
(3) I n f o r m a l powers by which the M i n i s t e r gives 
d i r e c t i o n s t o the boards by u n o f f i c i a l means, 
such as telephone c a l l s , discussions w i t h the 
chairman e t c . But u s u a l l y these d i r e c t i o n s are 
given under the term ' n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t . ' To 
l i m i t the di s c u s s i o n i t w i l l be d e a l t w i t h i n 
the f i r s t two c a t e g o r i e s . 
S p e c i f i c s t a t u t o r y powers. 
On e x e r c i s i n g these powers the M i n i s t e r may 
choose one o f two ways. E i t h e r t o leave the a c t u a l 
o p e r a t i o n of these f u n c t i o n s t o the board concerned 
assuming t h a t he has complete confidence i n t h e i r 
a b i l i t y or he may supervise the o p e r a t i o n h i m s e l f or 
v i a h i s s u r b o r d i n a t e s . I n the f i r s t case h i s r o l e i s 
j u s t t o s a n c t i o n the Board's decisions but i n the 
second case he s c r u t i n i z e s these d e c i s i o n s . T h i s , o f 
course, depends w h o l l y on the M i n i s t e r ' s own way o f 
d e a l i n g w i t h such m a t t e r s . However, i t seems t h a t 
M i n i s t e r s do not u s u a l l y t r y the f i r s t way. The 
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s t a t u t o r y powers o f the M i n i s t e r v a r y i n number and 
degree o f importance from s t a t u t e t o s t a t u t e , but on 
the whole they cover most of the i n d u s t r y ' s aspects* 
Examples of these are:: 
( l ) One o f the important powers which the M i n i s t e r 
possesses i s t h a t o f approving plans f o r the 
r e - o r g a n i s a t i o n of the i n d u s t r y concerned, 
e s p e c i a l l y when they i n v o l v e a s u b s t a n t i a l 
c a p i t a l expenditure. This includes not o n l y 
the c e n t r a l r e - o r g a n i s a t i o n but als o r e g i o n a l 
ones as i n the gas and e l e c t r i c i t y i n d u s t r i e s . 
Under the coal i n d u s t r y n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n Act 
of 19^6 i t was s t a t e d t h a t i n framing a programme 
of r e - o r g a n i s a t i o n or development i n v o l v i n g 
s u b s t a n t i a l o u t l a y on c a p i t a l account the board 
s h a l l act on l i n e s s e t t l e d from time t o time w i t h 
the approval of the M i n i s t e r . S i m i l a r l y under 
the Transport Act of 19^7 the M i n i s t e r ' s approval 
must be given from time t o time t o the 
Commission's general l i n e s of r e - o r g a n i s a t i o n 
and development.(73) The same power a p p l i e s 
t o the e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y , whereas under 
the E l e c t r i c i t y Act o f 19^7 i t i s the M i n i s t e r ' s 
(73) Hanson, A.H. Parliament & p u b l i c ownership 
London 196l p.35 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o determine questions about 
the exact boundary o f an Area, He a l s o has 
the power t o vary, create and amalgamate Area 
Boards.(74) 
(2) Programmes of pension schemes, t r a i n i n g , 
education and research are some s p e c i f i c aspects 
which must have the approval o f the M i n i s t e r . 
I t should be noted t h a t w h i l e some Acts such 
as coa l and t r a n s p o r t r e q u i r e m i n i s t e r i a l 
approval, others such as e l e c t r i c i t y o n l y 
r e q u i r e c o n s u l t a t i o n between the E l e c t r i c i t y 
Council and the M i n i s t e r . 
t3) F i n a n c i a l c o n t r o l . I t i s the M i n i s t e r ' s power 
u s u a l l y i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the Treasury t o 
c o n t r o l a l l f i n a n c i a l matters of p u b l i c boards. 
The M i n i s t e r and the Treasury r e t a i n annual 
c o n t r o l over the board by f i x i n g the sum 
a v a i l a b l e each year f o r c a p i t a l development. 
I n the Government's view, long term s t a t u t o r y 
l i m i t s of borrowing powers are e s s e n t i a l f o r 
planning the investment programmes demanded by 
great development schemes. I n the B r i t i s h 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y the M i n i s t e r o f 
(74) Op.Cit. Section 4 (2) 
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Fuel and Power and the Treasury have powers 
covering n e a r l y the whole p o l i c y o f f i n a n c e and 
investment. This c o u l d be seen from a l i s t i n g 
of these powers given by the Select Committee 
on n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r y . ( 7 5 ) 
Powers f o r the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t . 
There has been much s a i d about t h i s p o i n t i n 
B r i t a i n . The main c r i t i c i s m of economists §gainst 
t h i s s t a t u t o r y power i s t h a t the ' n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t ' 
i s a vague term. The M i n i s t e r can i n t e r v e n e i n the 
Board's a f f a i r s under t h i s s t a t u t o r y power. The 
n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n Acts make i t c l e a r t h a t the M i n i s t e r 
concerned has powers of general character i n r e l a t i o n 
t o matters which appear t o him t o a f f e c t the n a t i o n a l 
i n t e r e s t . The t r a d i t i o n a l t h e o r y i s t h a t since the 
Government i s r e s p o n s i b l e t o Parliament, a l l 
r e g u l a t i o n s f o r the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t must be performed 
by the head o f one o f the Departments o f S t a t e , i n 
order t h a t he may be made answerable t o Parliament f o r 
what he does. The question here i s how f a r these 
powers a f f e c t the economic dec i s i o n s o f the p u b l i c 
board. 
(75) Select Committee on N a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s , 
the e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y May, I963 
Appendices 64 p.262 
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S t a t u t o r i l y the M i n i s t e r can amend, modify 
or disapprove any p o l i c y i n i t i a t e d and formulated 
by the board f o r the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t . Many examples 
o f i n t e r v e n t i o n s , under t h i s s t a t u t o r y power could be 
found i n the Reports of the Select Committee on 
N a t i o n a l i s e d I n d u s t r i e s . The Committee Reports on 
Airways, (76) Railways (77) and the E l e c t r i c i t y supply 
i n d u s t r y give evidence of such i n t e r v e n t i o n * 
I n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y m i n i s t e r i a l 
i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t i s a p p l i e d as i n 
any o t h e r n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r y . Moreover t h e r e has 
been an agreement f o r some years between the M i n i s t e r 
and the boards by which the l a t t e r should g i v e the 
M i n i s t e r n o t i c e o f proposed changes i n t h e i r t a r i f f s . 
The o b j e c t i s t o enable the M i n i s t e r t o express t o 
the Area Boards any views which the Government may 
have on matter of n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t . The Area Boards 
i n t u r n should g i v e e f f e c t t o such d i r e c t i o n s . ( 7 8 ) 
The i n c r e a s i n g f o r m a l and i n f o r m a l powers of 
the M i n i s t e r and consequently more l i m i t a t i o n s on the 
board's freedom may r e s u l t i n uneconomic d e c i s i o n s . 
(76) May, 1959 H.C. 31^ para 215, 217, 2 l 8 . 
(77) J u l y , 1960 H.C. 254 para 75 & 76. 
(78) Select Committee, H.C. 236 - I I May, 1963 Q 277 
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Examples i n a l l the B r i t i s h n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s 
are r e p o r t e d by many economists and other a u t h o r i t i e s . 
For example, i t was r e p o r t e d t h a t there have been two 
occasions i n the e l e c t r i c i t y i n d u s t r y a t which the 
M i n i s t e r i n t e r f e r e d , i n 1957 and 1958. I n the l a t t e r 
occasion the M i n i s t e r asked f o r a r e d u c t i o n i n the 
bul k supply t a r i f f , a t the time when the Government 
was anxious t o keep p r i c e s down f o r consumers. This 
r e s u l t e d i n a r e d u c t i o n i n revenue by £2 m i l l i o n . ( 7 9 ) 
I t must be mentioned i n connection w i t h t h i s 
problem t h a t l i m i t a t i o n s on the Board's powers apply 
on c e n t r a l and r e g i o n a l ones. To give an example, i n 
the e l e c t r i c i t y i n d u s t r y though Area Boards are by 
s t a t u t e autonomous i n character they are r e s t r i c t e d 
i n t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s by pressure from t h r e e sources. 
F i r s t , the M i n i s t e r has the r i g h t t o give general 
d i r e c t i o n t o any Area Board. Second, the E l e c t r i c i t y 
Council c o n t r o l s most of the Area Boards' a c t i v i t i e s 
according t o the Council's own o p i n i o n or by 
t r a n s m i t t i n g the Government's view and, t h i r d , the 
Consumer C o n s u l t a t i v e Council can als o have, l e g a l l y , 
an e f f e c t on the Area Board's p o l i c y . Under the 
(79) Select Committee on N a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s , 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y May, 1963 Q.. l 4 l 6 . 
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E l e c t r i c i t y Acts 1947 and 1957 a C o n s u l t a t i v e Council 
could make r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s or r e p o r t s t o an Area 
Board. I f the Area Board does not give e f f e c t t o 
such r e p o r t s the C o n s u l t a t i v e Council can ask the 
E l e c t r i c i t y Council t o persuade the Area Board concerned 
t o remedy the d e f e c t . I f t h i s w i l l n ot have the 
expected r e s u l t the C o n s u l t a t i v e Council could l a y the 
matter before the M i n i s t e r . The M i n i s t e r can d i r e c t l y 
g i v e d i r e c t i o n s t o the board i f he t h i n k s i t necessary 
t o solve the problem. 
One could conclude t h a t i f a l l these l i m i t a t i o n s 
on the Board's a c t i v i t i e s e x i s t i n p r a c t i c e , then i t 
would be t r u e t h a t freedom o f the p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n s 
are l i m i t e d t o the extent o f narrowing the gap between 
the t r a d i t i o n a l freedom o f the p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n and 
the Government Department. 
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Conclusion. 
I n t h i s chapter many problems concerning the 
members o f the p u b l i c Boards have been examined. The 
most important p o i n t s o f t h i s d i s c u s s i o n are: 
(.1) I n the whole set of p u b l i c boards i n Egypt and 
B r i t a i n , the boards have d i f f e r e n t aims. Some 
of these boards have s i m i l a r aims i n Egypt and 
i n B r i t a i n , but others are on l y found i n Egypt, 
such as the Economic Development O r g a n i s a t i o n . 
(2) I t i s wrong t o f i x the si z e o f a l l boards 
because number o f members should be r e l a t e d t o 
the n a t u r e o f the i n d u s t r y . I t i s also wrong 
t o f i x the s i z e of one board because t h i s 
would damage the f l e x i b i l i t y of i n c r e a s i n g or 
decreasing the number o f members according t o 
the i n d u s t r y ' s a c t i v i t i e s . 
(3) Acceptable q u a l i f i c a t i o n s o f the members should 
be s t a t e d t o s u i t the nat u r e o f the i n d u s t r y . 
(4) The most important source from which t o s e l e c t 
f u l l - t i m e members i s the i n d u s t r y i t s e l f . I n 
ex c e p t i o n a l cases where no s u i t a b l e q u a l i t i e s 
are a v a i l a b l e i n the i n d u s t r y , the a p p o i n t i n g 
a u t h o r i t y should t r y i n other n a t i o n a l i s e d 
i n d u s t r i e s and l a s t l y i n l a r g e - s c a l e p r i v a t e 
e n t e r p r i s e s . 
Representation of workers i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n 
o f the Board should be c a r e f u l l y s t u d i e d . 
Consumer's r e p r e s e n t a t i o n seems t o be i n e f f e c t i v e 
a t the present t i m e . The i n c r e a s i n g o f consumers' 
vote a t the board i s i m p o r t a n t . 
Members o f Parliament are r i g h t l y d i s q u a l i f i e d 
from being members on the Boards i n B r i t a i n 
which should be f o l l o w e d i n Egypt. But, w h i l e 
by the very nature of the B r i t i s h p u b l i c 
c o r p o r a t i o n M i n i s t e r s are d i s q u a l i f i e d from 
being members, i t i s , i n some Egyptian p u b l i c 
e n t e r p r i s e s , e s s e n t i a l t o l e t M i n i s t e r s head 
the Boards. 
I t i s p r e f e r a b l e t h a t f u l l - t i m e members should 
n o t have f u n c t i o n a l d u t i e s . These d u t i e s should 
be l e f t t o senior o f f i c e r s and heads of the 
departments i n the i n d u s t r y . Also f u l l - t i m e 
members should not occupy other e x t e r n a l j o b s . 
The r o l e of p a r t - t i m e members i s important 
provided t h a t they give s u f f i c i e n t time t o 
discuss the i n d u s t r y ' s problems. 
Although i n t e r m e d i a t e channels, such as a 
procedure o f appointments of members, have been 
s t r o n g l y c r i t i c i s e d i n B r i t i s h p u b l i c 
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c o r p o r a t i o n s , i t h a s been p r o v e d t h a t i t was 
a r e a s o n a b l e method o f a p p o i n t i n g members o f 
a g r e a t number o f n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s i n 
E g y p t . 
The b e s t method f o r s e l e c t i n g f u l l - t i m e members 
s h o u l d be t h r o u g h t h e c h a i r m a n o f t h e b o a r d 
c o n c e r n e d , and an i n f o r m a l c o n t a c t between t h e 
M i n i s t e r c o n c e r n e d and t h e C h a i r m a n . But i n 
c o n s u l t i n g t h e C h a i r m a n and t h e e x i s t i n g b o a r d 
members f o r a new a p p o i n t m e n t i t i s n o t n e c e s s a r y 
t o g e t f u l l agreement o f t h e whole b o a r d . 
I n c o n t r a s t w i t h t h e B r i t i s h e x a m p l e s , t h e 
P r e s i d e n t o f t h e R e p u b l i c o f E g y p t i s one 
a u t h o r i t y i n a p p o i n t i n g t h e Chairman o f some 
B o a r d s • 
The powers o f t h e M i n i s t e r o v e r t h e B r i t i s h 
p u b l i c b o a r d s s h o u l d be c o n f i n e d t o h i s 
s t a t u t o r y powers. O t h e r f o r m a l powers u n d e r 
t h e t e r m ' n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t * s h o u l d be c l e a r l y 
d e f i n e d . And l a s t l y , d a y - t o - d a y a f f a i r s s h o u l d 
be l e f t c o m p l e t e l y t o t h e p u b l i c b o a r d i n o r d e r 
t o e m p h a s i s e t h e i d e a o f t h e p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n ' s 
c r e a t i o n . 
CHAPTER I I I . 
PROBLEMS OF PLANNING. 
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INTRODUCTION » 
P r o b l e m s o f p l a n n i n g . 
I n t h e p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r an e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e 
s t r u c t u r e o f b o a r d s i n p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s h a s been made. 
We a r r i v e d a t c o n c l u s i o n s a b o u t t h e s u i t a b i l i t y o f men 
t o r u n t h e s e b o a r d s s u c c e s s f u l l y . I n t h i s and t h e 
f o l l o w i n g c h a p t e r some o f t h e problems, o f p u b l i c 
e n t e r p r i s e s w i l l be examined w i t h w h i c h t h e s e b o a r d s 
have t o deal., S p e c i a l r e f e r e n c e w i l l be made t o t h e 
e l e c t r i c i t y s u p p l y i n d u s t r y i n B r i t a i n and E g y p t . 
T h e r e i s no doubt t h a t t h e aims o f e v e r y economic 
o r g a n i s a t i o n a r e t o s a t i s f y t h e n e e d s o f i t s c o n s u m e r s . 
To do t h i s , t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n must f i r s t o f a l l p l a n f o r 
t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f p r o j e c t s n e c e s s a r y t o meet t h e demand 
f o r i t s p r o d u c t s . 
To p l a n f o r t h e s e p r o j e c t s t h e b o a r d f a c e s many 
p r o b l e m s . Two o f them w i l l be i n v e s t i g a t e d i n t h i s 
c h a p t e r , t h e s e a r e : manpower p l a n n i n g and f i n a n c i a l 
p l a n n i n g . To examine t h e s e two p r o b l e m s t h e a u t h o r 
f e e l s t h a t i t i s n e c e s s a r y f i r s t t o e x p l a i n t h e 
i m p o r t a n c e o f f o r m u l a t i n g p l a n s , methods o f p l a n n i n g 
and t h e p r o j e c t s w h i c h a r e p l a n n e d t o meet t h e 
c onsumer's demands, e s p e c i a l l y w i t h r e g a r d t o 
e l e c t r i c i t y s u p p l y i n d u s t r y i n B r i t a i n and E g y p t . 
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G e n e r a l l y s p e a k i n g , t h e o b j e c t o f economic 
p l a n n i n g anywhere i s t o u s e t h e n a t i o n a l r e s o u r c e s i n 
t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s o f t h e n a t i o n . F o r t h i s Governments 
o f d e v e l o p e d and u n d e r - d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s a r e r e q u i r e d 
t o f r a m e and c a r r y out c o m p r e h e n s i v e p o l i c i e s , i n v o l v i n g 
a c o n s i d e r a b l e d e g r e e o f d i r e c t i o n and r e g u l a t i o n o f 
economic a c t i v i t i e s . The s c o p e o f g o v e r n m e n t a l a c t i o n 
i n u n d e r - d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s must be more t h a n i n 
d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s . T h i s i s due t o t h e w e a k n e s s o f t h e 
p r i v a t e s e c t o r i n c a r r y i n g out c e r t a i n i m p o r t a n t p l a n s . 
I n E g y p t , f o r example, t h e n a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g p o l i c y aims 
t o d o u b l e t h e n a t i o n a l income e v e r y t e n y e a r s . The main 
p l a n n i n g p r i n c i p l e i s t o d i s t r i b u t e i n v e s t m e n t s among t h e 
v a r i o u s s e c t o r s i n t h e economy i n s u c h a manner a s t o 
p r o d u c e t h e h i g h e s t p o s s i b l e y i e l d , a f t e r a c e r t a i n 
p e r i o d o f t i m e , w h i c h t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r c a n n o t a f f o r d . 
The p l a n n e r s , f o r i n s t a n c e , d e c i d e d t o d i r e c t a p a r t o f 
t h e s o c i e t y ' s income away from e x p e n d i t u r e on consumer 
goods and s e r v i c e s t o i n v e s t i n p r o d u c t i v e c a p i t a l goods. 
T h i s , i n u n d e r d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s , must be done m a i n l y 
by t h e G o v e r n m e n t . ( 1 ) I n B r i t a i n , n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n i s 
one o f t h e e f f e c t i v e t o o l s i n c a r r y i n g out t h e 
( 1 ) F u l l d e t a i l s on t h e f i v e - y e a r p l a n 1 9 6 0 / 6 5 i n E g y p t 
i s e x p l a i n e d by I s s a w i C h a r l e s , E g y p t i n R e v o l u t i o n 
London 1963 p.69 
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government's p l a n s b e c a u s e o f t h e e f f e c t i v e r o l e o f 
t h e Government i n f o r m u l a t i n g t h e n a t i o n a l i s e d 
i n d u s t r i e s ' p l a n s . I n c a r r y i n g out t h e i r p l a n s p u b l i c 
b o a r d s have t o g i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o t h e Government's 
p o l i c y . T h i s i s c l e a r from t h e n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n A c t s , 
w h i c h r e q u i r e t h a t n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s s h o u l d 
s u p p l y a d e q u a t e s e r v i c e t o t h e p u b l i c . To do t h i s 
e v e r y p u b l i c b o a r d h a s t o p l a n i t s p o l i c y programmes 
w e l l i n a d v a n c e t o e n s u r e t h e p r o v i s i o n and m a i n t e n a n c e 
o f an e f f i c i e n t p u b l i c s e r v i c e i n f u t u r e y e a r s . 
Programmes w i t h s o c i a l and economic i m p l i c a t i o n s s h o u l d 
be a d j u s t e d a s much a s p o s s i b l e t o t h e s o c i a l framework 
w i t h i n w h i c h i t w i l l t a k e p l a c e . I n d o i n g t h a t t h e 
i n d u s t r i e s sometimes p l a n f o r uneconomic p r o j e c t s , 
r u r a l e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n b e i n g an o b v i o u s e x a m ple. 
P l a n n i n g i n t h e e l e c t r i c i t y s u p p l y i n d u s t r y 
i n v o l v e s many problems» E l e c t r i c i t y a u t h o r i t i e s must 
s t a r t w i t h a p r e d i c t i o n o f t h e p r o b a b l e demand, w h i c h 
w i l l a r i s e from new consumers t o be c o n n e c t e d and t h e 
i n c r e a s i n g demand o f t h e e x i s t i n g c o n s u m e r s . T h i s i s 
n o t o n l y a p u b l i c r e g u l a t i o n i n most c o u n t r i e s b u t a l s o 
a d u t y , i f t h e i n d u s t r y i s n a t i o n a l i s e d , t o t h e p u b l i c 
t o be s e r v e d . ( 2 ) So e l e c t r i c i t y a u t h o r i t i e s a r e r e q u i r e d 
( 2 ) B e l l a m y , D. The consumer, t h e c r e a t o r o f demand -
t h e n e x t f i v e y e a r s , E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l 1962 p.5» 
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t o make t h e n e c e s s a r y p l a n n i n g t o meet t h i s g rowing 
demand. 
P l a n n i n g schemes i n t h e e l e c t r i c i t y s u p p l y 
i n d u s t r y a r e b a s e d on a number o f s p e c i f i c p u r p o s e s . 
F o r example, t h e r e i s s h o r t - t e r m p l a n n i n g f o r t h e 
o p e r a t i o n o f e x i s t i n g p l a n t s , m i d d l e - t e r m f o r t h e 
p r o v i s i o n o f new p l a n t s and i t s c a p i t a l and p e r s o n n e l 
p r o b l e m s , and l o n g - t e r m p l a n n i n g f o r t h e f u t u r e 
advancement o f new t e c h n o l o g i e s , l o c a t i o n o f g e n e r a t i n g 
s t a t i o n s and t h e i r t y p e s , t h e main t r a n s m i s s i o n l i n e s , 
e s p e c i a l l y t h o s e f o r l o n g d i s t a n c e s and a l s o f i n a n c i a l 
a n d p e r s o n n e l p r o b l e m s o f t h e s e p r o j e c t s * ( 3 ) A c c o r d i n g 
t o t h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , t h e t i m e r e q u i r e d f o r 
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e s e schemes v a r i e s f r o m s i x months 
o r one y e a r i n t h e s h o r t - t e r m , s i x , s e v e n o r e i g h t y e a r s 
a h e a d i n t h e medium t e r m and p r o b a b l y t w e n t y o r more 
y e a r s i n t h e l o n g - t e r m p l a n n i n g . Moreover t h e d i f f e r e n c e 
between t h e s e t e r m s i s due t o t h e t y p e o f work e x p e c t e d 
t o be done. S h o r t - t e r m i s f o r t h e m a i n t e n a n c e and 
r e - i n f o r c e m e n t o f t h e s u p p l y s y s t e m , m i d d l e t e r m i s 
r e q u i r e d f o r t h e d e s i g n , c o n s t r u c t i o n and c o m m i s s i o n i n g 
( 3 ) M e l l i n g , C.T. Long-term p l a n n i n g f o r e l e c t r i c i t y 
s u p p l y . An a d d r e s s g i v e n t o t h e R o y a l I n s t i t u t e 
o f P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n November, 1 9 6 3 E l e c t r i c i t y 
C o u n c i l P a m p h l e t p . 6 . 
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o f g e n e r a t i n g s t a t i o n s and l o n g - t e r m i s r e q u i r e d f o r 
e s t a b l i s h i n g a g r i d o r s u p e r - g r i d s y s t e m i n t h e c o u n t r y . 
T h e s e p l a n s f o r s u p p l y i n g more e l e c t r i c i t y e x i s t 
n o t o n l y b e c a u s e t h e e x p e c t e d demand i s g r o w i n g f a s t b u t 
a l s o t h e e l e c t r i c i t y i n d u s t r y , a s a c o m m e r c i a l u n d e r -
t a k i n g , h a s an i n t e r e s t i n i n c r e a s i n g t h e number o f 
consumers and s e l l i n g more t o t h e e x i s t i n g c o n s u m e r s . 
I n b o t h ways t h e i n d u s t r y c a n e x p a n d . ( 4 ) 
To p l a n f o r e x p a n s i o n i n t h e e l e c t r i c i t y s u p p l y 
demand we have t o l o o k a t t h e g e n e r a l s t a n d a r d o f 
c o n s u m p t i o n i n t h e c o u n t r y , c o n s u m p t i o n p e r c a p i t a , and 
t h e c o n s u m p t i o n o f c a t e g o r y o f consumer. T h i s c a n g i v e 
u s a g e n e r a l b a c k g r o u n d t o t h e s i t u a t i o n i n t h e c o u n t r y 
a s a s t e p t o w a r d s t h e n e c e s s a r y p l a n n i n g . I f we know 
t h e s e p o i n t s i n d e t a i l we c a n p l a n f o r p r o j e c t s a i m i n g 
a t a c h i e v i n g b e t t e r s t a n d a r d i n c o n s u m p t i o n p e r h e a d . 
The h i s t o r y o f e l e c t r i c i t y c o n s u m p t i o n c a n g i v e u s an 
i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e r a t e o f i n c r e a s e i n c o n s u m p t i o n , b u t 
f o r f u t u r e p l a n s we have t o r e v i e w demand p e r i o d i c a l l y 
owing t o t h e e x p e c t e d c h a n g e s . Methods o f e s t i m a t i o n 
w i l l be examined from B r i t i s h e x p e r i e n c e . 
( 4 ) Logan, E.A„ P l a n n i n g t o meet t h e l o a d . 
Summer s c h o o l o f t h e E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l 1962 p.56 
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E l e c t r i c i t y c o n s u m p t i o n t g e n e r a l s u r v e y . 
The p r o d u c t i o n and d i s t r i b u t i o n o f e l e c t r i c i t y 
t h r o u g h o u t t h e w o r l d h a s i n c r e a s e d and i s i n c r e a s i n g 
a t a h i g h r a t e . I n b o t h B r i t a i n and E g y p t , e l e c t r i c i t y 
c o n s u m p t i o n h a s i n c r e a s e d m a r k e d l y . I n B r i t a i n , 
T a b l e 1 shows t h e growth i n number o f consumers and 
c o n s u m p t i o n o f e l e c t r i c i t y i n B r i t a i n between 1 9 2 0 -
1 9 6 2 / 6 3 . 
The t a b l e shows t h a t numbers o f consumers have 
i n c r e a s e d more t h a n l 6 t i m e s w i t h i n about f o r t y y e a r s 
and u n i t s s o l d have i n c r e a s e d about 30 t i m e s . But t h e 
p e r c e n t a g e o f i n c r e a s e o f u n i t s s o l d was much l e s s i n 
c o r r e s p o n d e n c e w i t h t h e p e r c e n t a g e o f i n c r e a s e i n 
numbers o f consumers from 1925 t o 1 9 5 1• From 1955 t o 
1959 p e r c e n t a g e o f i n c r e a s e i n u n i t s s o l d was above 
t h e p e r c e n t a g e o f i n c r e a s e i n numbers o f consumers 
due t o t h e i n c r e a s e o f c o n s u m p t i o n p e r consumer a s 
shown i n Column 3 j and a s i l l u s t r a t e d i n F i g u r e 1 . I n 
f a c t , c o n s u m p t i o n p e r consumer shows an o b v i o u s d e c r e a s e 
from 1925 t o 1 9 5 1 . Columns 6 and 7 show no growth o f 
a v e r a g e a n n u a l c o n s u m p t i o n from 1925 t o 1935 due t o t h e 
w e l l known d e p r e s s i o n . From 1 9 ^ 0 t o 1 9 5 1 t h e r e was a 
s l i g h t g rowth a s i t was war t i m e and t h e n t h e s i t u a t i o n 
h a s i m p r o v e d from 1955 t o 1 9 5 9 • 
TABLE 1 . 
GROWTH OF NUMBERS OF CONSUMERS AND CONSUMPTION 
OF E L E C T R I C I T Y SUPPLY IN B R I T A I N . 
Number o f Consumers 
I n a l l c l a s s e s 
U n i t s s o l d 
Y e a r 
I n d e x 
M i l l i o n 1 9 2 0 = 1 0 0 
I n d e x 
M i l l i o n 1 9 2 0 = 1 0 0 
U n i t s 5 y e a r A v e r a g e 5 y e a r A v e r a g e 
s u p p l i e d growth a n n u a l growth raimtial. 
p e r growth p e r growth 
Consumer M i l l i o n Consumer p«r 
+ u n i t s Consumer 
s o l d 
1920 1 . 0 100 3 6 6 0 100 
1925 1 .8 180 5 5 8 5 153 
1 9 3 0 3 . 8 3 8 0 8 9 3 0 2 4 4 
1935 7 . 5 7 5 0 1 4 2 9 0 3 9 0 
1940 1 0 . 4 io4o 2 3 7 7 5 6 5 0 
1945 1 0 . 8 1 0 8 0 3 0 6 0 1 8 3 6 
1 9 5 0 - 1 1 3 . 1 1310 4 6 5 8 0 1273 
1 9 £ 4 - 5 * 14.9 1490 6 2 4 1 0 1705 
1 9 5 8 - 9 * 1 5 . 2 1 5 2 0 7 8 0 9 8 2 1 3 4 
1 9 6 2 - 3 1 6 . 4 i64o 1 1 5 5 1 7 3156 
3 6 6 0 
3 1 0 3 1925 385 - 5 7 7 - i l l 
2 3 5 0 3345 6 6 9 - 7 5 3 - 1 5 1 
1905 $360 1072 - 4 4 5 - 89 
2 2 8 6 9485 1897 3 8 1 76 
2 8 3 3 6 8 2 6 1365 5 4 7 109 
3556 1 5 9 7 9 3 1 9 6 7 2 3 145 
4 1 8 9 1 5 8 3 0 3 9 5 8 6 3 3 158 
5 1 3 8 1 5 6 8 8 3 9 2 2 949 2 3 7 
7 0 4 4 3 7 4 1 9 9355 1906 477 
+ U n i t s s u p p l i e d p e r consumer a r e t h e r e s u l t o f d i v i d i n g u n i t s s o l d by numbers o f 
co n s u m e r s , w h i c h i s d i f f e r e n t t h a n c o n s u m p t i o n p e r c a p i t a . Numbers o f eonsumers 
a r e t h e p e o p l e who f o o t t h e b i l l . C onsumption p e r c a p i t a i s t o d i v i d e t h e whole 
c o n s u m p t i o n by t h e p o p u l a t i o n . 
* F o u r y e a r s g r o w t h . 
P I G . 1 THE DELATION HKTWKKN INDEX IN NUMBER OK CONSUMKIIS AND INDEX OF UNITS 
OF E L E C T R I C I T Y SOLD BETWEEN 1920 - 1962/3 I N BRITAIN 
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D u r i n g 1 9 6 3 - 4 numbers o f consumers have i n c r e a s e d 
t o 16 , 648 , 096 ( i n E n g l a n d and W a l e s ) . S a l e s o f 
e l e c t r i c i t y d u r i n g t h e same p e r i o d amounted t o 1 2 1 , 5 2 4 
m i l l i o n u n i t s . The r a t e o f i n c r e a s e i n u n i t s s o l d 
depends, i n B r i t a i n , t o a g r e a t e r e x t e n t on t h e w e a t h e r , 
f o r i n s t a n c e , i n 1 9 6 2 - 6 3 t h e i n c r e a s e i n c o n s u m p t i o n 
was 11.4% w h i l e i n 1963-64 t h e i n c r e a s e was much l o w e r 
a t 5 « 2 % . T h i s was a r e s u l t o f t h e c o n t r a s t i n w e a t h e r 
i n t h o s e two y e a r s . ( 5 ) F u t u r e c o n s u m p t i o n o f 
e l e c t r i c i t y i s e s t i m a t e d t o be i n c r e a s e d by 10% p e r 
annum t o a c h i e v e a f i g u r e o f 2 3 0 , 0 0 0 u n i t s by 1 9 7 0 . ( 6 ) 
I n E g y p t t h e r e i s no com p a r a b l e f i g u r e s o f 
gr o w t h o f numbers o f consumers and co n s u m p t i o n o f 
e l e c t r i c i t y , b u t growth o f co n s u m p t i o n c o u l d be 
i l l u s t r a t e d by t h e i n c r e a s e o f e l e c t r i c i t y i n 
p r o d u c t i o n . 
I n E g y p t , e l e c t r i c i t y p r o d u c t i o n h a s a l s o 
i n c r e a s e d a t a h i g h r a t e . As e a r l y a s 1936 t h e whole 
i n s t a l l e d c a p a c i t y was 1 9 4 , 0 0 0 KW g e n e r a t e d f r o m 75 
power s t a t i o n s (15 i n C a i r o o f 8 7 , 5 0 0 KW, 5 i n 
( 5 ) E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l A n n u a l R e p o r t and A c c o u n t s 
1963-64 p a r a 5 0 . 
( 6 ) Marsh, N.F. E l e c t r i c i t y and Economic Growth, 
E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l 1 9 6 4 p . 2 . 
l 6 i 
A l e x a n d r i a o f 4 4,400 KW, 26 i n l o w e r E g y p t o f 3 9 , 7 0 0 Klf 
and 27 i n Upper E g y p t o f 2 3 , 2 0 0 KM.) ( 7 ) From 1954 t o 
1962 t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f e l e c t r i c i t y i n E g y p t h a s i n c r e a s e d 
by more t h a n 11% p e r annum. The f o l l o w i n g 2 t a b l e s c a n 
i l l u s t r a t e t h i s i n c r e a s e . T a b l e 2 shows t h e e v o l u t i o n 
o f p r o d u c t i o n ( w i t h o u t t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n o f t h e Aswan Dam 
h y d r o - e l e c t r i c w h i c h i s c o n f i n e d t o s u p p l y i n g t h e Kima 
f e r t i l i z e r f a c t o r y and t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e High Dam 
p r o j e c t . ) 
TABLE 2 . 
GROWTH OF E L E C T R I C I T Y PRODUCTION I N EGYPT 
WITHOUT THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE ASWAM DAM 
HYDRO-ELECTRIC„ 
Y e a r 
I n s t a l l e d 
c a p a c i t y G e n e r a t e d e n e r g y A n n u a l l o a d 
M..W.. M„K,W.>h. % i n c r e a s e f a c t o r 
1 9 5 4 469 1247 60% 
1955 565 1422 14.0 60% 
1956 596 1548 8 . 9 62% 
1 9 5 7 723 1712 1 0 . 6 63% 
1 9 5 8 7 8 4 1905 11.3 63% 
1959 8 2 7 2 1 2 5 11.6 64% 
1 9 6 0 8 7 4 2 3 8 8 12 . 4 65% 
1 9 6 1 9 6 3 2 7 0 9 13 . 4 65% 
1 9 6 2 963 2 9 3 9 12 . 2 66% 
A v e r a g e 11.8 63% 
( 7 ) The V i e n n a S e c t i o n a l m e e t i n g o f t h e w o r l d power 
c o n f e r e n c e , E n g i n e e r i n g 1938 V o l . 146 page 454. 
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I t c a n be s e e n from t h i s t a b l e t h a t g e n e r a t e d 
e n e r g y h a s b e e n i n c r e a s e d a t an a v e r a g e r a t e o f 1 1 . 7 % , 
t h e a n n u a l l o a d f a c t o r a t an a v e r a g e o f 6 3 » 1 % « The 
r e a s o n f o r a low l o a d f a c t o r i s due t o t h e l a c k o f a 
g r i d s y s t e m , so t h a t g e n e r a t i n g s t a t i o n s a r e n o t y e t 
f u l l y i n t e r c o n n e c t e d . A l l t h e s t a t i o n s have t o keep 
a h i g h e r r e s e r v e c a p a c i t y . 
W i t h t h e i n c l u s i o n o f t h e Aswan Dam p r o d u c t i o n 
t h e f o l l o w i n g T a b l e 3 and d i a g r a m a t i c a l l y i n f i g u r e 2 
shows t h e e v o l u t i o n o f g e n e r a t e d e n e r g y o f t h e whole 
c o u n t r y c l a s s i f i e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e t y p e o f p r o d u c e r s . 
The t a b l e shows a n i n c r e a s e o f s u p p l y from 
1247 M.K.W.h. i n 1 9 5 4 t o 4 , 1 0 0 M.K.W.h. i n 1 9 6 2 . I t 
c o u l d be a l s o n o t i c e d from t h e t a b l e t h a t though t h e 
t o t a l e n e r g y g e n e r a t e d h a s n e a r l y t r e b l e d i n t h e whole 
p e r i o d u n d e r d i s c u s s i o n , y e t t h e e n e r g y g e n e r a t e d and 
s u p p l i e d by t h e C a i r o E l e c t r i c i t y and Gas A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
h a s i n c r e a s e d n e a r l y f o u r t i m e s , b e c a u s e t h e a r e a s e r v e d 
by t h i s O r g a n i s a t i o n i s t h e main c e n t r e o f co n s u m p t i o n 
i n t h e c o u n t r y . G e n e r a t i o n by a l l p r o d u c e r s h a s been 
s l i g h t l y more t h a n d o u b l e d . E s t i m a t i o n o f e l e c t r i c i t y 
p r o d u c t i o n i n 1965 wfl.1 be 6 4 0 0 M.Kw.h. and a f t e r t h e 
f u l l u t i l i s a t i o n o f t h e H i g h Dam w i l l be a p p r o x i m a t e l y 
1 6 , 5 0 0 M.KW.H.(8) 
(8) U.A.R. G e n e r a l C o n g r e s s o f t h e N a t i o n a l U n i o n , t h e 
f i v e y e a r p l a n f o r t h e economic and s o c i a l 
d evelopment o f t h e U.A.R. 1 9 6 O - 6 5 C a i r o 1 9 6 0 p.35 
TABLE 5 . 
EVOLUTION OF GENERATED ENERGY I N EGYPT MILLION K.W.h. 
No. A u t h o r i t y - 1954 55 56 57 5 8 59 6 0 6 1 62 % 
1 C a i r o E l e c t r i c i t y Gas 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 2 2 1 2 6 3 356 426 5 2 0 6 1 7 7 9 4 9 2 7 1 0 5 1 376 
2 N a t i o n a l i s e d S o c i e t e 
E g y p t i e n n e d ' E l e c t r i c i t e 178 2 0 0 I83 197 2 0 9 2 1 7 199 195 2 2 0 24 
3 A l e x a n d r i a E l e c t r i c i t y & G a s 
O r g a n i s a t i o n 184 2 1 1 2 2 6 2 5 9 2 9 1 303 332 466 452 146 
4 M u n i c i p a l i t i e s 97 107 1 1 1 110 104 1 0 2 i l l 112 102 5 
5 I n d e p e n d e n t E l e c t r i c Power 
S t a t i o n s ( U t i l i t i e s ) 82 94 96 86 83 86 92 89 73 - 1 1 
6 Aswan Dam - - - - - 2 5 0 1003 1 1 6 1 3 6 4 
7 M e c h a n i c a l & E l e c t r i c a l Dept. 
M a i n l y I r r i g a t i o n & D r a i n a g e 79 100 108 117 140 183 2 1 2 2 3 8 300 2 8 0 
8 I n d u s t r i a l Companies 406 4 4 7 468 5 1 7 5 5 8 6 1 7 648 6 8 2 741 83 
9 T o t a l o f U-A.R. 1247 1422 1548 1712 1905 2 1 2 5 2 6 3 8 3 7 1 2 4 1 0 0 2 2 9 
F I G . 2 EVOLUTION OF ENERGY GENERATION IN EGYPT 
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Though t h e a n a l y s i s shows t h a t f i g u r e s a r e n o t 
p r e c i s e l y c o m p a r a b l e t h e y show t h a t i n b o t h c o u n t r i e s 
e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r 1954 p r o d u c t i o n and c o n s e q u e n t l y 
c o n s u m p t i o n o f e l e c t r i c i t y have i n c r e a s e d c o n s i d e r a b l y . 
C o nsumption p e r c a p i t a . 
The a v e r a g e c o n s u m p t i o n o f e l e c t r i c i t y p e r head 
p r o v i d e s a measure f o r co m p a r i n g i n d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s . 
C o n s u m p t i o n p e r head i s i n f l u e n c e d by s u c h f a c t o r s a s 
s i z e o f p o p u l a t i o n , c l i m a t e , t h e s t a n d a r d o f l i v i n g , 
d e g r e e o f i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n and t h e p o t e n t i a l i t i e s o f 
t h e c o u n t r y . The l a t t e r f a c t o r i s one o f t h e main 
e l e m e n t s w h i c h f a v o u r s c o u n t r i e s w i t h h y d r o - e l e c t r i c 
power r e s o u r c e s . T h i s c o u l d be shown from a c o m p a r i s o n , 
done by t h e E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l 1 9 6 0 / 6 1 , between g r o u p s 
o f c o u n t r i e s i n c l u d i n g B r i t a i n . From F i g u r e 3 i t i s 
s e e n t h a t c o n s u m p t i o n p e r c a p i t a i s a t a h i g h e r r a t e 
i n c o u n t r i e s w i t h l a r g e development o f h y d r o - e l e c t r i c 
power s u c h a s Norway, and S w i t z e r l a n d . I t c o u l d a l s o 
be n o t i c e d t h a t i n s p i t e o f t h e abundance o f cheap 
h y d r o - e l e c t r i c power i n t h e c o u n t r i e s m e n t i o n e d , B r i t a i n 
r a n k s f a i r l y h i g h i n c o n s u m p t i o n o f e l e c t r i c i t y p e r 
h e a d . I t amounted t o 2005 KWh p e r c a p i t a i n 1959 and 
i t i s i n c r e a s i n g a t an a v e r a g e a n n u a l r a t e ( f r o m 1950 
t o 1 9 6 0 ) o f 10.5% a s shown i n F i g u r e 4 . 
KWh 
8000r 
FIG. 3 THE ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA 
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I n Egypt consumption p e r c a p i t a has i n c r e a s e d 
i n t h e l a s t decade a t a m a r k e d l y h i g h r a t e , due t o t h e 
i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n i n t h e c o u n t r y and t h e r i s e o f 
t h e s t a n d a r d o f l i v i n g . I n 1936 t h e average consumption 
per head was 20 KWh pe r y e a r . A f t e r n e a r l y 20 y e a r s , 
consumption p e r c a p i t a was 66 KWh.(9) 
From t h e r e c e n t a v a i l a b l e d a t a , T a b l e 4 shows 
g e n e r a t e d energy p e r c a p i t a f r o m 1952 t o 1962 and t h e 
e s t i m a t e d f i g u r e s f r o m 1965 t o 1980.(10) 
T A B L E : 4. 
P E R C A P I T A G E N E R A T E D E N E R G Y I N E G Y P T 
Years 1952 1960 1962 1965 1970 1980 
KWh. 47 102 145 210 350 700 
The n o t i c e a b l e f e a t u r e i n t h i s t a b l e i s t h e sharp 
i n c r e a s e i n g e n e r a t e d power p e r c a p i t a i n t h e y e a r s 
f r o m 1952 t o 1962 w h i c h i s a t an average a n n u a l Bate 
o f 9.8%m 
I n c omparison w i t h B r i t a i n , i t c o u l d be n o t i c e d 
t h a t c o nsumption p e r c a p i t a i n B r i t a i n i s much h i g h e r 
t h a n i n Egypt. For example, w h i l e i n B r i t a i n c o n sumption 
( 9 ) U n i t e d N a t i o n s , The development o f m a n u f a c t u r i n g 
i n d u s t r y i n E g y p t , I s r a e l and T u r k e y , New York 
1958 p.18 
(10) Generated energy c o u l d be comparable w i t h 
c o n s u m p t i o n , t a k i n g i n t o a c c o u n t t h e p e r c e n t a g e 
o f t r a n s m i s s i o n l o s s e s . 
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per c a p i t a i n 1959 was 2005 KWh, i n Egypt i t was near 
90 KWh per y e a r . The average r a t e o f i n c r e a s e i n 
consumption p e r c a p i t a i n Egypt i s l o w e r t h a n i n 
B r i t a i n . For example, i n t h e e i g h t y e a r s 1952-60 t h e 
i n c r e a s e i n B r i t a i n was 9*5% ( F i g u r e 5) w h i l e i n Egypt 
i n t h e e i g h t y e a r s 1952-60 t h e r a t e was 7%» 
The average r a t e o f i n c r e a s e i n c onsumption p e r 
c a p i t a i n E g y p t , w h i l e i t appears t o be r e a s o n a b l e i n 
a d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r y , compared w i t h a d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r y 
l i k e B r i t a i n , i s , i n f a c t , r e l a t e d t o a g r e a t e r e x t e n t 
t o t h e new i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n schemes i n t h e l a s t decade 
o r so, and o t h e r c a t e g o r i e s o f consumers do n o t 
c o n t r i b u t e much i n t h i s p e r c e n t a g e . D e t a i l s a r e 
d i s c u s s e d below. 
Consumption by consumers' c a t e g o r i e s . 
The p l a n n e r i n t h e e l e c t r i c i t y s u p p l y i n d u s t r y 
must know t h e r o l e o f each c a t e g o r y o f consumer i n 
o r d e r t o programme f o r p l a n t e x p a n s i o n . The l e v e l o f 
demand o f each c a t e g o r y and t h e e x p e c t e d i n c r e a s e by 
them a r e i m p o r t a n t f o r s u c c e s s f u l p l a n n i n g . T h i s i s 
because e l e c t r i c i t y r e q u i r e m e n t s d i f f e r f r o m one 
c a t e g o r y t o a n o t h e r . The c a p a c i t y o f a power p l a n t , t o 
be p l a n n e d f o r , w o u l d d i f f e r g r e a t l y between a h e a v i l y 
i n d u s t r i a l a r e a and an a r e a where commercial consumers 
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o r f a r m i n g consumers a r e t h e dominant p a r t . I n 
B r i t a i n t h i s c o u l d be d e s c r i b e d i n a ( F i g u r e 6) showing 
t h e s a l e s t o t h e main c l a s s e s o f consumers d u r i n g t h e 
l a s t t e n y e a r s (1954/55 t o 1963 / 6 4 ) . The p l a n n e r may 
t a k e a l s o i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e i m p o r t a n t changes i n 
t h e r a t e s o f g r o w t h o f t h e d i f f e r e n t consumer c l a s s e s , 
w h i c h have an e f f e c t on p l a n n i n g t o meet t h e s e changes. 
Such changes i n B r i t a i n a r e p r e s e n t e d i n T a b l e 5» 
The t a b l e shows t h a t d u r i n g 1963 /64 t h e r a t e o f 
i n c r e a s e o f d o m e s t i c and c o m m e r c i a l consumers was l o w e r 
t h a n i n r e c e n t y e a r s , whereas s a l e s t o i n d u s t r y went 
up f a s t e r . C o n s i d e r a t i o n o f changes o f t h i s c h a r a c t e r 
i s n e c e s s a r y f o r economic p l a n n i n g , assuming t h a t t h e r e 
a r e some areas w h i c h a r e m a i n l y i n d u s t r i a l , c o m m e r c i a l 
o r d o m e s t i c . Thus i f i t i s e x p e c t e d t h a t t h e s t a n d a r d 
o f l i v i n g i s g o i n g t o r i s e , t h e r e w i l l be an i n c r e a s e 
i n commercial and domestic c o n s u m p t i o n . T h i s i s a 
r e s u l t o f improvements i n l i g h t i n g and d i s p l a y 
f a c i l i t i e s on t h e commercial s i d e , and an i n c r e a s e i n 
consumers' e x p e n d i t u r e on t h e do m e s t i c s i d e . The same 
p r o p o s i t i o n a p p l i e s t o t h e i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r . An 
e x p e c t e d e x p a n s i o n o f c e r t a i n i n d u s t r i e s , such as 
c h e m i c a l , i r o n and s t e e l and g e n e r a l e n g i n e e r i n g 
i n d u s t r i e s must r e s u l t i n an i n c r e a s e i n e l e c t r i c i t y 
T A B L E 5. 
UNITS SOLD TO CONSUMERS I N BRITAIN. 
Average 
U n i t s s o l d MK¥h a n n u a l 
Consumer 
C l a s s i f i -
c a t i o n 5 7 / 5 8 
% o f 
t o t a l 6 1 / 6 2 
% o f 
t o t a l 6 3 / 6 4 
°A- o f 
t o t a l 
% i n c r e a s e over p r e v i o u s 
6 3 / 6 4 6 2 / 6 3 6 1 / 6 2 6 0 / 6 1 
y e a r 
5 9 / 6 0 
i n c r e a s e 
i n con-
s u m p t i o n 
over t h e 
p e r i o d 
1 9 5 7 / 5 8 -
1 9 6 3 / 6 4 
Domestic 2 2 1 0 8 3 0 . 4 3 5 9 6 2 3 4 - 7 4 5 1 5 8 3 7 . 2 3 . 6 2 1 . 2 1 3 . 7 1 7 . 6 7*9 
Farm 1279 1 .8 1923 1 .9 2 3 0 3 1 .9 2 . 8 1 6 . 6 7 . 3 1 8 , 3 1 . 2 




1032 1 . 4 1 7 4 l 1 .7 2 0 8 1 1 .7 3 . 5 1 5 . 5 1 0 . 5 14 . 2 9 . 6 
1 0 . 9 % 
I n d u s t r i a l 3 7 0 0 0 5 0 . 9 48443 4 6 . 7 5 3 1 3 7 4 3 . 7 6 . 8 2 . 7 3 . 6 8 . 3 1 2 . 9 
P u b l i c 
L i g h t i n g 6 3 0 0 . 9 8 5 2 0 . 8 969 0 . 8 5 . 8 7 . 4 8 - 0 8 . 2 8 . 0 
T r a c t i o n 1552 2 . 1 1 6 6 1 1 .6 1773 1 .4 - 6 . 6 7 . 4 5 . 4 1 .8 2 . 3 
T o t a l 7 2 6 6 1 1 0 0 . 0 IO3685IOO.O 1 2 1 5 2 4 1 0 0 . 0 5 . 2 1 1 . 4 7 . 9 1 2 * 1 9 . 8 
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consumption i n area s where t h e s e i n d u s t r i e s a r e l o c a t e d 
o r p l a n n e d . 
I n Egypt t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f e l e c t r i c i t y c onsumption 
a c c o r d i n g t o t h e main c l a s s e s o f consumers i s shown i n 
Tab l e 6 and F i g u r e ( 7 ) . 
TABLE 6» 
CLASSIFICATION OF ENERGY CONSUMPTION ACCORDING TO PURPOSE 
(WITHOUT THE CHEMICAL FACTORIES I N ASWAN) I N 1958, 1962 
AND ESTIMATE FOR 1964. 
1958 1962 1964 
Purpose 
M i l l i o n 
KWh 
%. M i l l i o n % 
KWh 
M i l l i o n %. 
KWh 
Average 
a n n u a l 
i n c r e a s e 
i n con-
s u m p t i o n 
1958-64 
I n d u s t r i e s 1092 6 2 % 1750 66% 2610 70% 
R e s i d e n t i a l , 
p u b l i c 
u t i l i t i e s & 
p u b l i c 
l i g h t i n g 
468 26% 636 24% 900 24% 
15.6% 
I r r i g a t i o n & 
Drainage 120 7% 160 6% 150 4% 
T r a c t i o n 85 5% 104 k% 75 2% 
I t i s shown i n t h e t a b l e and f i g u r e 7 t h a t i n d u s t r i a l 
consumers consume most o f t h e e l e c t r i c i t y p r o duced i n 
r e c e n t y e a r s . The t a b l e shows a l s o t h a t w h i l e 
i n d u s t r i a l c onsumption i s i n c r e a s i n g a t a h i g h r a t e o f 
g r o w t h , o t h e r c l a s s e s show a c l e a r a b s o l u t e and r e l a t i v e 
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decrease i n t h e i r c o n sumption. T h i s i s a r e s u l t o f 
new i n d u s t r i a l developments i n t h e c o u n t r y consuming 
more t h a n t w o - t h i r d s o f e l e c t r i c i t y g e n e r a t e d * 
I n t h e comparison between t h e r a t e o f consumption 
o f t h e main c l a s s e s between B r i t a i n and E g y p t , i t c o u l d 
be n o t i c e d f r o m t h e a n a l y s i s above t h a t , w h i l e 
i n d u s t r i a l consumers i n B r i t a i n i n 1964 show a 
p e r c e n t a g e o f 43.7%, i n Egypt t h e y a r e e s t i m a t e d t o 
s h a r e about 70% o f t h e t o t a l c o n s u m p t i o n . I n c o n t r a s t 
w i t h t h i s , c o m m e r c i a l , d o m e s t i c , and p u b l i c l i g h t i n g 
i n 1964 consume i n B r i t a i n a h i g h p e r c e n t a g e o f 53»02& 
whereas i n Egypt t h e y a r e e s t i m a t e d t o share 24S£» T h i s 
i s due t o t h e wide d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e s t a n d a r d o f 
l i v i n g w h i c h i n f l u e n c e t h e consumption o f t h e s e c l a s s e s , 
as e x p l a i n e d above. T r a c t i o n i n b o t h c o u n t r i e s consumes 
a s m a l l p e r c e n t a g e o f t h e t o t a l . 
I t c o u l d be a l s o n o t i c e d t h a t t h e average a n n u a l 
r a t e o f i n c r e a s e o f consumption o f a l l c a t e g o r i e s 
between 1958 - 1964 i s h i g h e r i n Egypt t h a n i n B r i t a i n . 
The r a t e i n Egypt i s a p p r o x i m a t e l y 15.6% w h i l e i n 
B r i t a i n i t i s 10.9%» 
I n d u s t r i a l c o n s u m p t i o n . 
E l e c t r i c i t y as a f u e l i n i n d u s t r y has been used 
as e a r l y as 1904 i n t h e I r o n and S t e e l i n d u s t r y i n 
B r i t a i n , I n r e c e n t y e a r s t h e improvement o f 
t e c h n o l o g i e s , a u t o m a t i o n and new methods o f o p e r a t i o n -
t h e main f a c t o r s f o r h i g h e r p r o d u c t i v i t y depend on 
e l e c t r i c i t y s u p p l y . 
I n B r i t a i n , i n d u s t r i a l c onsumption o f 
e l e c t r i c i t y has i n c r e a s e d by a r a t e s l i g h t l y l e s s t h a n 
7"^ %- a n n u a l l y over t h e decade 1952-62, w h i l e t h e i n c r e a s e 
i n t h e i n d e x o f p r o d u c t i o n was s l i g h t l y more t h a n 3%» 
On t h e b a s i s o f t h e 4% g r o w t h , an i n c r e a s e i n 
i n d u s t r i a l p r o d u c t i o n by 6.8% as e s t i m a t e d by N.E.D.C., 
r e q u i r e s t h e e l e c t r i c i t y s u p p l y i n d u s t r y t o p l a n f o r a 
9% g r o w t h o f i n d u s t r i a l e l e c t r i c i t y c o n s u m p t i o n . ( 1 1 ) 
T h i s means t h a t s u p p l y has t o be more t h a n d o u b l e d i n 
t e n y e a r s . The i n c r e a s e i n i n d u s t r i a l c onsumption 
a r i s e s f r o m t h e e x p a n s i o n o f modern i n d u s t r i e s u s i n g 
r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e amounts o f e l e c t r i c i t y . The l a r g e s t 
i n d u s t r i a l consumers o f e l e c t r i c i t y i n B r i t a i n a r e t h e 
c h e m i c a l and a l l i e d t r a d e s , i r o n and s t e e l , e n g i n e e r i n g 
and e l e c t r i c a l goods and c o a l m i n i n g . They consume 
n e a r l y h a l f o f t h e t o t a l e l e c t r i c i t y s o l d t o i n d u s t r y . 
T a b l e 7 shows t h e t o t a l s a l e s i n 1963 /64 t o t h e main 
i n d u s t r i a l g r o u p i n g s i n B r i t a i n . I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e 
(11) Edwards, R.., The E l e c t r i c i t y s u p p l y i n d u s t r y . 
The p r e s e n t p o s i t i o n and aims f o r t h e f u t u r e 
E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l 1964 p.6 
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l a r g e r i n d u s t r i e s m e n t i o n e d , t h e t a b l e shows SL n o t a b l y 
h i g h e r p e r c e n t a g e o f use o f e l e c t r i c i t y i n v e h i c l e and 
t e x t i l e i n d u s t r i e s . 
TABLE 7> 
GROUPING OF INDUSTRIAL- CONSUMPTION I N BRITAIN 
1963 - 64"T 
I n d u s t r y group Share o f i n d u s t r i a l 
s a l e s 1963-64 
% 
Gas w a t e r e t c . 
Coal m i n i n g . 
Other m i n i n g & q u a r r y i n g , 
b r i c k s , p o t t e r y , g l a s s 
cement e t c . 
I r o n & S t e e l . 
N o n - f e r r o u s m e t a l . 
Chemicals & a l l i e d t r a d e s * 
S h i p b u i l d i n g & marine 
e n g i n e e r i n g . 
E n g i n e e r i n g e t c . 
V e h i c l e s . 
M i s c e l l a n e o u s m e t a l 
i n d u s t r i e s • 
T e x t i l e s , l e a t h e r & 
c l o t h i n g -
Footi, d r i n k & t o b a c c o . 
Paper p r i n t i n g & p u b l i s h i n g . 
C o n s t r u c t i o n . 
















T o t a l 100.0 
Chemical i n d u s t r i e s a r e t h e l a r g e s t consumers 
o f e l e c t r i c i t y , and a r e e x p e c t i n g t o use more 
e l e c t r i c i t y i n t h e f u t u r e . A s i g n i f i c a n t f e a t u r e o f 
t h i s e x p a n s i o n i s t h e g r o w i n g dependence on such 
t h i n g s as p l a s t i c s and manmade f i b r e s , w h i c h r e q u i r e 
l a r g e amounts o f power t o produce t h e e q u i v a l e n t o f 
t r a d i t i o n a l m a t e r i a l . The e x p e c t e d i n c r e a s e i n 
demand o f i r o n and s t e e l i n d u s t r y w i l l come f r o m t h e 
r e p l a c e m e n t o f t r a d i t i o n a l f u r n a c e s w i t h e l e c t r i c 
f u r n a c e s . I t i s c l a i m e d t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n c e between 
t h e c o s t o f e l e c t r i c i t y and o t h e r forms o f f u e l , i n 
t h e s t e e l i n d u s t r y , has been so red u c e d t h a t p r o d u c t i o n 
o f t h e common v a r i e t i e s o f s t e e l u s i n g e l e c t r i c f u r n a c e s 
has become a commercial r e a l i t y . ( 1 2 ) 
I n Egypt t h e i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r has,as me n t i o n e d 
above, absorbed t h e maj o r p a r t o f e l e c t r i c i t y p r o d u c e d . 
Most o f t h e e l e c t r i c i t y used i n m a n u f a c t u r i n g i n Egypt 
i s p r oduced by t h e i n d u s t r i a l p l a n t s f o r t h e i r own 
con s u m p t i o n . As i n B r i t a i n t h e l a r g e s t consumers o f 
e l e c t r i c i t y i n E g y p t i a n i n d u s t r i e s a r e t h e f e r t i l i z e r 
and s t e e l i n d u s t r i e s . The Kima f e r t i l i z e r f a c t o r y a t 
Aswan consumes most o f t h e g e n e r a t e d e n e r g y f r o m t h e 
(12) K i n g R o b e r t s o n . The s u p p l y i n d u s t r y ' s 
p e r s p e c t i v e s , The n e x t f i v e y e a r s , E l e c t r i c i t y 
C o u n c i l , 1962 p.53 
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h y d r o - e l e c t r i c power s t a t i o n a t Aswan. (The f a c t o r y 
i s s t i l l n o t w o r k i n g a t f u l l c a p a c i t y . ) Other 
i n d u s t r i e s a r e a l s o i n c r e a s i n g t h e i r demand f o r 
e l e c t r i c i t y , e s p e c i a l l y t h o s e l o c a t e d i n C a i r o and 
A l e x a n d r i a . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e a v a i l a b l e d a t a t h e whole 
i n d u s t r i a l c onsumption i n Egypt has i n c r e a s e d as shown 
i n T a b l e 8. 
TABLE 8. 
INDUSTRIAL CONSUMPTION I N EGYPT. 
MILLION KWh. 
Year 1950 1953 1954 1955 1958 1962 1964 
MKWh 540..0 720.6 790 .,6 896.8 1092 1750 2610 
F i g u r e s 1950, 53 , 54 and 55 p u b l i s h e d i n U n i t e d 
N a t i o n s Economic Development i n t h e M i d d l e East 
1958. F i g u r e s o f 1958, 1962 and 1964 a r e shown 
i n T a b l e 6. 
The r e m a r k a b l e i n c r e a s e i n i n d u s t r i a l 
c onsumption i n Egypt compared w i t h o t h e r c a t e g o r i e s , 
i s due t o comprehensive i n d u s t r i a l schemes and t h e 
f a c t t h a t t h e average charges f o r i n d u s t r y a r e much 
l o w e r t h a n i n most o f t h e c o u n t r i e s . ( 1 3 ) 
(13) See p. 280 
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Commercial c o n s u m p t i o n . 
Commercial consumption a r i s e s f r o m a d i v e r s e 
group c o m p r i s i n g shops, h o t e l s , o f f i c e s , h o s p i t a l s , 
p u b l i c b u i l d i n g s e t c . The i n c r e a s e o f demand o f t h i s 
c l a s s i s due t o t h e r i s i n g s t a n d a r d o f l i v i n g , o f 
Government e x p e n d i t u r e and t h e advancement o f 
t e c h n o l o g i e s i n e l e c t r i c a l a p p l i a n c e s . 
I n B r i t a i n , d u r i n g t h e 1950s t h e r e has been 
c o n s i d e r a b l e improvement o f commercial p r e m i s e s and 
t h e i r i n t e r n a l c o n d i t i o n s and i t i s s t i l l g r o w i n g . 
An example o f government e x p e n d i t u r e i s t h e Shops and 
R a i l w a y s Premises A c t 1963, by w h i c h i t i s e s t i m a t e d 
t h a t about one m i l l i o n p r e m i s e s accomodating about 
e i g h t m i l l i o n employees w i l l have i t s p a r t i c u l a r 
e f f e c t on t h e i n c r e a s e o f commercial demand. I t i s 
r e q u i r e d by t h i s A c t t h a t ' l i g h t i n g , h e a t i n g , h o t w a t e r 
s u p p l y and c l o t h e s d r y i n g f a c i l i t i e s s h a l l be p r o v i d e d . 
A l s o , and most e f f e c t i v e on commercial consumption i s 
t h e a i r c o n d i t i o n i n g w h i c h i s i n s t a l l e d i n most p u b l i c 
p r emises such as U n i v e r s i t i e s , o f f i c e b l o c k s and t h e 
l i k e . Examples o f t h e t e c h n o l o g i c a l advancement and 
i t s e f f e c t on commercial c o n s u m p t i o n a r e t t h e 
development o f t h e f l u o r e s c e n t lamp w h i c h l e a d t o an 
i n c r e a s e i n l i g h t i n g l o a d , t h e development o f t h e b l o c k 
storage h e a t e r s p e c i f i c a l l y designed to operate i n 
off-peak p e r i o d s which are a t p r e s e n t r a p i d l y 
i n c r e a s i n g i n numbers used i n commercial premises, 
f l o o r •warming d e v i c e s e t c . 
The e f f e c t of these f a c t o r s , i n the l a s t f i v e 
y e a r s , r e s u l t e d i n an i n c r e a s e of commercial s a l e s by 
10,3$> and i s expected to i n c r e a s e by 10.5% per annum 
u n t i l 1966, the p e r i o d i n v e s t i g a t e d by the N.E.D.C. 
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I n Egypt, s e p a r a t e f i g u r e s f o r t h i s c ategory are not 
a v a i l a b l e , but on the whole i t i s expected t h a t 
commercial consumption e s p e c i a l l y t h a t which i s 
i n f l u e n c e d by Government expenditure w i l l be growing* 
A g r i c u l t u r a l consumption. 
The use of e l e c t r i c power i n farms i n the 
western c o u n t r i e s i s on a l a r g e s c a l e which i t may not 
be p o s s i b l e to r e a c h i n underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s i n 
the near f u t u r e . P l a n s f o r u s i n g e l e c t r i c i t y on farms 
must be, i n underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s , drawn on a l a r g e 
s c a l e to achieve a comparable standard w i t h the 
western c o u n t r i e s . 
I n B r i t a i n an average of more than 85% of farms 
have been connected w i t h e l e c t r i c i t y . E l e c t r i c i t y has 
been used f o r farm machinery such as hammer m i l l s , 
mixers and p e l l e t i n g machines f o r p r e p a r i n g f o o d s t u f f s 
177 
f o r l i v e s t o c k . E l e c t r i c i t y supply has become a 
n e c e s s i t y i n modern farms f o r h a r v e s t i n g , water 
h e a t i n g , steam s t e r i l i s a t i o n , milk c o o l i n g and f o r 
the r e a r i n g of p i g s , p o u l t r y and c a t t l e . 
I n Egypt, planning to provide e l e c t r i c i t y f o r 
a g r i c u l t u r a l u s e s i s of g r e a t importance. Egypt 
embraces a v a s t a r e a of l a n d which can be c u l t i v a t e d , 
i f t h e r e i s enough water. For example, i n Upper 
Egypt where the l e v e l of l a n d does not permit a 
continuous f r e e f low f o r c a n a l s , e l e c t r i c a l l y - d r i v e n 
pumping s e t s , l a r g e and s m a l l , can b r i n g a copious 
supply of water to the s u r f a c e , improving the y i e l d 
of the l a n d and b r i n g i n g l a r g e r a r e a s under i r r i g a t i o n . 
I n Lower Egypt, where some of the l a n d i s s a l t y , 
drainage w i l l make i t f e r t i l e . E l e c t r i c pumping 
s t a t i o n s f o r drainage schemes can widen the 
c u l t i v a t e d a r e a i n Lower Egypt. 
The b e n e f i t s to be gained from the e x t r a 
c u l t i v a t a b i j l e a r e a cannot be over-estimatedr not only 
w i l l i t provide work f o r the unemployed, but i t would 
a l s o p r a c t i c a l l y f u l f i l l the country's economic 
requirements. I r r i g a t i o n and drainage, provided by 
cheap e l e c t r i c i t y s u p p l i e s , w i l l help towards a f u r t h e r 
expansion i n the d e s e r t on a long-term p o l i c y . For 
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i n s t a n c e , i t can be extended to cover the shores of 
the Mediterranean as f a r as the western boundaries of 
Egypt, T h i s r e g i o n has s u i t a b l e c l i m a t i c and 
geogr a p h i c a l c o n d i t i o n s f o r h a b i t a t i o n and s e a s i d e 
r e c r e a t i o n as w e l l as i n d u s t r i a l and commercial 
a c t i v i t i e s * 
Apart from the use of e l e c t r i c i t y i n i r r i g a t i o n 
and drainage schemes, i t can be used i n the p r o c e s s i n g 
of a g r i c u l t u r a l products, which t r a d i t i o n a l l y a r e made 
by other motive-power machines. A few of these 
p r o c e s s e s a r e r i c e - h u l l i n g and p o l i s h i n g , cotton g r i n i n g 
f l o u r - m i l l i n g , o i l - e x t r a c t i o n and timber-sawing. The 
f l e x i b i l i t y and economy a f f o r d e d by e l e c t r i c i t y i s 
l e a d i n g to i t s r e p l a c i n g other forms of motive power. 
The r u r a l p o p u l a t i o n i n Egypt who l i v e on a g r i c u l t u r e 
a r e not busy a l l the y e a r . Thus i f improved methods 
of a g r i c u l t u r e are introduced, other occupations w i l l 
have to be found f o r a l a r g e number of c u l t i v a t o r s who 
may become s u r p l u s manpower. I n t h i s case a r a p i d 
expansion of cottage i n d u s t r i e s mus-t be c r e a t e d . Among 
these i n d u s t r i e s which can be e s t a b l i s h e d w i t h the he l p 
of e l e c t r i c i t y are weaving on i n d i v i d u a l power looms, 
m a c h i n e - k n i t t i n g , button making, wooden toy making e t c . 
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There have been i n t e n s i v e s t u d i e s f o r the 
a p p l i c a t i o n of e l e c t r i c i t y to v a r i o u s types of farm 
work. E l e c t r i c i t y s u p p l i e s can a i d , i n some way or 
another, i n the growing, p r o c e s s i n g and d i s t r i b u t i o n 
of farm products. Some of the farm-work i n which 
e l e c t r i c i t y can be used are t. g r a i n - d r y i n g where 
a r t i f i c i a l g r a i n - d r y i n g equipment i s n e c e s s a r y to be 
used i n bad weather c o n d i t i o n s , g r a s s - d r y i n g which 
s e c u r e s high p r o t e i n feed f o r l i v e s t o c k , i f i t i s 
done r a p i d l y by e l e c t r i c machines. The i n s t a l l a t i o n 
of adequate l i g h t i n g i n farm houses and other b u i l d i n g s 
w i l l a t l e a s t e l i m i n a t e f i r e hazards due to the use of 
o i l l a n t e r n s . Heating f o r water and steam are r e q u i r e d 
f o r s t e r i l i z a t i o n purposes. There are a l s o many 
p r o c e s s e s i n farming i n which e l e c t r i c i t y can be used, 
such as d a i r y farming, f e e d - p r o c e s s i n g , p o u l t r y 
farming, f r u i t - g r o w i n g e t c . 
The main problem i n b r i n g i n g e l e c t r i c i t y to the 
farmers i s the high c o s t of connecting them to the 
mains. But the s o l u t i o n i n B r i t a i n i s t h a t i f farmers 
can make f u l l and v a r i e d use of e l e c t r i c i t y , they w i l l 
get a r e t u r n on t h e i r c a p i t a l investment and a t the 
same time t h i s w i l l help the E l e c t r i c i t y Boards to get 
proper r e t u r n on t h e i r c a p i t a l investment. 
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The problem i n Egypt may be more complicated, 
because of the l a c k of the g r i d system which i s 
r e q u i r e d f o r a r u r a l e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n scheme and 
because of the s c a r c i t y of c a p i t a l f o r a l l uses 
mentioned above. 
Though i t can be seen from T a b l e s 5 and 6 
above, t h a t the percentage of a g r i c u l t u r a l consumption 
i n Egypt i s higher than i n B r i t a i n but, i n f a c t , t h i s 
i s not s a t i s f a c t o r y , e s p e c i a l l y when, as shown i n 
Table 6, t h a t t h i s percentage i n Egypt i s d e c r e a s i n g . 
The f a c t t h a t Egypt depends on a g r e a t p a r t of i t s 
economy on a g r i c u l t u r e i s a primary reason f o r the 
Government to encourage by a l l means the consumption 
of e l e c t r i c i t y of t h i s category. 
Domestic consumption. 
I n domestic l i f e the i n c r e a s e i n numbers of 
domestic consumers and t h e i r average consumption 
r e p r e s e n t s a l a r g e p a r t i n the t o t a l of a l l c l a s s e s 
i n B r i t a i n . ( l 4 ) F i g u r e 8 shows the average s a l e s of 
e l e c t r i c i t y per domestic consumer, which amounts to 
an average r a t e of i n c r e a s e of 9% per annum from 
1954/55 to 1963/64. I n the l a s t f i v e y e a r s the 
average i n c r e a s e of domestic consumption waw 12.8$>» 
(l4> See Table 5 p. l68 
Units per 
consumer 
8- DOMESTIC S A L E S OF E L E C T R I C I T Y - AVERAGE SALES PER CONSUMER 
Average rate of increase 1954-55 to 1963-64 i n B r i t a i n 
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T h i s s u b s t a n t i a l i n c r e a s e i s due to the r i s i n g standard 
of l i v i n g and the growing range of power-driven 
f a c i l i t i e s a t home. I n B r i t a i n , i n 1964, e l e c t r i c 
cookers were used by 32% of households, double the 
propo r t i o n j u s t a f t e r the war. Consumers u s i n g 
r e f r i g e r a t o r s have r i s e n from 2% to 33%» washing 
machines from 2% to 50% and water h e a t e r s from 10% to 
h2%t over the same p e r i o d . ( l 6 ) I n a d d i t i o n to the 
growth of use of e l e c t r i c a l equipment a t home, domestic 
demand i s expected to i n c r e a s e i n B r i t a i n f o r reasons 
which a planner may take i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Some of 
these a r e , the development of space and sotrage methods 
of h e a t i n g s u p p l i e d on off-peak t a r i f f s , the 
establishment of smokeless zones under the Cl e a n A i r 
Act and the continued i n c r e a s e i n the number of married 
women a t work i n d i c a t i n g a g r e a t e r need f o r labour-
s a v i n g e l e c t r i c a l a p p l i a n c e s i n the home, according to 
the N.B.Q.C. p r e d i c t i o n s . ( 17)- I n Egypt i t i s d i f f i c u l t 
to a s s e s s comparable f i g u r e s i n the domestic f i e l d 
because f i g u r e s show no d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between domestic 
and commercial consumption. But g e n e r a l l y speaking, i t 
(16) Edwards, E . Address given a t the Annual Conference 
of the E l e c t r i c a l Development A s s o c i a t i o n a t 
Harrogate l8 t h Feb. 1964 E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l 
p u b l i c a t i o n p.9 
(17) Marsh, N.F. F i n a n c i a l Times Annual Review of 
B r i t i s h I n d u s t r y J u l y 6th, 1964. 
i s expected w i t h the r i s i n g standard of l i v i n g and 
the production of e l e c t r i c a l equipment such as cookers, 
h e a t e r s and e s p e c i a l l y r e f r i g e r a t o r s , domestic 
consumption w i l l be i n c r e a s e d i n the near f u t u r e . 
Consumption E s t i m a t e s , 
The a n a l y s i s above shows the a c t u a l consumption 
and the expected i n c r e a s e i n demand by v a r i o u s c l a s s e s 
of consumers. T h i s i n d i c a t e s the n e c e s s i t y f o r 
planning f o r the c o n s t r u c t i o n of e l e c t r i c i t y supply 
p r o j e c t s to meet t h i s demand. Planning f o r the 
i n s t a l l a t i o n of power p l a n t s i s based on the f o r e -
c a s t i n g of the growth of demand. The a c c u r a c y of 
these e s t i m a t e s a r e e s s e n t i a l to ensure t h a t -
(1) s u f f i c i e n t p l a n t s are i n s t a l l e d to meet the 
demand r e q u i r e d and 
(2) not too much p l a n t i s on lo a d as t h i s w i l l cause 
a d d i t i o n a l and unnecessary l o s s e s . (. l'ffl 
From the B r i t i s h experience, these e s t i m a t e s are made 
from t h r e e s o u r c e s , Area Boards, the E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l 
and the Generating Board. 
Area Boards' E s t i m a t e s . 
For short-term planning there i s no d i f f i c u l t y 
i n p r e d i c t i n g the demand, peak and off-peak pe r i o d s 
(t8) R u l s f o r d , H.C. Second Conference of U n i v e r s i t y 
P r o f e s s o r s on problems i n the E l e c t r i c i t y supply 
i n d u s t r y E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l , London 19-62 p,l8 
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are known. Sources of f o r e c a s t s of the M e t e o r o l o g i c a l 
O f f i c e f o r d i f f e r e n t times of the day are a v a i l a b l e . 
For example, l i g h t consumption can be estimated 
according to the hours of darkness, although i t may 
be i n f l u e n c e d by clouds c o v e r i n g v i s i b i l i t y . Space 
h e a t i n g demand v a r i e s according to the a i r temperature 
of the day during 2k hours, humidity and wind speed.(19) 
I n middle-term planning f o r the load growth, 
Area Boards have to consid e r both the demands of new 
b u s i n e s s and the i n c r e a s i n g demand of the e x i s t i n g 
consumers. E s t i m a t i o n of t h i s l oad growth can be made 
by a constant day-to-day c o n t a c t between the s t a f f of 
Area Boards and D i s t r i c t s and t h e i r consumers. They 
can get s u f f i c i e n t i n f o r m a t i o n about the development 
i n the number of p r o p e r t i e s which depends on the r a t e 
of b u i l d i n g and the r a t e of i n c r e a s i n g p o p u l a t i o n . 
For example i t would be known i f the l o c a l C o u n c i l 
was hoping to b u i l d a new housing e s t a t e and other 
b u i l d e r s were to produce more houses f o r s a l e . The 
s t a f f can a l s o get the n e c e s s a r y i n f o r m a t i o n about 
i n d u s t r i a l consumption and the growth a r i s i n g from the 
e s t a b l i s h i n g of new f a c t o r i e s or the e x t e n s i o n of 
e x i s t i n g ones. They can a l s o f o l l o w s i m i l a r methods 
(19)- I b i d p. 18 
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f o r the e s t i m a t i o n of other f i e l d s of consumption. 
The r a t e of population can be made a v a i l a b l e by the 
R e g i s t r a r General who w i l l provide the n e c e s s a r y 
f i g u r e s . E s t i m a t i o n of long-term demand, i n t r o d u c i n g 
long-term planning f o r schemes such as new bulk supply 
p o i n t s , may a l s o be done by Area Boards Headquarters, 
but these schemes w i l l be d i s c u s s e d w i t h the Generating 
Board and are decided upon according to any longer-term 
proposals f o r i n d u s t r i a l growth and housing development 
i n the a r e a . The whole f o r e c a s t f o r any of these 
p e r i o d s of time must take i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n the 
s t a t i s t i c s of the past s a l e s of e l e c t r i c i t y to give 
a t l e a s t an i n d i c a t i o n of the r a t e of i n c r e a s e i n 
demand f o r expected s i m i l a r c o n d i t i o n s . The main 
d i f f i c u l t y i n e s t i m a t i o n of demand by Area Boards i s 
the degree of c e r t a i n t y w h i l e i n short-term f o r e c a s t i n g , 
f o r s i x months or one y e a r , p r e d i c t i o n may be p r e c i s e , 
a p e r i o d of two or three y e a r s t h e r e i s a l e s s degree 
of c e r t a i n t y . Long-term f o r e c a s t i n g e s t i m a t i o n i s 
q u i t e d i f f i c u l t because changes i n i n d u s t r i a l , 
commercial and domestic demand could f l u c t u a t e 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n t h i s p e r i o d . I n an attempt to reduce 
t h i s d i f f i c u l t y , the E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l a r e t r y i n g to 
improve sources of information on r e g i o n a l development 
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p a r t i c u l a r l y i n connection w i t h i n d u s t r i a l s u p p l i e s * 
The combination of e s t i m a t e s by i n d i v i d u a l 
Area Boards needs f u r t h e r assumptions, because 'the 
u n i t consumption f o r e c a s t s can be aggregated but not 
the maximum demands. D i v e r s i t y of i n c i d e n c e of demand 
between a r e a s as w e l l as estimated t r a n s m i s s i o n l o s s e s 
have to be f o r e c a s t so as to give the e q u i v a l e n t 
n a t i o n a l simultaneous demand on generating p l a n t . * ( 2 0 ) 
E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l E s t i m a t e s . 
The second estimate i s made by the commercial 
department of the E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l . The commercial 
department makes a n a t i o n a l estimate a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n 
w i t h the Generating Board, the M i n i s t r y of Power, the 
T r e a s u r y and i n d u s t r i a l u s e r s about t h e i r f u t u r e p l a n s . 
The E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l t a k e s i n t o account not only the 
ten-ye a r t r e n d , but a l s o four main c o n s i d e r a t i o n s : 
( a ) The gross domestic product and i t s s u b - d i v i s i o n 
i n t o i n d u s t r i a l and other s e c t o r s . 
(b) I n d u s t r i a l production and i t s s u b - d i v i s i o n i n t o 
main i n d u s t r i a l groups. 
( c ) Commercial a c t i v i t y and i t s s u b - d i v i s i o n i n t o 
shops, o f f i c e s e t c . and 
(20) Edwards, R., & C l a r k , D. Planning f o r expansion 
i n e l e c t r i c i t y supply, E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l p.k 
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(d) Growth i n population households, s a t u r a t i o n 
f a c t o r s of the main e l e c t r i c a l domestic a p p l i a n c e s 
and annual consumption per a p p l i a n c e . ( 2 1 ) The 
o b j e c t of the estimate i s to check the Area 
Board's f o r e c a s t s and to see whether they a r e 
rea s o n a b l e i n l i g h t of n a t i o n a l economic and 
s o c i a l development and i f any divergence from 
p a s t r a t e s of growth i s l i k e l y . 
The Generating Board's E s t i m a t e , 
The t h i r d estimate i s made by the Planning 
Department of the C e n t r a l E l e c t r i c i t y Generating 
Board. The Board makes a n a t i o n a l f o r e c a s t based on 
the mathematical a n a l y s i s of the n a t i o n a l t r e n d of 
consumption over the preceeding ten y e a r s . The use 
of the t r e n d method i s based on the assumption t h a t 
e l e c t r i c i t y has been f a i f l y s t e a d i l y i n c r e a s i n g over 
the l a s t 40 y e a r s . The board chose the ten-year p e r i o d 
a f t e r examining the trends over v a r i o u s p e r i o d s and 
decided^ t h a t a ten-year t r e n d was the most s a t i s f a c t o r y 
to use i n s i x , seven or e i g h t y e a r s f o r e c a s t ahead. 
B e s i d e s the Board takes i n t o account, i n an annual 
review, any s i g n of t a p e r i n g o f f according to the 
f l u c t u a t i o n s of weather c o n d i t i o n s i n the y e a r . 
(21) I b i d . p.4. 
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The adopted e s t i m a t e . 
The T e c h n i c a l Planning Committee of the 
E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l c o n s i d e r the t h r e e e s t i m a t e s 
before the f u l l C o u n c i l take the d e c i s i o n s on p l a n t 
programmes and f i n a n c i a l e s t i m a t e s . The Committee 
adopt reasonable f o r e c a s t s t a k i n g i n t o account the 
background of each f o r e c a s t , even the p e r s o n a l i t y 
of the f o r e c a s t e r . 
The question now i s what i s the adopted 
forecast?:, what i s the margin of e r r o r ? 
I n f a c t , t h e r e i s d i f f i c u l t y i n making an 
a c c u r a t e f o r e c a s t of e l e c t r i c i t y consumption. 
F o r e c a s t i n g the demand f o r e l e c t r i c i t y s i x y e a r s 
ahead i s f o r e c a s t i n g the d e c i s i o n s of about l6 m i l l i o n 
consumers i n the f u t u r e , many of whom have not y e t 
co n s i d e r e d the purchase of the a p p l i a n c e s whose use 
w i l l c r e a t e a demand. However, a good degree of 
a c c u r a c y can be achieved by the improvement of market 
survey and f o r e c a s t i n g methods. I n r e c e n t y e a r s the 
E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l has adopted demand e s t i m a t e s 
s l i g h t l y below the ten-year t r e n d estimated by the 
Generating Board. I n 1959 the E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l 
adopted a f o r e c a s t e q u i v a l e n t to 6.5%, w h i l e the 
ten - y e a r t r e n d was 6.95°, i n 1960 the t r e n d f i g u r e 
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was 7% and the f i g u r e adopted was 6,6%. The reasons 
f o r adopting f i g u r e s below the trend l i n e , s t a t e d by-
P r o f e s s o r Edwards are; f i r s t , the c h r o n i c c a p i t a l 
s t r i n g e n c y e x i s t i n g f o r many y e a r s . Planning had to 
be on the b a s i s of what was the minimum which the 
i n d u s t r y could get by. Secondly, engineers were 
s t e a d i l y improving the e f f e c t i v e supply of p l a n t by 
improving the a v a i l a b i l i t y each w i n t e r . And l a s t l y , 
the f o r e c a s t e r s were always b e a r i n g i n mind the f a c t 
t h a t a doubling every ten y e a r s could not continue 
i n d e f i n i t e l y and they t h e r e f o r e tended to slow up the 
growth r a t e i n the f o l l o w i n g y e a r s of the f o r e c a s t s . ( 2 2 ) 
I n 196l the E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l adopted the 
estimated t r e n d f i g u r e of 7.2%, but i n 1962 tKey 
adopted a f i g u r e of 7.9% which was above the t r e n d 
f i g u r e of 7,6%. T h i s has r e s u l t e d i n an estimated 
i n c r e a s e i n the simultaneous maximum demand expected 
i n the f o l l o w i n g y e a r s to 1967/68 as shown i n Table 9.(23) 
(22) Edwards, R. , & C l a r k , D. Op.Cit. p . 6 l . 
(23) Marsh, N.E, Looking to the f u t u r e E l e c t r i c i t y 
C o u n c i l Spring school 63 p,2 
F i g . 9. 











1963 Es timatc S 
/M962 I Estimate 








SIMULTANEOUS MAXIMUM DEMAND GENERATING BOARDS 
SYSTEM IN AVERAGE COLD SPELL CONDITIONS (Mtf>. 
1962/3 63/64 6V65 65/66 66/67 67/68 
E S i n ^ l 9 6 i m a d e 2 9 ° 0 0 31000 33200 35500 38000 40700 
Estimate^made 2 q 6 o o 3 1 9 0 0 34350 3700O 39900 43000 
I n 1963, the E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l c onsidered a f o r e c a s t 
submitted by the C.E.G.B.. based on a tre n d 7*9% growth 
per annum i n maximum demand, the Area Boards* estimates; 
and the N..E.D.C o b j e c t i v e of a n a t i o n a l growth r a t e of 
k% per annum. The es t i m a t e s adopted were somewhat 
hig h e r than those proposed by the C ,E.G.B.. (2 4) The 
t h r e e e s t i m a t e s of 1961, 62, and 63 are shown i n 
f i g u r e 9» which demonstrates higher adopted e s t i m a t e s 
i n 1962 and 1963. 
The above d i s c u s s i o n shows t h a t t h e r e i s a 
margin of e r r o r o c c u r r i n g i n applying the ten year 
p e r i o d t r e n d method.( 25) The sharp i n c r e a s i n g demand 
i n the w i n t e r of 1962/63 i l l u s t r a t e t h i s . While i n 
1956 f o r e c a s t s were made on an average compound r a t e 
(24) C.E.G.B. Annual Report 1962/63 para 226 
(25) Edwards, R., & C l a r k , D. Planning f o r expansion 
i n e l e c t r i c i t y supply p . 6 l 
F i g . 10. Percentage Error in Forecasts of Demand 
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o f g r o w t h o f d o m e s t i c consumption over t h e p r e v i o u s 
f o u r y e a r s o f 5«^% between t h e y e a r s 1959/60 and 
1962/63 t h e r a t e o f g r o w t h had i n c r e a s e d t o 17.^%.(26) 
I t i s c l e a r f r o m T a b l e 5 t h a t t h e p e r c e n t a g e o f 
i n c r e a s e i n v a r i o u s c a t e g o r i e s i n t h e y e a r 1962/63 
over t h e p r e v i o u s y e a r was much h i g h e r t h a n any o t h e r 
y e a r . Changes i n weather and p a t t e r n s o f consumption 
ar e f a c t o r s w h i c h a f f e c t t h e t r e n d method. However, 
as shown i n f i g u r e 10, t h e t e n - y e a r t r e n d method gave 
i n c r e a s i n g l y worse f o r e c a s t s f o r t h e t h r e e y e a r s up t o 
1961/62. The remedy f o r t h e d e f e c t needs more 
i n t e n s i v e s t u d y o f t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f m a r k e t s as 
w e l l as economic r e s e a r c h on f a c t o r s a f f e c t i n g t h e 
e s t i m a t i o n o f demand, f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between demand and p r i c e i n t h e v a r i o u s m a r k e t s f o r 
e l e c t r i c i t y . ( 27i 
E l e c t r i c i t y s u p p l y p r o j e c t s . 
Having a r r i v e d a t a f o r e c a s t o f demand, t h e n e x t 
s t e p i s t o d e c i d e t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h e n e c e s s a r y 
p r o j e c t s w h i c h s h o u l d be p l a n n e d t o suppHy over and 
(26) M e l l i n g , C.T. Long-term p l a n n i n g i n e l e c t r i c i t y 
s u p p l y ,1963 p . 9 ( E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l p u b l i c a t i o n ) 
(27) Edwards, R., & C l a r k , D. Op.Cit. p.62 
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above t h e e s t i m a t e d demand* The p r o j e c t s o f t h e 
e l e c t r i c i t y s u p p l y i n d u s t r y i n c l u d e t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
o f new power s t a t i o n s , h y d r o - t h e r m a l or n u c l e a r , and 
t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f g r i d o r s u p e r g r i d systems by 
i n t e r c o n n e c t i n g a l l power s t a t i o n s i n t h e c o u n t r y w h i c h 
w i l l r e s u l t i n a h i g h l y i n t e g r a t e d system o f g e n e r a t i o n 
and t r a n s m i s s i o n . W i t h t h e g r i d system any power p l a n t 
can be used t o s u p p l y e l e c t r i c i t y t o any l o c a l i t y no 
m a t t e r how r e m o t e . 
I n E g y p t , p r o j e c t i o n o f power s t a t i o n s and t h e 
g r i d system have been d e c i d e d i n t h e f i r s t f i v e - y e a r 
p l a n 1960 -65 . The main scheme o f t h i s p l a n i s based on 
g e n e r a t i n g e l e c t r i c a l energy i n l a r g e , i n t e r c o n n e c t e d , 
h i g h e f f i c i e n c y t h e r m a l power s t a t i o n s s i t u a t e d a t 
a p p r o p r i a t e l o c a t i o n s w i t h r e s p e c t t o a v a i l a b i l i t y o f 
c o o l i n g w a t e r , f u e l f a c i l i t i e s and p r o x i m i t y t o l o a d 
c e n t r e s . The use o f d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c a l s t a t i o n s i s 
l i m i t e d t o r e g i o n s o f l i m i t e d e l e c t r i c i t y c o n s u m p t i o n , 
f a r f r o m t h e e x i s t i n g and p l a n n e d d i s t r i b u t i o n n e t w o r k ^ . 
Map I shows t h e e x p a n s i o n o f major e l e c t r i c i t y power 
s t a t i o n s i n l o w e r Egypt a c c o r d i n g t o t h e f i v e - y e a r p l a n 
I96O -65. The Map shows t h a t some seas such as Suez, 
i n d u s t r i a l a rea i n t h e D e l t a and A l e x a n d r i a , a g r e a t e r 
e x p a n s i o n i n t h e s i z e o f power s t a t i o n t a k e s p l a c e and 
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f a c e new i n d u s t r i a l schemes l o c a t e d i n t h e s e c i t i e s . 
I n C a i r o and i t s suburbs w h i c h a r e a l r e a d y h e a v i l y 
l o c a t e d i t c o u l d be seen f r o m t h e Map t h a t t h e r e i s 
l i t t l e e x p a nsion i n t h e s i z e o f power s t a t i o n s . The 
scheme a l s o i n c l u d e s t h e e r e c t i o n o f a 220 KV i n t e r -
c o n n e c t i o n and t r a n s m i s s i o n n e t w o r k i n Lower Egypt 
(Map 2 ) , and 132 KV system f o r t h e u t i l i s a t i o n o f t h e 
Aswan Dam H y d r o - e l e c t r i c energy i n Aswan and Quena 
Governates (Map 3)» as w e l l as t h e e r e c t i o n o f 66 KV, 
33 KV, and 11 KV d i s t r i b u t i o n n e t w o r k s f o r t h e f e e d i n g 
o f t h e new i n d u s t r i e s , i r r i g a t i o n and d r a i n a g e pumping 
s t a t i o n , w a t e r works and p u b l i c u t i l i t y p r o j e c t s and 
f o r t h e e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n o f m u n i c i p a l i t i e s and v i l l a g e s . 
I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e f i v e - y e a r p l a n a p r o v i s i o n 
p l a n f o r t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f high-voILtage n e t w o r k s 
have t o be r e a d y i n 19&7 t o t r a n s m i t and d i s t r i b u t e 
t h e e l e c t r i c a l e nergy g e n e r a t e d f r o m t h e f i r s t High-Dam 
u n i t s w h i c h a r e e x p e c t e d t o be commissioned a t t h e 
end o f 1967» T r a n s f o r m e r s u b s t a t i o n s a r e i n c l u d e d i n 
t h i s p l a n t o s u p p l y t h e l o a d c e n t r e s i n Upper and 
Lower Egypt as shown i n (Map 4 ) . 
A l o n g - t e r m p l a n e n d i n g i n 19^5 has a l s o been 
drawn up i n c l u d i n g t h e a v a i l a b l e r e s o u r c e s o f power 
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s u p p l y u n t i l t h i s d a t e , as shown i n F i g u r e 11.** 
The most i n t e r e s t i n g f e a t u r e o f t h e s e p l a n s 
i s t h e a t t e m p t t o e x p l o i t t h e h y d r o s o u r c e s o f t h e 
c o u n t r y f r o m dams and r e s e r v o i r s s i t e d and p l a n n e d t o 
be e s t a b l i s h e d on t h e R i v e r N i l e . The p r i o r i t y g i v e n 
t o h y d r o - e l e c t r i c power a r i s e s f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t t h e 
c o u n t r y ' s f u e l r e s o u r c e s , d u r i n g t h e f i v e - y e a r p l a n , 
c o u l d s c a r c e l y meet 68% o f i t s needs. (28 ) Moreover, 
cheap e l e c t r i c i t y s u p p l y has become a n e c e s s i t y i n 
E g y p t , f o r economic and s o c i a l development, w h i c h 
r e q u i r e s a c o n s t a n t i n c r e a s e i n p r o d u c t i o n t h r o u g h 
t h e use o f modern m a c h i n e r y . The p r o v i s i o n o f h y d r o 
cheap energy, no d o u b t , w i l l s t i m u l a t e t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t 
o f new i n d u s t r i e s and c o n s e q u e n t l y t h e hope o f r a i s i n g 
t h e s t a n d a r d o f l i v i n g . Sweden, S w i t z e r l a n d and I t a l y 
** F o o t n o t e . A c c o r d i n g t o F i g u r e 11 i t i s e x p e c t e d t h a t 
n u c l e a r power g e n e r a t i o n w i l l be o p e r a t e d i n 19&7 
i n s t e a d o f b e i n g commissioned i n t h e f i r s t f i v e - y e a r 
p l a n as m e n t i o n e d . There i s no i n d i c a t i o n why 
changes i n t h e p l a n has been made, b u t p r o b a b l y t h i s 
i s . due t o t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s a t t a c h e d t o n u c l e a r 
g e n e r a t i o n d i s c u s s e d i n page 
(28) I n d u s t r y a f t e r t h e r e v a l u a t i o n and t h e f i v e - y e a r 
p l a n E g y p t i a n M i n . o f I n d u s t r y J u l y , 1957 
C a i r o p.2 
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p r o v i d e examples o f t h i s . 
At p r e s e n t t h e e l e c t r i c i t y s u p p l y system i n 
Egypt c o n t a i n s t h r e e h y d r o - e l e c t r i c power s t a t i o n s . 
They g e n e r a t e n e a r l y one q u a r t e r o f t h e t o t a l g e n e r a t e d 
e n e r g y i n t h e whole c o u n t r y as shown i n T a b l e 10, 
TABLE 10. 
CLASSIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL POWER STATIONS I N THE 
U.A.it, ACCORDING TO TYPE OF PRIME MOVER 1961. 
Type o f pr i m e 
mover 
I n s t a l l e d capacity Generated energy 
MW % MKW h 
Steam t u r b i n e s 
D i e s e l e n g i n e 
Gas engines 













T o t a l 1308.5 100% 3622.4 100% 
The l a r g e s t and most i m p o r t a n t o f t h e s e s t a t i o n s i s 
t h e Aswan Dam. Most o f t h e power g e n e r a t e d f r o m t h e 
Aswan H y d r o - e l e c t r i c p r o j e c t i s used by t h e Kim 
F e r t i l i z e r Company. The r e s t i s s u p p l i e d t o t h e 
i r r i g a t i o n scheme I n t h e a r e a , i r o n mines and o t h e r 
i n d u s t r i e s o f sugar cane, c o n s e r v a t i o n o f d a t e e t c . 
The p l a n n e d h y d r o - e l e c t r i c p r o j e c t s a r e t h e H i g h Dam 
h y d r o - e l e c t r i c power s t a t i o n , t h e N i l e Barrages and 
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t h e Q u a t t a r a D e p r e s s i o n h y d r o - e l e c t r i c power p r o j e c t s . 
The H i g h Dam p r o j e c t w i l l s t a r t i t s o p e r a t i o n 
i n 1967. By 1970 t h e f u l l i n s t a l l e d c a p a c i t y w i l l be 
re a c h e d and t h e t o t a l a n n u a l g e n e r a t e d energy w i l l 
r e a c h i t s f u l l c a p a c i t y i n 1980 w i t h a maximum 9500 
MKWh per annum, as shown i n T a b l e 11. 
TABLE 11. 
ESTIMATED GENERATED ENERGY FROM THE 
HIGH DAM POWER STATION. 
Year I n s t a l l e d c a p a c i t y 
MB! 
A v a i l a b l e energy 
per annum HKWh 
1967 525 
1968 1050 3140 
1969 1575 6100 
1970 2100 7400 
1971 2100 7800 
1972 2100 8200 
1973 2100 8500 
1974 2100 8700 
1975 2100 8900 
1976 2100 9000 
1977 2100 9100 
1978 2100 9200 
1979 2100 9500 
1980 2100 9500 
The economics o f t h i s p r o j e c t can be b r i e f l y summed 
up as i t w o u l d p r o v i d e a cheap energy f o r t h e n e w l y 
c r e a t e d e l e c t r o - c h e m i c a l and e l e c t r o - t h e r m a l i n d u s t r i e s . 
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I n a g r i c u l t u r e t h e p r o j e c t w i l l p r o v i d e e l e c t r i c i t y 
f o r m a c h i n e r y , f o r i r r i g a t i o n and d r a i n a g e pumps, 
w h i c h u l t i m a t e l y w i l l have a t l e a s t t h r e e economic 
r e s u l t s . 
(1) The c u t t i n g down o f p r o d u c t i o n c o s t s and a l l o w i n g 
h i g h e r volumes t h a n p r e s e n t t e c h n i q u e s . 
(2) By r e p l a c i n g a n i m a l power by e l e c t r i c a l m a c h i n e r y 
w i l l p e r m i t a m a j o r p a r t o f t h e l a n d used f o r 
c u l t i v a t i o n o f a n i m a l f o o d t o be c o n v e r t e d t o 
p r o d u c t i o n f o r human u s e . 
(3) E l e c t r i c a l m a c h i n e r y w i l l r e l e a s e d a i r y a n i m a l s 
f r o m t h e p r e s e n t n e c e s s i t y t o p e r f o r m f a r m work 
and t h u s r a i s e t h e i r meat and m i l k p r o d u c t i o n . 
T h i s means t h a t t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n o f c o n v e n t i o n a l 
f e e d i n g s t u f f o u t o f h a r v e s t by o t h e r s c i e n t i f i c 
f o o d w o u l d r e s u l t i n s a v i n g o f l a n d and energy 
o f a n i m a l s . 
The r e s t o f t h e energy g e n e r a t e d f r o m t h e 
p r o j e c t w i l l be t r a n s m i t t e d by means o f 500 KV e x t r a 
h i g h v o l t a g e t r a n s m i s s i o n l i n e s t o t h e consumption 
c e n t r e s i n Upper and Lower E g y p t . 
A f t e r t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e H i g h Dam, a l o n g 
r a n g e p l a n i s f o r m u l a t e d f o r t h e e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n o f 
t h e N i l e Barrages e s t i m a t e d t o s u p p l y an a n n u a l energy 
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p r o d u c t i o n o f about 4700 MKfcTh, f o r e s e e n i n 1980. A l s o 
t h e Q u a t t a r a D e p r e s s i o n power s t a t i o n p l a n n e d t o be 
c o n s t r u c t e d i n 1985 i s e s t i m a t e d o f 1500 MW c a p a c i t y . 
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Conclusion*, 
To sum up, i t has been e x p l a i n e d i n t h i s s e c t i o n 
t h a t t h e g e n e r a l aims o f economic p l a n n i n g i n any-
c o u n t r y a r e t o r a i s e t h e s t a n d a r d o f l i v i n g , and 
p l a n n i n g i n t h e e l e c t r i c i t y s u p p l y i n d u s t r y aims a t 
r a i s i n g t h e l e v e l o f consumption p e r c a p i t a as a 
measure o f t h e s t a n d a r d o f l i v i n g . To a c h i e v e t h e s e 
a i m s , i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o t a k e i n t o a ccount t h e 
f o l l o w i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . 
The p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f t h e Government i n 
f o r m u l a t i n g economic p l a n s i s e s s e n t i a l , e s p e c i a l l y 
i n a d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r y such as Egypt, whenever t h e 
p r i v a t e s e c t o r f a i l s i n c a r r y i n g o u t an e f f e c t i v e 
r o l e i n t h e b a l a n c e d development o f t h e c o u n t r y . One 
o f t h e main i n d u s t r i e s i n Egypt w h i c h needs a Government 
comprehensive p l a n n i n g programme i s t h e e l e c t r i c i t y 
s u p p l y i n d u s t r y . 
Comparison between B r i t a i n and Egypt shows t h a t 
p r o d u c t i o n and g e n e r a l consumption i n B r i t a i n a r e much 
h i g h e r t h a n i n E g y p t . I n t h e p e r i o d s examined 1958-64 
t h e average a n n u a l r a t e o f i n c r e a s e i n g e n e r a l 
c o n s u m p t i o n i s h i g h e r i n Egypt t h a n i n B r i t a i n . 
Consumption per c a p i t a i s l o w e r i n Egypt t h a n i n 
B r i t a i n , The average r a t e o f i n c r e a s e i n consumption 
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p e r c a p i t a i n Egypt i s s l i g h t l y l o w e r t h a n i n B r i t a i n , 
i . e . i t i s r e a s o n a b l e i n a d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r y , b u t 
t h i s average i s d e s t o r e d by t h e heavy consumption o f 
t h e i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r . As m e n t i o n e d , compared w i t h 
B r i t a i n t h e i n d u s t r i a l c a t e g o r y i n Egypt consumes a 
g r e a t e r p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e whole p r o d u c t i o n . Though 
i n B r i t a i n t h e i n d u s t r i a l c a t e g o r y consumes t h e 
l a r g e s t p r o p o r t i o n , t h i s p r o p o r t i o n i s l o w e r t h a n i n 
E g y p t . I t i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t a g r i c u l t u r a l consumption 
i n Egypt s h o u l d be i n c r e a s e d more t h a n a t t h e p r e s e n t 
r a t e . Commercial and domestic consumption i n Egypt 
a l s o r e p r e s e n t s a l o w p r o p o r t i o n compared w i t h B r i t a i n . 
The l o w e r s t a n d a r d o f l i v i n g i s t h e main f a c t o r i n 
t h i s r e s p e c t . 
However, t h e a c t u a l consumption o f t h e s e 
c a t e g o r i e s must be known as a b a s i s f o r f u t u r e 
e s t i m a t i o n o f demands, a l t h o u g h i t i s n o t always a 
r e l i a b l e method. I t i s f o u n d f r o m t h e B r i t i s h e x p e r i e n c e 
t h a t t h e t r e n d method i s n o t always c o r r e c t . The use o f 
t h e a c t u a l d a t a i n f o r e c a s t i n g o f demands s h o u l d be 
r e v i e w e d p e r i o d i c a l l y combined w i t h more s t u d i e s o f t h e 
m a r k e t s . Once e s t i m a t e s have been made t h e n e c e s s a r y 
p r o j e c t s t o meet t h e s e demands have t o be p l a n n e d . 
Examples o f t h e s e p l a n s were g i v e n about t h e E g y p t i a n 
e l e c t r i c i t y s u p p l y i n d u s t r y w i t h t h e i r economic 
e x p e c t a t i o n s . 
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MANPOWER PLANNING. 
The aim o f manpower planning i s t o ensure t h a t 
the r e q u i r e d number o f workers w i t h the r e q u i r e d 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s are a v a i l a b l e . At any time i t i s the 
duty of pla n n e r s to budget f o r manpower requirements 
and to ensure t h a t they can be met, as i n planning to 
meet f i n a n c i a l requirements d i s c u s s e d i n the 
f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n . 
An i n v e s t i g a t i o n of manpower problems s h o u l d 
l e a d to p o l i c i e s f o r 
( a ) Securing the s i z e and q u a l i f i c a t i o n s of manpower 
r e q u i r e d f o r v a r i o u s a c t i v i t i e s contemplated under 
the p l a n and 
(b) An e f f e c t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n to absorbing excess 
workers by i n c r e a s i n g the number of a v a i l a b l e 
j o b s i n the e n t e r p r i s e concerned. Both p o l i c i e s 
a r e more d i f f i c u l t to c a r r y out s u c c e s s f u l l y i n 
Egypt than i n B r i t a i n , because the f i r s t of th e s e 
p o l i c i e s mainly i n v o l v e s f i n d i n g t e c h n i c a l and 
other personnel f o r d i f f e r e n t a c t i v i t i e s * I n 
Egypt, as i n most of the l e s s developed world, 
t h e r e i s a l a r g e s u r p l u s of u n s k i l l e d manpower 
which c o i n c i d e s w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l e shortage of 
workers of the s k i l l e d and the h i g h l y s k i l l e d 
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g r a d e s . The second p o l i c y i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h 
problems o f under-employment and unemployment 
w h i c h a r e o f a h i g h e r o r d e r i n Egypt t h a n i n 
B r i t a i n . 
To assess t h e n e c e s s a r y d a t a t o be c o n s i d e r e d 
i n c a r r y i n g o u t t h e s e p o l i c i e s , some q u e s t i o n s a r i s e : 
what i s t h e p r o p e r s i z e o f manpower i n t h e i n d u s t r y 
c o ncerned, and what a r e t h e f a c t o r s d e t e r m i n i n g t h e 
i n c r e a s i n g o r d e c r e a s i n g numbers o f w o r k e r s , and 
f i n a l l y t h e e d u c a t i o n and t r a i n i n g schemes w h i c h a r e 
a d o p t e d o r suggested t o improve t h e p r o d u c t i v i t y o f 
manpower. These problems w i l l be examined w i t h i n t h e 
p u b l i c s e c t o r i n B r i t a i n . A l s o a comparison w i t h 
E g y p t i a n p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s , \ v i t h s p e c i a l r e f e r e n c e 
t o t h e e l e c t r i c i t y s u p p l y i n d u s t r y , w i l l be made. 
S i z e o f manpower. 
To secure t h e r e q u i r e d s i z e o f manpower, each 
p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s h o u l d have a manpower committee 
w h i c h i n v e s t i g a t e s t h e e x i s t i n g s i z e and q u a l i f i c a t i o n s 
o f w o r k e r s and s t a f f and f o r e c a s t s t h e manpower 
r e q u i r e m e n t s over t h e p e r i o d under p l a n n i n g . To make 
an assessment o f t h e s e r e q u i r e m e n t s , p l a n n e r s must 
have a t t h e i r d i s p o s a l a knowledge o f p a s t employment 
t r e n d s i n t h e i n d u s t r y c o n c e r n e d , p r o v i d e d w i t h 
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s t a t i s t i c s showing the f a c t s of the p a s t y e a r s . Also 
a knowledge of any e x i s t i n g shortage of t e c h n i c a l 
manpower i s n e c e s s a r y . T h i s i n f o r m a t i o n w i l l be 
u s e f u l i n f o r e c a s t i n g . The knowledge of the e x i s t i n g 
shortage of t e c h n i c i a n s would i n d i c a t e the probable 
e f f e c t of t e c h n i c a l p r o g r e s s on the l e v e l of 
employment i n the e n t e r p r i s e . S t a t i s t i c a l d a t a about 
the k i n d of s k i l l r e q u i r e d and the probable supply of 
t h i s k i n d of manpower are a l s o of major importance. 
Before g i v i n g i n f o r m a t i o n about the c u r r e n t 
and f u t u r e t r e n d s i n employment, i t i s n e c e s s a r y to 
know the magnitude of men and women of working age. 
I n f a c t , the range of working age depends on the 
e d u c a t i o n a l system of the country. T h e r e f o r e f a c t o r s 
have to be considered, such as the c o n t i n u a t i o n of 
f u r t h e r education a t higher s c h o o l s , u n i v e r s i t i e s 
and other e d u c a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . T h i s group have 
not y e t begun t h e i r working l i f e . I n a d d i t i o n , the 
w i l l to r e t i r e a t a c e r t a i n age, has to be taken 
i n t o account, or people who do not want to work, mr 
m a r r i e d and unmarried women of working age who s t a y 
a t home. The balance a r e those who are a b l e and 
w i l l i n g to seek employment. 
Returning to the employment tre n d , i n 
B r i t a i n , the N.E.D.C. r e p o r t e d i n 1963 t h a t t h e r e 
w i l l be a steady i n c r e a s e i n the labour f o r c e i n the 
whole economy and t h a t t h e r e w i l l be an annual 
i n c r e a s e u n t i l 1966 of about 0.7%, but i n 1964 they 
estimated t h a t t h i s i n c r e a s e would be s l i g h t l y l a r g e r 
a t an annual r a t e of 0.8%, I n the B r i t i s h n a t i o n a l i s e d 
i n d u s t r i e s the employment t r e n d s f l u c t u a t e . While 
t h e r e i s a decrease i n numbers employed i n the c o a l 
and gas i n d u s t r i e s , t h e r e i s a s l i g h t i n c r e a s e i n the 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y . The main r e a s o n f o r the 
tendency f o r decrease i n numbers employed i s t e c h n i c a l 
improvements. I n the c o a l i n d u s t r y the average number 
employed, i n 196l , was 570,000 and a t the end of 1962 
536,000. The N.E.D.C. c o n s i d e r i n g the 4% growth, 
t h i n k t h a t the labour f o r c e i n the c o a l i n d u s t r y w i l l 
not exceed 500,000 i n 1966.(29) S i m i l a r l y i n the gas 
i n d u s t r y improvements i n technology account f o r the 
d e c l i n e i n i t s labour f o r c e . The f o l l o w i n g t a b l e 
shows t h i s d e c l i n e and the p r e d i c t i o n of the numbers 
employed i n 1966 based on the 4% growth of gross 
n a t i o n a l production estimated by N.E.D.C* 
(29) Report March 1963 para 49 - 50 
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TABLE 12. 
THE GAS INDUSTRY TOTAL EMPLOYMENT 
(THOUSANDS! 
1956 1961 1966 
Production 58 45 38 
Di s t r i b u t i o n 16 16 15 
Consumers se r v i c e s 64 65 64 and others 
Total 138 126 117 
The technological progress can be c l e a r l y seen 
from the remarkable decrease i n numbers employed i n 
the production processes i n which t e c h n i c a l improvements 
have a greater e f f e c t i n reducing the number employed* 
On the other hand consumer ser v i c e s show that there was 
more employment required between 1956 and 196l. This 
i s probably because employment i n t h i s process i s not 
greatly affected by technical progress. On the whole 
the tendency of employment i n the gas industry i s to 
decrease, as the l a t e s t figure shows that the number 
employed i n mid-September 1964 i s 122.0 thousand.(30) 
Planning for manpower requirements should be 
reviewed annually to take into account a l l possible 
changes derived from the recent enquiry and to reduce 
as much as possible the error i n estimation of the 
(30) Ministry of Labour Gazette Vol. LXXXII No.11 
Nov. 1964 
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proper s i z e of employments This has been made by the 
N.E.D.C. i n r e v i s i n g the manpower estimates i n 1964, 
and gives d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t s from those which had been 
published i n 1965* The following table shows a 
downward r e v i s i o n of e a r l i e r (1963) forecasts of 
manpower requirements for 1966 i n coal mining. 
TABLE 13. 
THE GROWTH IN EMPLOYMENT 1961 - 1966. 
1961 1966 Changes 1961 to 1966 
mid-year mid-year Thousands % per annum 
Thousands Thousands 
Goal mining 665 540 -125 -4.1 (-2.7) 
Gas 127 123 -4 -0.7 (-1.2) 
(Estimates i n brackets published i n 1963 by N.E»D.C. 
(Growth to 1966)) 
The reason given for these new estimates, i s the 
expectation of productivity to proceed at a f a s t e r 
rate than was assumed and t h i s w i l l enable the 
achievement of the output expected i n 1966 with a 
smaller labour force. 
On the other hand, the manpower decline i n the 
gas industry shows an upward r e v i s i o n according to the 
l a s t inquiry. The reason i s that according to the 
improvement of output expected which involves a 
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continuing increase i n sa l e s of domestic gas heating 
appliances, the gas industry would need more manpower 
than was expected i n 1963 Report. 
In contrast with the two examples of the coal 
and gas i n d u s t r i e s , the current and the forecast of 
manpower requirement i n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply industry 
shows an increasing trend. In the l a s t f i v e years 
ending i n March, 1964 the average annual increase i n 
numbers employed i n the industry i s 2.4%.(31) The 
estimated annual increase t i l l 1966 w i l l be 3*1% 
based on the N.JEJD.C. inquiry published i n 1964.(32) 
This s i g n i f i c a n t difference with other 
n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s i n B r i t a i n proves that 
t e c h n i c a l progress i n the industry concerned does not 
n e c e s s a r i l y coincide with decreasing employment 
requirements, because the e l e c t r i c i t y supply industry 
i n B r i t a i n i s t e c h n i c a l l y improving. 
The question which may a r i s e here i s why 
employment i n t h i s industry i s increasing. The 
reasons are: 
( l ) to take advantage of recruitment of more manual 
workers from the flow of school leavers* 
(31) E l e c t r i c i t y Council, Annual Report and Accounts 
1963-64 
(32) Op„Cit. para 59. 
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(2) additional employees are required on the 
generating and transmission side, for operating 
and maintaining new power stations both 
conventional and nuclear, and for maintaining 
and expanding of transmission networks* 
(3) perhaps the most important reason i s the 
expansion of the d i s t r i b u t i o n side of the 
industry, which i s much l e s s influenced by the 
techn i c a l progress* For example, the need for 
more employees to maintain the new i n s t a l l a t i o n s 
of sub-stations and transmission l i n e s * Also 
r a i s i n g the standard of consumers' s e r v i c e s due 
to the improvement of t e s t i n g consumers' 
i n s t a l l a t i o n s would lead to s u b s t a n t i a l increase 
i n the number of inspectors required. 
(4) the remarkable expansion of the industry on both 
sides (generation and transmission and 
d i s t r i b u t i o n ) n e c e ssitate the increase i n the 
techn i c a l engineering, research and development 
s t a f f required* 
(5) Any temporary re-organisation of administrative 
processes i n the industry, for instance, 
preparing for the t r a n s f e r of the accounting 
process from dispersed to c e n t r a l i s e d points 
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i n v o l v i n g the r e - w r i t i n g of r e c o r d s e t c . , r e q u i r e 
a d d i t i o n a l employees.(33) 
To conclude, i t i s obvious t h a t although 
t e c h n i c a l progress and improvement i n s a l e s a r e 
u n i v e r s a l f a c t o r s between gas and e l e c t r i c i t y , 
i n c r e a s e i n the s i z e of manpower i s shown i n 
e l e c t r i c i t y and not i n gas. T h i s i s because the 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y mentioned i s expanding 
w i t h a higher r a t e e s p e c i a l l y i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n 
s i d e which needs more manpower and i s not a f f e c t e d 
much by t e c h n i c a l p r o g r e s s * 
The problem of s k i l l e d manpower* 
The d i s c u s s i o n above shows t h a t the s i z e of 
manpower r e q u i r e d i s p a r t l y i n f l u e n c e d by the 
t e c h n o l o g i c a l progress i n the i n d u s t r y and p a r t l y 
by other f a c t o r s s t a t e d i n the case of the e l e c t r i c i t y 
supply i n d u s t r y . To draw up a p o l i c y aiming to 
a c h i e v e the s i z e r e q u i r e d , a major c o n s i d e r a t i o n must 
be given to the problem of the shortage of s k i l l e d 
labour* 
(33) Memorandum by the E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l , manpower 
and p r o d u c t i v i t y , Report of the S e l e c t Committee 
on N a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s , May, 19&3 
Appendix p.250 
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I n p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s , both i n B r i t a i n and 
Egypt the expansion of u s i n g h i g h l y modernized 
machinery n e c e s s i t a t e s the a p p r e c i a t i o n of s k i l l e d 
l abour requirements. For a balance between the 
f u t u r e demand and supply of t e c h n i c a l s k i l l s , a 
planne r must a c q u i r e the s t a t i s t i c a l data showing the 
e x i s t i n g shortage of s k i l l s and an a c c u r a t e estimate 
of the k i n d s of s k i l l s r e q u i r e d w i t h i n the p e r i o d 
of p l a n n i n g . A c l a s s i f i e d l i s t of the v a r i o u s 
occupations of the i n d u s t r y which need such s k i l l s 
and based on r e g i o n a l requirements may i n d i c a t e the 
p o s i t i o n of the demand f a c t o r . The supply f a c t o r 
may be known from the p o s s i b l e p r o p o r t i o n of 
t e c h n i c a l manpower graduated from u n i v e r s i t i e s , other 
t e c h n i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and the number who a t t e n d 
c o u r s e s of t r a i n i n g i n the i n d u s t r y who w i l l be 
r e c r u i t e d . But a balance of t h i s k i n d i s d i f f i c u l t 
to s e t up. Because i t i n v o l v e s a l l the problems of 
manpower m o b i l i t y , f o r i n s t a n c e , i t i s not easy to 
move workers w i t h p a r t i c u l a r q u a l i f i c a t i o n s from one 
i n d u s t r y to another. Competition w i t h the p r i v a t e 
s e c t o r i n the demand f o r t h i s r a r e commodity should 
be f a c e d . I t i s t r u e t h a t s k i l l e d manpower i s not 
a l e s s r a r e commodity than c a p i t a l and needs more 
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than the mechanisms of a f r e e labour market to 
a c h i e v e the balance between s k i l l e d manpower supply 
and demand. 
The problem of s k i l l e d manpower i n p u b l i c 
e n t e r p r i s e s i s more acute i n Egypt than i n B r i t a i n . 
As mentioned above i n most of the l e s s developed 
c o u n t r i e s t h e r e i s a l a r g e s u r p l u s of u n s k i l l e d 
manpower c o - i n c i d i n g w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l e shortages of 
s k i l l e d and h i g h l y s k i l l e d grades of manpower. What 
makes the s i t u a t i o n more d i f f i c u l t to s o l v e i s the 
f a c t t h a t Egypt i n c a r r y i n g out the tremendous 
i n d u s t r i a l schemes, through the p u b l i c s e c t o r , can 
u t i l i z e the most advanced technology and machinery 
which i n d u s t r i a l i z e d c o u n t r i e s have taken decades 
to develop,(34) T e c h n i c a l advances i n e v i t a b l y l e a d 
to an i n c r e a s e i n the demand f o r the h i g h l y - s k i l l e d 
l abour f o r c e w i t h a simultaneous decrease i n demand 
f o r u n s k i l l e d l a b o u r which u r g e n t l y needs to be 
absorbed. 
The problems of m o b i l i t y may be a l s o more 
acute i n E g y p t i a n p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s than i n B r i t a i n . 
(34) Harbison, F.H., & Ibrahim, I.A. Some labour 
problems i n Egypt, The Annals of the American 
Academy of P o l i t i c a l and S o c i a l S c i e n c e May, 1956 
V o l . p . l l 4 
211 
Because of the large number of newly established 
public enterprises, which for other economic fact o r s 
must be located i n areas with 'no inherited t r a d i t i o n 
of s k i l l , no ready f a m i l i a r i t y with mechanical 
appliances, no idea of standards of output or 
productivity and no appreciation of the exacting 
standards of mass production or even of occupational 
hazards• ' ( 35) 
In the e l e c t r i c i t y supply industry, perhaps, 
the problem i s the serious shortage of h i g h l y - s k i l l e d 
s c i e n t i f i c and technical personnel required i n 
connection with the construction of nuclear power 
sta t i o n s * In planning for manpower requirements to 
operate nuclear power st a t i o n s three questions a r i s e : 
the future demand of kinds of s k i l l , how these s k i l l s 
can be supplied, and the fa c t o r s which may a f f e c t the 
future supply of s k i l l e d manpower required* The 
operation of nuclear power stations requires s c i e n t i f i c 
and t e c h n i c a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n s such as those of 
p h y s i c i s t s , chemists, engineers, technicians, mechanics, 
e l e c t r o n i c workers, e l e c t r i c i a n s and others. 
(35) United Nations. Organisation and administration 
of public enterprises i n the i n d u s t r i a l f i e l d New 
York 1954 p.32 
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The supply of these q u a l i f i c a t i o n s may be 
drawn from t h r e e main s o u r c e s ; f i r s t , from the 
o r d i n a r y s k i l l e d labour i n other i n d u s t r i e s such as 
mechanics and e l e c t r i c i a n s , who need a comprehensive 
a d u l t v o c a t i o n a l t r a i n i n g ; second, from s k i l l e d 
workers who work i n other atomic power o r g a n i s a t i o n s * 
as atomic r e s e a r c h c e n t r e s and s i m i l a r i n d u s t r i e s 
u s i n g atomic energy; t h i r d , from young q u a l i f i e d 
workers who have r e c e n t t h e o r e t i c a l t r a i n i n g on 
i n d u s t r i a l u s e s of atomic energy* 
As r e g a r d s the f i r s t category, the e l e c t r i c i t y 
supply i n d u s t r y i s not l i k e l y to be s u c c e s s f u l i n 
s o l v i n g the problem of shortage of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r 
s k i l l by t r a n s f e r r i n g the s k i l l e d labour from 
c o n v e n t i o n a l to the atomic energy i n d u s t r y , ( 3 6 } 
because these persons who a r e a l r e a d y employed i n 
other i n d u s t r i e s have assumed a permanent c h a r a c t e r * 
The second c a t e g o r y i s d i f f i c u l t to approach because 
the demand f o r t h e s e s k i l l s a r i s e s a t the time when 
other c e n t r e s u s i n g atomic energy a r e s h o r t of these 
s k i l l s * Perhaps medical and m i l i t a r y c e n t r e s a r e 
s t r o n g competition i n t h i s f i e l d * 
(36) United Nations Economic a p p l i c a t i o n of atomic 
energy; power ge n e r a t i o n and i n d u s t r i a l and 
a g r i c u l t u r a l u s e s . New York 1957 p*89 
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The t h i r d s e c t o r i s understandably the most 
a v a i l a b l e source f o r r e c r u i t m e n t . The young people 
who have had some t h e o r e t i c a l knowledge would be 
e a s i l y adaptable to work i n n u c l e a r power s t a t i o n s . 
S i m i l a r d i f f i c u l t i e s concerning the requirements f o r 
atomic s k i l l w i l l f a c e the Egyptian e l e c t r i c i t y 
supply i n f u t u r e . T h e r efore proper planning f o r t h i s 
k i n d of s k i l l should be made i n advance. 
E d u c a t i o n and t r a i n i n g . 
The overwhelming demand f o r s k i l l e d labour 
may make i t e s s e n t i a l to develop l a r g e - s c a l e t r a i n i n g 
programmes i n order to safeg u a r d manpower planning 
t a r g e t s . 
I t i s e s s e n t i a l i n p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s t h a t 
the w i d e s t f a c i l i t i e s should be given f o r the 
education and t r a i n i n g of workers. Workers should 
not only know how to do the job but a l s o should know 
why they do i t and some of the economic and 
managerial problems of the i n d u s t r y concerned. 
I t i s a l s o e s s e n t i a l t h a t other c a t e g o r i e s of 
manpower such as foremen, i n s t r u c t o r s and management 
pe r s o n n e l should have adequate t r a i n i n g f a c i l i t i e s 
to f u r t h e r t h e i r knowledge. T r a i n i n g , e i t h e r of 
manpower employed i n the i n d u s t r y or of new e n t r a n t s , 
has a considerable e f f e c t on economic development. 
As technology advances, t r a i n i n g and r e t r a i n i n g , on 
an increasing s c a l e , w i l l promote the necessary 
s h i f t s and adjustments* Bad programming of appropriate 
t r a i n i n g schemes w i l l r e s u l t i n f a u l t y planning of 
production, f a u l t y choice of materials, incorrect 
assignment of machines, inadequate maintenance of 
plant and equipment, and bad s t a f f r e l a t i o n s due to 
untrained works managers* 
Training of foremen and senior managers* 
To avoid these repercussions proper methods of 
t r a i n i n g manpower should be adopted and c a r e f u l l y 
applied to s u i t the country's circumstances* For 
example, the reconstruction of the Egyptian economy 
and the tremendous expansion i n manufacturing during 
recent years have combined to make the lack of 
experienced supervisors and senior managers one of 
the most d i f f i c u l t problems. The d i f f i c u l t y i s to 
provide t r a i n i n g f a c i l i t i e s for large numbers of t h i s 
category quickly, and even i f these f a c i l i t i e s were 
to be provided, the t r a i n i n g process i s not easy 
enough to be compressed into a short period of time* 
In Egyptian public enterprises there are three 
methods from which to choose. F i r s t , t r a i n i n g within 
the e n t e r p r i s e , supplemented where n e c e s s a r y by 
f o r e i g n s k i l l s . By t h i s method foremen and other 
i n t e r m e d i a t e employees go through t h r e e c o u r s e s : 
job i n s t r u c t i o n , ( i . e . how to i n s t r u c t , ) job 
r e l a t i o n s , ( i . e . how to handle s t a f f e f f e c t i v e l y ) ? 
and job methods, ( i . e . how to organise work). The 
me r i t of t h i s method i s t h a t i t o f f e r s a g e n e r a l 
programme, which i s not co n f i n e d to the i n d i v i d u a l 
i n d u s t r y . ( 3 7 ) 
The second method i s t o e s t a b l i s h a 
s u p e r v i s o r y t r a i n i n g c e n t r e . I n t h i s c e n t r e 
s u p e r v i s o r s i n v a f i o u s e n t e r p r i s e s a t t e n d courses 
d e a l i n g w i t h technology of t h e i r s p e i f i c i n d u s t r y , 
techniques of s u p e r v i s i o n , t h e o r e t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l 
study of the c o n d i t i o n of labour f o r c e s i n the p u b l i c 
s e c t o r as a whole, a n a l y s i s of methods of t r a i n i n g 
adopted i n developed c o u n t r i e s and how to adapt them 
to n a t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s and so f o r t h . Such a method 
r e q u i r e s c o - o r d i n a t i o n between e x i s t i n g e d u c a t i o n a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s and Government a s s i s t a n c e . 
The t h i r d method may be to send some of 
th e s e s u p e r v i s o r s abroad to l e a r n and see the 
(37) United Nations. Some problems i n the 
o r g a n i s a t i o n and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of p u b l i c 
e n t e r p r i s e i n the i n d u s t r i a l f i e l d , p.37 
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e f f i c i e n c y of the s u p e r v i s o r s i n the f i r m s they 
v i s i t and suggest v a r i o u s ways of improving 
p r o d u c t i v i t y and output i n t h e i r home p l a n t s by 
b e t t e r production te c h n i q u e s , e t c . 
I f one of these methods i s to be adopted i n 
Egyptian p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s , i t seems p r a c t i c a b l e 
to choose the second method. Most of the i n d u s t r i a l 
p l a n t s i n Egypt are l o c a t e d i n two b i g c i t i e s , C a i r o 
and A l e x a n d r i a , and t h e i r suburbs. A c e n t r e f o r 
te a c h i n g s u p e r v i s o r s could be p l a c e d i n these two 
c i t i e s where a l s o the a s s i s t a n c e of e d u c a t i o n a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s and other f a c i l i t i e s a r e a v a i l a b l e . 
Although the other two methods may aldo be adopted, 
the main o b s t a c l e i s the h i g h c o s t i n v o l v e d i n 
sending s u p e r v i s o r s or b r i n g i n g f o r e i g n s k i l l s to a 
g r e a t number of e n t e r p r i s e s newly e s t a b l i s h e d . But, 
of course, i f i t i s found t h a t i n p a r t i c u l a r e n t e r p r i s e s 
f o r e i g n s k i l l i s i n e v i t a b l e , as i n the i r o n and s t e e l 
i n d u s t r y , e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y , and chemical 
i n d u s t r i e s , t h e s e two methods may prove s u p e r i o r . 
For s e n i o r managers and other h i g h l y s p e c i a l i s e d 
p e r s o n n e l such as accountants, s a l e s managers e t c . , 
n a t i o n a l s e s s i o n s , by l e c t u r e s could be arranged to 
g i v e a p i c t u r e of modern techniques and of the p r o g r e s s 
217 
made i n foreign countries* These l e c t u r e s could be 
followed by discussion of p r a c t i c a l problems of 
using these techniques and p o l i c i e s * 
Training of s k i l l e d labour* 
Training s k i l l e d labour i s also a d i f f i c u l t 
problem although i n Egypt, t e c h n i c a l colleges and 
schools u s u a l l y cater for a c l a s s of s k i l l e d labour 
that may be needed i n a l l kinds of industry. College 
and school leavers of t h i s kind may be e a s i l y adapted 
to the kind of s k i l l meeded i n plant t r a i n i n g . 
Two d i f f i c u l t i e s have to be faced i n connection 
with s k i l l e d labour£ f i r s t , although i t may appear 
that there i s an adequate flow of t h i s c l a s s , the 
problem i s that considerable numbers are reluctant to 
work i n a factory where i n e a r l y i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n 
pioneering s e r v i c e i s required. This means that i n a 
newly established enterprise i t i s expected that 
welfare f a c i l i t i e s would not be s u f f i c i e n t , i n addition 
that t e c h n i c a l school leavers prefer to have c l e r k 
jobs to avoid d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the new industry. 
Secondly, f a c i l i t i e s required to t r a i n t h i s c l a s s i n 
the plant are lacking. I f these d i f f i c u l t i e s are to 
be overcome, two methods of t r a i n i n g may be adopted; 
on-the-job t r a i n i n g under s k i l l e d guidance by which 
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the i n d i v i d u a l undertakes gradually the job he i s 
going to do, or attend a s p e c i a l course of t r a i n i n g 
i n a centre under a r t i f i c i a l conditions s i m i l a r to 
those i n the industry* 
Perhaps the f i r s t method, on-the-job t r a i n i n g , 
may be suitable i n Egyptian public enterprises to 
avoid the cost of e s t a b l i s h i n g a centre of highly 
e xp en s ive e qu ipment. 
Training of u n s k i l l e d labour* 
For t r a i n i n g u n s k i l l e d workers, t h e o r e t i c a l l y , 
there i s no problem* The newcomer can be shown what 
to do, and a f t e r a short time he w i l l do the job 
reasonably w e l l . But p r a c t i c a l l y there may be two 
problems involved. F i r s t , such workers should have 
had preliminary education, which depends on 
Government schemes to abolish i l l i t e r a c y i n the 
country, and secondly, such t r a i n i n g may be a c o s t l y 
operation and may r e s u l t i n a l o s s of material. 
Handling of expensive material i s an example. The 
proper method i n t h i s connection i s to provide l o c a l 
t e c h n i c a l schools teaching s p e c i f i c c u l t u r a l background* 
Enterprises and the government should integrate t h e i r 
e f f o r t s to prepare a new type of worker who has 
besides a s p e c i f i c c u l t u r a l background, the capacity 
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to a t t a i n an o v e r a l l p e r s p e c t i v e of p r o d u c t i v e 
p r o c e s s e s * 
T r a i n i n g i n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y * 
The e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y has to employ 
people of many p r o f e s s i o n s and t a l e n t s * The 
t e c h n i c a l s i d e of the i n d u s t r y , g e n e r a t i o n , 
t r a n s m i s s i o n and d i s t r i b u t i o n r e q u i r e s a c o n s i d e r a b l e 
number of e l e c t r i c a l , mechanical and c i v i l e n g i n e e r s , 
a r c h i t e c t s , s u r v e y o r s and draughtsmen* Also the 
running and maintenance of power s t a t i o n s and networks 
depends on a v a r i e t y of c r a f t s and manual s k i l l s such 
as b l a c k s m i t h s , e l e c t r i c i a n s , f i t t e r s , j o i n e r s , 
linemen and other t r a d e s * On the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s i d e , 
the e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y need h i g h l y q u a l i f i e d 
a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , accountants, s e c r e t a r i e s , c l e r k s and 
other p r o f e s s i o n s * 
I n t r a i n i n g these people the B r i t i s h e l e c t r i c i t y 
supply i n d u s t r y has had a long experience u n t i l i t 
has reached a high l e v e l of t r a i n i n g . P r o v i s i o n f o r 
education and t r a i n i n g schemes has been in t r o d u c e d 
i n the E l e c t r i c i t y Act of 1947* The i n d u s t r y has t o 
provide the f a c i l i t i e s f o r employees a t a l l l e v e l s 
whether t e c h n i c a l , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e or otherwise* I n 
c a r r y i n g out t h i s duty the Area Boards have to draw 
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up a g e n e r a l programme f o r education and t r a i n i n g 
d i s c u s s e d and approved by the N a t i o n a l J o i n t 
Advisory C o u n c i l , to be submitted to the M i n i s t e r 
concerned* The need f o r these programmes i s 
i n c r e a s i n g l y important to provide s k i l l e d manpower 
r e q u i r e d f o r the l a r g e c o n s t r u c t i o n programmes and 
d i s t r i b u t i o n networks o u t l i n e d i n the long-term 
planning of both gen e r a t i o n and d i s t r i b u t i o n p r o j e c t s * 
The question now i s how to t r a i n these 
people, what are the methods adopted i n the i n d u s t r y 
and what i s the importance of t r a i n i n g schemes*? 
Methods of t r a i n i n g i n the B r i t i s h e l e c t r i c i t y 
supply i n d u s t r y a r e designed to s u i t a l l grades* 
For newcomers i n the i n d u s t r y , s c h o o l l e a v e r s 
a r e t r a i n e d to be j u n i o r o p e r a t i v e s and u l t i m a t e l y 
s e m i - s k i l l e d or s k i l l e d workers* The e l e c t r i c i t y 
supply i n d u s t r y , i n t h i s connection, apply the 
a p p r e n t i c e s h i p method, which i s a p p l i e d i n most of 
the engineering i n d u s t r i e s i n B r i t a i n * C r a f t 
a p p r e n t i c e s h i p covers a l l t r a d e s i n the i n d u s t r y * 
Under t h i s method t r a i n e e s a r e prepared to be 
e l e c t r i c a l f i t t e r s , e l e c t r i c i a n s , meter mechanics, 
j o i n e r s and linesmen* E n t r a n t s to t h i s c l a s s should 
have, before s i g n i n g a formal a p p r e n t i c e s h i p 
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agreement, s i x or nine months to g a i n b a s i c workshop 
t r a i n i n g a s a p r o b a t i o n a r y p e r i o d , ( 3 8 ) They are 
a l s o g iven a r e l e a s e of one day a week to a t t e n d a 
c i t y and g u i l d course, f o l l o w i n g the ' e d u c a t i o n a l 
i n c e n t i v e s * . ( 3 9 ) The contents of t h e s e courses a r e 
based on the e d u c a t i o n a l standard of the e n t r a n t , 
h i s age, the type of t r a i n i n g to be undertaken, 
d u r a t i o n of the course and the c o n d i t i o n s of the 
s e r v i c e s • 
B e s i d e s t h i s c l a s s , the t e c h n i c a l p r o c e s s e s 
of the i n d u s t r y r e q u i r e t r a i n e d t e c h n i c a l e ngineering 
s t a f f . The i n d u s t r y draw up graduate t r a i n i n g schemes 
f o r people a l r e a d y holding q u a l i f i c a t i o n s of u n i v e r s i t y 
degree or higher n a t i o n a l c e r t i f i c a t e s tandard. 
Programmes are designed to d e a l w i t h t e c h n i c a l 
problems of g e n e r a t i o n , t r a n s m i s s i o n and d i s t r i b u t i o n . 
These programmes i n c l u d e three courses of two y e a r s 
each by which the t r a i n e e would be a b l e to g a i n 
a l l - r o u n d experience i n the v a r i o u s branches of the 
i n d u s t r y , and then s p e c i a l i s e d i n one of the three 
( 3 8 ) S e l f , Henry, & Watson, E.M. E l e c t r i c i t y supply 
i n d u s t r y i n G.B. London 1952 p . l 4 0 
( 3 9 ) Bellamy, P.G. Aspects of Education and T r a i n i n g 
Summer school 1962 E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l , p.59 
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main branches* There i s a l s o the e n g i n e e r i n g 
a p p r e n t i c e s h i p method by which some of the e n t r a n t s 
i n t o the i n d u s t r y can a t t e n d a dour or f i v e y e a r 
course d i v i d e d i n t o s i x months i n the t e c h n i c a l 
c o l l e g e and s i x months i n the i n d u s t r y every year* 
Manual workers i n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply 
i n d u s t r y a r e t r a i n e d on the job, or having w i t h i n 
the i n d u s t r y elementary i n s t r u c t i o n s by means of 
l e c t u r e s , experimental apparatus, f i l m s and so on, 
concerning the j o b s they undertake* 
The c l e r i c a l s t a f f has had no s i m i l a r schemes 
of a p p r e n t i c e s h i p u n t i l the N*.J»A»C. recommended a 
method of t r a i n i n g t h i s c l a s s i n 1 9 6 2 . Under t h i s 
method r e c r u i t e d c l e r i c a l s t a f f and s e l e c t e d members 
of the e x i s t i n g s t a f f would have to be t r a i n e d i n a 
number of departments over a p e r i o d of t h r e e y e a r s 
i n o f f i c e s k i l l s * The s t a f f can a l s o a t t e n d c o u r s e s 
i n t e c h n i c a l c o l l e g e s to g a i n e d u c a t i o n a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n s 
through one-day r e l e a s e every week. Students who show 
a c e r t a i n p r o g r e s s can have a chance of t r a i n i n g of 
two more y e a r s . ( 4 0 ) 
Apart from the s p e c i f i e d programmes and 
methods of t r a i n i n g d i s c u s s e d above, the E l e c t r i c i t y 
(40) E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l Annual Report and Account 
ending 3 1 s t March, 1962 para 1 7 2 . 
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C o u n c i l i n B r i t a i n undertakes a c e n t r a l i s e d t r a i n i n g 
scheme. The important example, i s the e s t a b l i s h i n g 
of summer and s p r i n g s c h o o l s * By t h i s method the 
i n d u s t r y groups a l l grades i n summer or s p r i n g i n a 
r e s i d e n t i a l c o l l e g e f o r one week. The system i n 
these s c h o o l s i s to hear papers and l e c t u r e s g iven 
by members of the e l e c t r i c i t y a u t h o r i t i e s , by trade 
u n i o n i s t s or by some of the students themselves. 
S u b j e c t s taught cover the o r g a n i s a t i o n and 
development i n the i n d u s t r y * Study groups a r e 
or g a n i s e d to ask que s t i o n s to be answered by 
l e c t u r e r s . 
The i d e a of t h i s method i s twofoldr f i r s t , 
to give the chance to employees i n the i n d u s t r y to 
know the top management and to ask q u e s t i o n s of 
p a r t i c u l a r importance. Secondly, students may get 
to know each o t h e r ' s work as they l i v e together f o r 
a p e r i o d of time. A combination of the s e two f a c t o r s 
r e a l i s e s the harmony between employees and 
management r e q u i r e d i n a s u c c e s s f u l i n d u s t r y . ( k l ) 
The C e n t r a l E l e c t r i c i t y Generating Board run as w e l l 
a t r a i n i n g c e n t r e f o r t e c h n i c a l s u b j e c t s e s p e c i a l l y 
( 4 1 ) S e l f , H. & Watson, E.M. Op.Cit. p.139 
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c o u r s e s i n n u c l e a r power and computing techniques* 
I n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y i n Egypt, 
no data i s a v a i l a b l e on s p e c i f i c programmes and 
t r a i n i n g methods adopted* But, how f a r can we adopt 
the B r i t i s h methods i n t h i s context* 
As r e g a r d s the c e n t r a l i s e d c o u r s e s , adopted 
by the E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l and the Generating Board, 
i t may be of g r e a t use to adopt them i n the Egyptian 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y w i t h some m o d i f i c a t i o n , 
f o r example, t h e r e i s no need f o r a r e s i d e n t i a l 
p l a c e a t the p r e s e n t time, to avoid c o s t s * T e c h n i c a l 
and managerial q u a l i f i c a t i o n s to t e a c h i n such s c h o o l s 
can, beside the i n d u s t r y ' s q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , be provided 
by i n t e r e s t e d people i n u n i v e r s i t i e s and planning 
i n s t i t u t i o n s • 
Programmes f o r c l e r i c a l s t a f f can be 
s u c c e s s f u l l y a p p l i e d i n Egypt, but i n s t e a d of one-day 
r e l e a s e as i n B r i t i s h methods, students of t h i s k i n d 
i n Egypt can a t t e n d evening s c h o o l s a v a i l a b l e * 
Manual workers' methods of t r a i n i n g can a l s o 
be adopted provided t h a t i t w i l l be o n l y on-the-job 
t r a i n i n g as mentioned e a r l i e r i n t h i s s e c t i o n * 
The main problem appears to be i n applying a 
s u i t a b l e method of t r a i n i n g newcomers i n the i n d u s t r y 
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to s k i l l e d l abour, and a l s o the t r a i n i n g of high 
grades such as e n g i n e e r s . As mentioned before, the 
s k i l l e d labour i n Egypt g e n e r a l l y comes from 
t e c h n i c a l c o l l e g e s * Thus the most s u i t a b l e and 
i n e x p e n s i v e method here i s t r a i n i n g on the job and 
probably f o r those who show a c e r t a i n p r o g r e s s the 
i n d u s t r y may grant them more advanced s t u d i e s i n 
higher t e c h n i c a l c o l l e g e s a v a i l a b l e f o r a p e r i o d of 
one or two y e a r s * 
For e n g i n e e r s , t h e r e i s a l r e a d y a shortage, 
so i t would be i m p r a c t i c a b l e to t r a i n them f o r long 
p e r i o d s . The i n d u s t r y may f i n d a s u i t a b l e method 
f o r t h i s c l a s s to be t r a i n e d i n the p l a n t , p o s s i b l y 
by f o r e i g n s k i l l s * 
The importance of the adopted B r i t i s h methods 
or the suggestions made f o r Egypt could be 
summarised as f o l l o w s i 
( l ) T r a i n i n g employees of the i n d u s t r y of a l l grade 
would i d e n t i f y them w i t h the t e c h n i c a l and 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e problems of the i n d u s t r y * T h i s 
i s a concept used i n a l l l a r g e i n d u s t r i e s and 
i t i s of p a r t i c u l a r importance i n the 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y because of i t s 
t e c h n i c a l complexity and to ensure the s a f e t y 
from e l e c t r i c i t y h a z a r d s * 
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( 2 ) T e c h n o l o g i c a l advancement, f o r example, the 
i n t r o d u c t i o n of n u c l e a r power and computing 
techniques must be known by i t s t e c h n i c a l s t a f f . 
( 3 ) As mentioned i n the p r e v i o u s chapter, the 
importance of r e c r u i t m e n t from w i t h i n the 
i n d u s t r y r e q u i r e s t r a i n i n g of p a r t i c u l a r groups 
of employees to f i l l the top management po s t s * 
For example, foremen should have c o u r s e s t e a c h i n g 
them how to conduct day-to-day a f f a i r s . They 
must a l s o be t r a i n e d to t h i n k about the problems 
t h a t may f a c e the i n d u s t r y * 
( 4 ) I n c r e a s i n g the e f f i c i e n c y of the i n d u s t r y as a 
whole cou l d be achieved by the t r a i n i n g of a l l 
employees* But i f t h i s i s not p o s s i b l e , 
e s p e c i a l l y i n the s h o r t or medium term, i t 
should be accepted t h a t the g r e a t e r the number of 
t r a i n e e , s k i l l e d workers i n any of the i n d u s t r y ' s 
a r e a s , the b e t t e r the hope of s o l v i n g the problem 
of shortage of s k i l l s i n the whole i n d u s t r y . 
T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t the movement of t r a i n e d labour 
from one a r e a to another l a c k i n g t h i s p a r t i c u l a r 
s k i l l i s important, and i s a means of s o l v i n g 
the problems of redundancy. T r a i n e d workers 
w i t h i n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y can do 
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the work i n any a r e a . 
The problem of m o b i l i t y i s not so easy to 
s o l v e . M o b i l i t y i s always a s s o c i a t e d w i t h economic 
and s o c i a l o b s t a c l e s , such as t r a v e l l i n g and 
r e s e t t l e m e n t problems: p r o v i s i o n of housing, the l o s s 
of income f o r workers t r a n s f e r r e d c a r r y i n g r e l a t i v e l y 
lower r a t e s of pay, and the e x t r a c o s t to the 
t r a n s f e r r e d worker w h i l e w a i t i n g f o r a house. These 
problems may be so l v e d by e i t h e r of two methods: by 
co-operation between the i n d u s t r y and housing 
a u t h o r i t i e s , p u b l i c or p r i v a t e e s p e c i a l l y i n a r e a s of 
high e r standard of l i v i n g as London, or the e x t r a 
c o s t s may be met by an Exchequer s u b s i d y . The N.E.D.C. 
i n v e s t i g a t i n g the problem i n the c o a l i n d u s t r y s t a t e s 
t h a t the c o s t to; the Exchequer of such t r a n s i t i o n a l 
schemes would be s m a l l * ( 4 2 ) 
P r o d u c t i v i t y of la b o u r . 
The economical s t a f f i n g i n the i n d u s t r y and the 
t e c h n i c a l a b i l i t y and knowledge r e s u l t i n g from proper 
methods of t r a i n i n g a r e two of many f a c t o r s accounting 
f o r p r o d u c t i v i t y of l a b o u r . 
When measuring p r o d u c t i v i t y per labour i n 
d i f f e r e n t i n d u s t r i e s two d i f f e r e n t methods could be 
(42) Op.Cit. Report 1963 p a r a 51 
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a p p l i e d , one baned on output per head, and the other 
on the v a l u e of output per head. On a comparison 
between d i f f e r e n t i n d u s t r i e s i n d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s 
the measurement of output per head i n v o l v e s numerous 
d i f f i c u l t i e s . T h i s i s due to the f a c t t h a t i n d i v i d u a l 
i n d u s t r i e s , as c l a s s i f i e d by the Censuses, each 
produce a group of products and by-products which a r e 
not i d e n t i c a l i n type and q u a l i t y . A c h o i c e of 
standard u n i t cannot overcome completely the l a c k of 
homogenity between d i f f e r e n t i n d u s t r i e s . Because of 
t h i s p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t y measurement could be made 
i n terms of v a l u e . 
I n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y p r o d u c t i v i t y 
per manpower could be measured by output per employee. 
I n comparison between d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s the same 
method could be a p p l i e d . For example, f i g u r e 12 shows 
the development of output (measured as thousands KWh.) 
per employee i n B r i t a i n from 1925 to 1 9 5 9 . ( 4 3 ) The 
f i g u r e shows t h a t p r o d u c t i v i t y per manpower has 
i n c r e a s e d markedly w i t h the expansion of the supply. 
The l e v e l i n 1959 i s about t h r e e and a h a l f times 
t h a t on 1 9 2 5 . Such i n c r e a s e i s due to the modern 
( 4 3 ) S t a t i s t i c a l Diagrammes r e l a t i n g to the 
E l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y , E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l 
1962 p.12 & 1 3 . 
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c a p i t a l equipment used, the improvement of 
o r g a n i s a t i o n and management and the expansion of 
supply o f e l e c t r i c power to v a r i o u s consumers. But 
the expansion of supply does not n e c e s s a r i l y c o - i n c i d e 
w i t h i n c r e a s i n g p r o d u c t i v i t y per employee. The 
N.E.D.C. Report i n 1964 shows t h a t the expected 
i n c r e a s e of manpower i n the i n d u s t r y by n e a r l y 3% 
h i g h e r than estimated i n the l a s t i n q u i r y p u b l i s h e d 
i n 1 9 6 3 i would reduce the i n c r e a s e i n s a l e s per 
employee from k2% i n KWh s o l d per employee to 373&«(44) 
Other reasons f o r t h i s e s timated decrease i s t h a t the 
h i g h e r p r o p o r t i o n of workers employed i s u n r e l a t e d to 
c u r r e n t s a l e s . T h i s means t h a t employment occurs i n 
the development, design and commissioning of 
g e n e r a t i n g s t a t i o n s r a t h e r than the supply of output. 
F i g u r e 13 shows t h a t comparison between 
d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s on p r o d u c t i v i t y per manpower could 
be based on putput (thousands KWh) per employee. The 
d i f f i c u l t y i n making a comparison of p r o d u c t i v i t y per 
manpower i n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y between 
d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s i s not because the method of 
p h y s i c a l output cannot be a p p l i e d but because of many 
( 4 4 ) N.E.D.C. The growth of the Economy, London 
1964 para 228 
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other r e a s o n s . Some of these a r e : 
( l ) The p a t t e r n of e l e c t r i c i t y supply i s d i f f e r e n t 
from one country to another according to the 
n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s . Some c o u n t r i e s generate 
e l e c t r i c i t y mainly from thermal power s t a t i o n s 
such as c o a l f i r e d , n a t u r a l gas or o i l f i r e d . 
The s i z e of manpower d i f f e r s among these t y p e s , 
f o r i n s t a n c e , c o a l f i r e d s t a t i o n s need more 
manpower than the other two. Other c o u n t r i e s 
which have a dominant p a r t of t h e i r c a p a c i t y 
as hydro-power s t a t i o n s a r e i n a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n , 
because they can produce the same output or even 
higher w i t h s m a l l e r labour f o r c e . I n B r i t a i n , 
the dominating method of g e n e r a t i o n i s by c o a l -
f i r e d power s t a t i o n s . I n Egypt, t h e r e a r e 
e i t h e r o i l - f i r e d or n a t u r a l gas power s t a t i o n s 
and hydro 
Consequently the labour f o r c e i n the B r i t i s h 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply i s expected to be higher i n 
B r i t a i n than i n Egypt assuming t h a t they produce 
the same output. 
Another obvious reason a f f e c t i n g a 
comparison between d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s i s the 
f a c t t h a t some c o u n t r i e s s t i l l use power s t a t i o n s 
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of l e s s e r e f f i c i e n c y than modern ones* The 
former need more manpower to operate them* 
I n a d d i t i o n , the i n t e r c o n n e c t i n g system of power 
s t a t i o n s has an e f f e c t on the q u a n t i t y of labour 
r e q u i r e d and a c c o r d i n g l y has an e f f e c t on the 
manpower/productivity r a t i o * A g r i d and super-
g r i d system improves the p r o d u c t i v i t y per 
manpower. Here ag a i n the s i t u a t i o n i s g r e a t l y 
d i f f e r e n t i n B r i t a i n compared w i t h Egypt: w h i l e 
the g r i d system i n B r i t a i n has been i n o p e r a t i o n 
s i n c e 1936 and i t i s planned f o r a s u p e r - g r i d 
scheme, i n Egypt a g r i d system i s planned to be 
i n o p e r a t i o n i n 1 9 6 8 * 
One has a l s o to take i n t o account t h a t 
some c o u n t r i e s import e l e c t r i c c u r r e n t which i s 
accounted i n the n a t i o n a l output. The 
imp o r t a t i o n of e l e c t r i c i t y supply does not need 
much manpower* 
j 
(2) The d i f f i c u l t y i n comparison between d i f f e r e n t 
c o u n t r i e s i s c l e a r when c o n s i d e r i n g the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n s e r v i c e s of the i n d u s t r y . The more 
s e r v i c e s o f f e r e d to consumers a f t e r connection 
the more manpower r e q u i r e d which has no r e l a t i o n 
to output of e l e c t r i c i t y . For example, s e r v i c e s 
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of s e l l i n g a p p l i a n c e s , showrooms, and maintenance of 
consumers* e l e c t r i c a p p l i a n c e s are known i n B r i t a i n 
but such s e r v i c e s are not o f f e r e d i n Egypt by the 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y . 
J o i n t s e r v i c e s work a g a i n s t a proper 
comparison. For example, i n Egypt e l e c t r i c i t y and 
gas consumers' s e r v i c e s a r e managed and operated by 
the same a u t h o r i t y . T h i s means t h a t the same number 
of employees s e r v e both i n d u s t r i e s , f o r i n s t a n c e , 
r e a d i n g gas and e l e c t r i c i t y meters i s done by one 
employee. T h i s method of j o i n t s e r v i c e s i s not 
a p p l i e d i n B r i t a i n . 
( 3 ) Some c o u n t r i e s use modern methods of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
such as computers f o r b i l l i n g , mechanisation and 
c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of accounting systems. These methods 
r e q u i r e l e s s manpower showing higher p r o d u c t i v i t y 
per employee than other c o u n t r i e s which have not 
such modern t e c h n i q u e s . 
(4) Comprehensive f i g u r e s and s t a t i s t i c s showing the 
volume of output and the q u a n t i t y of manpower are 
not a v a i l a b l e i n every country. 
( 5 ) Working hours i n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y i n 
d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s may d i f f e r g r e a t l y . I f working 
hours i n a p a r t i c u l a r country a r e l e s s than i n 
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another country, t h i s means more manpower i n 
o p e r a t i o n and consequently l e s s p r o d u c t i v i t y per 
employee. 
These reasons do not mean t h a t comparison 
between two c o u n t r i e s or s e v e r a l c o u n t r i e s of 
p r o d u c t i v i t y per employee i s i m p o s s i b l e . Comparison 
based on f i g u r e s would g i v e an i n d i c a t i o n of the 
problem. The O.E.E.G. Report 1960 shows a comparison 
of t h i s k i n d i n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y 
between s e v e r a l c o u n t r i e s of Europe shown i n the 
14 
f o l l o w i n g t a b l e and F i g u r e 13. 
Comparison based on these f i g u r e s shows t h a t t h e r e 
a r e f o u r c o u n t r i e s of h i g h e r output per employee than 
the U nited Kingdom. But when i t i s known t h a t the 
f i r s t t h r e e c o u n t r i e s use mainly h y d r o - e l e c t r i c 
power s t a t i o n s and the Netherlands does not undertake 
e x t e n s i v e consumer s e r v i c e s as i n B r i t a i n , t h i s may 
i n d i c a t e t h a t B r i t a i n i s i n a more fa v o u r a b l e p o s i t i o n 
than shown i n the table.. 
A comparison of p r o d u c t i v i t y per manpower i n 
the e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y between B r i t a i n and 
Egypt would show a much lower p r o d u c t i v i t y per 
manpower i n Egypt than i n B r i t a i n . ( 4 5 ) Two s e t s of 
( 4 5 ) Although there i s a J o i n t S e r v i c e s of e l e c t r i c i t y 
and gas i n d u s t r i e s i n Egypt, the p r o p o r t i o n of 
gas s e r v i c e s i s v e r y low which cou l d put the 
comparison to a l a r g e extent r i g h t . 
TABLE 14. 
THOUSAND KWh PER EMPLOYEE. 
Sweden Norway 
X 




A u s t r i a 
0 
Belgium Spain I r e l a n d 
1869 1407 1081 517 483 441 4 3 8 390 380 299 226 
x 1957 o 1956 
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reasons may explain t h i s position* 
F i r s t , f a c t o r s which influence the e l e c t r i c i t y -
supply industry. These are: 
(1) Consumption per cad.ta i n Egypt i s much lower than 
i n B r i t a i n as we have seen e a r l i e r i n the 
chapter. (46) This means that i f consumption per 
capita r i s e s output w i l l be increased owing to 
a better u t i l i z a t i o n f a c t o r . At the same time 
an increase of output does not require a s i m i l a r 
r a te of increase of numbers employed. 
(2) Production of e l e c t r i c i t y i s not yet i n t e r -
connected i n a gr i d system i n Egypt. This means 
that smaller u n i t s used i n areas lacking 
connection need more manpower. In addition, 
there are large i n d u s t r i a l companies using t h e i r 
own power s t a t i o n s . 
For these reasons the e l e c t r i c i t y supply 
system i n Egypt requires more manpower and 
consequently has a lower productivity. However, 
there are two factors working i n favour of Egypt 
compared with B r i t a i n ; one i s that the proportion 
of hydro generation, though i t i s r e l a t i v e l y low, 
i s s t i l l higher than i n B r i t a i n . The other factor 
(46) See page 165 
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i s the f a c t that consumers' ser v i c e s i n Egypt, l i k e 
displaying e l e c t r i c appliances and s e l l i n g them, 
are not known* 
Even i f we allow for these two f a c t o r s , 
productivity of manpower i n Egypt i s much lower 
than i n B r i t a i n . In addition to the reasons 
mentioned there are many general reasons accounting 
for lower productivity of labour i n the Egyptian 
industry as a whole, which have the same e f f e c t on 
the e l e c t r i c i t y supply industry. The following are 
the most important reasons. 
(1) The socio-economic structure i n Egypt i s bound 
to r e s u l t i n a low l e v e l of productivity, e.g. 
the low standard of health and of housing 
conditions. 
(2) I l l i t e r a c y , though i t s proportion has been 
lowered i n recent years, s t i l l influences the 
supply of e f f i c i e n t manpower. 
(3) The lack of an e f f e c t i v e c o l l e c t i v e bargaining 
structure and the abundance of supply of labour 
means that labour receives a reward l e s s than 
i t s marginal productivity. 
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(k) The absence of economical s t a f f i n g and the 
lack of s u f f i c i e n t t e c h n i c a l a b i l i t y and 
knowledge as mentioned at the beginning of 
t h i s section* 
(5) The high rate of absenteeism, the large labour 
turnover, i n d u s t r i a l fatigue due to long hours 
of work and the i n s t a b i l i t y of labour a f f e c t 
productivity. 
(47) Said, G. Some aspects and problems of 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n i n Egypt Cairo p.73 
Conclusion, 
The discussion above shows the following 
r e s u l t s • 
F i r s t : for manpower planning i t i s important to know 
the trend of increase or decrease i n the s i z e of 
manpower• 
Second: t e c h n i c a l progress i s a common feature i n 
B r i t i s h n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s , which u s u a l l y r e s u l t 
i n a decreasing i n numbers of manpower required. I n 
the B r i t i s h e l e c t r i c i t y supply industry, though, 
there i s also t e c h n i c a l progress but there i s a 
tendency towards increase i n manpower* This i s due 
to the high rate of expansion i n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply 
industry e s p e c i a l l y i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n side which i s 
not affected much by te c h n i c a l improvements* 
Third: i t i s obvious from the discussion that the 
problem of s k i l l e d manpower i n Egypt deserves more 
attention. I n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply industry, the 
problem of s k i l l e d manpower i n nuclear generation 
could be solved by r e c r u i t i n g young q u a l i f i e d workers. 
Fourth: to provide s k i l l e d labour required i n public 
enterprises and i n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply industry a 
comprehensive education and tr a i n i n g scheme i s 
necessary. For every grade of employees and workers 
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a s p e c i f i c t r a i n i n g programme has to be designed* 
In Egypt, i t i s suggested that a supervisory t r a i n i n g 
centre i s appropriate, for t r a i n i n g foremen and 
middle personnel, national sessions for senior managers 
on-the-job t r a i n i n g for s k i l l e d labour and preliminary 
c u l t u r a l education for manual workers. 
In the e l e c t r i c i t y supply industry, methods 
adopted by the B r i t i s h industry could be u s e f u l l y 
applied i n Egypt with some necessary modifications to 
s u i t the Egyptian economy. 
F i f t h r for a giving output i n a giving industry the 
s i z e of manpower and the p r v i s i o n of the required 
s k i l l are two main factors among others to increase 
productivity per man. 
L a s t l y : to increase productivity per man i s the main 
aim of manpower planning i n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply 
industry. 
To compare productivity per man, i n the 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply industry, between two countries 
i s an extremely d i f f i c u l t matter, because of 
di f f e r e n t patterns of supply, d i f f e r e n t systems of 
d i s t r i b u t i o n sources, d i f f e r e n t methods of 
administration and lack of s t a t i s t i c s required. 
However, as an ind i c a t i o n , i n a comparison 
between B r i t a i n and Egypt, i t i s concluded that 
productivity per man, i n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply 
industry, i n Egypt i s much lower than i n B r i t a i n . 
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F i n a n c i a l Planning. 
Every project must provide an answer to the 
basic question, how to finance i t . This r a i s e s the 
problem of a l l o c a t i n g funds through the market by 
public loans guaranteed! or not guaranteed by the 
Government or Exchequer advances or s e l f - f i n a n c i n g . 
I n t h i s section, examination of these problems, 
within the public sector and p a r t i c u l a r l y the 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply industry, w i l l be made. 
Generally speaking the t o t a l sum appropriated 
r e f l e c t s the r e l a t i v e importance of the projects, 
within the frame of a p a r t i c u l a r sector (public or 
private), and consequently within the national economy 
as a whole. In B r i t a i n , the common feature of nearly 
a l l the na t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s i s the large c a p i t a l 
requirements for new programmes. For example, 
throughout the 1950s more than a t h i r d of the nation's 
t o t a l fixed c a p i t a l formation took place i n the public 
sector and of t h i s nearly a h a l f was i n the 
nati o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s including the Post Office. ( 4 8 ) 
According to the N.E.D.C. Report of 1964, the t o t a l 
investment i n the public sector was £1513 m i l l i o n 
i n 1961 r i s i n g to £lS51 m i l l i o n i n 1962 and £163-
(48) Shanks, M. (Ed.) Lessons of public enterprises 
London 1963 p.34 
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m i l l i o n i n 1963. Estimation on the basis of k% 
growth w i l l be an average of £2025 m i l l i o n i n 1964/65 
and £2280 m i l l i o n i n 1966.(49) The e l e c t r i c i t y supply 
industry has us u a l l y a big share i n the t o t a l c a p i t a l 
requirement i n the public sector. The gross f i x e d 
investment i n the industry was £360 m i l l i o n i n 1961 
and £398 m i l l i o n i n 1962. I t i s expected to r i s e to 
a sum of £694 m i l l i o n i n 1966.(50) The coal, 
railways and gas ind u s t r i e s invest annually about 
£100 m i l l i o n , £75 m i l l i o n and £50 m i l l i o n r e s p e c t i v e l y 
i n c a p i t a l expansion. 
S i m i l a r l y i n Egypt the important r o l e of the 
public business sector i n development plans has been 
w e l l manifested by the f a c t that appropriation of the 
Development Budget amounted to £E286 m i l l i o n i n 
1960/61 and £E315 m i l l i o n i n 1961/62. In 1962/63 the 
share of the public business sector i n the National 
Budget was £E493.4 m i l l i o n . ( 5 l ) The a l l o c a t i o n of 
these sums expresses, i n terms of money, the r e l a t i v e 
importance of the projects; i t also determines the 
implementation of the public enterprises' plans. 
This leads us to the question of how to finance these 
programmes• 
(49) Op.Cit. para 119. 
(50) N.E.D.C. March 1964 para 110. 
(51) National Bank of Egypt Economic b u l l e t i n Vol.XV 
Nos. 2 & 3 p.114. 
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The three main sources of financing c a p i t a l 
programmes i n public enterprises are: 
( l ) by issuing stocks i n the market guaranteed or 
not by the Government. 
(4) by Exchequer advances or 
(3) from the commercial earnings of the industry. 
The B r i t i s h experience? 
I n i t i a l l y , public corporations i n B r i t a i n 
have been granted f i n a n c i a l autonomy. I t was 
thought that one of the main advantages of choosing 
the public corporation to govern the nat i o n a l i s e d 
i n d u s t r i e s i s i t s f i n a n c i a l independence. The main 
reason for such independence was to ensure the 
business f l e x i b i l i t y of the industry concerned. I n 
f a c t , the pre-war corporations had t h i s independence. 
The Bort of London Authority was the f i r s t example. 
The Authority's assets were c a p i t a l i s e d by means of 
the issue of i t s own stock. S i m i l a r l y t h i s was the 
position of the Central E l e c t r i c i t y Board and the 
London Passenger Transport Board. The p r i n c i p l e of 
issuin g t h e i r stock kept them immune from 
governmental scrutiny. In the case of the post-war 
public corporation, two main factors worked against 
t h i s independence: f i r s t , the shortage of s u f f i c i e n t 
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surpluses to enable them to finance t h e i r programmes 
without borrowing, and secondly, the f a c t that the 
state may have to use the n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s to 
manipulate the levers of the economy. The f i r s t 
f actor i s c l e a r from the large c a p i t a l invested by 
these i n d u s t r i e s every year which s e l f - f i n a n c i n g , 
while impossible i n some in d u s t r i e s such as the 
railways, only a small proportion i n other i n d u s t r i e s 
such as e l e c t r i c i t y and gas. The second factor could 
be seen i n the government interference i n p r i c e s and 
other commercial a c t i v i t i e s for the national i n t e r e s t 
An additional factor, which affected the i d e a l of 
f i n a n c i a l independence of the public corporation, i s 
that the Government wished to provide cheaper loans 
to them. This could only be done by d i r e c t borrowing 
from the Exchequer or by providing a treasury 
guarantee for the money r a i s e d from the market. Thus 
the argument shows that f i n a n c i a l independence of the 
public corporations has been greatly reduced by 
Government measures. Nevertheless there are some 
features of f i n a n c i a l independence of public 
corporations which govern the B r i t i s h n a t i o n a l i s e d 
i n d u s t r i e s . The fact that they are not included i n 
the National Budget. Their estimates of income and 
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expenditure have not to have the approval of 
Parliament. Their accounts are audited by-
professional auditors and not by the Comptroller 
and the Auditor General. The published accounts of 
the n a t i o n a l i s e d industries are i n the form which 
conform with the commercial standards, the accounts 
include separate operating and f i n a n c i a l r e s u l t s 
for each main a c t i v i t y of the Board. (52) 
I t i s true that there are some features of 
f i n a n c i a l independence, but t h i s does not mean that 
the actual performance of corporations' f i n a n c i a l 
a c t i v i t i e s are within t h e i r management's d i s c r e t i o n . 
However, the common pattern followed by most 
of the n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n Acts was that the Treasury 
should guarantee a l l stocks issued i n the market. 
The n a t i o n a l i s e d e l e c t r i c i t y , gas and transport 
i n d u s t r i e s were authorised by statutes governing 
them to issue such guaranteed stock. The coal 
industry was d i f f e r e n t , i t s operations had to be 
financed by Advances from the Treasury. I t can a l s o , 
as well as the other n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s , borrow 
temporarily by way of overdrafts from the banking 
system authorised by the Ministers concerned and 
subject to a defined l i m i t by s t a t u t e s . 
(52) Budgeting in public a u t h o r i t i e s , by a study 
group of the Royal I n s t i t u t e of Public 
Administration 1959 p . 4 l . 
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The borrowing powers of each of the 
nati o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s are limited, and may be 
changed every year, according to the requirements 
of the industry as we s h a l l see i n the case of the 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply industry. Before 1956 the 
nation a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s were authorised to borrow 
from the market within the defined l i m i t s . The 
reason for borrowing l i m i t s i s that development 
programmes i n these i n d u s t r i e s require a large 
amount of funds which may have a d i r e c t impact on 
the c a p i t a l market and consequently on the economy 
as a whole. Thus the Government has to have a 
voice i n deciding the borrowing p o l i c i e s of the 
nati o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s . This could be c l e a r i f we 
know that only the c a p i t a l expenditure of the 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply industry on property, plant 
and equipment amounted to £469 m i l l i o n i n 1963 /64.(53) 
This amount was 20 m i l l i o n (k%) l e s s than the 
amount approved by the Minister as i t was stated 
i n the White Paper "Public investment i n G.B.", 
October 1963 Cmnd 2177. This i s shown i n the 
following table. (15) 
(53) E l e c t r i c i t y Council, Annual Report and Accounts 
1963/64 para 35. 
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TABLE 15. 
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE IN BRITISH 
ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY. 
( m i l l i o n pounds) 
Approved Actual 
estimate expenditure 
Generating board 334.0 310.1 
Area boards 155.0 159.4 
Total 489.0 469.5 
Other nationalised i n d u s t r i e s also invest a great 
amount of money e s p e c i a l l y transport and coal as was 
mentioned e a r l i e r i n t h i s s e c t i o n . 
In 1956 a l l stock issues ceased and the money 
for a l l nat i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s , at present, i s to be 
provided d i r e c t l y by Exchequer Advances. This was a 
r e s u l t of an issue by the e l e c t r i c i t y supply industry 
amounting to £200 which was heavily undersubscribed 
and consequently imposed a heavy burden on the Bank 
of England. In t h i s respect, the controversy a r i s e s 
i s whether the n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s should go to 
the market for borrowing or should r e l y only on 
Exchequer Advances. On one hand the Herbert 
Committee recommended that n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s 
should compete for c a p i t a l funds on the market 
without the support of the Treasury guarantee. This 
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would encourage the e f f i c i e n t use of capital. ( 5 4 ) 
As regards e l e c t r i c i t y , the Committee recommended 
the amendment of the E l e c t r i c i t y Act "so that each 
Board would go to the market for i t s own c a p i t a l 
requirements and so assume a more d i r e c t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
for the r a i s i n g and spending of capital." ( 5 5) They 
stated that "short of t h i s i t i s very d i f f i c u l t to 
achieve f u l l e f f i c i e n c y . " ( 5 6 ) I t i s also argued 
that the system of guaranteed stock or Exchequer 
advances depends upon p o l i t i c a l rather than r a t i o n a l 
economic considerations. This may r e s u l t i n an 
expansion of the nat i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s at the 
expense of other businesses i n the economy. 
Professor Edwards and Townsend stated that " p u b l i c l y 
owned i n d u s t r i e s j u s t because they are p u b l i c l y 
owned should not make l e s s remunerative investments 
than those a v a i l a b l e i n private industry." ( 5 7 ) 
Keif-Cohen a r r i v e d at a s i m i l a r conclusion to the 
Herbert Report, hoping that the Government would 
take the decisive step of authorising the Treasury 
(54) Para 348-51 
(55) Para 353 
(56) Para 348 
(57) Op.Cit. Business enterprises p . 5 l 4 
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to draw up the necessary regulations under which 
the board of any natio n a l i s e d industry would be 
empowered to go on to the market to borrow.(58) 
On the other hand, the Committee on the 
working of the Monetary System reported that i n 
1955 there was an increasing d i f f i c u l t y i n s e l l i n g 
n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s ' stocks to the public and 
a succession of such i s s u e s had to be taken up 
almost e n t i r e l y by the Issue Department, which 
would mean financing the in d u s t r i e s from the 
Exchequer. As a r e s u l t the Finance Act of 1956 
gave power to the Treasury to make advances of 
long-term c a p i t a l to these industries.(59) 
Another Report on 'The f i n a n c i a l and Economic 
obligations of the natio n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s ' , 196l, 
stated that unguaranteed borrowing i s not r e a l i s t i c , 
because the amounts of money needed are much too 
large to be r a i s e d i n the open market without the 
Government's support. These i n d u s t r i e s are 
considered by the public as c l o s e l y associated with 
the Government. Thus i t would be d i f f i c u l t for the 
(58), Op.Cit. Nationalisation i n B r i t a i n p. 194 
(59) Committee on working of the Monetary System 
Report, August 1959, Cmnd. #27 para 87 
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market to regard them as independent f i n a n c i a l 
concerns*(60) Also Professor Robson described 
fighting for c a p i t a l as being u n r e a l i s t i c . He 
gave two reasons for t h i s . F i r s t , the market has 
not s u f f i c i e n t strength to provide the large 
c a p i t a l requirements of these i n d u s t r i e s . Secondly, 
the picture of a kind of a l l - o u t wrestling match 
or scrimage among the d i g n i f i e d gentlemen who 
d i r e c t the a f f a i r s of our great j o i n t - s t o c k 
companies i n a strenuous attempt to secure for 
t h e i r companies the hard-won savings of the investor 
i s a purely imaginary one . ' t S l ) In summing up, the 
argument seems i n favour of the e x i s t i n g system 
which implies that the na t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s should 
not compete with private enterprises i n the open 
market. In addition to the reasons given above, 
two reasons can be added. 
F i r s t , because of the monopolistic or 
semi-monopolistic position which the n a t i o n a l i s e d 
i n d u s t r i e s enjoy, they can e a s i l y compete with the 
private sector, by offering a high rate of i n t e r e s t . 
But t h i s must be passed on to the consumer which i s 
against the national i n t e r e s t . 
(60) Op.Cit. Cmnd. 1337 para 27 
(61) Op.Cit. Nationalised industry and public 
ownership p.309 
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Secondly, i t i s not r e a l i s t i c t o compare 
pri v a t e enterprises w i t h public enterprises i n 
as much as the former only go to the market f o r a 
small proportion of t h e i r f i n a n c i a l requirements* 
The r e s t i s always found from commercial earnings. 
The l a t t e r have usually a small proportion of 
s e l f - f i n a n c i n g . 
This leads us to the problem of s e l f -
financing. I n a recent argument on the problem i n 
the B r i t i s h nationalised i n d u s t r i e s , the White 
Paper on the Financial and Economic Obligations 
states that experience has shown a general need 
f o r the nationalised ind u s t r i e s to b u i l d up 
adequate reserves to deal w i t h contingencies. The 
White Paper goes on:: 'there are powerful grounds 
i n the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t f o r r e q u i r i n g these 
undertakings t o make a substant i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n 
towards the cost of t h e i r c a p i t a l development out 
of t h e i r own earnings, and so reduce t h e i r claims 
upon the nations's savings and the burden on the 
Exchequer. ' (62), The argument of the Herbert 
Committee, i n t h i s context, i s that i f the p r o f i t s 
of the industry are ploughed back as c a p i t a l , the 
(62) Op.Cit. para 22 
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present consumer who purchases the industry's 
goods and services i s f i n e d by paying costs which 
ought to be spread over a period of years. The 
Report states 'to use prices charged to the 
consumers as a device f o r r a i s i n g c a p i t a l f o r 
expansion i s to impose compulsory saving on 
e l e c t r i c i t y users; to make them pay, so to speak, 
a tax i n proportion to t h e i r e l e c t r i c i t y consumption 
so that the community may b u i l d up the e l e c t r i c i t y 
industry f o r the benefit of fut u r e consumers. To 
make present consumers subsidise i n t h i s way the 
c a p i t a l requirements of fut u r e consumers would be 
quite inequitable and also i t leads t o i n e f f i c i e n c y . *' 
This i s also stressing the Committee's argument 
f o r r a i s i n g c a p i t a l from the market. Another point 
of view against a high r a t i o of s e l f - f i n a n c i n g i s 
the probable e f f e c t of reducing the volume of 
investment below what i s p r o f i t a b l e . This means 
that nationalised industries are assumed to be 
able t o raise prices on the grounds of i n e l a s t i c 
demand f o r t h e i r produces and services which i s 
not r e a l i s t i c . ( 6 3 ) This i s true i f we adopt the 
(63) Foster, C.D. The cost of financing the 
nationalised i n d u s t r i e s , I n s t i t u t e of 
S t a t i s t i c s , Oxford May 1960 p.102 
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idea that nationalised i n d u s t r i e s should provide 
t h e i r goods and services at the cheapest possible 
r a t e . 
The main objection against the above argument 
i s t h a t a public enterprise i s avoiding making 
p r o f i t s , t h i s w i l l make higher p r o f i t s available t o 
pri v a t e enterprises at the expense of the public 
sector. This i s economically damaging to r e n t i e r s 
i n those nationalised i n d u s t r i e s which face 
substitutes i n the private s e c t o r . ( 6 4 ) 
In f a c t , one could not be dogmatic i n dealing 
w i t h t h i s problem. The r a t i o of s e l f - f i n a n c i n g 
l a r g e l y depends on the p r i n c i p l e s on which the 
industry i s working. The general economic factors 
which may determine the degree of s e l f - f i n a n c i n g are 
the price/cost r a t i o , the r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
depreciation provisions and gross investment, the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between c a p i t a l requirements and 
turnover, and the rate of growth i n the industry. 
For example, a fast-growing industry w i t h a nigh 
capital/output r a t i o , where prices are not much 
above average cost, would require a high proportion 
of outside finance. On the other hand an industry 
(64). Hughes, J . Nationaliaed i n d u s t r i e s i n the 
mixed economy. Fabian Tract 328 1960, i n 
Hanson Ed. Na t i o n a l i s a t i o n p.272 
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w i t h a lower capital/output r a t i o and a low ra t e 
of growth would require a high r a t e of sel f - f i n a n c e . 
Taking these factors i n t o consideration, a r i g i d 
determination of se l f - f i n a n c i n g r a t i o w i l l lead to 
wrong p r i c i n g and investment p o l i c i e s . 
Let us now examine the methods of financing 
Egyptian public enterprises and give some examples. 
Financing Egyptian public enterprises. 
As most of Egyptian public enterprises before 
1956 were run by Government Departments, the normal 
procedure f o r financing t h e i r c a p i t a l requirements 
was to draw up estimates f o r the coming f i n a n c i a l 
year. These estimates were subject to the consent 
of the Minister concerned and of the cabinet. Their 
accounts were audited by the Auditor General. Such 
a method has proved inappropriate f o r a public 
enterprise especially of a manufacturing nature. 
The delay involved i n the sanction of these 
estimates and the extremely l i m i t e d freedom of 
managers i n f i n a n c i a l operations were the main 
reasons. Hanson suggests some modifications t o 
t h i s method. "A d i s t i n c t i o n may be made between 
current and c a p i t a l expenditures, estimating and 
appropriation controls relaxed i n various ways, 
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'revolving funds' established, "and so f o r t h . He 
believes that such modifications may enable the 
enterprise to behave i n a more business-like way 
and help i t t o achieve solvency.(65) 
Another method of financing used was the 
creation of the I n d u s t r i a l Bank i n 1949* The Bank 
was to provide c a p i t a l to a l l enterprises including 
public ones. The Bank was empowered to p a r t i c i p a t e 
i n the c a p i t a l i s a t i o n of i n d u s t r i a l enterprises, 
and to grant short-term advances w i t h s e c u r i t i e s 
and medium-term loans (66), and long-term loans 
f o r the creation of new enterprises.(67) This 
method has shown reasonable success i n financing 
the Egyptian public enterprises.(68) The loans of 
the I n d u s t r i a l Bank rose from £2 m i l l i o n i n 1958 
to £4.2 m i l l i o n i n 1960, p a r t i c u l a r l y medium and 
long-term loans which had appreciably increased 
t o 38% of the t o t a l i n 1960.(69)' According to 
(65) Hanson, A.H. Public enterprise and economic 
development. London 1959 p.423 
(66) United Nations. Processes and problems of 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n i n under-developed countries 
New York 1955 p.56 
(67) Issawi. G. Egypt i n r e v o l u t i o n p.265 
(68) Taking i n t o consideration that a f t e r 1956 
n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of large group of i n d u s t r i e s 
which were financed p a r t l y by the I n d u s t r i a l 
Bank. 
(69) Issawi. C. Op.Cit. p.266 
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Hanson, there i s no objection to t h i s method 
provided that the Government reta i n s s u f f i c i e n t 
c o n t r o l otf the Bank's operation. (70) During t h i s 
period the public sector included a large number of 
commercial and i n d u s t r i a l organisations. 
I n addition to the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the 
I n d u s t r i a l Bank, the financing of these 
organisations' c a p i t a l requirements was supplied 
from t h e i r commercial p r o f i t s and i f necessary from 
f i n a n c i a l a id of grants from the National Budget. 
I n a Budget Statement by the Minister of the 
Treasury i n 196l, a new practice has been introduced. 
Instead of aid from the National Budget, the 
Government enabled these organisations, through the 
Government's guarantee, to have recourse to the 
Central Bank of Egypt.(71) They can obtain the 
necessary funds as repayable loans. The Government's 
aim was twofold: f i r s t , f i n a n c i a l c o n t r o l over the 
Organisation's recourse to public funds, and second, 
the repayment of the loans, together w i t h the 
i n t e r e s t was apt to show the degree of r e a l success 
which any of these Organisations may achieve i n 
(70) Hanson, A.H. Public enterprise and economic 
development p.425 
(71) N:B.E. Economic B u l l e t i n Vol. XIV No. 2 
196l p.132 
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t h e i r commercial and i n d u s t r i a l a c t i v i t i e s . 
The financing of the Egyptian public sector 
i s not only supplied by domestic resources but also, 
and of special importance, by external sources of 
c a p i t a l . Methods of external finance to Egyptian 
public enterprises can be broadly c l a s s i f i e d i n t o : 
(a) improvements i n the terms of f o r e i g n trade, and 
(b) foreign a i d . 
I n Egypt, i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade can play a 
major part i n financing public enterprises. Cotton 
exports, when i t s prices r i s e and r e s u l t i n an 
improvement i n the terms of trade, can put at the 
disposal of Egypt a d d i t i o n a l outside resources of 
f o r e i g n currencies that can be used to promote 
i n d u s t r i a l development i n the public sector. 
Foreign a i d , through loans from countries 
where c a p i t a l i s more p l e n t i f u l , i s an obvious 
way to supply c a p i t a l . Some of the investment 
programmes i n communication and e l e c t r i c power 
have been dependent upon public borrowing from 
for e i g n sources. Foreign c a p i t a l i s available from 
the great c a p i t a l markets i n Japan, Germany, the 
U.S.A.. etc., or from I n t e r n a t i o n a l Finance 
Organisations such as the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Bank of 
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Reconstruction and the U.S.A., Export-Import Bank, 
and''from U.S..S..R.. But consideration must be given 
not only to the circumstances of c a p i t a l importing 
countries and t h e i r f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s but also to 
fact o r s i n the world s i t u a t i o n as a whole* The 
factors a f f e c t i n g t h i s method of finance are p a r t l y , 
the fear of a r b i t r a r y acts by Governments of 
c a p i t a l importing countries, such as n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n , 
or double t a x a t i o n , or exchange c o n t r o l preventing 
remittence of c a p i t a l and p r o f i t s i n f o r e i g n 
currency and the fear of lack of technical s t a f f 
t o operate e f f i c i e n t l y large new undertakings.(72) 
I t should be noted that these c r e d i t f a c i l i t i e s from 
f o r e i g n countries can be e i t h e r obtained through 
the Egyptian Government or d i r e c t l y between the 
public enterprise concerned and the f o r e i g n c a p i t a l 
market.(73) 
Owing to the remarkable expansion of the 
Egyptian public sector a f t e r the end of 196l and 
consequently to the development of i t s functions, 
the Government took important and d i r e c t r o l e i n 
financing public enterprises. This was clear from 
(72) Saied, G.M. Some aspects and problems of 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n i n Egypt w i t h special 
reference to problems of finance. Cairo 1958 p. 
(73) Egyptian economic and p o l i t i c a l review 
A p r i l 1961 p.27 
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the new budgetary system introduced i n 1962/63* The 
important feature of the National Budget of t h i s 
year was the l i n k between the public sector's plans 
and the n a t i o n a l plan f o r economic and s o c i a l 
development. I n examining the public sector's share 
i n t h i s Budget an important d i s t i n c t i o n has to be 
made* A public business sector working as a producer 
of goods and services f o r sale, and a public service 
sector which provides p a r t i c u l a r services free of 
charge. 
The problem here i s how the f i r s t category 
i . e . public business sector i s financed from the 
National Budget. 
T r a d i t i o n a l l y the National Budget i s used 
f o r f i s c a l c o n t r o l , but a f t e r the incorporation of 
the public business sector, i t i s used now i n part 
as a t o o l f o r implementing the sector's plans. 
Thus the public business sector appears i n a section 
separate from the National Budget. I n financing 
these plans two concepts are used, a narrow one, 
which includes public a u t h o r i t i e s and public 
organisations, and a broad one, which includes, i n 
a d d i t i o n , the companies a f f i l i a t e d to public 
Organisations•(74\ 
(74) Appendix (3) 
260 
To explain t h i s complex system, I chose the 
l a t e s t available data from the 1962/63 Budget i n 
•which t o t a l public expenditure estimated f o r the 
year was £ E 1 , 0 1 2.6 m i l l i o n out of which fiE519.2 
m i l l i o n was f o r the Service Budget and £E493»4 
m i l l i o n was f o r the business Budget. 
Capital requirements i n t h i s l a t t e r f i g u r e 
amounted to £E275.1 m i l l i o n allocated as f o l l o w s : 
Public a u t h o r i t i e s 
and organisations £E 179 .7 m i l l i o n 
A f f i l i a t e d companies £E 95.4 m i l l i o n 
An attempt has been made to f i n d the sources of 
financing t h i s c a p i t a l and the r e s u l t s are as 
fo l l o w s : 
Self-financing £E 59.9 m i l l i o n 
Social insurance and 
pensions reserves 48 .5 m i l l i o n 
Government subscription 19•2 m i l l i o n 
Foreign loans 33•5 m i l l i o n 
Domestic loans 114 .0 m i l l i o n 
Total £E 275.1 m i l l i o n 
The public business sector depends on i t s own 
resources to the extent of £E108.4 out of which 
£E59.9 retained as a surplus are available f o r 
investment and £ E 4 8 . 5 represent the increase i n 
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the resources of the Social Insurance and Pensions 
fund. In addition the Treasury subscribed £ £ 1 9 . 2 
m i l l i o n through the Central Bank. Regarding t h i s 
p a r t i c u l a r year foreign loan c r e d i t f a c i l i t i e s 
available i n the National Budget amounted to 
£E325.8 m i l l i o n out of which £E84 . 5 m i l l i o n were 
reserved f o r the whole public sector. As shown 
above foreign loans required amounted to only 
£ E 3 3 . 5 m i l l i o n . Thus i t would be easy f o r the 
public business sector to get the f o r e i g n c a p i t a l 
required. Domestic loans, which are u l t i m a t e l y 
provided from pr i v a t e savings were not lacking 
e i t h e r . Again i n t h i s year, nationa l savings were 
estimated at £E302.0 ( £ E l 4 7 . 6 public savings and 
£ E 1 5 4 . 4 p r i v a t e savings), and i t was estimated that v^ 
the private sector would require only £ E 2 4 l , so the 
r e s t would be available f o r lending to the public 
sector including the business category.(7 5) These 
then are the various methods of financing public 
enterprises i n Egypt. I n practice the methods 
adopted d i f f e r from one Organisation to another 
according to i t s f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n . For example, 
while the Central Railways Authority finances i t s 
(75) Figures f o r the Budget 1962/63 are mainly 
from the National Bank of Egypt, Economic 
B u l l e t i n Vol. XV No. 2 and 3 1962. 
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c a p i t a l mainly from i n t e r n a l resources, the E.D.O. 
depends l a r g e l y on long-term loans and small 
proportions of i n t e r n a l resources. To i l l u s t r a t e 
t h i s , two examples w i l l be given i n more d e t a i l . 
Central Railways Authority. 
Before t h i s a u t h o r i t y became an independent 
e n t i t y i t was a Government Department attached t o 
the M i n i s t r y of Communications. I t s f i n a n c i a l 
requirements were regulated by the fo l l o w i n g laws: 
(1) According to Law No. 25 of 1931 c a p i t a l 
programmes ought to be formed from the 
industry's revenue. Capital requirements 
were not to exceed! 65% of the expected revenue, 
subject t o reconsiderations by the cabinet. 
(2) Law No. 104 of 1949 (Sec. 5) increased the 
above percentage t o 75% of the revenue 
retained by the Department. This percentage 
not only includes new c a p i t a l requirements 
but also a l l other expenditures. 
The estimated amount of c a p i t a l expenditure 
had to be submitted to the M i n i s t r y of Finance 
which had f u l l a u t h o r i t y to approve or refuse.the 
sums required. Accordingly the industry has had 
many delays i n implementing i t s future plans.(76) 
(76) Abu-Ismail Ahmed. The f i n a n c i a l r e s u l t s of 
government e x p l o i t a t i o n of railways i n 25 
years 1925/50 Egypte contemporaine Vol.43 1952 p.35 ( i n Arabic) 
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Even a f t e r the re-organisation of the 
Authority and the evolution of i t s plan i n the l a s t 
decade, s e l f - f i n a n c i n g was s t i l l a large proportion. 
From examination of the Authority's Budget i n 
1961/62 i t i s noticeable that expenditure was 
estimated at £E22.5 m i l l i o n out of which £E19,785,878 
were running expenses and the remaining £E2,714,122 
were reserved f o r amortization of materials. On 
the other hand the revenue of the enterprise vwas 
estimated at 24 m i l l i o n s . The excess of receipts 
over expenditure i s therefore £E1.5 m i l l i o n . There 
are two kinds of programmes to be financed: renewals 
of materials financed from the amortization fund, 
as i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r year, amounted to £E2,714,122 
which have been charged to expenditure. New plans 
estimated i n 1961/62 would require £E2..5 m i l l i o n . 
This would be supplied from the excess or reserve 
over expenditure amounting to £E1.5 m i l l i o n and 
the remaining £E1 m i l l i o n would be provided by the 
Treasury.(77) Thus the s e l f - f i n a n c i n g r a t i o i n 
the case of the railways i s 60%, 
The E..D-..®. 
As has been mentioned i n Chapter 2, the 
E.D.O. i s the largest public Organisation i n Egypt. 
(77) Egyptian economic and p o l i t i c a l review 
July 1958 p.43 
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I t s investment programmes cover many f i e l d s of 
the economy. Since i t s establishment i n 1957* 
c a p i t a l investment of i t s future plans has been 
st e a d i l y increased as shown i n Table l 6 . 
TABLE 16. 
INVESTMENT IN VARIOUS FIELDS. 
Sectors 1957 1958 1959 
L. E. m. %, L-. E . m. % L.E. m. 
Banks 4.8 10.1 6.2 10 .7 6.6 10.2 
Insurance 0.4 0.8 1.0 1.7 l.O 1.5 
Mining 5.4 11 .4 4 .4 7.6 6.2 9.6 
Industry & 
trade 33.5 70.8 46.9 70.8 45.3 69.8 
Transport 3.2 6.9 5.3 9.2 5.8 8.9 
Total 47.3 100 .0 57 .8 100 .0 64.0 100 .0 
The financing of t h i s c a p i t a l could be 
shown from the balance sheets of the three 
successive years. Table 17. 
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TABLE 17. 
THE BALANCE SHEET AS ON 31st DECEMBER. 
£E OOP's 
L i a b i l i t i e s 1957 1958 1959 
Capital and reserves g fi 6 fi ^ c a p i t a l * ' ' 
Reserves and p r o f i t s _ 2 Q g ^ long-term loans ~ ' •>% 
G a u t h o r i ? y q U e S t r a t i ° n l 6 ' 5 ° 7 1 9 , 3 8 6 2 ° * 5 5 7 
Banks and others 
short-term loans 
Banks and others 
c r e d i t o r s 
2,100 9,800 14,600 
0,499 1,228 1,641 
Total 47,467 58,569 66 ,464 
Assets 
Investments 47,236 58,004 64,920 
0,109 0,109 
0,231 0,456 1,435 
Lands and other 
assets 
Cash and other 
debtors 
Total 47 ,467 58,569 66 ,464 
The table shows that most of the funds 
required w i t h i n the three years came from long-term 
loans obtained from the General Sequestration 
A u t h o r i t y and from the banking system, while 
financing from the Organisation's p r o f i t s and 
reserves are of a small proportion. The table 
(78) N.B.E.. Vol. XIV No. 1. 1961 p.74 
The f i g u r e 0,456 (Cash and other debtors i n 
1958) i s shown i n the reference as O.656 
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also shows a feasible increase i n overdrafts from 
the banking system w i t h the three years i n question* 
I f we take the example of 1959» i t can be seen tha t 
long-term loans are ££35*1 m i l l i o n , i n t e r n a l p r o f i t s 
are £E3*5 m i l l i o n and banking overdrafts were 
£E1*6 m i l l i o n . 
The E.D.O. was authorised since i t s creation 
i n 1957 to borrow from the market w i t h Government 
guarantee. Under Law No. 183 of 1957, i t could 
r a i s e i t s funds up to £E15 m i l l i o n . I n t e r e s t charges 
were to be borne by the Government f o r a period of 
f i v e years from the date of the promulgating of 
t h i s law. 
Under Law No. 2 of 1960 the E.D.O. had to 
borrow d i r e c t l y from the National Bank of Egypt 
w i t h i n a prescribed l i m i t of £E25 m i l l i o n . ( 7 9 ) 
I n a ddition to the above examples, other 
public enterprises were financed d i r e c t l y from the 
Government. For example, the c a p i t a l requirements 
f o r the National Production Council i n the years 
1952/53 to 1955 were allocated by the fo l l o w i n g 
methods: 
(1) from revaluation of gold balances. 
(2) from domestic loans issued by the Government and 
(79) Egyptian economic and p o l i t i c a l review 
June/July 1960. 
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( 3 ) from the N a t i o n a l Budget.(80) 
F i n a n c i n g of B r i t i s h E l e c t r i c i t y Supply P r o j e c t s • 
I t has been mentioned e a r l i e r i n t h i s 
chapter t h a t the economic problems of the 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y are the r e s u l t s of i t s 
expansion to meet the steady i n c r e a s e i n demand. 
I t i s the duty of the i n d u s t r y to s a t i s f y t h i s 
demand which needs a continuous r e - i n f o r c e m e n t and 
maintenance of the system and the i n s t a l l a t i o n of 
new generation, t r a n s m i s s i o n and d i s t r i b u t i o n 
equipment. T h i s i n v o l v e s a l a r g e c a p i t a l investment. 
I n B r i t a i n , planning f o r the f i n a n c i n g of 
the i n d u s t r y ' s programmes i s one of the major t a s k s 
of the E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l . They r e v i e w every 
s p r i n g the investment programmes of the Generating 
Board and the twelve Area Boards, then the 
c o n s o l i d a t e d programme f o r the whole i n d u s t r y i s 
agreed and submitted to the M i n i s t e r of Power f o r 
a p p r o v a l . ( 8 l ) T h i s c o n s o l i d a t e d programme i n c l u d e s 
the estimated amounts of money r e q u i r e d f o r i t s 
implementation and the p o s s i b l e sources of f i n a n c e s . 
(80) Egyptian economic and p o l i t i c a l r e v i e w 
August 1959. 
(81) Edwards, R. The o r g a n i s a t i o n and p o l i c y of the 
n a t i o n a l i s e d e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n G.B. 
E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l 1964 p.22 
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T h i s i s done s e p a r a t e l y by each of the twelve Area 
Boards i n England and Wales and the Generating 
Board. As r e g a r d s the long-term estimate of the 
c a p i t a l requirements, the Boards take i n t o 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n the l a t e s t i n f o r m a t i o n by r e v i e w i n g 
them an n u a l l y * The p r o c e s s i s d e s c r i b e d by 
P r o f e s s o r R. Edwards as f o l l o w s : 
"The Boards' f o r e c a s t s a r e forwarded to the 
E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l i n mid-January. Copies of the 
Boards' e s t i m a t e s are s e n t by the C o u n c i l 
immediately to the M i n i s t r y , so t h a t the process 
of c o n s u l t a t i o n and approval may be c o n c e n t r a t e d 
i n t o as s h o r t a p e r i o d as i s consonant w i t h 
e f f i c i e n c y . C o n s u l t a t i o n between Boards and the 
C o u n c i l Headquartefs takes p l a c e i n the next 
ensuing two months and the c a p i t a l e s t i m a t e s a r e 
reviewed by the Finance Committee of the C o u n c i l 
and then by the C o u n c i l i t s e l f . By the time t h i s 
p r o c e s s of c o n s u l t a t i o n i s approaching completion, 
the Boards w i l l have experienced one more w i n t e r ' s 
weather, and i n the l i g h t of t h i s l a t e r knowledge 
of peak demands the Boards and the C o u n c i l may 
modify t h e i r f o r e c a s t s and e s t i m a t e s . 
When the C o u n c i l has completed i t s review, 
i t submits to the M i n i s t e r of Power a c o n s o l i d a t e d 
statement of programmes f o r the i n d u s t r y as a 
whole. Having made h i s own view, the M i n i s t e r 
g i v e s approval, i n J u l y or August, to the Boards' 
programmes and to the i n c u r r i n g of c a p i t a l 
expenditure of a c e r t a i n amount (which may, of 
course, be l e s s than was proposed) during the 
succeeding y e a r , and p r o v i s i o n a l approval f o r the 
year beyond t h a t . And so the pr o c e s s goes one s t e p 
forward each y e a r , the p r o v i s i o n a l f i g u r e s being 
f i n a l l y approved or v a r i e d , and a new s e t of 
p r o v i s i o n a l f i g u r e s being adopted f o r the next 
ensuing y e a r . " ( 8 2 ) 
Knowing the procedure by which the c a p i t a l 
requirements a r e a p p l i e d f o r and supposing t h a t 
they are approved, we have to know the sources f o r 
supplying such c a p i t a l * 
F i n a n c i n g the e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y i n 
B r i t a i n i s a l s o based on two main s o u r c e s , borrowing 
and s e l f - f i n a n c i n g . S i n c e n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n the 
B r i t i s h e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y ' s a u t h o r i t i e s 
have t r i e d t o o b t a i n a reas o n a b l e balance between 
both s o u r c e s . The i n d u s t r y cannot meet a l l i t s 
(82) Edwards, R. The f i n a n c e of E l e c t r i c i t y supply 
Lloyds Bank Review 1960 Pp.24/25 
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f i n a n c i a l requirements from i n t e r n a l r e s o u r c e s , 
and i t i s n e c e s s a r y to borrow. There a r e long-term 
l o a n s provided i n i t i a l l y by the market and now by 
Exchequer Advances. The f i r s t long-term borrowing 
powers of the i n d u s t r y s i n c e n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n were 
under a c e i l i n g of £700 m i l l i o n and have s i n c e been 
i n c r e a s e d c o n s i d e r a b l y . I n 1953 the Government 
i n c r e a s e d borrowing powers by a f u r t h e r £700 m i l l i o n 
t o r e a c h £1,400 m i l l i o n by which i t was expected to 
meet the requirements u n t i l 1959. The method of 
borrowing was by stock i s s u e s t r e a t e d i n the market 
as g i l t - e d g e d and the T r e a s u r y may guarantee the 
redemption or repayment of such s t o c k . I n 1955 the 
i n d u s t r y i s s u e d a sum o f £200 m i l l i o n a t k$%t 
a t t r a c t i v e as i t was thought, but i t was much 
unders u b s c r i b e d which r e s u l t e d i n abandoning t h i s 
method. Under the Finance Act of 1956 and 
subsequent enactments and under s e c t i o n (15) 3 of 
the E l e c t r i c i t y Act of 1957 the E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l 
was a u t h o r i s e d to r a i s e money ( w i t h i n the o v e r a l l 
s t a t u t o r y l i m i t s ) by o b t a i n i n g Exchequer Advances. 
They a r e repayable by way of annual i n s t a l m e n t s over 
a p e r i o d of 25 y e a r s . These Advances c a r r y a 
permanent f i x e d r a t e of i n t e r e s t . The T r e a s u r y 
271 
d e c i d e s from time to time t h i s r a t e t a k i n g i n t o 
account market r a t e s f o r Government s t o c k s . For 
example, whereas the i n d u s t r y had borrowed a t 
v e s t i n g date a t 3% per annum, the c u r r e n t r a t e of 
Exchequer Advances i s 5^/8%.(83) These Advances 
a r e f i n a n c e d out of Budget s u r p l u s e s or by the 
Government's own borrowing. The E l e c t r i c i t y 
Borrowing Powers Act of 1959 s e t a l i m i t to the 
i n d u s t r y ' s o v e r a l l s t a t u t o r y borrowing of £1,800 
m i l l i o n , and not exceeding £2,300 m i l l i o n to be 
s p e c i f i e d by order of the M i n i s t e r of Power 
s u b j e c t to the consent of P a r l i a m e n t . The i n c r e a s e 
of t h i s borrowing c e i l i n g happened a f t e r the 
i n d u s t r y ' s long-term p l a n formulated i n 1958 i n 
which the Generating Board and the Area Boards 
showed t h a t the c a p i t a l requirements over the 
seven y e a r s to 1965 made an aggregate c a p i t a l 
requirement of £2,130 m i l l i o n . The E l e c t r i c i t y 
Borrowing Power Order of 1961 r a i s e d the i n d u s t r y ' s 
borrowing l i m i t to the f u l l £2,300 m i l l i o n . 
According to the a d d i t i o n a l investment requirement 
i t was expected t h a t the l i m i t of £2,300 m i l l i o n 
would be reached by the middle of 1964 i n s t e a d of 
(83) Drummond, J.M. The f i n a n c e of e l e c t r i c a l 
supply, E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l Spring School 
1963 p.30 
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e a r l y 1965 as was expected a t the time of the 
1959 A c t . ( 8 4 ) 
Under the E l e c t r i c i t y and Gas Act of 1963 
the borrowing l i m i t s were diner eased to £3,300 
m i l l i o n or a l a r g e r sum not exceeding £4,400 m i l l i o n * 
T h i s i s expected to cover the i n d u s t r y ' s requirements 
u n t i l about 1966 and 1970 r e s p e c t i v e l y . ( 8 5 ) 
The s o u r c e s of short-term borrowing c o n s i s t 
of the London C l e a r i n g Banks, the T r u s t e e s of the 
i n d u s t r y ' s superannuation schemes and of s u b s i d i a r y 
companies* The l i m i t s of t h i s temporary borrowing 
are imposed by the M i n i s t e r a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h 
the T r e a s u r y . 
B e s i d e s long and short-term borrowing powers, 
the B r i t i s h e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y has been 
a b l e to f i n a n c e a f a i r p r o p o r t i o n of i t s c a p i t a l 
requirements from i t s i n t e r n a l r e s o u r c e s * The 
l e v e l of s e l f - f i n a n c i n g i n the i n d u s t r y i s c l o s e l y 
connected w i t h the problems of the enormous c a p i t a l 
r e q u i r e d f o r planned schemes and the power of the 
i n d u s t r y to charge p r i c e s as c l o s e as p o s s i b l e to c o s t s . 
(84) E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l , Finance f o r more power 
1963 p.15 
(85) E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l , Annual Report and Accounts 
1963/64 p.42 
273 
For these r e a s o n s the s e l f - f i n a n c i n g r a t i o of 
f i n a n c i n g the i n d u s t r y ' s p r o j e c t s d i f f e r between 
the p r e - n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n and p o s t - n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n 
p e r i o d s * For example, during the 1930's the l e v e l 
of s e l f - f i n a n c i n g i n the i n d u s t r y averaged about 
60%.(86) During the y e a r s 1948/49 to 1957/58 the 
r a t i o of s e l f - f i n a n c i n g was 42%. The h i g h e s t i n 
any y e a r being 48% i n 1953/54. 
I n Power f o r the f u t u r e p u b l i s h e d by the 
E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l i n 1958, i t was expected t h a t 
a p r o p o r t i o n of about 48*6% would be f i n a n c e d from 
i n t e r n a l r e s o u r c e s * I n the whole t h r e e y e a r s from 
1958 to March 1961 the p r o p o r t i o n of s e l f - f i n a n c i n g 
was 45.6%.(87) T h i s means t h a t to a c h i e v e the 
t a r g e t of 48.6%. f o r the seven y e a r s of planning, 
the i n d u s t r y had to f i n d from i n t e r n a l r e s o u r c e s a 
percentage of over 50%. i n the remaining four y e a r s * 
But, as i s shown i n Table 18, the p r o p o r t i o n during 
the l a s t f i v e y e a r s and the estimate f o r the next 
t h r e e y e a r s ending March 1967, the t a r g e t i n the 
1958 p l a n was not achieved* 
(86) Marsh, N.E. E l e c t r i c i t y supply - l o o k i n g to the 
f u t u r e , E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l Spring s c h o o l 1963 
P.3 
(87) E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l F i n a n c e f o r power 196l p.21 
TABLE 1 8 , 
RATIO OF SELF-FINANCE. 
Es t i m a t e d 
59/60 60/61 61/62 62/63 63/64 64/65 65/66 66/67 
m£ % m£ % m£ % m£ % m£ % m£ % m£ % m£ % 
?ota l 
c a p i t a l 
-equire-
ment 
304*5 100 289.4 100 326.5 100 380 100 464.5 100 518.3 100 521*5 100 528.6 100 
i n t e r n a l 
•esources 132.8 43.6 133.6 46.2 152.8 46.8 181.8 47.8 222.4 47.9 250.2: 48.3 273.4 52.4 298 56.4 
ret 
>orrowing 171.7 56.4 155.8 53.8 173*7 53.2 198.8 52.2 242.1 52.1 268.1 51.7 248*1 47.6 230.6 43.6 
C a l c u l a t e d to achieve ( w i t h 
d e p r e c i a t i o n and i n t e r e s t ) 
12^% g r o s s r e t u r n on average 




The t a b l e a l s o shows the other t a r g e t which 
had been s e t i n 196l a t which i t was argued t h a t 
f o r the f i v e y e a r s ending 1966/67, the g r o s s r e t u r n 
on n e t investment should be not l e s s than 12%% 
c a l c u l a t e d as f o l l o w s : 
I n t e r e s t on l o a n s k%% 
D e p r e c i a t i o n fund 5i% 
S u r p l u s 2^% 
12$% 
From t h i s r a t e of r e t u r n the p l a n expected t h a t the 
i n d u s t r y would meet h a l f of i t from i n t e r n a l 
r e s o u r c e s * I t was a l s o c o n s i d e r e d as p r a c t i c a b l e 
t h a t i n the e a r l y y e a r s the r a t e of r e t u r n would be 
s l i g h t l y higher than planned.(88) 
From the s e t t i n g up of the above a c t u a l and 
estimated f i g u r e s , and the e r r o r i n p r e d i c t i n g the 
proper r a t i o of s e l f - f i n a n c i n g , i t i s d i f f i c u l t to 
d i s c o v e r the p r i n c i p l e which the i n d u s t r y has to 
f o l l o w . As has been mentioned a t the beginning of 
t h i s s e c t i o n some economists t h i n k t h a t e x c e s s i v e 
s e l f - f i n a n c i n g i s wrong i n p r i n c i p l e ; on the other 
hand others have expressed the view " t h a t t h e 
n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s be t o l d t h a t i n the f u t u r e 
(88) E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l , Finance f o r power p . l 6 
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they w i l l have to f i n d a l l t h e i r c a p i t a l 
requirements by i n t e r n a l f i n a n c e . n ( 8 9 ) P r o f e s s o r 
Ronald Edwards says t h a t to generate the whole 
c a p i t a l requirements through p r i c e s would mean t h a t 
revenues from consumers would have to be i n c r e a s e d 
by more than 25%* How much more would depend on 
c o n s e q u e n t i a l t a x l i a b i l i t i e s and the e l a s t i c i t y 
of demand f o r e l e c t r i c i t y . ( 9 0 ) 
F i n a n c i n g of E g y p t i a n e l e c t r i c i t y supply p r o j e c t s . 
The f i r s t important f e a t u r e c h a r a c t e r i s i n g 
the c a p i t a l requirements f o r f i n a n c i n g the E g y p t i a n 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply p r o j e c t s i s the l a r g e p roportion 
of f o r e i g n C a p i t a l . I n the f i r s t f i v e - y e a r p l a n 
I96O-65, the t o t a l estimated c a p i t a l r e q u i r e d was 
£E253»5 out of which £El53»s was f o r e i g n c a p i t a l . 
The t o t a l c a p i t a l was to be d i v i d e d between the 
U.A.R. E l e c t r i c i t y Commission and the Power 
Producing Departments. Each was a u t h o r i s e d to spend 
a l i m i t e d amount on t h e i r p r o j e c t s , as s t a t e d i n 
d e t a i l i n Appendix ( 7 ) F o r e i g n c a p i t a l i s important 
i n Egypt's High Dam e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n p r o j e c t . The 
(89) Harrod, Roy. P o l i c y a g a i n s t i n f l a t i o n 1958 p.233 
Quoted by R. Edwards The f i n a n c e of e l e c t r i c i t y 
supply, Lloyds Bank Review 1960 p.104 
(90) I b i d . p.10 
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The estimated t o t a l c a p i t a l r e q u i r e d f o r f i n a n c i n g 
t h i s p r o j e c t , from 1 9 6 1 / 6 2 to 1 9 7 0 / 7 1 i s £ E 1 0 7 . 5 
m i l l i o n out of which £ E 6 3 . 5 5 m i l l i o n i s f o r e i g n 
c a p i t a l and £ E 4 3 . 9 5 domestic. Table 19 shows the 
sums r e q u i r e d each year w i t h the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of 
c a p i t a l needed f o r g e n e r a t i o n and t r a n s m i s s i o n p l a n t s * 
The second important f e a t u r e i s the high 
p r o p o r t i o n of s e l f - f i n a n c i n g . The a n a l y s i s of 
f i g u r e s , shown i n the Budgets of the f o u r main 
e l e c t r i c i t y a u t h o r i t i e s (Table 2 0 ), i n d i c a t e s t h a t 
the t o t a l expenditure i s £ E 3 5 * 9 out of which 
£El6 . 2 i s investment on new p r o j e c t s . The f i n a n c i a l 
r e s o u r c e s , £El8 . 6 as s e l f f i n a n c e , £El4 . 3 as l o a n s 
and £ E 3 . 0 d e f i n e d as other s o u r c e s . T h i s shows 
t h a t s e l f f i n a n c e i s a l i t t l e more than 50%„ The 
h i g h r a t i o of s e l f - f i n a n c i n g here i s due to the 
r e l a t i v e l y h igh average e l e c t r i c i t y r a t e s per 
consumer* From some of the c o u n t r i e s i n v e s t i g a t e d 
by the U.N., Table 21 shows thataverage p r i c e s per 
consumer i n Egypt i s h i g h e r than i n any other country 
i n v e s t i g a t e d , except Turkey. The average p r i c e i s 
co n f i n e d to C a i r o and A l e x a n d r i a , the two main urban 
a r e a s i n the c o u n t r y . ( 9 1 ) 
( 9 1 ) United N a t i o n s . The development of manufacturing 
i n d u s t r y i n Egypt, I s r a e l and Turkey^ New York 
1 9 5 8 . 
TABLE 19• 
ASWAN HIGH-DAM ELECTRIFICATION PROJECT 
ESTIMATES OF INVESTMENT COSTS (MILLION POUNDS) 
Year T o t a l 1961/62 1962/63 1963/64 1964/65 1965/66 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 1970/71 
b• Power gene r a t i o n 
domestic 23.95 0.80 1.10 2.50 4.00 3.50 3.50 2.75 2.30 2.00 1.50 
f o r e i g n 33.55 0.20 0.40 1.00 1.50 4.50 5.50 6.25 6.70 6.00 1.50 
t o t a l 57.5 1.00 1.50 3.50 5.50 8.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 8.00 3.00 
c. Power t r a n s m i s s i o n 
domestic 20.0 0.40 1.40 3.80 4.50 4.20 4.20 1.50 - -
f o r e i g n 30.0 0.10 2.10 5.70 7.00 6.30 6.30 2.50 - -
t o t a l c 50.0 0.50 3.50 9.50 11.50 10.50 10.50 4.00 - — 




BUDGET FOR 1962/63 (IN POUNDS)» 
A u t h o r i t y C »E • G . A *• 
E l e c t r i c i t y 
commission & 
t e c h n i c a l 
H.E.P.D, bureau A.E.G.O. 
T o t a l 
E l e c t r i c i t y 
A u t h o r i t i e s 
Expenditures 
Operating charges 
S a l a r i e s & wages 
F u e l , o i l & l u b r i c a t e s 
Other operating charges 
I n t e r e s t on Govt, l o a n s 
Repayment of Govt, l o a n s 
D e p r e c i a t i o n 
Other expenditure & ta x e s 
E x c e s s revenue 



























T o t a l 15,961,418 3,338,035 11,692,000 4,987,400 35,978,853 
Revenue 















T o t a l 15,961,418 3,338,035 11,692,000 4,987,400 35,978,835 
CO 
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TABLE 2 1 . 
AVERAGE RATES FOR ELECTRICITY 
CENTS PER KILOWATT HOUR. 
Country and y e a r Average a l l u s e r s 
Avefage 
i n d u s t r y 
Egypt 1954 (b) 4 . 3 1 . 3 
I s r a e l 1956 1 . 9 1 .4 
Turkey 1952 ( c ) 5 . 0 4 . 7 
France 1952 2 . 3 1 .6 to 2 . 0 
I t a l y 1952 1 .4 0 . 6 
Sweden 1952 0 . 6 0 - 5 
S w i t z e r l a n d 1952 1 .4 0 . 9 
U.Kl. 1952 1 . 5 1 . 1 
U.S.A. 1951 1 . 8 0 . 8 
(b) i n c l u d i n g t a x e s amounting to 8% and 44% of the 
r a t e f o r n o n - i n d u s t r i a l use i n C a i r o and 
A l e x a n d r i a r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
( c ) e x c l u d i n g t a x e s amounting to 40-50% of the r a t e s 
f o r e l e c t r i c i t y used f o r l i g h t i n g and 30-40% of 
the r a t e s f o r e l e c t r i c i t y used i n i n d u s t r y . 
Data c o v e r s only I s t a n b u l 1954 
The t a b l e a l s o shows t h a t average charges to 
i n d u s t r y a r e much lower than Turkey and l i t t l e lower 
than F r a n c e . Compared w i t h the U.K. charges to 
i n d u s t r y a r e a l i t t l e h i g h e r . The r e l a t i v e l y lower 
charges to i n d u s t r y i n Egypt i s due to the p o l i c y of 
encouraging new i n d u s t r i e s i n the county to be more 
p r o d u c t i v e . Average p r i c e s per consumer i n r u r a l a r e a s 
are expected to be much hi g h e r than those i n urban a r e a s , 
had r u r a l consumers been connected. 
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R u r a l e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n . 
T h i s d i s c u s s i o n may l e a d us to one of the 
most important problems of f i n a n c i a l planning, i . e . 
f i n a n c i a l r u r a l e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n schemes* 
The r u r a l market f o r e l e c t r i c i t y has been f o r 
many y e a r s untapped* The reason i s t h a t r u r a l 
consumers a r e f a r t h e r from the main d i s t r i b u t i v e 
network and more s c a t t e r e d than urban consumers and i t 
t h e r e f o r e c o s t s more to connect and to supply them. 
The problem of f i n a n c i n g r u r a l consumers i n 
B r i t a i n i s l e s s d i f f i c u l t than i n Egypt. I f the 
d i f f i c u l t y i n B r i t a i n i s t h a t t h a t c a p i t a l i n v o l v e d 
cannot be s u b j e c t e d to the normal t e s t of r e t u r n on 
investment, the d i f f i c u l t y i n Egypt i s the l a c k of 
c a p i t a l r e q u i r e d . To overcome the problem i n 
B r i t a i n , and to encourage the Area E l e c t r i c i t y Boards 
to promote r u r a l e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n as a n a t i o n a l duty, 
v a r i o u s t h e o r e t i c a l methods of f i n a n c i n g could be 
adopted. For example, to charge the r u r a l consumers 
concerned a l l c o s t s of connecting them. But 
a p p a r e n t l y t h i s method cannot be a p p l i e d because the 
consumers cannot a f f o r d to pay the high c o s t s 
i n v o l v e d . Or the Area Board concerned, where r u r a l 
consumers a r e , would c a r r y out the p r o j e c t . T h i s 
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method can be a p p l i e d i f the Board concerned have 
a s p e c i a l i n c e n t i v e , f o r i n s t a n c e , through a 
r e d u c t i o n i n the bulk supply t a r i f f . But t h i s 
method would i n v o l v e a complex system of accounting 
a non-uniform bulk supply t a r i f f . T h i s method may 
a l s o burden the consumers of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r Area 
when c o s t s of connection cannot be r e c o v e r e d through 
the s a i d i n c e n t i v e . The method which has a l r e a d y 
been adopted i s t h a t the i n d u s t r y as a whole c a r r i e s 
t h i s burden, by e s t a b l i s h i n g a c e n t r a l fund i n which 
the whole of the consumers c o n t r i b u t e s . T h i s method 
was c r i t i c i s e d by the Herbert Report. The Report 
s t a t e d t h a t i f P a r l i a m e n t decides i n the n a t i o n a l 
i n t e r e s t t h a t the Boards should pursue p o l i c i e s and 
i n c u r expenditure which a f t e r normal economic or 
commercial t e s t s , would be avoided o f defered, the 
c o s t of such p o l i c i e s should f a l l on the n a t i o n a l 
Exchequer r a t h e r than on the consumer of e l e c t r i c i t y . ( 9 2 ] 
But a l s o s u b s i d i s a t i o n by t h i s method, through the 
Exchequer, would r a i s e the c r i t i c i s m t h a t the i n d u s t r y 
i s i n e f f i c i e n t and burdening the t a x p a y e r . 
I t seems to be a p r a c t i c a l method i n B r i t a i n , 
i f r u r a l consumers a r e to be connected, t h a t the 
( 9 2 ) Op.Cit. para 367 
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Government should s u b s i d i s e these consumers and 
a l s o f o r the consumers concerned to c o n t r i b u t e 
i n the c o s t s of t h e i r connection.(93) 
I n Egypt the problem i s more d i f f i c u l t , as 
the number of consumers i s much s m a l l e r i n Egypt 
than i n B r i t a i n and the growth of l o a d i s a l s o slow 
because of the r e l a t i v e l y low standard of l i v i n g . 
Y e t i t i s i n e v i t a b l e t h a t u n l e s s e l e c t r i c i t y i s 
extended to r u r a l a r e a s , the standard of l i v i n g 
cannot be r a i s e d and, i f c o n v e n t i o n a l methods for 
f i n a n c i n g are a p p l i e d , r u r a l e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n cannot 
be accomplished. Thus i t i s e s s e n t i a l to f i n d out 
a s u i t a b l e method to f i n a n c e r u r a l e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n 
schemes• 
Methods which may be suggested i n t h i s case 
a r e t 
f i r s t , to demand from consumers concerned i n d i v i d u a l l y 
or c o l l e c t i v e l y a loan, a t a low r a t e of i n t e r e s t , to 
cover a p o r t i o n of the c a p i t a l r e q u i r e d . I f consumers, 
as expected, cannot be made to pay, the only 
a l t e r n a t i v e i s a subsidy. 
second, a s u b s i d y may take s e v e r a l forms 
(a ) by s h i f t i n g the burden onto the urban consumers, 
(93) Edwards, R. The i n f l u e n c e of the n a t i o n a l i s e d 
i n d u s t r i e s , E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l 1960 p . l 8 
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i . e . to r a i s e p r i c e s charged to these consumers 
above the c o s t of supplying them. Making a 
s u r p l u s t h i s way w i l l c o n t r i b u t e i n f i n a n c i n g 
r u r a l p r o j e c t s * The s u c c e s s of such a method 
depends mainly on the standard of the e x i s t i n g 
t a r i f f . J£ i t i s low enough, then the g r e a t e r 
the i n c r e a s e i n r a t e the g r e a t e r the p r o p o r t i o n 
of the c a p i t a l to be devoted to r u r a l 
e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n . But i t i s n e c e s s a r y t h a t 
consumers who accept t h i s i n c r e a s e i n t a r i f f s 
must be convinced t h a t r u r a l e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n 
w i l l pay i t s way a f t e r a p e r i o d of time. And 
as the scheme w i l l become remunerative, there 
w i l l be a b e n e f i t from t h i s development which 
would accrue to the whole consumers i n the 
form of a r e d u c t i o n of t a r i f f s . 
The a p p l i c a t i o n of t h i s method i n Egypt must 
be r u l e d out because e l e c t r i c i t y t a r i f f s a r e 
a l r e a d y high i n comparison w i t h other c o u n t r i e s 
as we have seen from Table 21. 
(b) The other form of s u b s i d i s i n g i s t h a t the 
Government w i l l f o o t the b i l l . By t h i s the 
burden w i l l be on the g e n e r a l t a x - p a y e r . 
Support f o r t h i s t '.method comes from the f a c t 
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t h a t r u r a l e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n i s e s s e n t i a l f o r 
r a i s i n g the standard of l i v i n g by i n c r e a s i n g 
the p r o d u c t i v i t y of these a r e a s * As the 
burden of c a p i t a l r e q u i r e d cannot be c a r r i e d 
by r u r a l consumers alone, or even by the 
whole i n d u s t r y , as mentioned above, t h e r e i s 
no other a l t e r n a t i v e but t o t r a n s f e r the 
burden to the g e n e r a l taxpayer. I f i n d i r e c t 
economic b e n e f i t s w i l l a c c rue to the whole 
community, t h e r e f o r e s u b s i d y by t h i s method 
i s j u s t i f i a b l e * To adopt t h i s method, i t 
should be borne i n mind t h a t s u b s i d y f o r r u r a l 
e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n must compete w i t h other economic 
p r o j e c t s r e q u i r i n g a s i m i l a r s u b s i d y . I n sue hi 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s the Government must be sure t h a t 
economic b e n e f i t s , from r u r a l e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n , 
w i l l accrue from v a r i o u s u s e s of e l e c t r i c i t y 
o ther than f o r mere l i g h t i n g * The p o s s i b l e 
a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o j e c t s which can be economically 
c a r r i e d out have been mentioned e a r l i e r i n t h i s 
c h a p t e r * ( 9 4 ) 
(94), See A g r i c u l t u r a l consumption p. 176 
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C o n c l u s i o n , 
I t i s c l e a r from the d i s c u s s i o n of f i n a n c i a l 
planning t h a t p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s and p a r t i c u l a r l y 
the e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y r e q u i r e a l a r g e 
c a p i t a l investment. To r a i s e t h i s c a p i t a l , i n 
B r i t a i n t h e r e a r e mainly t h r e e methods a v a i l a b l e : 
from the market-guaranteed by the Government or not, 
by Exchequer Advances and by ploughing back the 
i n d u s t r y ' s s u r p l u s e s . 
From the v a r i o u s views on borrowing i t i s 
concluded t h a t n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s should not 
compete w i t h other i n d u s t r i e s i n the market, because 
of the m o n o p o l i s t i c p o s i t i o n the n a t i o n a l i s e d 
i n d u s t r i e s hold and a l s o because they have a low 
r a t i o of s e l f - f i n a n e i n g . M o n o p o l i s t i c p o s i t i o n 
enables the n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r y to r a i s e r a t e of 
i n t e r e s t but t h i s w i l l be passed on to the consumer. 
The low r a t i o of s e l f - f i n a n e i n g h e l p s the 
n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r y to draw a l a r g e p a r t of 
c a p i t a l from the market which the market cannot 
a f f o r d . On the s e l f - f i n a n c i n g problem one cannot 
be dogmatic. The r a t i o of s e l f - f i n a n c i n g should 
depend on the economic f a c t o r s embracing the 
i n d u s t r y , such as the p r i c e / c o s t r a t i o and the 
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r a t e of growth i n the i n d u s t r y . I n E g y p t i a n 
p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s examples show t h a t some 
e n t e r p r i s e s depend g r e a t l y on t h e i r s u r p l u s e s , 
o t h e r s r e q u i r e loans f o r f i n a n c i n g t h e i r 
programmes* 
I n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y i t i s 
shown t h a t i n B r i t a i n f i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e s a r e 
mainly Exchequer Advances and s e l f - f i n a n c i n g * 
The l a t t e r has been i n c r e a s e d s l i g h t l y i n i t s 
p r o p o r t i o n to other s o u r c e s * I n c o n t r a s t w i t h 
B r i t a i n the Egyptian e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y 
depends mainly on two sources £ f o r e i g n l o a n s and 
s e l f - f i n a n c i n g . The l a t t e r p r o v i d e s a higher 
proportion than i n B r i t a i n because the average 
p r i c e of e l e c t r i c i t y supply i s much higher i n 
Egypt than i n B r i t a i n * 
The high r a t i o of s e l f - f i n a n c i n g i s one of 
the main f a c t o r s f o r implementing r u r a l 
e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n schemes* I t i s found t h a t i n 
f i n a n c i n g r u r a l programmes i n B r i t a i n i t would be 
a p r a c t i c a l method i f consumers c o n t r i b u t e d towards 
the c o s t of connection, w i t h a Government subsidy* 
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I n Egypt i t i s i m p o s s i b l e to burden the r u r a l 
consumers w i t h more charges. Thus the Government, 
through the g e n e r a l taxpayer, should be r e s p o n s i b l e 
f o r f i n a n c i n g r u r a l e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n schemes. 
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INVESTMENT POLICY. 
I t has a l r e a d y been mentioned i n the 
pr e v i o u s chapter t h a t a l l i n d u s t r i e s examined i n 
both B r i t a i n and Egypt which have come under p u b l i c 
ownership or have been c r e a t e d as p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s 
r e q u i r e l a r g e amounts of c a p i t a l f o r f i n a n c i n g t h e i r 
investment programmes. The c a p i t a l i n v e s t e d i n 
these programmes amounts t o a c o n s i d e r a b l e p r o p o r t i o n 
of the t o t a l investment of the whole country, and a 
l a r g e percentage of t h i s t o t a l c a p i t a l i n v e s t e d i n 
the p u b l i c s e c t o r i s r e q u i r e d by the e l e c t r i c i t y 
supply i n d u s t r y . One s i n g l e generating p l a n t , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y hydro or n u c l e a r , may r e q u i r e a v e r y 
l a r g e amount of c a p i t a l . I n Egypt, the High-Dam 
h y d r o - e l e c t r i c power s t a t i o n w i l l c o s t approximately 
£E100 m i l l i o n . A n u c l e a r power s t a t i o n e s t a b l i s h e d 
i n B r i t a i n c o s t s between £45 m i l l i o n and £65 m i l l i o n , 
each e x c l u d i n g the i n i t i a l f u e l charge (about 
£15 m i l l i o n . ) ( l ) 
Because of the l a r g e c a p i t a l i n v o l v e d i t i s 
the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the management to develop and 
apply s y s t e m a t i c investment c r i t e r i a , aiming to 
s e l e c t the most economical method of supplying 
( l ) Baker, R.J.S. The Management of c a p i t a l p r o j e c t s 
London 1962 p.150 
e l e c t r i c power to the u l t i m a t e consumer. I n other 
words, a s u c c e s s f u l investment p o l i c y i n the 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y should l e a d to a 
rea s o n a b l e c o s t per k i l o w a t t hour s u p p l i e d . The 
c o s t per k i l o w a t t d i f f e r s not only between v a r i o u s 
means of supplying e l e c t r i c i t y but a l s o between one 
country and another w i t h r e g a r d to the same method 
of supply. Therefore i t i s important to note t h a t 
a comparison of the c o s t per k i l o w a t t of a l t e r n a t i v e 
means coul d o n l y be v a l i d f o r p l a n t s o p e r a t i n g under 
s i m i l a r c o n d i t i o n s . As t h e r e a r e wide d i f f e r e n c e s 
of economic background throughout the world, 
investment p o l i c i e s may d i f f e r w i d e l y from country 
to country. But t h i s does not mean t h a t t h e r e a r e 
no common f a c t o r s to be con s i d e r e d i n investment 
d e c i s i o n s . The problem of cho i c e between d i f f e r e n t 
s ources of ge n e r a t i o n i n v o l v e s some qu e s t i o n s which 
should be co n s i d e r e d i n any c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 
The problem of c h o i c e . 
As has been mentioned, the e l e c t r i c i t y supply 
i n d u s t r i e s i n both B r i t a i n and Egypt have planned to 
e s t a b l i s h s e v e r a l e l e c t r i c i t y p r o j e c t s to meet the 
growing demand estimated i n the f u t u r e . These 
p r o j e c t s i n c l u d e the c o n s t r u c t i o n of g e n e r a t i o n , and 
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t r a n s m i s s i o n p l a n t s * 
The q u e s t i o n here i s on what economic bases 
i t i s decided to i n s t a l l t hese p r o j e c t s * With 
r e g a r d to generation p r o j e c t s , the problem, i s the 
c h o i c e between d i f f e r e n t methods of g e n e r a t i o n , 
whether c o n v e n t i o n a l thermal, n u c l e a r or hydro 
gen e r a t i n g p l a n t s * What makes an investment d e c i s i o n 
i n t h i s r e s p e c t c r i t i c a l i s the l a r g e c a p i t a l 
r e q u i r e d to e s t a b l i s h any of these g e n e r a t i n g 
d e v i c e s . The c h o i c e of a s u i t a b l e p l a n t based on 
c o s t comparison should r e s u l t i n the most economical 
p l a n t which produces e l e c t r i c i t y a t a minimum c o s t 
per u n i t . A c o s t comparison here c o n s i s t s of t h r e e 
c a t e g o r i e s ; f i x e d charges, f u e l c o s t s and operating 
c o s t s . Within a given c a p a c i t y , c a p i t a l c o s t s of 
a hydro p l a n t a r e approximately 2.5 to 3 times those 
of c o n v e n t i o n a l thermal p l a n t s * Also c a p i t a l c o s t s 
of n u c l e a r power s t a t i o n s a r e twice as much as those 
of c o n v e n t i o n a l thermal. Hydro power s t a t i o n s need 
v e r y l a r g e c a p i t a l i n c i v i l e n g ineering works. 
Nuclear power s t a t i o n s r e q u i r e s p e c i a l equipment 
of n u c l e a r power r e a c t o r s , which i n v o l v e s complex 
engi n e e r i n g c o n s t r u c t i o n and the use of s p e c i a l 
m a t e r i a l . There a r e a l s o d i r e c t c o s t s f o r s h i e l d i n g 
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a g a i n s t contamination by r a d i a t i o n , i n a d d i t i o n 
to g r e a t p r e c i s i o n needed i n the d e s i g n , manufacture 
and c o n s t r u c t i o n of the r e a c t o r * I t should be noted 
here t h a t f u e l c o s t s i n n u c l e a r p l a n t s a r e a l s o 
i n c l u d e d i n c a p i t a l c o s t s * I t i s the p r e s e n t 
p r a c t i c e of the e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y i n 
B r i t a i n to amortize f u e l c o s t s over the l i f e of 
the r e a c t o r * ( 2 ) 
Another element of f i x e d charges i s 
d e p r e c i a t i o n which r a i s e s a p a r t i c u l a r problem i n 
c o s t comparison between d i f f e r e n t g e n e r a t i n g 
methods* The f a c t t h a t the l i f e of a hydro p l a n t 
i s n e a r l y t w i c e as long as t h a t of a thermal p l a n t , 
means t h a t i n a c o s t comparison a l i f e span of two 
s u c c e s s i v e thermal p l a n t s has to be measured a g a i n s t 
the l i f e of one hydro. The d i f f i c u l t y i n t h i s 
measurement i s the estimate of the second thermal 
p l a n t , the c o s t of which, w i t h the advancement of 
technology, i t i s not p o s s i b l e to know i n advance. 
I n t h i s r e s p e c t the Mackenzie Report suggests, f o r 
an almost c o r r e c t c o s t comparison between hydro 
and two thermal p l a n t s , u s i n g the component c o s t s 
(2) E l e c t r i c i t y i n S c o t l a n d . Report of the 
Committee on the g e n e r a t i o n and d i s t r i b u t i o n 
of e l e c t r i c i t y i n S c o t l a n d Cmnd. 1859 
November, 19&2 para 120 
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of the most advanced a l t e r n a t i v e thermal p l a n t 
t h a t would be i n s t a l l e d a t the time t h a t the hydro 
scheme i s proposed* (3) 
The d e p r e c i a t i o n f a c t o r i s d i f f i c u l t to 
c a l c u l a t e , i n n u c l e a r power s t a t i o n s too. Because 
of incomplete knowledge of t e c h n i c a l f a c t o r s , the 
l i f e of n u c l e a r p l a n t s i s u n c e r t a i n . E s t i m a t e s 
v a r y c o n s i d e r a b l y , f o r example, i n B r i t a i n f i f t e e n 
y e a r s l i f e i s assumed f o r the n u c l e a r p o r t i o n of 
the p l a n t and t h i r t y y e a r s l i f e f o r the r e s t of the 
p l a n t t a k i n g an o v e r a l l f i g u r e of twenty y e a r s f o r 
the whole p l a n t . Other e s t i m a t e s expect twenty 
y e a r s f o r the n u c l e a r p o r t i o n and t h i r t y - t h r e e 
and one t h i r d y e a r s f o r the c o n v e n t i o n a l p o r t i o n 
of the p l a n t . An o v e r a l l assumption of t w e n t y - f i v e 
y e a r s has been taken i n t o a c c o u n t . ( 4 ) 
Other c o s t s which should be c o n s i d e r e d to 
a r r i v e a t a f i n a l e v a l u a t i o n of c o s t per u n i t are 
f u e l c o s t s and other o p e r a t i n g c o s t s . The l a t t e r , 
i n f a c t , do not d i f f e r m a t e r i a l l y between d i f f e r e n t 
forms of g e n e r a t i o n . These are c o s t s of maintenance, 
r e p a i r s , wages and s a l a r i e s i n the g e n e r a t i o n p r o c e s s * 
(3) I b i d , para 115. 
(4) United Nations. Economic a p p l i c a t i o n s of Atomic 
Energy, New York 1957 p.9 
295 
But f u e l c o s t s d i f f e r w i d e l y between d i f f e r e n t 
forms of generation* I n c o n v e n t i o n a l thermal 
power s t a t i o n s f u e l c o s t s depend b a s i c a l l y on the 
c o s t of e x t r a c t i n g and p r o c e s s i n g f u e l , the c o s t 
of t r a n s p o r t i n g i t and the p r i c e t r e n d of c o a l 
or o i l . The whole of these c o s t s r e p r e s e n t about 
t w o - t h i r d s of the c o s t of production. I n hydro 
p l a n t s t h e r e a r e no f u e l c o s t s which have to be 
s e t a g a i n s t the heavy c a p i t a l expenditure. F u e l 
c o s t s i n n u c l e a r p l a n t s c o n s i s t of the replacement 
of the i n i t i a l f u e l , a d d i t i o n a l charges f o r 
chemical p r o c e s s i n g and waste d i s p o s a l l e s s 
by-products• 
E v a l u a t i o n of these production c o s t s g i v e s 
an approximate i d e a of the production c o s t per 
u n i t of e l e c t r i c i t y . I n a comparison of production 
c o s t s between d i f f e r e n t sources of g e n e r a t i o n , 
they should be a d j u s t e d to take i n t o account the 
d i f f e r e n c e i n the load f a c t o r (5) and the l o s s o£ 
b e n e f i t d e r i v i n g from the p r e f e r e n c e of s e l e c t i n g 
a p a r t i c u l a r source r a t h e r than another. For 
example, n u c l e a r power s t a t i o n s are u s u a l l y designed 
(5) The l o a d f a c t o r i s the r a t i o of average demand 
i n the year to peak demand. I f a power s t a t i o n 
runs a t 120 KW on the average but the demand 
goes up to 200 KW sometimes during the year i t 
has a load f a c t o r of 120 or 60%. 
200 
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to supply a r e l a t i v e l y h igher l o a d f a c t o r than 
thermal or hydro. I t i s n e c e s s a r y a l s o to take 
i n t o account the l o s s of production from hydro 
p l a n t s i f t h e r e are not s u f f i c i e n t consuming 
c e n t r e s , because g e n e r a l l y hydro p l a n t s are l o c a t e d 
i n remote a r e a s . 
Apart from production c o s t s used as a b a s i s 
f o r comparison there a r e other f a c t o r s which 
d e c i s i o n makers have to take i n t o account. These 
f a c t o r s may change a d e c i s i o n based only on 
production c o s t s . L e t us f i r s t c o n s i d e r some of 
these f a c t o r s and then examine a p a r t i c u l a r case 
i n the E g y p t i a n e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y , 
( l ) F l e x i b i l i t y of economical s i t i n g of power 
s t a t i o n s may a f f e c t a d e c i s i o n to s e l e c t a 
s u i t a b l e source of e l e c t r i c power. For 
example, hydro p l a n t s a r e s t r i c t l y l o c a t e d 
where flow of water i s a v a i l a b l e . E x p l o i t a t i o n 
of hydro p l a n t s i s g r e a t l y a f f e c t e d by the 
d i s t a n c e between consuming c e n t r e s and the 
l o c a t i o n of the proposed p l a n t ; i f the s i t e 
i s too remote i t i s n e c e s s a r y to take i n t o 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n the high c o s t s of t r a n s m i s s i o n 
l i n e s r e q u i r e d . Thus hydro p l a n t s a r e only 
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economic where s u f f i c i e n t consumption i s 
expected to a f f e c t the c o s t s of t r a n s m i s s i o n * 
Conventional power s t a t i o n s a r e more f l e x i b l e 
than hydro, but t h i s f l e x i b i l i t y i s i n f l u e n c e d 
by the d i f f e r e n c e of c o s t s between two f a c t o r s . 
One i s where l o c a t i o n of the power s t a t i o n 
would be n e a r e r to the consumption l o a d , as 
i n t h i s case c o s t s of t r a n s p o r t i n g f u e l a r e 
high". The other i s where a power s t a t i o n i s 
l o c a t e d near to f u e l s o u r c e s , e i t h e r c o a l 
f i e l d s or a harbour of imported f u e l , i n which 
case the c o s t s of t r a n s m i s s i o n to consuming 
c e n t r e s should be taken i n t o account* 
Nuclear p l a n t s a r e more f l e x i b l e i n s i t i n g 
than both hydro and c o n v e n t i o n a l thermal, 
because c o s t s of f u e l t r a n s p o r t i n g a r e not as 
h igh as i n the c o n v e n t i o n a l thermal. So i t may 
be thought t h a t n u c l e a r p l a n t s can be s i t e d i n 
remote a r e a s to save c o s t s of t r a n s m i s s i o n . But 
the main f a c t o r which a f f e c t s t h i s f l e x i b i l i t y 
i s the f a c t t h a t n u c l e a r p l a n t s must supply a 
heavy l o a d c e n t r e which i s not l i k e l y to be 
found i n r u r a l a r e a s . Nuclear power supply 
must be continuous. I n a d d i t i o n s a f e t y 
c o n d i t i o n s may be v e r y expensive* 
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(2) T e c h n i c a l progress and the i n c r e a s e of the 
s i z e of con v e n t i o n a l thermal p l a n t s have 
secured l a r g e economies of s c a l e r e s u l t i n g i n 
a decrease of consumption of f u e l and t h e r e f o r e 
a decrease i n c o s t per u n i t . 
I t i s estimated t h a t 'modern thermal s t a t i o n s 
consume about 2400 c a l o r i e s of f u e l per K i l o w a t t 
hour produced, compared to the 3500 c a l o r i e 
consumption of new s t a t i o n s i n 1935.(6) Modern 
thermal power s t a t i o n s have r e s u l t e d i n a g r e a t 
decrease of c o s t s of manpower. A modern power 
s t a t i o n r e q u i r e s one man per 2.5 MW w h i l e o l d 
s t a t i o n s r e q u i r e d a t l e a s t four men per Megawatt. 
Moreover, i t has been argued t h a t , f o r example, 
i n France, t e c h n i c a l progress i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n 
of hydro p l a n t s has been o f f s e t by the exhansion 
of s i t e s . T h i s means t h a t c o n v e n t i o n a l thermal 
power s t a t i o n s w i l l s t r o n g l y compete a g a i n s t 
hydro p l a n t s . But there are some f a c t o r s which 
may work a g a i n s t a d e c i s i o n to choose a modern 
conv e n t i o n a l thermal p l a n t . These a r e : 
(a) t e c h n i c a l progress occurs a l s o i n hydro 
p l a n t s , i f s i t e s a r e not exhausted. I n f a c t , 
(6) B o i l e u x , M. E l e c t r i c Energy, f a c t s , problems and 
p r o s p e c t s . Nelson, S.R. (Ed.) Marginal c o s t 
p r i c i n g i n p r a c t i c e 1964 p.7» 
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t h e r e are many hydro s i t e s , e s p e c i a l l y i n 
under-developed c o u n t r i e s , which are not y e t 
e x p l o i t e d * 
(b) Modern co n v e n t i o n a l thermal power s t a t i o n s 
may r e q u i r e a h i g h c a p i t a l costs which reduce 
the t r a d i t i o n a l advantage of low c a p i t a l costs* 
( c ) The f a c t t h a t i t i s n o t easy t o re p l a c e o l d 
conv e n t i o n a l thermal p l a n t s by modern thermal 
ones* An investment i n the replacement o f old. 
p l a n t s may n o t be w o r t h w h i l e • ( 7 ) 
(3) A d e c i s i o n t o choose a p a r t i c u l a r source o f 
power should be based on the p o t e n t i a l i t i e s 
o f the country* I n some c o u n t r i e s , where hydro 
power sources are n o t a v a i l a b l e , a choice i s 
l i m i t e d between conv e n t i o n a l thermal s t a t i o n s 
or an a l t e r n a t i v e n u c l e a r one. On the other 
hand some c o u n t r i e s , which have u n e x p l o i t e d 
hydro s i t e s , have a wider range o f choice 
between the three sources o f power. P o t e n t i a l i t i e s 
a l s o may i n c l u d e the necessary equipment f o r 
c o n s t r u c t i o n , f u e l and machinery. This f a c t o r 
may be ver y important i n a choice between 
nuclear power p l a n t s and two other forms. I n 
(7) Brown, F.H.S., & Edwards, R.S. The replacement 
of obsolescent p l a n t , Economica, V o l . 28 1961 
p.297 
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Most underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s equipment and 
s k i l l s necessary f o r nuclear p l a n t s are not 
a v a i l a b l e . Assuming a t the same time t h a t 
hydro s i t e s are a v a i l a b l e ; a choice between 
the two forms must take i n t o account the cost 
of i m p o r t a t i o n o f machinery and s k i l l f o r the 
e s t a b l i s h i n g of nuclear p l a n t s . Such costs 
may sway the d i r e c t i o n i n favour o f hydro 
although i t i s known t h a t c a p i t a l costs o f 
hydro p l a n t s are g r e a t e r than nu c l e a r over a 
s i m i l a r c a p a c i t y . 
(k), A f a c t o r which i s c l o s e l y l i n k e d w i t h the 
p o t e n t i a l i t i e s o f the country i s the reserve o f 
f o r e i g n exchange which may be r e q u i r e d . I t may 
be argued t h a t the s c a r c i t y o f f o r e i g n exchange 
i n underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s makes investment 
i n hydro and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n nuclear p l a n t s 
u n a t t r a c t i v e . Since i t i s t r u e t h a t nuclear 
p l a n t s r e q u i r e h i g h l y s p e c i a l i s e d equipment 
and s k i l l produced o n l y i n a few c o u n t r i e s , 
i n s t a l l a t i o n of nuclear power s t a t i o n s needs 
a considerable amount o f imported equipment, 
using f o r e i g n exchange. But hydro p l a n t s 
i n v o l v e a l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n o f costs i n c i v i l 
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engineering work which could be s u p p l i e d by-
n a t i o n a l producers and consequently c a r r i e d 
out w i t h r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e f o r e i g n exchange. 
Conventional thermal power s t a t i o n s are i n a 
more d i f f i c u l t p o s i t i o n i n t h i s r e s p e c t , 
because advanced power s t a t i o n s a t the present 
time produced i n h i g h l y i n d u s t r i a l i s e d c o u n t r i e s 
r e q u i r e heavy f o r e i g n exchange. What makes the 
s i t u a t i o n more d i f f i c u l t i s the i m p o r t a t i o n o f 
f u e l , i f i t i s not a v a i l a b l e from n a t i o n a l 
resources. These costs are, of course, 
r e c u r r i n g . The r e s u l t o f c o n s i d e r i n g t h i s 
f a c t o r w i l l put hydro p l a n t s i n a favourable 
p o s i t i o n as against the two other sources of 
e l e c t r i c power. 
Amenity and landscape value may a f f e c t the 
d e c i s i o n o f choice. The importance of t h i s 
f a c t o r a r i s e s from the f a c t t h a t n o t t o s p o i l 
the beauty o f an area may cost a g r e a t amount 
of c a p i t a l , which should be added t o the t o t a l 
costs o f the scheme. For instance i f 
t r a n s m i s s i o n l i n e s between thermal power 
s t a t i o n s and consuming centres have t o be 
underground f o r amenity purposes, t h i s would 
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r e s u l t i n a high cost per u n i t s u p p l i e d from 
the thermal s t a t i o n , and consequently lessen 
the advantage of low c a p i t a l costs* But a 
hydro p l a n t designed t o be l o c a t e d i n an area 
o f g r eat landscape v a l u e may n o t compete 
f a v o u r a b l y w i t h an a l t e r n a t i v e thermal s t a t i o n * 
From the above examination o f f a c t o r s 
a f f e c t i n g the choice o f p a r t i c u l a r type of g e n e r a t i o n , 
two questions a r i s e : f o r an equal o u t p u t , can the 
nu c l e a r power method compete economically w i t h 
c o n v e n t i o n a l thermal or hydro, and would hydro power 
gene r a t i o n be p r e f e r a b l e t o co n v e n t i o n a l thermal? Let 
us t r y t o answer these two questions w i t h i n the 
p a r t i c u l a r circumstances of the Egyptian economy* 
With r e g a r d t o the f i r s t q u e s t i o n , one could 
argue t h a t n u c l e a r power p r o j e c t s i n Egypt are 
aneconomic. The reasons a re, f i r s t , the h i g h c a p i t a l 
r e q u i r e d f o r the i n s t a l l a t i o n o f nuclear p l a n t s i n 
comparison w i t h conventional thermal ones, i n v o l v i n g 
a h i g h p r o p o r t i o n of f o r e i g n c a p i t a l . Secondly, 
nuc l e a r power p l a n t s can o n l y be economic i n a h i g h l y 
e f f i c i e n t g r i d system i n order t o supply the base 
l o a d . This i s n o t a v a i l a b l e i n Egypt a t the present 
t i m e . T h i r d l y , the a b i l i t y o f nuc l e a r power t o 
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compete w i t h o t h e r sources depends t o a s i g n i f i c a n t 
e x t e n t on intergovernmental agreements on f i n a n c i a l 
and f u e l p r o v i s i o n s . F o u r t h l y , the expected low 
f u e l cost per u n i t i n nuclear power i s n o t y e t known 
by experience. F i f t h l y , i f the c a p i t a l r e q u i r e d t o 
e s t a b l i s h n u c l e a r power s t a t i o n s i s a l i t t l e l e s s 
than t h a t o f hydro i n a given c a p a c i t y , why should 
we n o t d i v e r t t h i s c a p i t a l t o hydro, p l a n t s , c o n s i d e r i n g 
i t s advantages, e s p e c i a l l y when i t i s known t h a t t h e r e 
are many s i t e s e i t h e r on the River N i l e or other 
n a t i o n a l water resources which are n o t y e t e x p l o i t e d . 
On the other hand, th e r e are some reasons i n 
favour o f e s t a b l i s h i n g nuclear power s t a t i o n s . I f 
o i l and other f u e l s are s t i l l imported f o r 
c o n v e n t i o n a l power s t a t i o n s , n u c l e a r methods o f 
g e n e r a t i o n may compete economically, because i n t h e 
former case f u e l costs are r e c u r r i n g . Nuclear power 
s t a t i o n s are more fl e x i b l e - - i n l o c a t i o n . Also 
c o u n t r i e s may have a d e s i r e t o h o l d n u c l e a r knowledge. 
An e v a l u a t i o n o f the advantages and 
disadvantages i n terms of f i g u r e s may make i t 
d i f f i c u l t t o g i v e a p r e c i s e answer. But i f we 
consider the a v a i l a b l e knowledge, n u c l e a r power 
s t a t i o n s should be the l a s t t o be e s t a b l i s h e d . 
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A r r i v i n g a t t h i s conclusion i t i s s t i l l 
necessary t o consider whether hydro power s t a t i o n s 
would be p r e f e r a b l e t o an e q u i v a l e n t c o n v e n t i o n a l 
thermal type. An example o f t h i s problem i n Egypt i s 
the d e c i s i o n taken t o i n s t a l l the High-Dam power 
s t a t i o n or e s t a b l i s h i n g i n s t e a d c o n v e n t i o n a l thermal 
power s t a t i o n s , w i t h s i m i l a r c a p a c i t y , throughout the 
co u n t r y . H. Su l t a n claimed (8) t h a t an e q u i v a l e n t 
c o n v e n t i o n a l thermal power s t a t i o n would be 
economically b e t t e r than the High-Dam hydro power 
s t a t i o n . To a r r i v e a t t h i s c o n c l u s i o n , H. Sultan 
assumes two methods o f t r a n s m i t t i n g e l e c t r i c i t y from 
the High-Dam p r o j e c t . The f i r s t i s where a l l 
generated energy w i l l be t r a n s m i t t e d t o Cair o , the 
main consuming c e n t r e . I n t h i s case i t i s c a l c u l a t e d 
t h a t the cost o f the h y d r o - e l e c t r i c s t a t i o n and the 
tr a n s m i s s i o n l i n e s w i l l be about £E97 m i l l i o n , w h i l e 
the e s t a b l i s h i n g o f a co n v e n t i o n a l thermal power 
s t a t i o n nearer t o the load centre i n Cairo w i l l cost 
o n l y £E^3 m i l l i o n , producing the same energy. The 
other method assumes t h a t a p r o p o r t i o n o f the 
generated energy from the High-Dam h y d r o - e l e c t r i c 
s t a t i o n w i l l be consumed i n 'Minia and A s s u i t ' through 
(8) Sultan Hamed. High Dam power s t a t i o n . 
Memorandum 8^ o f the N a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g committee 
Dec. 7th 1958. 
two t r a n s f o r m e r power s t a t i o n s i n those l a r g e 
c i t i e s i n Upper Egypt. I n t h i s case the t o t a l costs 
o f the h y d r o - s t a t i o n , two transformer power s t a t i o n s 
and the t r a n s m i s s i o n l i n e s t o Cairo w i l l cost 
£E100 m i l l i o n . I n s t e a d H. Sultan suggests t h a t two 
thermal power s t a t i o n s could be e s t a b l i s h e d i n the 
two mentioned c i t i e s i n a d d i t i o n t o the main thermal 
one i n Cairo* A l l these w i l l cost o n l y ££48 m i l l i o n . 
By adopting the second method the d i f f e r e n c e between 
the two c o s t s , ( o f the High-Dam power s t a t i o n and 
conve n t i o n a l thermal) would amount t o £E52 m i l l i o n . 
Also an advantage w i l l come from the saving o f 
f o r e i g n exchange required*. I t i s estimated t h a t 
f o r e i g n exchange r e q u i r e d f o r the High-Dam hydro 
p r o j e c t i s approximately £E6.771 m i l l i o n a n n u a l l y 
d u r i n g the c o n s t r u c t i o n p e r i o d o f f i f t e e n years. 
For the a l t e r n a t i v e thermal power s t a t i o n s the 
r e q u i r e d f o r e i g n exchange i s approximately £E3»335 
m i l l i o n a n n u a l l y d u r i n g a c o n s t r u c t i o n p e r i o d o f 
5 years. Saving of f o r e i g n currency could a l s o be 
achieved i f f u e l f o r t&e suggested thermal p l a n t s 
could be s u p p l i e d from n a t i o n a l resources. 
H. Sultan's study suggests t h a t the establishment 
o f thermal power p l a n t s as an a l t e r n a t i v e t o the 
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High-Dam h y d r o - e l e c t r i c p r o j e c t , i s economically 
p r e f e r a b l e . Saving, p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r e i g n currency, 
would lessen t o a g r e a t e r extent the heavy burden 
on the Balance of Payment, 
Let us see how f a r t h i s conclusion i s 
j u s t i f i e d . Are the assumptions r i g h t ? I f they are 
r i g h t what are the b e n e f i t s o f the High-Dam hydro-
e l e c t r i c p r o j e c t ? 
With r e g a r d t o the f i r s t q u e s t i o n , the main 
e r r o r made i n the a n a l y s i s i s the assumption t h a t 
the hydro p r o j e c t has a l i f e o f 40 years a g a i n s t a 
l i f e o f 31 years f o r the c o n v e n t i o n a l thermal p l a n t . 
However, i t has been suggested by the Mackenzie 
Report t h a t i n a c o r r e c t comparison between the two 
p r o j e c t s i t i s necessary t o take i n t o account two 
successive thermal p l a n t s a g a i n s t one hydro p l a n t . 
And even i f the former assumption i s r i g h t and the 
Mackenzie Report i s wrong, the a n a l y s i s ignores the 
l i f e o f the h y d r o - p l a n t , when c a l c u l a t i n g f u e l 
charges of thermal p l a n t s . 
Also i t has not been considered i n the 
a n a l y s i s t h a t the costs of modern thermal p l a n t s 
are expected t o be h i g h and the t r e n d i n the p r i c e 
of f u e l i s upward. 
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The other question i s , what are the economic 
b e n e f i t s of the High-Dam hydro e l e c t r i c p r o j e c t ? 
( l ) I t has been mentioned t h a t the main advantage 
of a hydro e l e c t r i c s t a t i o n i s t h a t i t consumes 
no f u e l , which o f f s e t s the h i g h c a p i t a l costs 
i n v o l v e d . Thus i n comparison between the High-
Dam hydro e l e c t r i c p r o j e c t and an a l t e r n a t i v e 
thermal p l a n t i t i s important t o consider the 
h i g h f u e l charges i n v o l v e d i n the thermal case, 
e s p e c i a l l y when i t i s known t h a t i f f u e l w i l l 
not be s u p p l i e d from n a t i o n a l resources, t h i s 
w i l l cost about £E7 m i l l i o n f o r e i g n currency 
a n n u a l l y . This i s a l r e a d y a heavy burden on 
the Balance of Payments. I t has been mentioned 
t h a t the advantage o f having no f u e l charges 
i n hydro p l a n t s would be o f f s e t by the exhaustion 
o f s i t e s . I n Egypt hydro s i t e s are not y e t 
exhausted. Long-term planning shows t h a t hydro 
s i t e s can be u t i l i s e d up t o 1985. I n a d d i t i o n 
the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the g r i d system i n 1968 w i l l 
p e r m i t a systematic use o f surplus water which 
w i l l r e s u l t i n economies i n the use o f f u e l o f 
other c o n v e n t i o n a l thermal power s t a t i o n s * 
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(2) The main load centre i n Egypt i s Cairo and i t s 
suburbs, which i s already exhausted by the 
location of large numbers of thermal plants. 
Consequently the problems of a i r p o l l u t i o n and 
amenity w i l l be more d i f f i c u l t to solve. The 
High-Dam project transmitting e l e c t r i c i t y 
through 500 KW transmission l i n e s would need 
only one transformer power station s i t e d near 
Cairo for supplying e l e c t r i c i t y requirements 
i n the area.(9) 
(3) One of the most important advantages of the 
hydro project i s the s e c u r i t y of national 
supply. I t has been mentioned that nuclear 
plants as well as modern conventional thermal 
plants require a large proportion of foreign 
c a p i t a l and s k i l l than hydro. 
(4) Not much l e s s important i s the f a c t that hydro 
projects contribute e f f e c t i v e l y i n reducing the 
burden of unemployment. For instance the High-
Dam project employs 17000 men for a long period 
of construction than a l t e r n a t i v e thermal while 
the period of construction of the High-Dam 
hydro e l e c t r i c project i s 15 years. This already 
(9) See Maps 3 & ^. 
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has given the Aswan area, where the Dam i s located, 
some economic prosperity, 
(5) H, Sultan argued that the economical advantages of 
the High-Dam project would only have s i g n i f i c a n t 
r e s u l t s i f a group of i n d u s t r i e s were to be 
established i n the Aswan area, r e s u l t i n g i n a saving 
of £E32 m i l l i o n of transmission l i n e s to Cairo. This 
suggestion may be c r i t i c i s e d as i t would r e s u l t i n 
an uneconomical location of i n d u s t r i e s . The fact 
that the Aswan area i s too remote from the national 
consuming centres and exporting harbours would r e s u l t 
i n additional costs making production expensive. 
(6) H. Sultan a l s o argued that investment i n hydro plants 
has a rate of return amounting to lk%+ This i s 
considered low compared with a rate of return of 20% 
which i s considered by the International Bank of 
Construction as a f a i r return on investment i n under-
developed countries. But regarding the urgent needs 
of e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n Egypt to a s s i s t i n economic 
and s o c i a l planning, lk% rate of return i s favourable. 
Having a l l these advantages i n mind a decision to 
choose between the High-Dam hydro e l e c t r i c project 
and an a l t e r n a t i v e conventional thermal plant, would 
be s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n favour of the hydro project. 
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Conclusion. 
One of the aims of investment policy i n the 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply industry i s to s e l e c t the best 
method of generation with the minimum cost per unit 
supplied. The problem of choice should be dealt with 
according to the economic position of the country. 
For example, i t has been proved that nuclear 
generation i n Egypt at the present time as scheduled 
i n the f i r s t 5-year plan i s uneconomic, because the 
ex i s t i n g hydro s i t e s are not yet exhausted. But there 
are also some general considerations which have to be 
taken into account i n any country. The example given 
about whether to carry out the High-Dam hydro- e l e c t r i c 
project or to e s t a b l i s h instead a l t e r n a t i v e 
conventional thermal plants show that some wri t e r s 
advocate the l a t t e r procedure. The author's opinion, 
a f t e r giving the ava i l a b l e evidence, i s that the 
High-Dam hydro-project assures the u t i l i s a t i o n of 
av a i l a b l e national resources as well as being a 
cheaper method of supply. 
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Pr i c e Policy,. 
In the previous section an examination of 
the economic facotrs on which a choice of the 
suitable generating plant has been made. In a given 
example within c e r t a i n conditions we a r r i v e d at a 
conclusion that hydro plants may produce e l e c t r i c i t y 
u n i t s with lower costs than the two other types. 
But i n other circumstances d i f f e r e n t conclusions 
may be reached. Whatever the choice w i l l be, the 
main target i n the most economical choice i s 
supplying e l e c t r i c i t y to the ultimate consumer with 
the minimum cost and consequently to charge consumers 
with a reasonable p r i c e . I n practice the minimum 
cost of supply i s not the only basis on which 
consumers are charged for t h e i r consumption. There 
are also other factors to be taken into account i n 
the public i n t e r e s t . For these reasons the price 
p o l i c y i n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply industry and a l l 
public u t i l i t i e s involve some problems d i f f e r e n t 
from those which face private enterprises. By the 
nature of public enterprises, they are either 
operated by agencies of the Government or regulated 
by public laws with a c e r t a i n degree of m i n i s t e r i a l 
intervention i n the public i n t e r e s t . At the same 
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time i t i s considered that they work as commercial 
undertakings* Thus one could argue that p r i c i n g 
p o l i c i e s i n public enterprises should be considered 
to take into account two aims: f i r s t , the sound 
economic basis on which to f i x the price which, i n 
t h i s section, w i l l be examined within the boundaries 
of monopolistic or semi-monopolistic power, which 
they enjoy, and second, the public i n t e r e s t following 
the o f f i c i a l recommendations to pursue a desirable 
policy, instead of r e l y i n g merely on t h e i r economic 
pos i t i o n . 
In B r i t i s h public enterprises, these two aims 
are c l e a r l y stated i n the White Paper 'The f i n a n c i a l 
and Economic obligation of the Nationalised 
I n d u s t r i e s ' published i n 196l. ( l 0 ) The Paper 
describes the Government's general p o l i c y i n r e l a t i o n 
to n a t i o n a l i s e d industries as, on the one hand, to 
secure that the industries are organised and 
administered e f f i c i e n t l y and economically i n order 
to carry out t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and they are 
thus enabled to make the maximum contribution towards 
the economic well-being of the country as a whole. 
On the other hand, although the ind u s t r i e s have 
(10) Grand 1337 1961 para 2 
obligations of a national and non-commercial kind, 
they are not and ought not to be regarded as s o c i a l 
s e r v i c e s absolved from economic and commercial 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n . The l a t t e r issue i s , i n f a c t , the 
main problem i n finding an appropriate price policy 
to be followed by public enterprises. I t i s thought 
that any attempt to consider these i n d u s t r i e s as 
merely of commercial kind would be wrong, because 
they are regulated by public Acts, on the other hand 
they cannot be considered as s o c i a l s ervices because 
there i s nothing to prevent them from operating at 
a surplus nor i s there any l e g a l l i m i t to such a 
surplus.(11) Hence there i s a p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t y 
i n finding a u n i v e r s a l p r i c e policy in public 
enterprises. For example, i n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply 
industry the t a r i f f s a c t u a l l y applied vary from one 
country and even from one Area to another as there i s 
no p r i n c i p l e commonly accepted i n a l l countries on 
which i t i s possible to determine the l e v e l of rate 
applicable to each category of consumers and to each 
type of supply.(12) 
(11) Robson, W. Nationalised industry and public 
ownership p.66 
(12) O.E.E.C. The theory of marginal cost and 
e l e c t r i c i t y r a t e s , P a r i s 1958 para 2. 
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However, there have been several attempts 
to f i n d out the most suitable method on which pric e s 
should be determined. For example, i n B r i t i s h 
public enterprises, there i s a statutory break-even 
method. The Boards of the nat i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s 
must not make p r o f i t s i n the normally accepted sense. 
But they rather seek to balance t h e i r revenues and 
t h e i r outgoings on an average of good and bad years. 
Thus price s should be equal to t h e i r costs, neither 
more nor l e s s . I t i s found i n a l l n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n 
Acts, that they are required to ensure that t h e i r 
revenue i s not to be l e s s than s u f f i c i e n t taking one 
year with another, to meet outgoings properly 
chargeable to revenue. The Boards are not obliged 
to cover t h e i r outgoings every year but at l e a s t 
s u f f i c i e n t to cover d e f i c i t s on revenue accounted 
over a five-year period. The e l e c t r i c i t y supply 
industry i n B r i t a i n applies t h i s p r i n c i p l e i n 
addition that each Area Board i s required i n d i v i d u a l l y 
to s a t i s f y t h i s l e g i s l a t i o n . ( 1 3 ) The merit of t h i s 
method i f * i t i s pushed to i t s l o g i c a l conclusion, 
the prices charged for each unit or category of goods 
(13) Edwards, E., & Townsend, H. Business enterprise 
London 1958 p.565. 
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or s e r v i c e s should always correspond t o t h e i r 
r e l a t i v e c o s t s . ' ( l 4 ) 
The main c r i t i c i s m of t h i s method i n the 
case o f e l e c t r i c i t y i s t h a t p r i c e s are s e n s i t i v e t o 
the e l a s t i c i t y o f demand. Most e l e c t r i c i t y users 
have d i r e c t s u b s t i t u t e s . I n commercial and 
i n d u s t r i a l consumption and some domestic, demand i s 
v u l n e r a b l e t o c o m p e t i t i o n from other sources o f 
power, such as gas, o i l and even c o a l . For example, 
e l e c t r i c i t y meets c o m p e t i t i o n from c o a l , coke, gas 
and o i l f o r h e a t i n g , gas and o i l f o r l i g h t i n g , o i l , 
gas, steam and water f o r power and o i l and steam f o r 
t r a c t i o n . The v a r y i n g a v a i l a b i l i t y and s u i t a b i l i t y 
o f the s u b s t i t u t e s a f f e c t s the e l a s t i c i t y of demand 
which p r e v a i l s i n each market. E l e c t r i c i t y has 
a r e l a t i v e l y i n e l a s t i c demand f o r l i g h t i n g . On the 
other hand f o r h e a t i n g , gas and s o l i d f u e l s have a 
r e l a t i v e advantage and the demand f o r e l e c t r i c i t y 
i s more e l a s t i c . I t has been noted t h a t n a t i o n a l i s e d 
i n d u s t r i e s are as v u l n e r a b l e t o c o m p e t i t i o n as much 
of p r i v a t e i n d u s t r y , so t h a t t h e r e i s no reason t o 
suppose t h a t e l e c t r i c i t y i n most o f i t s uses has 
( l 4 ) Robson, W. N a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r y and p u b l i c 
ownership p.291 
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much monopoly power. Any considerable change i n 
e l e c t r i c i t y t a r i f f s would l e a d t o i t s replacement 
by other f u e l . ( 1 5 ) I n other words, i f e l e c t r i c i t y 
t a r i f f s are so h i g h as t o d i v e r t consumers t o other 
s u b s t i t u t e s , then the i n d u s t r y w i l l not be able t o 
cover i t s costs from revenue. 
I f we consider the e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y 
as a s o c i a l s e r v i c e which should be s u p p l i e d t o the 
community t o achieve s o c i a l ends, a method of 
determining a p r i c e could be set a p r i c e as low as 
p o s s i b l e . The serious c r i t i c i s m o f t h i s method i s 
t h a t i t leads t o m i s - a l l o c a t i o n o f resources, because 
of the u n d e r - p r i c i n g o f the product. 
The most c o n t r o v e r s i a l issue i n f i x i n g 
e l e c t r i c i t y r a t e s i s whether t o r e l a t e them t o the 
marginal cost or the average cost of producing 
e l e c t r i c i t y u n i t s . 
Marginal cost i s the cost of producing 
a d d i t i o n a l s u p p lies and marginal cost p r i c i n g aims 
at ensuring t h a t the p r i c e s charged should correspond 
t o the cost of a d d i t i o n a l supply i n c l u d i n g new 
i n s t a l l a t i o n s which have t o be e s t a b l i s h e d i n the 
(15) Foster, CD. The cost o f f i n a n c i n g the 
n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s , I n s t i t u t e o f S t a t i s t i c s , 
Oxford B u l l e t i n , V o l . 22, 1960 p.9^. 
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i n d u s t r y . Thus e l e c t r i c i t y r a t e s should be f i x e d 
on the basis t h a t each KWh should be s o l d a t the 
cost of the power which would be produced by any 
a d d i t i o n a l p l a n t i n s t a l l e d i n c l u d i n g t r a n s m i s s i o n 
and d i s t r i b u t i o n . On the other hand, average cost 
p r i c i n g i s t o equate p r i c e charged w i t h the cost o f 
producing the average u n i t of output i n c l u d i n g n ot 
o n l y v a r i a b l e costs but also f i x e d c o s t s . 
The advocates of the marginal cost t h e o r y 
c l a i m t h a t i t i s the best method of p r i c i n g i n the 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y . E l e c t r i c i t y under-
t a k i n g s i n v e s t a l a r g e c a p i t a l , thus they are 
op e r a t i n g under c o n d i t i o n s o f decreasing average 
c o s t s . Under these c o n d i t i o n s the optimum output 
w i t h marginal cost p r i c i n g i s gr e a t e r than the 
optimum output under average cost p r i c i n g . This 
d i f f e r e n c e would r e s u l t i n a d d i t i o n a l investment 
and w e l f a r e optimum could be a t t a i n e d . ( l 6 ) The 
ex p l a n a t i o n i s t h a t because f i x e d costs i n 
e l e c t r i c i t y undertakings are d i v i d e d from the very 
s t a r t among on l y a few u n i t s o f s e r v i c e , so t h a t as 
output increases the same or n e a r l y the same t o t a l 
o f f i x e d costs are spread over more u n i t s o f output 
( l 6 ) Harbeson, D.W. A c r i t i q u e of marginal cost 
p r i c i n g , Land Economics Feb. 1955 p.55* 
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and the average costs decrease. This i s c l e a r when 
off-peak s e r v i c e s expand, as no a d d i t i o n a l investment 
i n the basic p l a n t c a p a c i t y i s r e q u i r e d . As output 
expands towards the optimum, f i x e d costs d e c l i n e . 
However, average costs do n o t always decrease, f o r 
i n s t a n c e , i f the u t i l i s a t i o n o f the e x i s t i n g p l a n t 
i s i n c r e a s i n g too f a s t , i . e . i f demand a t a c e r t a i n 
time increases too f a s t , the e x i s t i n g c a p a c i t y 
would n o t be s u f f i c i e n t t o meet demand. Consequently 
the i n d u s t r y has t o use l e s s e f f i c i e n t p l a n t s o f 
ge n e r a t i o n , according t o the m e r i t of order p r i n c i p l e . 
Hence a s i t u a t i o n of i n c r e a s i n g costs p r e v a i l s . 
T h i s can be i l l u s t r a t e d by the r e l a t i o n between 
t h r e e curves showing average t o t a l c o s t s , average 
v a r i a b l e costs and sh o r t p e r i o d marginal c o s t s . 
When the average t o t a l costs and average v a r i a b l e 
costs slope downward the marginal cost curve i s 
below them and decreasing more r a p i d l y than they a r e . 
When the average v a r i a b l e costs are constant, the 
marginal cost and average v a r i a b l e costs curves 
i n t e r s e c t . And when the average t o t a l cost and 
average v a r i a b l e cost curves slope upward, the 
marginal cost curve i s above them.(17) Another 
(17) T r o x e l , E. Economics o f p u b l i c u t i l i t i e s New 
York 19^7 p . W . 
reason f o r i n c r e a s i n g average costs i s the exhaustion 
of hydro e l e c t r i c s i t e s and the tendency towards 
decreasing r e t u r n s which appears i n thermal e l e c t r i c i t y 
due t o the problem of a i r p o l l u t i o n . But t h i s f a c t o r 
i s o f f s e t by the i n c r e a s i n g r e t u r n s i n d i s t r i b u t i o n , ( l 8 ) 
Moreover, i t i s argued t h a t a l l costs are marginal 
i n the long r u n , so t h a t marginal cost p r i c i n g and 
average cost p r i c i n g are one and the same.(19) Thus 
the d e f i n i t i o n o f m a r g i n i a l cost ignores the time 
element, whereas the r a t e o f growth over time o f an 
i n d u s t r y undoubtedly a f f e c t s i t s c o s t s . 
Now assuming t h a t the e l e c t r i c i t y supply i s 
working under decreasing average costs i n the sho r t 
r u n , how would marginal cost p r i c i n g r e s u l t i n 
a d d i t i o n a l investment? 
I t has been argued t h a t i f e l e c t r i c i t y r a t e s 
are t o be f i x e d on the average cost p r i n c i p l e , t h a t 
i s , by simply d i v i d i n g t o t a l costs by t o t a l k i l o w a t t 
hours, such a process would ignore s p e c i a l costs due 
(18) Boiteux, M. 1&2tctr>t ^ y v ^ j > hcts , ^ rololtm^, a^J cni/^e-fi 
(19) L i t t l e , J.M.D. A c r i t i q u e o f w e l f a r e economics, 
London 1958, p .156 
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d i r e c t l y t o p a r t i c u l a r classes o f consumers* Also 
i t ignores the d i f f e r e n c e i n r a t e l e v e l t h a t can be 
e f f e c t i v e l y a p p l i e d t o s t i m u l a t e u t i l i s a t i o n . 
Domestic and small commercial consumers u s u a l l y 
impose r e l a t i v e l y h i g h costs compared t o other 
commercial and i n d u s t r i a l consumers. An equal r a t e 
per KWh f o r a l l purposes and q u a n t i t i e s o f consumption 
would not be a good system of rates. ( 2 0 ) I n t h i s 
c o ntext the Herbert r e p o r t says t h a t the e l e c t r i c i t y 
supply i n d u s t r y should have one duty, t h a t i s t o 
supply e l e c t r i c i t y t o those who w i l l meet the costs 
o f i t . ( 2 1 ) Professor R. Edwards supp o r t i n g t h i s 
view says ' i f the p r i c e charged by a n a t i o n a l i s e d 
i n d u s t r y i s not increased i n response t o a cost 
increase the surplus w i l l be reduced and even i f the 
c a p i t a l investment i s not reduced because the 
i n d u s t r y i s allowed t o borrow more from the 
Government, the Government must e i t h e r borrow more 
or increase t a x a t i o n , so the pressures are reduced 
by a d i v e r s i o n o f resources from other borrowers o f 
taxpayers.( 2 2 ) 
(20) Bauer, E. , & C a s t e l l o , P. P u b l i c o r g a n i s a t i o n o f 
e l e c t r i c power New York 19^9 p.216. 
(21) Op.Cit. para 567. 
(22) Edwards, R. The i n f l u e n c e o f the n a t i o n a l i s e d 
i n d u s t r i e s , P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n December, 1960 
p . 4 6 . 
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I f each consumer should be made t o pay f o r 
the k i l o w a t t hour s u p p l i e d , the exact cost i n v o l v e d 
i n the p r o d u c t i o n o f t h a t k i l o w a t t hour, i t would 
c e r t a i n l y be an i d e a l t a r i f f i n the economic sense. 
But i t may be u n r e a l i s t i c , because i t i s known t h a t 
the e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y i s an expanding 
i n d u s t r y f a c i n g a demand increase which has t o be 
met by a d d i t i o n a l p l a n t s . The cost of t h i s 
machinery v a r i e s from time t o time, w i t h a tendency 
t o i ncrease. A considerable p r o p o r t i o n of p r o d u c t i o n 
costs are d e p r e c i a t i o n and i n t e r e s t charges. This 
means t h a t when the cost of new i n s t a l l a t i o n i s h i g h 
and t a r i f f s are t o be based on marginal c o s t , t h i s 
would r e s u l t i n burdening new consumers w i t h higher 
charges t o a g r e a t e r extent than the e x i s t i n g : 
consumers even though they are w i t h i n one category. 
Average cost p r i c i n g i n t h i s context appears t o be 
f a i r . 
The preceding argument i s o n l y one p o i n t out 
of many i n v o l v e d i n the cont r o v e r s y o f marginal cost 
and average cost p r i c i n g . I t shows how d i f f i c u l t i t 
i s t o f o l l o w e i t h e r of the two t h e o r i e s . This i s 
c l e a r from the f a c t t h a t 'The Committee on n a t i o n a l 
p o l i c y f o r the use o f Fuel and Power Resources', 
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were e q u a l l y d i v i d e d on the subject. ( 2 3 ) 
I f we want t o adopt a p r a c t i c a l method f o r 
p r i c i n g i n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y , we must 
take i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n the s p e c i a l f e a t u r e s o f the 
i n d u s t r y . F i r s t , i n c o n t r a s t w i t h many i n d u s t r i e s 
e l e c t r i c i t y costs v a r y n o t merely w i t h the amount o f 
output s u p p l i e d but also w i t h the time o f day, month 
and year a t which i t i s s u p p l i e d and t o whom i t i s 
s u p p l i e d . The wide v a r i a t i o n o f costs i n c u r r e d a t 
d i f f e r e n t times i s due t o v a r i a t i o n i n demand, as 
could be seen i n any loa d curve f o r a day, season 
or year. 
This f e a t u r e r a i s e s the problem o f off-peak 
p r i c i n g . To increase demand i n peak periods i s n o t 
always d e s i r a b l e since i t r e q u i r e s a d d i t i o n a l p l a n t s 
used only f o r a few hours i n a day or a t c e r t a i n 
times d u r i n g the year. 
The question here i s , w i l l the p r i c e be equal 
t o the marginal cost or the average cost of supply 
a t peak periods? There i s an o p i n i o n which may be 
s u i t a b l e t o be adopted, i f i t proves a f t e r f u r t h e r 
s t u d i e s t h a t i t can work wel l . . 
(23) Cmnd 8 6 £ 7 1952 para 5^ 
The o p i n i o n i s , t h a t since e x t r a costs are 
i n c u r r e d by the demand o f peak users, thus peak 
t a r i f f s must be higher than off-peak t a r i f f s . At 
peak hours t a r i f f s should i n c l u d e i n a d d i t i o n t o 
the marginal cost a charge f o r the f i x e d costs o f 
the p l a n t . ( 2 4 ) On the other hand a t off-peak 
periods the p r i c e should be equal t o the marginal 
cost of producing and d e l i v e r i n g e l e c t r i c i t y . 
Another f e a t u r e o f the e l e c t r i c i t y supply 
i n d u s t r y i s the f a c t t h a t e l e c t r i c i t y cannot be 
st o r e d a t l e a s t f o r a long time or r e s o l d , by the 
consumer. Also the f a c t t h a t the consumer cannot 
e a s i l y t r a n s f e r h i s demand t o another producer 
makes i t p o s s i b l e f o r the e l e c t r i c i t y i n d u s t r y t o 
p r a c t i c e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n between d i f f e r e n t classes, 
of consumers. Because of the importance of 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n p r i c e p o l i c y o f the e l e c t r i c i t y 
i n d u s t r y i t i s necessary t o examine i t i n more 
d e t a i l • 
P r i c e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . 
While d i s c r i m i n a t i v e e l e c t r i c i t y t a r i f f s 
between classes o f consumption may be acceptable, 
(24) Harberger, D., & An d r e t t a , N. A note on the 
economic p r i n c i p l e o f e l e c t r i c i t y p r i c i n g . 
A p plied economic papers, March 1963 p»38» 
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d i s c r i m i n a t i o n between consumers f o r use of 
e l e c t r i c i t y f o r the same purpose would not be 
t o l e r a t e d . To e x p l a i n t h i s statement we have t o 
know the economic reasons why e l e c t r i c i t y 
a u t h o r i t i e s d i s c r i m i n a t e between classes o f 
consumers. The cost of s e r v i c e i s one economic 
reason f o r d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . E l e c t r i c i t y a u t h o r i t i e s 
i n c u r sometimes more costs i n s e r v i n g one cla s s o f 
consumer than another. For example, the cost of 
se r v i n g l a r g e i n d u s t r i a l consumers i s lower than 
f o r small consumers i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e i r consumption. 
Also consumers who have l a r g e off-peak demand are 
l e s s c o s t l y than peak users, because i n the former 
case no a d d i t i o n a l p l a n t i s r e q u i r e d . This i s a 
sound reason f o r d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between off-peak 
t a r i f f s and peak t a r i f f s . Another example i s t h a t 
i n d u s t r i a l consumers who have a steady demand over 
a long time could be s u p p l i e d w i t h l i t t l e excess 
c a p a c i t y , or consumers who have a l a r g e demand a t 
one p o i n t o f supply w i l l save d i s t r i b u t i o n and 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c osts. These classes should be 
charged w i t h promotional t a r i f f s . ( 2 5 ) 
E l a s t i c i t y of demand i s another reason f o r 
p r i c e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . As a r u l e i n d u s t r i a l and 
(25) See R e t a i l t a r i f f s below p.33^ 
325 
large commercial consumers have more e l a s t i c demand 
than domestic consumers. The former c l a s s e s can 
turn to other sources of power i f e l e c t r i c i t y rates 
are not low enough to compete, or they may fin d that 
i t i s more economical for them to i n s t a l l t h e i r own 
generating plants. I t has been mentioned e a r l i e r 
i n t h i s section that domestic consumers have an 
e l a s t i c demand for several uses other than l i g h t i n g . 
But i t should be noted that demand e l a s t i c i t y of 
domestic consumers cannot be very high. A consumer 
may think more about the pr i c e and qu a l i t y of the 
e l e c t r i c appliance than about e l e c t r i c i t y p r i c e s . 
Thus a t a r i f f structure may take into account 
these differences i n e l a s t i c i t y of demand by 
charging lower rates to i n d u s t r i a l and large 
commercial consumers and r e l a t i v e l y higher rates to 
domestic consumers. 
Price discrimination based on the e l a s t i c i t y 
of demand can stimulate additional investment and 
an expansion of output. For example, a price 
reduction for consumers of l e s s e l a s t i c demand w i l l 
lead to more consumption, as long as the demand i s 
not p e r f e c t l y i n e l a s t i c . Additional investment can 
be achieved by dividing consumption into l a y e r s each 
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of which has a dif f e r e n t running charge equal to 
the marginal cost, which the consumers are w i l l i n g 
to pay. This i s the idea of the block t a r i f f which 
a t t r a c t s people who do not want to be committed to 
pe r i o d i c a l payment without r e l a t i o n to actu a l 
consumption and want to secure quantity discount. 
While a l l these are economic reasons for 
discrimination, i t i s s o c i a l l y undesirable to charge 
consumers with d i f f e r e n t r a t e s . Moreover consumers 
who pay high p r i c e s w i l l c e r t a i n l y f e e l that i t i s 
a wrong p r i c e policy. Thus, as i t has been argued, 
i f a public enterprise i s working on a non-profit 
making b a s i s , benefits from discrimination would not 
accrue to the monopolist, but to some section of 
the consumers. I n t h i s case i t would be desirable 
for the e l e c t r i c i t y supply industry to minimise 
discrimination as f a r as possible. And i f ' i t has 
to discriminate, i t should do so only at the request, 
or with the sanction of the s t a t e . Otherwise the 
monopoly would arrogate to i t s e l f the r i g h t to tax 
or subsidize c e r t a i n members of the community i n a 
purely a r b i t r a r y fashion'. (26 ) 
(26) Gabriel Dessus. The general p r i n c i p l e s of rate 
f i x i n g i n public u t i l i t i e s . Nelson, (Ed.) 
Op.Cit. p.37 
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P r i c e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n according t o costs o f 
supply complicate the question o f r u r a l e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n . 
There i s no doubt t h a t supplying r u r a l consumers f o r 
farming and oth e r purposes i s of great importance t o 
the n a t i o n a l economy. On the other hand i t would be 
impossible f o r those consumers t o pay the cost o f 
sup p l y i n g them. The Herbert Report observes t h a t 
t h e l a r g e numbers of new connections has i n v o l v e d 
the E l e c t r i c i t y Boards i n heavy c a p i t a l expenditure, 
much o f which i s not i n i t i a l l y economic by referen c e 
t o the expected revenue from the new consumers' 
payment f o r e l e c t r i c i t y . This i s e s p e c i a l l y the 
case i n r u r a l areas where th e r e are fewer consumers 
per mile o f l i n e and where the i n d i v i d u a l s e r v i c e 
connections are u s u a l l y longer than i n the towns.(27) 
To conclude, i t may be s t a t e d t h a t although 
p r i c e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i s economically j u s t i f i e d , i t 
may b r i n g some s o c i a l problems. A reasonable p o l i c y 
i n t h i s respect could be based on economic p r i n c i p l e s 
i . e . p r i c e s should be r e l a t e d as f a r as p o s s i b l e t o 
costs of supply, as w e l l as s t a t e r e g u l a t i o n s t o 
overcome these d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
(27) Bp.Git. para 151. 
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Uniform p r i c e . 
I f discrimination does not prove to be an 
e n t i r e l y correct method, then an a l t e r n a t i v e i s a 
uniform t a r i f f . But t h i s i s not an easy substitute, 
differences i n costs among areas p e r s i s t under any 
system and they w i l l i n e v i t a b l y remain. Thus uniform 
ra t e s charged i n a l l areas would mean that some 
consumers are subsidising others. I t may also look 
u n f a i r . A rate which looks comparatively low may 
i n f a c t be excessive while a much higher one may be 
j u s t i f i e d . For example, an E l e c t r i c i t y Area Board i n 
B r i t a i n which enjoys a large demand for bulk supply 
can charge a much lower average price than one without 
t h i s advantage. The old B r i t i s h E l e c t r i c i t y Authority 
i n i t s f i r s t report states that uniformity of charges 
for each c l a s s of consumer i s neither practicable nor 
desirable and that i t cannot be of uniform benefit to 
a l l consumers.(28) 
The E l e c t r i c i t y Act of 19^7 (29) l a i d upon the 
Area Boards the duty of promoting the s i m p l i f i c a t i o n 
and standardisation of methods of charge for supplies 
of e l e c t r i c i t y . The second report of the B.E.A. 
(28) B.E.A., Annual Report and Accounts, F i r s t Report 
1948 para 362. 
(29) Op.Cit. Section 6. 
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emphasised t h i s p r i n c i p l e by reporting that the need 
for such s i m p l i f i c a t i o n i s c l e a r and the object of 
the Authority and Boards i s to replace the m u l t i p l i c i t y 
of forms of t a r i f f s and of money charges by a s e r i e s 
of standard t a r i f f s , which while giving s u f f i c i e n t 
f l e x i b i l i t y to serve the best i n t e r e s t s of consumers, 
w i l l be comparatively few i n number and equitable to 
a l l c l a s s e s of consumers•(30) 
The question here i s , whether i t i s n a t i o n a l l y 
desirable that consumers i n low cost areas, mainly 
urban, should enjoy the f u l l advantage of lower 
t a r i f f s whereas consumers i n high cost areas, mainly 
r u r a l , should carry the f u l l costs of t h e i r supply. 
But i s a uniform t a r i f f equitable? I t has 
been argued that though a uniform t a r i f f appears to 
be j u s t i f i e d as a national policy, i t i s i n e f f e c t 
discriminatory i n i t s e l f . I f e l e c t r i c i t y i s supplied 
to remote d i s t r i c t s , i t costs more than to supply 
d i s t r i c t s close to generation. A uniform t a r i f f w i l l 
p r a c t i c a l l y discriminate against consumers who l i v e 
close to generating plants. ( 3 1 ) 
(30) Op.Git. para 214. 
(31) Weiss, L.W.. Economics and American industry 
1962 p.246. 
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One could argue, that according to the 
p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t y of c a l c u l a t i n g the costs of 
supply to di f f e r e n t regions, assuming they are i n the 
same area, a uniform t a r i f f , charged to consumers with 
homogenious demand, i s not discriminatory* 
Knowing the d i f f i c u l t y i n adopting a p r a c t i c a l 
method for pr i c i n g p o l i c i e s , i t i s f i n a l l y the aim 
to i l l u s t r a t e the t a r i f f structure i n both B r i t a i n 
and Egypt. 
In B r i t a i n e l e c t r i c i t y t a r i f f s may be examined 
within two categories: the bulk supply t a r i f f and 
r e t a i l t a r i f f s . The structure and the forms of 
t a r i f f s to be adopted involve some problems, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
r e l a t e d to the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the e l e c t r i c i t y 
supply industry, for instance, peak and off-peak t a r i f f s 
and seasonal t a r i f f s . The features of the e l e c t r i c i t y 
supply industry also impose the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
changes of t a r i f f structure to s a t i s f y the new 
conditions. Examples are changes i n bulk supply 
t a r i f f i n B r i t a i n , discussed below, and the conversion 
from m u l t i p l i c i t y to standardisation of r e t a i l 
t a r i f f s to achieve s o c i a l equality. On the whole, 
as mentioned, a t a r i f f should not only be f a i r to 
achieve s o c i a l equality, but must also be formulated 
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on an economic b a s i s to ensure t h a t the demand i s 
not unduly s t i m u l a t e d or depressed by undercharging 
or over-charging a p a r t i c u l a r c l a s s of consumers. 
The Bulk supply t a r i f f i n B r i t a i n , 
The bulk supply t a r i f f i s a who l e s a l e t a r i f f 
charged by the 6.E.G.B. to the Area Boards f o r t h e i r 
demands f o r e l e c t r i c i t y . The composition of t h i s 
t a r i f f i s (a) f i x e d charge r e l a t e d to the maximum 
KW demand made on the system by Area Boards and (b) 
running charge r e l a t e d to the number of u n i t s 
consumed by the Area Board, The f i x e d charge has to 
cover the C.E.G.B.'s c a p i t a l charges and i s r e l a t e d 
to f i x e d c o s t s . The running charge has to cover 
mainly f u e l c o s t s and other running c o s t s . The 
design of t h i s t a r i f f i s made by the Generating 
Board w i t h c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l 
i n such a way to a l l o w the Generating Board to 
c o l l e c t from Area Boards the whole c o s t s of gen e r a t i o n 
and t r a n s m i s s i o n . These c o s t s should i n c l u d e 
d e p r e c i a t i o n and a s u r p l u s to enable the Generating 
Board to f i n a n c e a reasonable p r o p o r t i o n of i t s 
c a p i t a l e x p e n d i t u r e , (32 ) S i n c e n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of 
(32) Robert, K, The supply i n d u s t r y ' s p e r s p e c t i v e . 
E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l 196l p.13. 
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the e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y i n B r i t a i n the 
assessment of the Bulk supply t a r i f f has been 
changed s e v e r a l times. For example, the 19^7 Act 
permitted the C e n t r a l A u t h o r i t y to f i x d i f f e r e n t 
supply t a r i f f s f o r d i f f e r e n t Area Boards to take 
i n t o account the v a r i a t i o n of p r i c e s of c o a l between 
d i f f e r e n t a r e a s . The trend towards s t a n d a r d i s a t i o n 
of the t a r i f f , a f t e r t h a t , was c r i t i c i s e d on the 
grounds t h a t t h i s would a l t e r the economic p o s i t i o n 
of the Area Boards to compete w i t h other sources 
of power. A s o l u t i o n to t h i s problem was i n t r o d u c e d 
i n A p r i l 1950 (33). by which the bulk supply t a r i f f 
would be a d j u s t e d by a f u e l c l a u s e to take i n t o 
account the c o s t of f u e l i n the a r e a s of supply. 
The most important change i n the bulk supply 
t a r i f f , which r e s u l t e d i n the p r e s e n t method, occurred 
i n 1962-63. U n t i l t h i s year the charges have been 
d i s t r i b u t e d between Area Board p r o p o r t i o n a l l y to t h e i r 
i n d i v i d u a l peak demands r e g a r d l e s s of when they 
o c c u r r e d . By t h i s method, i f an Area Board has a 
l o c a l s p e l l of s e v e r e weather during off-peak times 
when the system i s not f u l l y loaded, the r e s u l t w i l l 
be a gain to the Generating Board and w i l l c o s t the 
(33) E l e c t r i c a l Review March 1950 p.584. 
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Area Board an unexpected loss.(3*0 T h i s i s a r e s u l t 
of the f a c t t h a t Area Boards charge consumers a low-
off-peak t a r i f f where the demand i s g r e a t e r i n t h i s 
s e v e r e c o l d s p e l l a t the time when the Generating 
Board charges the Area Boards on peak demands w i t h 
a h igh t a r i f f . Under the new method each Area 
Board bears a f i x e d charge a c c o r d i n g to the average 
of t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t i o n to the h a l f hour 
of n a t i o n a l peak demand before and to the h a l f hour 
a f t e r 31st December i n each y e a r . A c c o r d i n g l y the 
e f f e c t s of l o c a l weather would be l e s s e n e d and the 
Area Boards could modify the s t r u c t u r e and content 
of t h e i r own r e t a i l t a r i f f to r e f l e c t the c o s t s of 
the Area Boards supply. A second important f e a t u r e 
i n the r e v i s e d t a r i f f of 1962-63 i s the d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n 
between day and n i g h t r a t e s . Between 11 p.m. and 
7 a.m. the d i f f e r e n c e i s to be 20% l e s s than f o r 
u n i t s bought by the Area Boards during the day. 
T h i s i s an important st e p to encourage Area Boards 
to o f f e r cheap t a r i f f s a t off-peak times and 
r e s t r i c t t h e i r demands a t the time of the n a t i o n a l 
peak. I t encourages, as w e l l , the development of 
n i g h t l o a d and improves the u t i l i z a t i o n of generating 
( 3 ^ ) Edwards, R. Planning f o r expansion p.35 and 
Heek, D.L. The bulk supply t a r i f f f o r 
e l e c t r i c i t y , Oxford Economic papers J u l y 19&3 
p.112. 
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p l a n t s . I t i s obvious t h a t the c o s t of producing 
power i s lower per u n i t at n i g h t than i t i s during 
the day because the higher the demand the higher 
the p r o p o r t i o n of high c o s t p l a n t t h a t i t i s running. 
I t has been argued t h a t the pr e s e n t bulk 
supply t a r i f f i s 'highly s u b t l e and complex 
document, and the f u l l meaning of a number of i t s 
p r o v i s i o n s cannot be grasped a t a c a s u a l r e a d i n g . ' ( 3 5 ) 
On the other hand, P r o f e s s o r Edwards s t a t e s 'the 
bulky supply t a r i f f i s one of the b i g g e s t f a c t o r s 
i n f l u e n c i n g the Area Boards' planning and t h e i r 
commercial p o l i c i e s and p r i c i n g p r a c t i c e s . I t 
a l l o c a t e s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r more than two-thirds 
of a l l the i n d u s t r y ' s c o s t s . I t does not have to be 
understood i n d e t a i l by m i l l i o n d of people.'(36) 
R e t a i l t a r i f f s . 
When examining the r e t a i l t a r i f f s , t h i s means 
d e a l i n g w i t h the demands of m i l l i o n s of consumers 
f o r e l e c t r i c i t y i n s t e a d of only twelve as i n the 
case of the bulk supply t a r i f f . I t may be u s e f u l 
to precede the examination of the r e t a i l t a r i f f 
s t r u c t u r e by d i s c u s s i n g b r i e f l y the s t r u c t u r e of 
(35) Meek, D.L. I b i d . p.107 and E a s t e r n E l e c t r i c i t y 
Board, Annual Report 1961 p.48. 
(36) Edwards, R. Op.Cit. p.35. 
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c o s t s which a f f e c t the framing of these t a r i f f s . 
I n i t i a l l y c o s t s were d i v i d e d by Hopkinson i n t o two 
c a t e g o r i e s , s t a n d i n g c o s t s and running c o s t s . The 
former are the c o s t s of c a p a c i t y i n s t a l l e d to 
supply e l e c t r i c i t y and the l a t t e r are the c o s t s of 
a c t u a l l y supplying e l e c t r i c i t y , ( 3 7 ) At p r e s e n t 
economists d i v i d e e l e c t r i c i t y supply c o s t s i n t o 
four c a t e g o r i e s according to t h e i r r e l a t i o n to 
output, 
( a ) C a p a c i t y c o s t s . These are the c o s t s depending 
on the a n t i c i p a t e d maximum demand i n K i l o w a t t s 
on the whole equipment or on p a r t of i t 
i n c l u d i n g i n t e r e s t , d e p r e c i a t i o n , maintenance 
of f i x e d equipment, and wages and s a l a r i e s i n 
power s t a t i o n o p e r a t i o n and g r i d c o n t r o l . 
(b) Energy c o s t s . These are chargeable according 
to the number of K i l o w a t t s generated. They 
c o n s i s t mainly of f u e l and labour c o s t s a t 
power s t a t i o n s and g e n e r a l a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
charges which v a r y w i t h the amount generated, 
( c ) Consumer c o s t s . These v a r y w i t h the number 
of consumers because the c o s t of d i s t r i b u t i o n 
(37) B y a t t , J.C.R. The g e n e s i s of the p r e s e n t 
p r i c i n g system i n e l e c t r i c i t y supply. Oxford 
economic papers V o l . 15 March 1963. 
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networks v a r i e s w i t h the number of consumers. 
They i n c l u d e the c o s t of meters, accounts, 
w i r i n g e t c . These c o s t s would be hi g h e r i n 
r u r a l a r e a s than i n urban a r e a s , 
(d) R e s i d u a l c o s t s . These are r e l a t i v e l y a s m a l l 
item which does not v a r y w i t h a n y t h i n g . They 
comprise some management expenses such as the 
chairman's s a l a r y . ( 3 8 ) 
The p r i n c i p l e s on which the d i f f e r e n t types 
of t a r i f f s should be based are to frame the t a r i f f s 
on economic background, ( i . e . to r e l a t e t a r i f f s 
to t h e i r c o s t s of supply) and p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a b i l i t y . 
To r e l a t e t a r i f f s to t r u e c o s t s i s an extremely 
d i f f i c u l t p r a c t i c e because of the complex s t r u c t u r e 
of c o s t s of supply. P r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a b i l i t y i s 
always shown i n the e f f o r t s of d i r e c t i n g the 
for m u l a t i o n of these t a r i f f s towards s e c u r i n g a 
hi g h load f a c t o r by lowering the p r i c e w i t h i n 
c e r t a i n l i m i t s f o r i n c r e a s e d consumption per KW 
to make the c o s t s of supply as low as p r a c t i c a b l e . 
The exception here i s the f l a t r a t e t a r i f f designed 
as a s i n g l e charge i n pro p o r t i o n to the number of 
(38) L i t t l e , E.A.D. The p r i c e of f u e l Oxford 1958 
p 5^-55 and Howthaker, H.S. E l e c t r i c i t y 
t a r i f f s : i n theory and p r A e t i c e Econ. J o u r n a l 
March 1951. 
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KWh s u p p l i e d . The r a t e , i n t h i s t a r i f f , i s f i x e d 
on the b a s i s of o v e r a l l c o s t i n c l u d i n g a reasonable 
r e t u r n on c a p i t a l i n v e s t e d . I t was only charged 
to domestic consumers f o r l i g h t i n g purposes. Thus 
the f l a t r a t e t a r i f f would not i n g e n e r a l conform 
w i t h the economics of e l e c t r i c i t y supply. I t does 
not r e f l e c t the i n c i d e n c e of d i f f e r e n t types of 
c o s t s , as shown above, i n a complex supply system. 
Therefore a two-part t a r i f f was developed. I t 
c o n s i s t s of a f i x e d charge oer annum and a low 
running charge. The f i x e d charge i s estimated i n 
advance and measured by the r a t e a b l e v a l u e , f l o o r 
a r e a or number of rooms of the consumer. The 
running charge depends on the a c t u a l consumption of 
the consumer. I t encourages the consumer to use 
e l e c t r i c i t y not only f o r l i g h t i n g purposes but a l s o 
f o r a wide v a r i e t y of other domestic s e r v i c e s . The 
p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n of the two-part t a r i f f i n the 
domestic f i e l d has shown an important d e f e c t . A 
f i x e d charge based a r b i t r a r i l y on the s i z e of a 
house or i t s r a t e a b l e v a l u e i s not d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d 
to the e l e c t r i c i t y demand of the consumer and the 
c a p i t a l c o s t s which are i n v o l v e d i n supplying him. 
Consumers i n a house of given s i z e or r a t e a b l e 6 v a l u e 
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may make v e r y d i f f e r e n t demands on the supply 
system a t times of peak and t h e r e f o r e impose 
d i f f e r e n t burdens on f i x e d c o s t s * 
An i n c r e a s e i n the f l e x i b i l i t y over the 
two-part t a r i f f i s provided by the block t a r i f f . 
The block t a r i f f i s designed i n a s e r i e s of b l o c k s 
u s u a l l y about fo u r i n number a t p r o g r e s s i v e l y lower 
p r i c e s . T h i s t a r i f f i s a t t r a c t i v e to consumers who 
do not want to be committed to p e r i o d i c a l payments 
without r e l a t i o n to t h e i r a c t u a l consumption. 
The main c r i t i c i s m of domestic t a r i f f s i s 
t h a t they do not c o n t r i b u t e to the system peak 
load. ( 3 9 ) The R i d l e y Report of 1952 s t a t e s 'that 
the domestic two-part t a r i f f and block r a t e v a r y 
the charge w i t h a measure of the s i z e of house and 
w i t h the amount of e l e c t r i c i t y used - but not w i t h 
the extent to which the i n d i v i d u a l u s e r c o n t r i b u t e s 
to system peak l o a d . ( 4 0 ) 
For l a r g e i n d u s t r i a l and commercial consumers 
the present p r i c i n g system adopts the maximum demand 
t a r i f f . T h i s t a r i f f c o n s i s t s of a standing charge 
(39) Worswick (Ed.) The B r i t i s h economy i n the 
nin e t e e n f i f t i e s 1962 p . 4 l 2 . 
(40) . Report of the committee on n a t i o n a l p o l i c y 
f o r the use of f u e l and power r e s o u r c e s . 
September 1952 Cmnd 8647 para 242 . 
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based on maximum demand and a running charge. The 
running charge i s changeable according to the f u e l 
c l a u s e which ensures t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p to energy-
c o s t s i s maintained when the c o s t of f u e l v a r i e s . 
The standing charge i n c l u d e s c a p a c i t y c o s t s and 
consumer c o s t s . The main d i f f i c u l t y i n applying 
t h i s t a r i f f i s the n e c e s s i t y f o r two meters, the 
maximum demand meter which i s expensive f o r s m a l l 
i n d u s t r i a l and commercial consumers, and the 
o r d i n a r y meter. Another d i f f i c u l t y i s the f a c t 
t h a t i n d u s t r i a l consumers who take n e a r l y a l l 
t h e i r c u r r e n t a t n i g h t ( o f f - p e a k ) which r e q u i r e s 
no a d d i t i o n a l c a p a c i t y , have a maximum demand 
which has no s i g n i f i c a n c e to c a p a c i t y c o s t s . 
To overcome the former d i f f i c u l t y maximum 
demand may be determined by a c t u a l measurement 
a t the time of s t a r t i n g s e r v i c e of i n s t a l l a t i o n . 
But the o b j e c t i o n i s t h a t i t would not be c o r r e c t to 
charge consumers on i n d i v i d u a l maximum demand on 
the b a s i s of system maximum demand i n o p e r a t i o n . 
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I t can be seen from the above examination of the 
t a r i f f s t r u c t u r e t h a t the main problem i s t h a t p r i c e s 
do not r e f l e c t the proper c o s t s of supply. The 
Herbert r e p o r t s t a t e s t h a t i n d u s t r i a l consumers 
complain t h a t they pay much more f o r t h e i r 
e l e c t r i c i t y than domestic consumers, who may have 
s i m i l a r i n d i v i d u a l load c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . ( 4 l ) Meek 
a l s o argued t h a t e l e c t r i c i t y i s not a homogenious 
commodity. 8 A.M. e l e c t r i c i t y i s d i f f e r e n t from 
9 a.m. e l e c t r i c i t y and summer e l e c t r i c i t y i s 
d i f f e r e n t from w i n t e r e l e c t r i c i t y . There are w i d e l y 
d i f f e r e n t c o s t s of production i n each of these c a s e s . 
He continues 'on the p r i n c i p l e t h a t p r i c e s should 
r e f l e c t c o s t s , t h e r e f o r e , i t f o l l o w s t h a t the r e t a i l 
t a r i f f s should l a y down d i f f e r e n t p r i c e s f o r the 
d i f f e r e n t commodities which a r e produced and t h a t 
the wholesale t a r i f f should be such to encourage 
and f a c i l i t a t e the formation of r e t a i l t a r i f f s of 
t h i s type. ( 4 2 ) But t h i s would r a i s e the problem of 
s t a n d a r d i s a t i o n of the bulk supply t a r i f f d i s c u s s e d 
above• 
(41) Para 338. 
(42) Meek, Op.Cit. p.118 - 1 1 9 . 
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Coats and t a r i f f i n Egyptian e l e c t r i c i t y supply. 
The Egyptian p r i c i n g system of e l e c t r i c i t y 
supply has d i f f e r e n t f e a t u r e s compared w i t h the 
B r i t i s h system. For example, f i r s t the p r i c e charged 
to d i f f e r e n t consumers i s r e l a t i v e l y v e r y high 
compared w i t h the B r i t i s h r a t e of charge. I t has 
been s t a t e d t h a t an average u n i t p r i c e i n C a i r o i s 
about t h r e e times t h a t i n B r i t a i n , t a k i n g i n t o 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h a t the C a i r o a r e a i s the cheapest 
a r e a of supply i n Egypt.(43) Secondly, d i s c r i m i n a t i o n 
between consumers i s obvious, each e l e c t r i c i t y supply 
a u t h o r i t y i n Egypt having a d i f f e r e n t t a r i f f s t r u c t u r e . 
T h i r d l y , d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between peak and off-peak, 
day and n i g h t and w i n t e r and summer i s b a s i c a l l y 
a p p l i e d i n the Egyptian t a r i f f s t r u c t u r e . Within 
t h e s e t h r e e p o i n t s the s t r u c t u r e of c o s t s and 
t a r i f f s i n Egyptian e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y w i l l 
be examined. 
From the e a r l y days of supplying e l e c t r i c i t y 
i n Egypt the c o s t s of g e n e r a t i o n and t r a n s m i s s i o n 
were v e r y high, consequently t a r i f f l e v e l s were v e r y 
h i g h too. The reason was t h a t e l e c t r i c i t y s u p p l i e r s 
(43) Fouad, F. E l e c t r i c i t y and s o c i a l i s a t i o n 
Arab Students J o u r n a l 6. 1. 65. i n A r a b i c . 
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were mainly p r i v a t e f o r e i g n c o n c e s s i o n a i r s • Domestic 
consumers, f o r example, i n C a i r o and A l e x a n d r i a , were 
charged about twenty m i l l i m e s per KWh ( m i l l i m e being 
£d.) I n d u s t r i a l , commercial, p u b l i c l i g h t i n g and 
other purposes were charged l e s s than t h i s r a t e under 
a s p e c i a l agreement w i t h these companies. Thus from 
the v e r y s t a r t E g y p t i a n t a r i f f s were v e r y c l o s e to 
t h e i r c o s t s of supply, because i n t e r f e r e n c e from 
the Government i n the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t was meaningless 
at these times. The s i t u a t i o n remained mainly 
unchanged t i l l the n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of the whole 
supply system i n 19-61. Even a f t e r t h a t i t appears 
from the t a r i f f s t r u c t u r e t h a t c o s t s a r e the 
predominant f a c t o r of the t a r i f f s t r u c t u r e . Before 
d e t a i l s are given about the s t r u c t u r e of t a r i f f s , 
the question should be asked, why are c o s t s so 
h i g h ? , and why a r e they d i f f e r e n t from one a r e a to 
a nother?. F i r s t , production c o s t s a r e high because 
of the l a c k of cheap l o c a l f u e l and the high c o s t s 
of imported o i l . Secondly, the high c o s t s of 
t r a n s p o r t i n g f u e l o i l by r a i l w a y s and road between 
d i f f e r e n t a r e a s of g e n e r a t i o n are expensive. There 
i s no s e t of p i p e l i n e s , f o r example, between Eg y p t i a n 
a r e a s . Hence the c o s t of t r a n s p o r t i s the main 
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f a c t o r f o r d i f f e r e n c e s i n c o s t s between a r e a s . 
T h i r d l y , g e n e r a t i n g p l a n t s a r e s m a l l i n s i z e , which 
i n c r e a s e s the c o s t of p r o d u c t i o n . F o u r t h l y , some 
of the p l a n t s use d i e s e l o i l which i s the most 
expensive co n v e n t i o n a l f u e l , and f i n a l l y , a common 
f a c t o r , t h a t i s the l a c k of g r i d system which 
r e q u i r e s t h a t every p l a n t must have a stand-by p l a n t 
f o r emergencies which makes a l a r g e p a r t of c a p i t a l 
u nproductive. These f a c t o r s a r e obvious from the 
t a b l e s given i n Appendix ( 8 ) which show the 
d i f f e r e n c e s between c o s t s of supply. An a d d i t i o n a l 
f a c t o r may be given, t h a t i s , u n t i l the p r e s e n t time 
h y d r o - e l e c t r i c power was not c o n t r i b u t i n g much i n 
the supply system. Before 1960, h y d r o - e l e c t r i c 
power was generated only from Nag-Hammedi Barrage 
and the Fayoum Province, both being s m a l l s t a t i o n s . 
The Aswan Dam hydro power p l a n t working a t f u l l 
c a p a c i t y i n 196l has given more e l e c t r i c c u r r e n t , 
but the u t i l i z a t i o n of t h i s source i s mainly confi n e d 
to the chemical i n d u s t r i e s s i t e d t h e r e , so i t i s not 
p r a c t i c a l l y h e l p i n g i n the r e d u c t i o n of supply c o s t s 
to the main l o a d c e n t r e s i n C a i r o and the N i l e D e l t a . 
Because of the reasons given above the 
p r i c i n g system i s much more complicated than the 
B r i t i s h ; one. To s i m p l i f y the t a r i f f p i c t u r e i n 
the whole system, examples w i l l be given of the 
d i f f e r e n t t a r i f f s t r u c t u r e a p p l i e d by the four main 
a u t h o r i t i e s i n Egypt. 
The C a i r o E l e c t r i c i t y and Gas A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 
T h i s A u t h o r i t y i s the l a r g e s t s u p p l i e r i n 
the country. The charging methods a p p l i e d may give 
a g e n e r a l i d e a about the whoBe system. The A u t h o r i t y 
s u p p l i e s the c i t y of C a i r o and some of i t s suburbs. 
D i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n p r i c e s i s found even between the 
same c l a s s of consumers. For example, f o r the 
purpose of l i g h t i n g , the normal s u b s c r i b e r s a r e 
charged a f l a t r a t e of about 24 m i l l i m e s , w h i l e 
f o r the same purpose, Government consumers, c h a r i t y 
s o c i e t i e s , p u b l i c h o s p i t a l s , r e l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s , 
orphanages and so on, and s p o r t i n g c l u b s a r e charged 
a t a r i f f of about 21.6 m i l l i m e s per KWh. For 
another purpose i n the domestic f i e l d , i . e . 
consumption from use of e l e c t r i c a l a p p l i a n c e s , 
consumers a r e c a t e g o r i s e d i n t o two. Ordinary 
consumers, who have a cho i c e of e i t h e r of two types 
of t a r i f f ( a ) a s i n g l e t a r i f f f o r the whole 
consumption a t any time, w i t h an average charge of 
14 m i l l i m e s per KWh or (b) a double t a r i f f v a r y i n g 
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between day and n i g h t . The day r a t e i s about 
10 m i l l i m e s per KWh and the n i g h t r a t e i s 24 
m i l l i m e s per KWh, The second category i s 
Governmental consumers, and the t a r i f f here i s 
block t a r i f f and i t a l s o d i f f e r s between day and 
n i g h t . T h i s l a t t e r t a r i f f could be i l l u s t r a t e d 
i n the f o l l o w i n g t a b l e . ( 2 & ) . 
TABLE 22.. 
BLOCK TARIFF FOR GOVERNMENT CONSUMERS. 
Day Rate Mms/KWh Night r a t e Mms/KWh 
F i r s t 200 h r s . 12 F i r s t 400 h r s . 21.6 
f o l l o w i n g o _ f o l l o w i n g ._ ^ 
1800 h r s . 600 h r s . 5 
r e s t of energy 7.7 r e s t of energy 8,7 
D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between w i n t e r and summer i s a l s o 
a p p l i e d i n the A u t h o r i t y ' s t a r i f f , (Appendix 7) f o r 
comparatively l a r g e consumers. To keep t a r i f f s as 
c l o s e as p o s s i b l e to c o s t s of supply the f u e l c l a u s e 
i s to be added to the p r i c e of each KWh, but t h i s 
v. 
i s o nly f o r l a r g e consumers who r e a c h the lower r a t e 
( e q u a l to or l e s s than 10 m i l l i m e s per KWh.). For 
consumers who appear to be the l a r g e s t i n the 
country are charged, s i m i l a r l y to the B r i t i s h system, 
a maximum demand t a r i f f (or b i g consumer t a r i f f ) . 
The maximum demand i s f i x e d as more than 500 KW. 
The charge i s based on a two-part t a r i f f , a f i x e d 
annual charge and a running charge based on a step 
t a r i f f system (Appendix 9 ) • A promotional t a r i f f 
i s c o n s t r u c t e d f o r n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t . For example, 
when the I r o n and S t e e l i n d u s t r y was f i r s t founded 
i n Egypt, a s p e c i a l agreed t a r i f f was i n t r o d u c e d to 
the S t e e l Company, a t a v e r y low r a t e . I t was 
designed as *up to and i n c l u d i n g 50,000,000 KWh, 
the r a t e was 5.9 m i l l i m e s and a l l energy exceeding 
t h i s sum a t a r a t e of 3»6 m i l l i m e s per KWh'. Also 
one of the b i g g e s t t o u r i s t companies was promoted 
a lower t a r i f f . ( A p p e n d i x 9 ) • 
Other a u t h o r i t i e s supplying e l e c t r i c power 
i n Egypt have, more or l e s s , the same t a r i f f 
s t r u c t u r e but w i t h d i f f e r e n t r a t e . T h i s i s mainly 
according to the d i f f e r e n c e i n supplying c o s t s as 
mentioned above. 
I n a country which has two s o u r c e s of supply 
( h y d r o - e l e c t r i c and thermal power), the d i f f e r e n c e 
i n c o s t s i s seen i n i t s p r i c i n g p o l i c y . For 
example, the h y d r o - e l e c t r - i c power department (which 
i s , mainly, i n charge of the Aswan h y d r o - e l e c t r i c 
power station) i s promoting a t a r i f f at a much 
lower rate than any other Authority. The main 
reason i s the lower costs of producing and 
transmitting e l e c t r i c i t y . 
To sum up, the reasons for various t a r i f f s 
applied i n d i f f e r e n t regions are: 
(1) Costs of generation and d i s t r i b u t i o n vary 
between d i f f e r e n t regions. 
(2) P r i c i n g policy of the d i f f e r e n t a u t h o r i t i e s 
may have an e f f e c t on the t a r i f f s tructure. 
Even a f t e r the n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of the whole 
industry the p r i c i n g p o l i c i e s may not be 
changed yet. 
(3) The aggregate s i z e of the undertakings are 
d i f f e r e n t , while, for example, the Cairo 
Administration serves about 3 m i l l i o n population, 
Alexandria Organisation serves only about 
1 m i l l i o n , so that the scope of inter-consumer 
subsidies d i f f e r correspondingly. F i n a l l y , 
the administrative costs, which imply an 
important factor i n the costs of production, 
also vary between one Authority and another. 
There i s now a tendency i n the Egyptian 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply industry, towards uniformity of 
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t a r i f f • The main reason seems to be one of s o c i a l 
equity, for instance r u r a l areas i n Egypt have been 
for a long time without e l e c t r i c i t y for economic 
reasons• 
We have seen from the B r i t i s h experience that 
uniformity of price i s strongly c r i t i c i s e d . But i t 
i s expected to be praised i n Egypt for s o c i a l equity. 
3^9 
Conclusion. 
The main problem of pr i c i n g p o l i c i e s i n the 
nati o n a l i s e d industries i s whether to consider them 
as purely commercial undertakings, or as s o c i a l 
s e r v i c e s of a non-commercial kind. The B r i t i s h 
n a t i o n a l i s e d industries are regulated by public 
Acts and regulations, and there i s nothing to 
prevent them from operating at a surplus* 
Methods of charging discussed i n the section 
are: the break-even p r i n c i p l e , the low pr i c e s r u l e , 
the average cost and marginal cost methods. 
The break-even p r i n c i p l e i s c r i t i c i s e d as i t 
does not consider the e l a s t i c i t y of demand. For 
example, e l e c t r i c i t y charges may be above or below 
the costs of supply i f demand i s i n e l a s t i c or 
e l a s t i c r e s p e c t i v e l y . I f e l e c t r i c i t y t a r i f f s are 
so high and the demand i s e l a s t i c , consumption w i l l 
be diverted to substitutes and consequently the 
industry could not cover i t s costs from revenue. 
The low pr i c e s r u l e tends to lead to 
misallocation of resources, i f pri c e s are below cos t s . 
The controversy about average versus marginal 
cost p r i c i n g i s too complicated to s e l e c t one or 
the other. However, with regard to the e l e c t r i c i t y 
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supply the opinion that at peak times pri c e s should 
correspond to t h e i r marginal costs while at off-peak 
periods t a r i f f s should be based on the average cost 
of supply, needs further study. 
Discrimination between c l a s s e s of consumers 
i s economically j u s t i f i e d as a method of p r i c i n g . 
E l e c t r i c i t y Authorities could discriminate between 
various c l a s s e s of consumers i n such a way that 
these Authorities could a t t a i n the highest possible 
surpluses. But discrimination between consumers i n 
the same c l a s s should be l e g a l l y forbidden and 
discrimination between c l a s s e s should be li m i t e d 
to state regulations. 
Uniform t a r i f f s are strongly c r i t i c i s e d on 
the grounds that they do not r e f l e c t the proper 
costs of supply. Nevertheless standardisation of 
e l e c t r i c i t y t a r i f f s has been c l e a r l y advocated by 
E l e c t r i c i t y Acts i n B r i t a i n and there i s a recent 
trend towards uniformity of e l e c t r i c i t y p r i c e s i n 
Egypt. Uniform t a r i f f s appear to be n a t i o n a l l y 
desirable because the consumers f e e l that they pay 
the price which i s s i m i l a r l y charged to the same 
c l a s s of consumers anywhere else i n the country. 
Generally i t i s not desirable that consumers of 
urban areas, where costs are r e l a t i v e l y low, should 
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subsidise consumers i n r u r a l areas, where costs 
of supply are high-. While t h i s i s possible i n 
B r i t a i n , uniform t a r i f f s i n Egypt may be n a t i o n a l l y 
desirable because urban consumers are u s u a l l y of 
much higher standard of l i v i n g than r u r a l consumers. 
Taking into account the above discussion, 
a correct p r i c e policy i n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply 
industry should lead to an appropriate t a r i f f 
s t ructure. I t was not the aim of t h i s study to 
investigate i n d e t a i l the t a r i f f structure applied 
i n B r i t a i n , and to examine how f a r any of the 
methods are adopted. But from the b r i e f outline 
of the t a r i f f structure i n B r i t a i n and Egypt i t 
could be noted that there are wide differences, 
between the two str u c t u r e s . In Egypt the average 
price l e v e l i s much higher than i n B r i t a i n . I n 
addition, while standardisation may be a dominant 
method i n B r i t a i n , within the same c l a s s of 
consumers, i n Egypt i t i s found that E l e c t r i c i t y 
Supply Departments charge widely d i f f e r e n t rates 
taking into account the difference of costs and 
some s o c i a l factors as i s seen from the low prices 
charged to Government consumers, c h a r i t i e s and so 
f o r t h , 
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Wages policy. 
I t has been mentioned i n the previous 
section that p r i c i n g p o l i c i e s i n the nationalised 
i n d u s t r i e s , including the e l e c t r i c i t y supply 
industry, are decided on both economic and s o c i a l 
considerations. Wages p o l i c i e s may follow the 
same p r i n c i p l e s . Economically, i f wages r i s e , for 
example i n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply industry, t a r i f f s 
charged tend to r i s e to meet the costs. But i f 
t a r i f f s do not r i s e due to Government po l i c y t h i s 
does not mean that wages w i l l be stable because 
wage claims through organised trade unions are 
frequently r a i s e d . One of the main reasons for 
these claims i s the r a i s i n g of the R e t a i l P r i c e s 
Index. Thus, i n contrast with private enterprise, 
where a wage dispute i s discussed between the 
employers and the trade unions of the industry 
concerned, i n public enterprises there are three 
bodies which influence the decision taken regarding 
wages claims, the Boards, the trade unions and 
the Government• 
Before examining the r o l e of these three 
p a r t i e s i n wages p o l i c i e s , two points should be made 
c l e a r , the f i r s t i s the key position of public 
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enterprises i n the national economy, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
the e l e c t r i c i t y supply industry, and the second 
i s the wages structures i n the public sector. In 
B r i t a i n the former factor i s obvious i n the 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply industry. There are several 
reasons for t h i s : the large number of employees 
and workers involved i n any wage dispute; i t i s a 
c a p i t a l intensive industry; c a p i t a l investment 
per employee averages about £1200 (taking the 
C.E.&.B. only the figure i s about £26000 or more.) 
I t i s a growing industry expanding at an unusually 
high r a t e . ' I t therefore has both the problems 
and opportunities that come with rapid growth.'(44) 
On the e l e c t r i c i t y supply industry depend most of 
the e s s e n t i a l services such as water supply, sewers 
and others. 
Because of t h i s key position of the 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply industry as well as of other 
na t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s i n B r i t a i n , the fear of the 
grave consequences of o f f i c i a l and u n o f f i c i a l 
s t r i k e s should be taken into account i n wage pol i c y . 
Examples of these s t r i k e s are known; for instance, 
(44) Edwards, R. Human values and human problems 
i n e l e c t r i c i t y supply, E l e c t r i c i t y Council 
1963 p . l . 
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u n o f f i c i a l stoppages, 'go-slow' campaigns i n the 
coal industry range between 1500 and 3400 each 
year.(45) Many of these s t r i k e s are due to disputes 
about wages. Also i n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply 
industry s t r i k e s have occurred i n several years 
since n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n . The danger of such s t r i k e s 
i n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply industry may be 
i l l u s t r a t e d by the u n o f f i c i a l walkouts which 
occurred at four London power stations i n December 
1949 and which caused considerable disturbance and 
load shedding. The Government was obliged to c a l l 
men from the armed forces to maintain e s s e n t i a l 
supplies.(46) Recently i n March 1964 a f t e r the 
E l e c t r i c i t y Boards and trade union members had 
f a i l e d to reach agreement on wage claims, the trade 
unions instructed t h e i r members to operate a ban on 
overtime which took e f f e c t from the 23rd of March 
to the 1st of A p r i l 1964.(47) Consequently the 
output of the Generating Board's generating plants 
was d r a s t i c a l l y reduced. As an eff e c t 'towards the 
(45) RobsonJf'3 Nationalised industry and public 
ownership p.330. 
(46) The Times 13 to 17 December 1949 quoted by 
Lewis Ben, B r i t i s h planning and n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n 
p.116. 
(47) E l e c t r i c i t y Council Annual Report and Accounts 
1963-64 p.57. 
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end of the period one t h i r d of the generating 
capacity which would normally have been i n operation 
was immobilized and i t was necessary to reduce 
demand by voltage reduction for long periods during 
the l a s t four days of the ban.(48) 
These are some of the considerations which 
should be taken into account i n wages p o l i c i e s i n 
the nationalised industries i n general and i n the 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply industry i n p a r t i c u l a r . 
I f i t appears from the above discussion that 
the key position of these i n d u s t r i e s i n the 
national economy has a p a r t i c u l a r e f f e c t on the 
structure of wages, the questions here are whether 
the wage l e v e l s i n the nat i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s are 
higher than those i n private enterprises, and 
whether the rate of increase i n wage pay i s higher 
than in other in d u s t r i e s ? Although i t may be 
argued that the nati o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s can a t t a i n 
a higher l e v e l of wages than private enterprises, 
because of the elimination of private p r o f i t , there 
i s evidence against t h i s . M, Shanks states that 
the r a i s i n g of wage rates i n the nat i o n a l i s e d 
i n d u s t r i e s has proved to be d i f f i c u l t to maintain. 
(48) Central E l e c t r i c i t y Generating Board. Annual 
Report and Accounts 1963-64 p.l4. 
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The Guilletaaud Report has proved the f a i l u r e of 
wage rates i n the Railways to keep pace with other 
i n d u s t r i e s ; there i s also the l o s s by the miners of 
t h e i r leadership i n the earning league,(49) M. Shanks 
shows i n a (man's r a t e s ) table that only the 
e l e c t r i c i t y and gas i n d u s t r i e s show a marked increase 
i n the l e v e l of wages greater than the average of 
industry as a whole. He concludes that, i n general, 
wage ra t e s i n public enterprise have r i s e n no more 
quickly than elsewhere. B.C. Roberts s«ys that i n 
many private enterprises wages and working conditions 
have improved as rapidly as, i n some cases more than, 
i n the nationalised industries.(50) 
Hence i t seems that, generally, the increase 
i n wage ra t e s in the n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s , 
r e s u l t s i n a wage-level not higher than i n private 
enterprises• 
The B r i t i s h e l e c t r i c i t y supply industry i s 
i n a better position regarding the wages level.. I t 
may be thought that t h i s higher wage l e v e l e x i s t s 
(49) Shanks, M. (Ed.) The lessons of public 
enterprise, London 1963 p.72. 
(50) Roberts, B.C. Trade unions and n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n , 
Progress Vol. 44 Winter 1954-55 by Hanson, (Ed.) 
Nationalisation: a book of readings 1963 p.374. 
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because the industry i s reasonably prosperous, 
more than other nationalised i n d u s t r i e s . But, i n 
f a c t , t h i s i s not an e f f e c t i v e reason, because wages 
i n public enterprises are not based on what the 
industry can afford to pay; wages and s a l a r i e s are 
fixed, among other f a c t o r s , according to the general 
trend i n the whole public sector. This i s c l e a r 
from the f a c t that the Railway workers have been 
granted wage increases though the industry does not 
pay i t s way. I t has been claimed that the reason 
for higher wage l e v e l s i n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply 
industry i s , i n f a c t , as mentioned above, due to 
the importance of the industry, upon which depend 
many v i t a l s e r v i c e s , and to the large c a p i t a l 
investment per worker involved. Professor R. 
Edwards states that because of these reasons, i t 
makes good commercial sense to ensure that wages and 
s a l a r i e s are at the l e v e l s which enable good quality 
employees to be rec r u i t e d and to be retained i n 
good heart.(51) 
Does t h i s mean that the supply of labour i s 
influenced by the l e v e l of wages i n the industry.? 
I n other words can the e l e c t r i c i t y supply industry, 
(51) Edwards, R. Human values and human problems i n 
the e l e c t r i c i t y supply industry, E l e c t r i c i t y 
Council p.8. 
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because of i t s higher wage l e v e l , a t t r a c t labour 
more than other industries.? On the one hand there 
are some w r i t e r s who think that the wage l e v e l s are 
not an e f f e c t i v e factor i n determining the quantity 
and qua l i t y of labour supply. T.P. H i l l s t ates 
that because of the imperfection of the labour 
market the supply of labour i s not affected by the 
l e v e l of wages, and there are many firms which seem 
to be able to maintain an adequate labour force 
despite the f a c t that the wage l e v e l of these firms 
i s very low compared with other firms, even i n the 
same l o c a l i t y . The argument here i s based on the 
f a c t that wages are not fixed i n response to the 
forces of supply and demand for labour. For 
example, the National Coal Board i n B r i t a i n has 
attract e d labour from a l l over the country by using 
mainly two methods other than higher wages. One i s 
the considerable p u b l i c i t y given to vacancies i n 
the industry, and by offerring comprehensive housing 
f a c i l i t i e s i n the area which requires an adequate 
labour force. I n addition, there may be some other 
s o c i a l factors which influence the workers' 
willingness to accept or remain i n any p a r t i c u l a r 
job. Some of these factors are the s e c u r i t y of 
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employment, pension prospects, s u i t a b i l i t y of 
surroundings and working conditions*(52) 
From the above argument i t may be c l e a r that 
the e l e c t r i c i t y supply industry cannot a t t r a c t a 
labour force adequate to i t s needs, merely on the 
grounds of having a wage l e v e l higher than other 
indu s t r i e s i n the public sector or i n the private 
sector* But other s o c i a l factors should be taken 
into account* 
Let us now examine the wages structure i n 
Egypt. 
In Egyptian public enterprises wage l e v e l s 
may d i f f e r widely. From the census published i n 
1962, some of these in d u s t r i e s are shown i n the 
following table (23). 
(52) H i l l , T.F. B u l l e t i n of University of Oxford 
I n s t i t u t e of S t a t i s t i c s 1962 p.185. 
360 
TABLE 23. 
AVERAGE OF MONEY WAGES PER WEEK, 
FIRST WEEK OF WORKING IN PIASTERS(53) 
T„/ I , , J u l y x January o Industry ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Mining (crude o i l 
and natural gas) 874 813 993 950 
T e x t i l e 212 217 219 210 
E l e c t r i c i t y and gas 405 388 394 384 
Transport 351 340 348 337 
x There i s no census on January 1957 & 1958 
o There i s no census on July 1959 & 1960 
Sources Annual. Census 1960-61 Department of 
S t a t i s t i c s Cairo 1962 ( i n Arabic) 
From figures shown i n t h i s table, two f a c t s 
can be seen. F i r s t , while i n the period Jul y 1957 -
January 1960 money wages were s l i g h t l y increasing 
i n mining, they were nearly stable i n t e x t i l e and 
s l i g h t l y decreasing i n e l e c t r i c i t y , gas and transport 
i n d u s t r i e s . Second, wages i n mining i n d u s t r i e s are 
much higher than i n o£her in d u s t r i e s shown i n the 
table. T e x t i l e i s at the lowest l e v e l . The wages 
l e v e l i n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply industry i s nearly 
(53) A P i a s t e r i s approximately 1/5 of a s h i l l i n g . 
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ha l f of mining. The wide difference i n wages l e v e l s 
between these i n d u s t r i e s may be p a r t l y due to the 
f a c t that the factor of supply and demand for labour 
was to some extent influencing these l e v e l s . Up to 
196l these i n d u s t r i e s were not f u l l y owned and 
controlled by the Government except e l e c t r i c i t y and 
gas which were p a r t l y n a t i o n a l i s e d . I t may be also 
noted that the reason for lower wage l e v e l i n the 
t e x t i l e industry i s due to a considerable proportion 
of female workers who usu a l l y have lower wages than 
male workers. However, a f t e r the mass n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n 
i n 1961, there was a move towards equal wages l e v e l s 
i n the whole public sector. The main reason may have 
been the elimination of a free labour market. Supply 
of labour i s now under government control. This i s , 
to a greater extent, true i n newly established public 
enterprises, while public enterprises which were 
p r i v a t e l y controlled, before n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n , may 
s t i l l enjoy a d i s t i n c t i v e l y higher l e v e l of wages. 
On the whole i t may be said that wage 
determination i s not, to some extent, influenced by 
the forces of supply and demand for labour. I n both 
countries, B r i t a i n and Egypt, other fac t o r s play a 
c r u c i a l r o l e i n wage determination. 
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Another p r i n c i p l e on which wages may be 
determined i s that of f a i r comparison. This method 
ind i c a t e s that s i m i l a r r a t e s of pay should be 
granted to workers who do s i m i l a r jobs. This may 
be applied within one industry - comprising several 
regions - where workers doing s i m i l a r jobs may have 
a uniform rate of pay. The same method may be 
applied! i n d i f f e r e n t i n d u s t r i e s where workers of 
s i m i l a r q u a l i t y may have s i m i l a r r a t e s of pay. 
One of the main factors influencing the tendency 
towards uniform wages, based on f a i r comparison, 
i s the c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of wage-negotiations. 
However, though f a i r comparison of r a t e s of pay 
appear to be j u s t , the method involves serious 
economic c r i t i c i s m . 
I n one industry uniform wages do not take 
into account the economic differences between areas. 
For example, an area with high unemployment can 
offer lower r a t e s of pay than an area with a 
shortage of labour. Also there are some areas of 
high cost of l i v i n g which should grant a r e l a t i v e l y 
higher l e v e l of wages. I t should be noted that t h i s 
i s already in existence i n the B r i t i s h n ationalised 
i n d u s t r i e s (e.g. London d i f f e r e n t i a l s . ) (54) 
(54) Shanks, M. The lessons of public enterprise p.86 
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As between d i f f e r e n t i n d u s t r i e s comparable 
•wages i n d i c a t e t h a t s i m i l a r r a t e s are p a i d to workers 
of s i m i l a r s k i l l i n other e n t e r p r i s e s . For example, 
equal r a t e s may be given to manual workers i n the 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y and the r a i l w a y s , or 
equal s a l a r i e s f o r employees i n p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s 
and c i v i l s e r v i c e s * 
The main c r i t i c i s m of comparable r a t e s of 
pay between d i f f e r e n t e n t e r p r i s e s i s t h a t the 
method does not take i n t o account the i n c r e a s e i n 
p r o d u c t i v i t y . For example, i t i s uneconomic to 
i n c r e a s e wages i n the B r i t i s h r a i l w a y s , w i t h i t s 
p e r s i s t e n t l o s s a t a s i m i l a r r a t e to t h a t i n the 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y . I f the l a t t e r i n d u s t r y 
r a i s e t h e i r wages p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y w i t h i n c r e a s i n g 
p r o d u c t i v i t y , and then the r a i l w a y s d u p l i c a t e t h i s 
wage i n c r e a s e on the grounds of c o m p a r a b i l i t y , the 
t o t a l wage i n c r e a s e s i n the economy w i l l be g r e a t e r 
than the t o t a l i n c r e a s e i n n a t i o n a l p r o d u c t i v i t y , 
thus l e a d i n g to i n f l a t i o n . T h i s i s , i n f a c t , the 
main d i f f i c u l t y i n drawing up a c o r r e c t wages 
p o l i c y i n p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s which i n d i c a t e t h a t 
wage i n c r e a s e s should correspond to p r o d u c t i v i t y 
i n c r e a s e i n the i n d u s t r y concerned. 
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Another c r i t i c i s m i s t h a t i f wages i n c r e a s e 
i n any i n d u s t r y f o r any reason, t h i s w i l l l e a d to 
a s i m i l a r i n c r e a s e i n another i n d u s t r y and so on, 
which w i l l r e s u l t i n a wage s p i r a l and again i n 
i n f l a t i o n . 
But i t could be argued t h a t i n p u b l i c 
e n t e r p r i s e s two p o i n t s a r e i n favour of c o m p a r a b i l i t y . 
One, a p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e which does not pay i t s 
way may be regarded as a p u b l i c s e r v i c e working i n 
the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t . I n t h i s case wages cannot 
be r e l a t e d to the e n t e r p r i s e ' s p r o f i t a b i l i t y , 
e s p e c i a l l y when i t i s known t h a t t h e r e i s a gr e a t 
d e a l of government i n t e r v e n t i o n i n p r i c e s . 
The other reason i s t h a t when workers* 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s cannot argue t h a t wages should be 
i n c r e a s e d so as to share a p r o f i t which i s 
n o n - e x i s t e n t they put t h e i r wage c l a i m s on the 
grounds of s o c i a l j u s t i c e . That i s , wages should 
c o i n c i d e w i t h the i n c r e a s e i n the R e t a i l P r i c e s 
Index. 
The q u e s t i o n which could be r a i s e d i n t h i s 
context i s , whether a p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e which i s 
re a s o n a b l y prosperous should i n c r e a s e wages.? 
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I n the B r i t i s h e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y , 
f o r example, i t has been argued t h a t s u r p l u s e s i n 
the i n d u s t r y a r e only a r e s u l t of a p o l i c y d e c i s i o n , 
as to how much the consumer should pay towards 
c a p i t a l development. T h i s means t h a t the i n c r e a s i n g 
c a p i t a l investment c o n t r i b u t e s to a g r e a t e r extent 
to the i n c r e a s e of s u r p l u s e s , and t h a t t h e r e i s , 
t h e r e f o r e , no reason f o r t a k i n g a more generous l i n e 
on wages and s a l a r i e s . S i m i l a r l y i f the i n d u s t r y 
works a t lower s u r p l u s e s , i t would be wrong to use 
t h i s f a c t o r i n the n e g o t i a t i o n of wages and s a l a r y 
s e t t l e m e n t s . ( 5 5 ) 
The l a t t e r p a r t of t h i s argument has a l r e a d y 
been d i s c u s s e d i n the case of a p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e 
which does not pay i t s way. I n the former case one 
c o u l d argue t h a t an i n c r e a s i n g s u r p l u s i n the 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y , even i f i t does not 
r e s u l t from the d i r e c t c o n t r i b u t i o n of workers, i s 
s t i l l a reason f o r i n c r e a s i n g wages, f o r the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of incomes. 
The whole argument about wages p o l i c y examined 
above may show t h a t supply and demand f o r labour, and 
(55) Edwards, R. Human v a l u e s and human problems 
i n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply, p.10. 
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c o m p a r a b i l i t y are not d e c i s i v e f a c t o r s i n wage 
s e t t l e m e n t s . I t i s obvious t h a t a c o r r e c t wages 
p o l i c y i n p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e i s t h a t which r e l a t e s 
wage i n c r e a s e to p r o d u c t i v i t y i n c r e a s e i n the 
i n d u s t r y concerned. T h i s i s , i n f a c t , the main 
t a r g e t of a n a t i o n a l incomes p o l i c y . 
I n B r i t a i n , f o r i n s t a n c e , the White Paper 
on Incomes and P r i c e s s t a t e s t h a t the main aim of 
the Government i s to r a i s e p r o d u c t i v i t y and 
e f f i c i e n c y so t h a t r e a l n a t i o n a l output can i n c r e a s e 
and to keep i n c r e a s e i n wages and s a l a r i e s i n l i n e 
w i t h i n c r e a s e i n p r o d u c t i v i t y . To achieve t h i s 
t a r g e t the Government l a y s down a norm i n d i c a t i n g 
the average r a t e of annual i n c r e a s e i n money 
incomes per head.(56) To apply t h i s norm the White 
Paper s t a t e s t h a t i t i s n e c e s s a r y to take i n t o 
account 'not only i n c r e a s e s i n wages and s a l a r y 
r a t e s but a l s o i n c r e a s e s i n c o s t s r e s u l t i n g from 
r e d u c t i o n i n working hours without l o s s of pay, 
from higher r a t e s of pay f o r overtime or s h i f t 
work and from improvements i n f r i n g e work.'(57) 
(56) P r i c e s and Incomes P o l i c y White Paper, 
Crand. 2639 A p r i l 1965 para 11. 
(57) I b i d , para 13. 
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The aims of an incomes p o l i c y a r e not easy 
to reagch, because of the d i f f i c u l t y i n g e t t i n g an 
agreement between the i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s i n wage 
n e g o t i a t i o n s . However, i n p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s i t 
may be l e s s d i f f i c u l t . The Government i s bound 
to have a more e f f e c t i v e r o l e i n p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e 
than other s e c t o r s i n the economy. The f a c t o r s 
which make the p u b l i c boards give e f f e c t to the 
n a t i o n a l wages p o l i c y a r e : 
(1) P u b l i c boards a r e accountable to P a r l i a m e n t 
and t h e i r p o l i c i e s are i n f l u e n c e d by 
m i n i s t e r i a l i n s t r u c t i o n s about the Government's 
wages p o l i c y . 
(2) P u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s are not f r e e i n t h e i r 
p r i c i n g p o l i c i e s as mentioned i n the p r e v i o u s 
s e c t i o n . The f a c t t h a t they cannot i n c r e a s e 
t h e i r p r i c e s of products and s e r v i c e s to meet 
wage c o s t s , the l a c k of s e l f - f i n a n c i n g and 
government l i m i t a t i o n s of borrowing powers 
make i t more d i f f i c u l t f o r the p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e 
to grant wage i n c r e a s e s without m i n i s t e r i a l 
approval. 
(3) Apart from the economic and s t a t u t o r y f a c t o r s 
mentioned, there i s always a c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p 
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between M i n i s t e r and p u b l i c Boards * Chairmen 
which means th a t the l a t t e r are i n f l u e n c e d by 
the M i n i s t e r ' s views.(58) Indeed these f a c t o r s 
could give e f f e c t i v e r e s u l t s to the n a t i o n a l 
wages p o l i c y , e s p e c i a l l y when i t i s taken i n t o 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h a t p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s employ 
a l a r g e number of workers and s a l a r i e d 
employees• 
The Government and the P u b l i c Board a r e not 
alone i n any wage d i s p u t e . They are f a c e d by a 
strong opponent, t h a t i s the Trade Union. At t h i s 
p o i n t i t i s n e c e s s a r y to gi v e more d e t a i l about the 
r o l e of the t h r e e p a r t i e s concerned. 
Trade Unions and Boards' r o l e s . 
I n B r i t a i n , i t may^be argued t h a t t r a d e 
unions i n the n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s a r e l i k e l y to 
hold a strong p o s i t i o n i n n e g o t i a t i n g wage demands, 
because of the l a r g e numbers of t h e i r members i n 
any of these i n d u s t r i e s and because of the t h r e a t 
of s t r i k e s . The p o s i t i o n of the trade unions has 
been d e s c r i b e d as one which may become dominant, 
op p r e s s i v e and sometimes menacing.(59) What may 
(58) D e t a i l s of the Government's r o l e w i l l be given 
l a t e r i n t h i s s e c t i o n . 
(59) Robson, W. Nationalise-d I n d u s t r y and P u b l i c 
ownership p.320. 
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strengthen t h i s p o s i t i o n i s the l i m i t e d freedom 
which the management of the n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s 
have. However, the r o l e of the management and the 
tr a d e unions has been expressed i n w i d e l y d i f f e r i n g 
p o i n t s of view. 
The Acton S o c i e t y T r u s t g i v e s two v i e w s . 
On the one hand, the T r u s t s t a t e s t h a t the 
management of the n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s have 
much l e s s freedom to n e g o t i a t e than the management 
of p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e s , because of m i n i s t e r i a l 
d i r e c t i o n s and the need to work w i t h i n the country's 
planning p o l i c y ; the managements' d e c i s i o n s may be 
taken as a precedent f o r other n a t i o n a l i s e d 
i n d u s t r i e s and because any mistakes w i l l be s u b j e c t 
to severe p u b l i c c r i t i c i s m . On the other hand, 
although trade unions know the weak p o s i t i o n of 
the management because of the reasons mentioned, 
they do not want to handicap the n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n 
experiment. 'So the trade unions a r e i n a p o s i t i o n 
to n e g o t i a t e on reasonable demands,(60) 
G. Baldwin remarks t h a t n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n 'has 
not provided the workers w i t h a horn of p l e n t y i n t o 
(60) The f u t u r e of the unions No.8., 1951 pp 15-16. 
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which they could dip t h e i r hands whenever they 
f e l t p r e s s e d by the s t r u g g l e f o r l i f e . ' The 
a t t i t u d e of management has g e n e r a l l y been f i r m . ( 6 l ) 
Other s c h o o l s of thought a t t a c k s t r o n g l y 
the powerful p o s i t i o n of tr a d e unions i n the 
n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s . Wages c l a i m s by the 
unions are annual without n e c e s s a r i l y s p e c i a l 
r e a s o n s , which r e s u l t i n s i m i l a r c l a i m s i n the 
whole country. D e c i s i o n s on wage cl a i m s a r e taken 
from the management s i d e by men who were for m e r l y 
t r a d e union l e a d e r s . They can h a r d l y change t h e i r 
h a b i t s and are not expected to d e a l w i t h wage 
n e g o t i a t i o n s i n a j u d i c i a l way. 
The s e r i o u s c r i t i c i s m a g a i n s t the t r a d e 
unions* r o l e i n wage-claims i s t h a t the tr a d e unions 
have a p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e which can be e x e r c i s e d 
i n persuading M i n i s t e r s or Members of Pa r l i a m e n t 
to i n f l u e n c e the Boards' a t t i t u d e . B.C. Roberts 
s t a t e s t h a t w i t h the p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e which the 
unions e x e r c i s e they can secure improvements over 
the heads of the Boards. He g i v e s the examples of 
the f i v e day week p o l i c y i n the c o a l i n d u s t r y and 
( 6 l ) Quoted by Robson, W. Op.Cit. p.321. 
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the two wage i n c r e a s e s i n the r a i l w a y s as having 
been decided i n t h i s way. He goes on to say t h a t 
the g r e a t danger of t h i s development, i f i t were 
to go v e r y f a r , i s t h a t wage p o l i c y i n p u b l i c l y 
owned i n d u s t r i e s would become a p o l i t i c a l matter.(62) 
The above examination of views on the r o l e 
of t r a d e unions and management shows two v e r y 
d i f f e r e n t a t t i t u d e s . One i s t h a t the t r a d e unions 
i n the n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s are not i n a strong 
p o s i t i o n and t h a t the Boards have always been f i r m 
i n wage d e c i s i o n s . The other i s t h a t the t r a d e 
unions have a g r e a t power over the Boards i n wage 
n e g o t i a t i o n s backed e i t h e r by t h e i r former o f f i c i a l s 
working i n the i n d u s t r y concerned or by the p o l i t i c a l 
i n f l u e n c e which the t r a d e unions have over the 
Boards to achieve t h e i r aims, or both. 
With r e g a r d to the ex-trade union l e a d e r s 
who work i n the i n d u s t r y concerned, i t has been 
confirmed by B.C. Roberts t h a t ex-trade union 
l e a d e r s 'are expected by the rank and f i l e to behave 
as though they were s t i l l employed by the union.'(63) 
(62) Roberts, B.C. Trade unions and n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n . 
Progress V o l . kk No. 2^5 Hanson, A.H.,(Ed.) 
N a t i o n a l i s a t i o n , a book of r e a d i n g s London 
1963 P.377. 
(63) I b i d . p.376. 
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As f a r as the p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e i s concerned i t 
may be argued t h a t not a l l the trade unions have 
p o l i t i c a l i d e o l o g i e s which may have an e f f e c t 
a g a i n s t the i n t e r e s t s of the industry,, and the 
p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e i s , i n f a c t , l i m i t e d by t h a t 
of the Government i n o f f i c e . I t has a l s o been 
claimed t h a t the danger of s e c t i o n a l i n t e r e s t may 
a r i s e from some trade unions w i t h strong p o l i t i c a l 
i d e o l o g i e s . Wage-pressures may r e s u l t when the 
p o l i t i c a l p a r t y to which the trade unions a r e 
a f f i l i a t e d comes to power. These consequences may 
work a g a i n s t the i n t e r e s t of the p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e 
concerned and t h a t of the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t . ( 6 4 ) 
T h i s , i n f a c t , i s not g e n e r a l l y t r u e . The 
Labour Government i n B r i t a i n a t the p r e s e n t time, 
(1964-65) has a d i f f e r e n t a t t i t u d e towards the 
t r a d e unions. The White Paper on Incomes and P r i c e s 
does not exclude the n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s from 
f o l l o w i n g the Government's norm. But even i f the 
t r a d e unions have t h i s p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e , they 
may not a c t i n the wage dis p u t e i n the n a t i o n a l i s e d 
i n d u s t r y i n qu e s t i o n to the extent which w i l l r e s u l t 
(64) United Nations O r g a n i s a t i o n and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
of p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s i n the i n d u s t r i a l f i e l d 
New York 1954 p.45. 
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i n a handicap to the n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n experiment, 
a s mentioned* And the t r a d e unions a r e a l s o 
i n t e r e s t e d i n the e f f i c i e n c y of the n a t i o n a l i s e d 
i n d u s t r i e s because i t i s u l t i m a t e l y i n the i n t e r e s t 
of t h e i r members* Assuming t h a t the p o l i t i c a l 
i n f l u e n c e of the trade unions i s l e s s e n e d by those 
f a c t o r s , and assuming t h a t the ex-trade union 
l e a d e r s s i t t i n g on the Boards w i l l behave i n the 
i n t e r e s t of the i n d u s t r y , - e v e n i f i t i s a g a i n s t 
the workers* d e s i r e , - wage n e g o t i a t i o n s w i l l be 
l e f t to be e x e r c i s e d by the normal procedure, i . e . 
between the t r a d e union and the management. Even 
w i t h the given assumptions, the trade unions are i n 
a powerful p o s i t i o n . T h i s i s because of the reasons 
g i v e n a t the beginning of t h i s s e c t i o n ; t h ere i s 
a l s o the f a c t t h a t i f the trade unions i n s i s t on 
t h e i r c l a i m s w i t h t h r e a t s of s t r i k e s , the 
n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r y would have to meet the wage-
c l a i m s , e i t h e r by more borrowing or by i n c r e a s i n g 
p r i c e s * 
The r o l e of the Government. 
When wage n e g o t i a t i o n s a r e conducted f r e e l y 
between trade unions and the management of the 
i n d u s t r y concerned a p o s s i b l e r e s u l t i s , i n view 
of the powerful p o s i t i o n of the trade unions and 
of the p o s s i b l e w i l l i n g n e s s of the management to 
accept wage c l a i m s i n order to hold t h e i r labour 
f o r c e , t h a t wage cl a i m s w i l l be met. I f t h i s 
happens a wage p r i c e s p i r a l w i l l e x i s t . I n c r e a s e 
i n wages w i l l l e a d to i n c r e a s e i n the l e v e l of 
aggregate consumption, without corresponding change 
i n output r e s u l t i n g i n an i n c r e a s e i n the l e v e l of 
p r i c e which i n t u r n w i l l r e s u l t i n f u r t h e r wage 
c l a i m s and so on. Because of t h i s i n f l a t i o n a r y -
t r e n d the Government may i n t e r v e n e to p r o t e c t the 
n a t i o n a l economy a g a i n s t i n f l a t i o n . 
As mentioned the Government i s l i k e l y to 
ac h i e v e an e f f e c t i v e incomes p o l i c y through p u b l i c 
e n t e r p r i s e s . P u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s employ a l a r g e 
number of wage and s a l a r y e a r n e r s . I f the 
Government s u c c e s s f u l l y i n t e r v e n e i n one n a t i o n a l i s 
i n d u s t r y to s e t t l e a wage d i s p u t e , t h i s may prevent 
other n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s from having wage 
i n c r e a s e s and p o s s i b l y a v o i d labour o r g a n i s a t i o n s 
i n p r i v a t e i n d u s t r i e s r a i s i n g more wage c l a i m s . 
What i s the B r i t i s h Government's r o l e i n p r a c t i c e ? 
I t has been claimed by s e v e r a l sources t h a t 
the B r i t i s h Government i s o f t e n r e l u c t a n t to 
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i n t e r v e n e i n wage d i s p u t e s * The O.E.E.C. Report 
i n 1961 reco r d e d only one o c c a s i o n , i n the f i f t i e s , 
when the Government succeeded i n moderating the r i s e 
i n wages by t a k i n g a f i r m l i n e i n i t s a t t i t u d e 
towards wage n e g o t i a t i o n s i n the p u b l i c s e c t o r . ( 6 5 ) 
But f a r more o f t e n , the Report s t a t e s , l a c k of 
c o n s i s t e n c y i n t h i s f i e l d has been an important 
f a c t o r i n the almost continuous wage-wage s p i r a l * ( 6 6 ) 
I t i s t r u e t h a t , u n l i k e i n some other 
c o u n t r i e s , the B r i t i s h Government's i n t e r v e n t i o n 
i n wage d i s p u t e s i n the n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s i s 
moderate. For example, i n the French n a t i o n a l i s e d 
i n d u s t r i e s wages and s a l a r i e s cannot be changed 
u n t i l the ap p r o p r i a t e M i n i s t e r has asked the adv i c e 
of an i n t e r m i n i s t e r i a l committee d e a l i n g w i t h wages 
and s a l a r i e s * ( 6 7 ) 
To i l l u s t r a t e the Government's a t t i t u d e i n 
wage n e g o t i a t i o n s , we may examine the extent of 
m i n i s t e r i a l i n t e r v e n t i o n i n wage d i s p u t e s i n the 
B r i t i s h e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y . 
(65) O.E.E.C. The r i s e i n p r i c e s 1961 p . 6 l . 
(66) I b i d . p . 6 l . 
(67) Lewis, E.G., P a r l i a m e n t a r y c o n t r o l of 
n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s i n France, American 
P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Review V o l . 51 1957 p.678. 
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I n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply Acts 19^7 and 
1957 i t i s not c l e a r l y s t a t e d t h a t the M i n i s t e r 
concerned w i l l i n t e r v e n e i n the c u r r e n t wage 
n e g o t i a t i o n s . I t i s only the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of 
the E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l or the Area Boards to 
s e t t l e by n e g o t i a t i o n s terms and c o n d i t i o n s of 
employment of persons employed i n the i n d u s t r y . 
But i t i s the M i n i s t e r ' s s t a t u t o r y power to give 
g e n e r a l d i r e c t i o n s . These d i r e c t i o n s may i n c l u d e 
t h a t there a r e to be no wage i n c r e a s e s given before 
a p a r t i c u l a r time; or the M i n i s t e r may gi v e as a 
general d i r e c t i o n t h a t no wage i n c r e a s e s a r e to be 
granted without h i s permission.(68) But a t the 
time of n e g o t i a t i o n s i t i s not l e g a l f o r the 
M i n i s t e r to i s s u e any d i r e c t i o n s of g e n e r a l 
c h a r a c t e r r e g a r d i n g wage d i s p u t e s . However, the 
Government has always p r e f e r r e d to proceed 'by 
l e a v i n g the Chairman of the i n d u s t r y i n no doubt 
what the Government p o l i c y i s . ' ( 6 9 ) 
To conclude, i t i s obvious t h a t d i r e c t 
i n t e r v e n t i o n by the Government i n c u r r e n t wage 
n e g o t i a t i o n s i s n e i t h e r l e g a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d nor 
(68) S e l e c t Committee on N a t i o n a l i s e d I n d u s t r i e s 
May 1963 Q 305. 
(69) I b i d . Q 306. 
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a c t u a l l y p r a c t i s e d . 
I f t h i s i s so, how can the Government give 
e f f e c t to i t s n a t i o n a l incomes p o l i c y i n the 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y . ? 
To some extent, t h i s could be achieved by 
a c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p between the M i n i s t e r concerned 
and the i n d u s t r y . For i n s t a n c e , according to the 
E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l : 
( i ) The M i n i s t e r has kept the E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l 
c l o s e l y informed of the Government's economic 
p o l i c y w i t h p a r t i c u l a r r e f e r e n c e to incomes. 
( i i ) The E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l have kept the M i n i s t e r 
c l o s e l y informed on the wages and s a l a r i e s 
s i t u a t i o n and on each o c c a s i o n of a c l a i m have 
given the M i n i s t e r an a p p r e c i a t i o n of the f a c t s . 
( i i i ) The E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l have given f u l l 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n to the Government's p o l i c y as 
conveyed to them by the M i n i s t e r and have 
taken t h a t p o l i c y i n t o account before d e c i s i o n s 
on wage matters have been taken. 
( i v ) The E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l , however, having 
considered Government p o l i c y have regarded 
themselves as having a duty to r e a c h t h e i r own 
d e c i s i o n s i n the l i g h t of the whole of t h e i r 
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d u t i e s and have taken f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r 
those d e c i s i o n s . 
I f t h i s procedure i s c a r r i e d out as e x p l a i n e d , 
two important p r i n c i p l e s could be a t t a i n e d ! f i r s t , 
the freedom of n e g o t i a t i o n between the Boards of the 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y and the t r a d e unions, 
second, and most important, the n a t i o n a l incomes 
p o l i c y drawn up by the Government could be followed 
by one of the important i n d u s t r i e s * . 
However, freedom of n e g o t i a t i o n seems to 
have been maintained i n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply 
i n d u s t r y . The pr e s e n t Chairman of the E l e c t r i c i t y 
C o u n c i l a f f i r m e d t h i s freedom by sa y i n g t h a t 
during the wage n e g o t i a t i o n s i n w i n t e r 1962-63, 
i t was from the beginning to the end i n the hands 
of the Chairman and h i s c o l l e a g u e s . ( 7 0 ) 
With r e g a r d to the second p o i n t , the 
ques t i o n i s , i s such a r e l a t i o n s h i p between the 
M i n i s t e r and the E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l a safeguard 
to apply the aims of the n a t i o n a l p o l i c y ? I n 
p r e c i s e terms, w i l l the r a t e of wage i n c r e a s e not 
be above the norm decided by the Government.? 
(70) Report of the S e l e c t Committee on N a t i o n a l i s e d 
i n d u s t r i e s May 1963 p.59. 
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I t has been suggested t h a t to adopt the 
Government's p o l i c y , i . e . to s e t a norm f o r the 
r a t e of i n c r e a s e i n wages and s a l a r i e s , i t may 
be of b e n e f i t to arrange f o r the Government to 
be r e p r e s e n t e d a t any important wage n e g o t i a t i o n , 
not simply as mediators but as an i n t e r e s t e d 
p a r t y to r e p r e s e n t the g e n e r a l p u b l i c ' s s t a k e 
i n the outcome,(71) I t has a l s o been suggeated 
t h a t i t i s not reasonable t h a t t h i s f u n c t i o n 
should be n e g l e c t e d or a t b e s t l e f t vaguely to 
the p r e s s and p u b l i c opinion, and i t has been 
emphasised t h a t the Government should p a r t i c i p a t e 
i n the n e g o t i a t i o n a t an e a r l y stage r a t h e r than 
i n t e r v e n e only a f t e r a t t i t u d e s have become 
c r y s t a l l i s e d as i n the case of a r b i t r a t i o n . 
P r e s s and trade unions would o b j e c t to J 
d i r e c t i n t e r v e n t i o n by the Government. They 
b e l i e v e t h a t wage n e g o t i a t i o n s should not be 
d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y h e l d w i t h p o l i t i c i a n s . 
There are a l s o doubts whether t h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
would have a p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t . I n other words, 
u n l e s s the Government were r e p r e s e n t e d by a 
(71) O.E.E..C. Report, the r i s e i n p r i c e s , 196l 
p.59. 
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s u f f i c i e n t number on the n e g o t i a t i n g t a b l e , they 
would be outvoted. A more s e r i o u s c r i t i c i s m of 
t h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s t h a t once the n e g o t i a t i o n 
f a i l s and s t r i k e s begin, these s t r i k e s w i l l be 
more s e r i o u s because they w i l l be p a r t l y a g a i n s t 
the Government. 
F i n a l l y , one could say t h a t i n s p i t e of 
these c r i t i c i s m s i n t e r v e n t i o n by the Government 
may become a n e c e s s i t y i n some p a r t i c u l a r d i s p u t e s , 
because the breakdown of n e g o t i a t i o n s and the 
suspension of important s e r v i c e s w i l l not be accepted 
by the p u b l i c . ( 7 2 ) 
(72) United Nations, Op.Cit. p.44. 
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C o n c l u s i o n , 
I t may be seen from the d i s c u s s i o n on 
wages p o l i c i e s t h a t some of the economic p r i n c i p l e s 
on wages p o l i c i e s can not e a s i l y be a p p l i e d i n 
p r a c t i c e . The r e l a t i o n between p r i c e and wages 
i s l e s s e n e d by the f a c t t h a t wage c l a i m s a r e p a r t l y 
based on reasons other than r i s e i n the i n d u s t r y ' s 
charges, as expressed i n the r i s e i n the R e t a i l 
P r i c e s Index. Supply and demand f a c t o r s a r e a l s o 
not d e c i s i v e i n wage l e v e l s . Other f a c t o r s are 
taken i n t o account. T h i s has been c l e a r l y shown 
i n the evidence on the wage l e v e l s i n B r i t i s h and 
Eg y p t i a n p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s . C o m p a r a b i l i t y of 
wages i n d i f f e r e n t i n d u s t r i e s may be wrong according 
to economic p r i n c i p l e s but i t i s a l r e a d y i n 
e x i s t e n c e , because of the c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of wage-
n e g o t i a t i o n s • 
However, the main aim i n wage p o l i c i e s i n 
p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s and i n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply 
i n d u s t r y i s to r e l a t e wage i n c r e a s e s t o p r o d u c t i v i t y * 
But t h i s i s again i n f l u e n c e d by the f a c t t h a t t r a d e 
unions i n B r i t a i n have a powerful p o s i t i o n and 
because the Government's r o l e i s moderate which 
r e s u l t i n a higher r a t e of wage i n c r e a s e s than 
p r o d u c t i v i t y r a t e . 
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I t may not be p o s s i b l e to convince the 
tr a d e unions of the economic p o l i c y of the 
Government, but i t may be p o s s i b l e to i n c r e a s e 
the r o l e of the Government on the n e g o t i a t i n g 
t a b l e . Though the l a t t e r suggestion may have 
some drawbacks i t i s c e r t a i n l y u s e f u l i n c e r t a i n 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 
The procedure of wage s e t t l e m e n t s i n 
Egyp t i a n p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e i s not a v a i l a b l e . 
CHAPTER V» 
CENTRALISATION AND DECENTRALISATION• 
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C e n t r a l i s a t i o n and d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n . 
I n the preceding c h a p t e r s of t h i s study, 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n has been made i n t o some of the 
managerial and economic problems of p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s 
w i t h p a r t i c u l a r r e f e r e n c e to the e l e c t r i c i t y supply 
i n d u s t r y . I n t h i s chapter one of the managerial 
problems w i l l be examined, t h a t i s , the c e n t r a l i s a t i o n 
and d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of e n t e r p r i s e s ' a c t i v i t i e s . The 
purpose of t h i s chapter i s to f i n d out where the 
a u t h o r i t y of making d e c i s i o n s i s l o c a t e d . 
To s t a r t w i t h i t would be u s e f u l to d e f i n e the 
two terms, c e n t r a l i s a t i o n and d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n . 
Economists and a d m i n i s t r a t o r s d i f f e r , sometimes widely, 
i n d e f i n i n g these two terms. A r i s i n g from the 
d i f f i c u l t y of d e f i n i t i o n , there i s the que s t i o n of 
the a p p r o p r i a t e forms of d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n . For 
example, i f d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n means t h a t lower l e v e l s 
of management have complete autonomy i n d e a l i n g w i t h 
a l l economic problems, t h i s would r e s u l t i n a form of 
complete d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n . But i f d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n 
means the d e l e g a t i o n of only s p e c i f i c f u n c t i o n s , t h i s 
would r e s u l t i n a l i m i t e d form of d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n . 
I n t h i s case what f u n c t i o n s could p o s s i b l y be 
c e n t r a l i s e d or d e c e n t r a l i s e d ? 
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There are g e n e r a l advantages and disadvantages 
of a c e n t r a l i s e d or d e c e n t r a l i s e d p r o c e s s . I t i s 
u n l i k e l y t h a t one would f i n d a w r i t e r who i s i n favour 
of c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of a l l f u n c t i o n s of the o r g a n i s a t i o n 
and s i m i l a r l y w i t h d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n . What happens i s 
t h a t there are l i n e s of communication between the 
c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t i e s and lower l e v e l s of management i n 
order to compromise between the advantages and 
disadvantages of e i t h e r of these two systems. 
D e f i n i t i o n s of c e n t r a l i s a t i o n and d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n . 
C e n t r a l i s a t i o n and d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n a r e 
phenomena of l a r g e - s c a l e o r g a n i s a t i o n s of a l l k i n d s 
i n c l u d i n g n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s . G e n e r a l l y speaking 
c e n t r a l i s a t i o n means the c o n c e n t r a t i o n of power a t 
the top l e v e l of management, i . e . a l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
i s r e t a i n e d a t a c e n t r a l p o i n t . D e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n means 
the l o c a t i o n of a u t h o r i t y a t any of the i n d u s t r y ' s 
d i v i s i o n s . D e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n could a l s o mean the 
l o c a t i o n of p l a n t s . Some economists d e s c r i b e the 
l o c a t i o n of power s t a t i o n s of the e l e c t r i c i t y supply 
i n d u s t r y , a ccording to the economic and t e c h n i c a l 
f a c t o r s as d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n . ( 1 ) 
( l ) N i s e i , H. C e n t r a l i s a t i o n au d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n dans 
1 ' I n d u s t r i e de e l e c t r i c i t e . Egypt Conteraporaine 
V o l . XXXIV pp 4 l - 55. 
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Regarding the meaning of c e n t r a l i s a t i o n , some 
w r i t e r s t h i n k t h a t c e n t r a l i s a t i o n i s not uniformly-
c o i n c i d e n t w i t h the r e t e n t i o n of power a t the top. 
Two reasons are given, f i r s t , a management t h a t i n s i s t s 
on maximisting the area over which i t takes d e c i s i o n s 
becomes over-occupied w i t h t r i v i a l i t i e s . Secondly, 
d e l e g a t i o n v e r y o f t e n i m p l i e s t h a t persons d e l e g a t i n g 
are doing so to f r e e themselves f o r more important 
d e c i s i o n s • ( 2) 
For these two reasons one could p o s s i b l y 
conclude t h a t i n p r a c t i c e t h e r e i s no ab s o l u t e l o c a t i o n 
of a l l powers a t the h i g h e s t l e v e l of o r g a n i s a t i o n . I n 
other words, the d e f i n i t i o n which i m p l i e s t h a t 
c e n t r a l i s a t i o n i s the r e t e n t i o n of a l l powers a t the 
ce n t r e i s not p r e c i s e . 
R e s e a r c h i n g on the problem i n the B r i t i s h 
n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s , the Acton S o c i e t y T r u s t g i v e s 
a more p r e c i s e d e f i n i t i o n . They say t h a t n a t i o n a l i s e d 
i n d u s t r i e s are organised u s u a l l y i n t o two or more 
ty p e s . I f an Area Board i s l a r g e l y independent, the 
i n d u s t r y i s d e c e n t r a l i s e d a t the upper l e v e l and 
c e n t r a l i s e d a t lower l e v e l s . And i f an Area Board 
(2) Spencer, P., & Sofer, C. O r g a n i s a t i o n a l changes 
and i t s management, The j o u r n a l of management 
s t u d i e s March 196^ No. 1. V o l . 1. p.31. 
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i s l a r g e l y dependent on the C e n t r a l A u t h o r i t y , the 
i n d u s t r y i s c e n t r a l i s e d a t the upper l e v e l and 
d e c e n t r a l i s e d a t lower l e v e l s . On the other hand, a 
c e r t a i n f u n c t i o n can be s a i d t o be c e n t r a l i s e d when 
t h i s f u n c t i o n i s decided a t the ce n t r e or d e c e n t r a l i s e d 
when i t l a r g e l y i s decided a t a r e g i o n a l l e v e l . The 
Acton S o c i e t y T r u s t conclude t h e i r d e f i n i t i o n by 
s t a t i n g ' i t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t we can say of any 
i n d u s t r y t h a t i t i s wholly c e n t r a l i s e d or w h o l l y 
d e c e n t r a l i s e d . We can only say t h a t c e n t r a l i s a t i o n 
e x i s t s i n c e r t a i n r e s p e c t s and w i t h r e g a r d to c e r t a i n 
l e v e l s . ( 3 ) Under the T r u s t ' s d e f i n i t i o n , c e n t r a l i s a t i o n 
c o u l d be de f i n e d according to the l e v e l i n the 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e h i e r a r c h y a t which operating d e c i s i o n s 
a r e made and according to the l o c a t i o n of the a c t u a l 
f u n c t i o n . 
One could argue t h a t the T r u s t ' s d e f i n i t i o n 
i s complicated and confusing, because we have to f i n d 
out a t what l e v e l a d e c i s i o n i s taken and then i t 
could be e i t h e r c e n t r a l i s e d or d e c e n t r a l i s e d owing to 
the o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of the i n d u s t r y . Also we 
have to f i n d whether such a d e c i s i o n taken on a 
p a r t i c u l a r l e v e l i s f i n a l or not f i n a l . 
(3) The Acton S o c i e t y T r u s t r The extent of 
c e n t r a l i s a t i o n P a r t i . No. 6 1951 p.l« 
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To avoid c o n f u s i o n i n the d e f i n i t i o n of the 
terms one could p o s s i b l y s t a t e t h a t the term 
c e n t r a l i s a t i o n should be used more s p e c i f i c a l l y , i . e . 
the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n i s 
r e t a i n e d a t the c e n t r e . The c a r r y i n g out of delegated 
a u t h o r i t y f o r t h i s p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n by e x e c u t i v e 
management a t other l e v e l s but r e t u r n i n g to the 
c e n t r e f o r f i n a l d e c i s i o n would not a l t e r the meaning. 
There i s a l s o no c l e a r d e f i n i t i o n about 
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n . There are g e n e r a l l y two meanings 
f o r the term d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n . As mentioned above, 
t h e r e i s geographical d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n and 
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of a u t h o r i t y . What i s of p a r t i c u l a r 
importance to n o t i c e i s t h a t the term sometimes i s 
used i n e x a c t l y the same sense as d e l e g a t i o n , which i s 
not a b s o l u t e l y c o r r e c t . For example, a United 
Nations p u b l i c a t i o n s t a t e s 'delegation and 
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n r e f e r e s s e n t i a l l y to the same 
method - a fanning out of d e c i s i o n making so t h a t 
employees a t v a r i o u s l e v e l s i n the o r g a n i s a t i o n can 
take a c t i o n s without a w a i t i n g approval by t h e i r 
s u p e r v i s o r s • ( k ) 
(.k) United Nations. O r g a n i s a t i o n and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
of p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s i n i n d u s t r y . New York 
195^ para 27 p.52. 
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I n f a c t t h e r e i s a d i f f e r e n c e i n meaning 
between d e l e g a t i o n and d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n . D e l e g a t i o n 
i s the a c t of p a s s i n g to the lower l e v e l s i n 
management the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ( e i t h e r w h o l l y or 
p a r t l y ) of c a r r y i n g out a c e r t a i n f u n c t i o n . T h i s , 
of course, happens i n any i n d u s t r y , l a r g e or s m a l l * 
There must be a delegated a u t h o r i t y down the l i n e 
of management l e v e l s . But d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n i s the 
p a t t e r n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s t h a t r e s u l t s from 
d e l e g a t i o n . The same d e f i n i t i o n a p p l i e s when 
a u t h o r i t y i s delegated to g e o g r a p h i c a l l y s e p a r a t e d 
u n i t s i n the i n d u s t r y , t h a t i s , a u t h o r i t y i s 
delegated to e x e c u t i v e s i n charge of u n i t s a t 
d i f f e r e n t l o c a t i o n . T h i s l a t t e r case i s only found 
i n v e r y l a r g e - s c a l e e n t e r p r i s e s . 
Forms of d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n . 
D e legation of a u t h o r i t y may occur i n 
d i f f e r e n t ways which w i l l r e s u l t i n d i f f e r e n t types 
or forms of d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n i n the B r i t i s h 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y . 
F i r s t method. 
Delegation of f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r Area 
Boards' Chairmen i n t h e i r Areas. The Chairmen c a r r y 
out a l l elements of management w i t h i n t h e i r 
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r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . They a l s o s p e c i f y the way of 
c o - o r d i n a t i o n w i t h the c e n t r e (the E l e c t r i c i t y 
C o u n c i l ) • 
The f u l l e s t b e n e f i t from such a method could 
be achieved; 
( i ) i f d e l e g a t i o n i s r e a l i s t i c both i n d e f i n i t i o n 
and a c t i o n . T h i s means t h a t the E l e c t r i c i t y 
C o u n c i l must be s a t i s f i e d to pass these 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s on, and the E l e c t r i c i t y 
C o u n c i l must encourage the Area Boards' 
Chairmen to c a r r y out these r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . 
( i i ) i f Area Boards' Chairmen are able ( p e r s o n a l l y ) 
to make f i n a l d e c i s i o n s on the problem i n 
q u e s t i o n without f e e l i n g t h a t they have to 
t u r n to the c e n t r e . 
( i i i ) i f the f u n c t i o n s delegated can be p r a c t i c a l l y 
d e a l t w i t h w i t h i n the Area. For example, there 
a r e some t e c h n i c a l problems which i t may not 
be p o s s i b l e to delegate, such as t e c h n i c a l 
r e s e a r c h concerning the development of the 
whole i n d u s t r y . 
( i v ) I n a d d i t i o n to the above c o n d i t i o n s , a method 
of f u l l d e l e g a t i o n of a u t h o r i t y can work w e l l 
i f the f u n c t i o n c a r r i e d out by v a r i o u s Area 
Boards are d i f f e r e n t . 
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However, i t may be obvious t h a t the method 
of f u l l d e l e g a t i o n i s u n l i k e l y to apply i n the 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y , because as i t w i l l be 
d i s c u s s e d l a t e r , t h ere a r e some f u n c t i o n s which 
should be decided a t the c e n t r e . 
Second method. 
A form of d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n , may be, where 
Area Boards' Chairmen have l e s s autonomy. 
R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s delegated are much more l i m i t e d 
and s p e c i f i e d than i n the f i r s t method. I n a 
l i m i t e d d e l e g a t i o n programmes and major problems are 
decided a t the c e n t r e (the E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l ) , but 
the a p p l i c a t i o n of the pla n s and the d e t a i l e d day-
to-day ope r a t i o n a t t a c h e d to these p l a n s a r e w i t h i n 
the d i s c r e t i o n of the Area Boards* Chairmen. 
By t h i s method, i t i s meant to b e n e f i t from 
widespread views of good i d e a s worked out a t the 
c e n t r e by e x p e r t s . The method must a l s o be a p p l i e d 
i f i t appears t h a t Area Boards' personnel l a c k the 
a b i l i t y to i n i t i a t e and implement programmes. 
T h i r d method. 
D e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n may take the form of 
d e l e g a t i n g a p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n to a c e r t a i n 
i n d i v i d u a l . T h i s depends g r e a t l y on the s p e c i a l 
391 
r e p u t a t i o n of t h i s i n d i v i d u a l i n d e a l i n g w i t h the 
problem. I n f a c t , t h i s method may be the l e a s t 
f r equent to be a p p l i e d because of the personnel 
problems i t i n v o l v e s , which may a f f e c t morale. 
Although i t may be p o s s i b l e to adopt any of 
the three methods i n l a r g e - s c a l e e n t e r p r i s e - and 
i n the E l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y i n B r i t a i n - the 
second method seems to be more f l e x i b l e i n p r a c t i c e . 
The main reason f o r the choice of the second method 
i s t h a t the d e l e g a t i o n of some f u n c t i o n s are 
u nnecessary. 
The above d i s c u s s i o n about the d e f i n i t i o n s 
of the two terms, c e n t r a l i s a t i o n and d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n , 
and the assumption of d i f f e r e n t methods of d e l e g a t i o n 
may be f u r t h e r c l a r i f i e d by an i l l u s t r a t i o n of the 
f u n c t i o n s which have to be c e n t r a l i s e d or 
d e c e n t r a l i s e d . Before examining some of the f u n c t i o n s 
i n p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s and p a r t i c u l a r l y the 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y , the argument about 
c e n t r a l i s a t i o n or d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n w i l l be examined. 
C e n t r a l i s a t i o n or d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n i n p u b l i c 
e n t e r p r i s e s . 
The decision-making of a p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n 
to be a u t h o r i s e d a t the c e n t r e or a t Area l e v e l or a t 
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another lower l e v e l may be i n f l u e n c e d by s e v e r a l 
f a c t o r s . Some of these f a c t o r s a r e : the c h a r a c t e r 
of the o r g a n i s a t i o n ( p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n or 
Government Department), the ge o g r a p h i c a l d i s t r i b u t i o n 
of the Areas of the i n d u s t r y concerned, the na t u r e of 
the work and i t s t e c h n i c a l complexity, the 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s and a b i l i t y of management a t lower 
l e v e l s and the o u t s i d e c o n d i t i o n s which have an 
i n f l u e n c e over the i n d u s t r y ' s p o l i c y such as 
Government i n t e r f e r e n c e i n favour of some f u n c t i o n s 
to be c e n t r a l i s e d . I n a d d i t i o n the s t a t u t o r y 
s t r u c t u r e of the i n d u s t r y i s important, f o r example, 
the gas i n d u s t r y i n B r i t a i n i s c h a r a c t e r i s e d by more 
d e c e n t r a l i s e d f u n c t i o n s than the B r i t i s h e l e c t r i c i t y 
supply i n d u s t r y . T h i s i s emphasised by the l e g a l 
p r o v i s i o n s f o r the two i n d u s t r i e s l a i d down by the 
v a r i o u s A c t s . I n c i d e n t l y , the t e c h n i c a l 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the gas i n d u s t r y i s another f a c t o r 
by which t h e r e a r e more d e c e n t r a l i s e d f u n c t i o n s i n 
the gas i n d u s t r y than other p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s i n 
B r i t a i n . I t has been s a i d t h a t e l e c t r i c i t y can be 
switched from one r e g i o n to another and th e r e i s a 
n a t i o n a l g r i d . Gas on the other hand i s l e s s e a s i l y 
t r a n s m i t t e d over d i s t a n c e s . Consequently the r e g i o n a l 
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or Area Gas Boards are more independent of the Gas 
C o u n c i l than the r e g i o n a l E l e c t r i c i t y Boards of the 
C e n t r a l A u t h o r i t y . ( 5 ) 
I t i s not only t h a t one p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n 
has more c e n t r a l i s e d or d e c e n t r a l i s e d f u n c t i o n s than 
another, but a l s o p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s as a whole d i f f e r 
from p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e s i n t h i s r e s p e c t . I t may be 
argued t h a t the p r o p o r t i o n of c e n t r a l i s e d f u n c t i o n s 
i n p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s i s g r e a t e r than i n p r i v a t e 
e n t e r p r i s e s . There are two reasons f o r t h i s , 
( l ) I t has been argued t h a t n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n means 
c e n t r a l i s a t i o n . A. Palmer says • i t i s p u b l i c 
ownership under s t a t e d i r e c t i o n . The p o l i t i c a l 
powers and boundaries of the n a t i o n embrace the 
i n d u s t r y n a t i o n a l i s e d , n e i t h e r more nor l e s s . 
Vtfhatever the t h e o r e t i c a l autonomy of the p u b l i c 
c o r p o r a t i o n , t h i s i s undoubtedly the view the 
B r i t i s h p u b l i c take of t h e i r contemporary 
n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s . And u n l e s s a method 
can be d e v i s e d f o r appointing the boards from 
below or i n t e r n a l l y i t i s not easy ( t o s a y ) the 
p u b l i c are wrong.(6) 
(5) Florence, P.S. I n d u s t r y and the S t a t e London 
1957 p.136. 
(6) Palmer, Arthur. The background to o r g a n i s a t i o n 
Shanks, H. (Ed.) The l e s s o n s of p u b l i c 
e n t e r p r i s e 1963 p.l86. 
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(2 ) I t may a l s o be argued t h a t n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n 
could not be compatible w i t h a g r e a t e r degree 
of d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n . Because n a t i o n a l i s e d 
i n d u s t r i e s are l a r g e i n s t r u c t u r e and t h i s 
l a r g e n e s s has r e s u l t e d i n c e n t r a l i s a t i o n , and, 
as mentioned i n s e v e r a l p l a c e s i n t h i s study, 
because the degree of c o n s i d e r i n g the p u b l i c 
i n t e r e s t i n p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s i s much g r e a t e r 
than i n p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e s , i t i s a n e c e s s i t y 
t h a t p u b l i c i n t e r e s t should normally be d i c t a t e d 
by l e g a l and economic reasons i n the broadest 
sense, r a t h e r than by narrow s e c t i o n a l and 
technoUbgical view p o i n t s . T h i s p o s i t i o n would 
l e a d to a h i g h l y c e n t r a l i s e d decision-making of 
f u n c t i o n s a f f e c t i n g the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . I t i s 
tr u e t h a t a c o n s i d e r a b l e number of f u n c t i o n s i n 
p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s have to be c e n t r a l i s e d , but 
there are a l s o some f u n c t i o n s which a r e b e t t e r 
d e c e n t r a l i s e d . 
More d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of f u n c t i o n s has been 
suggested i n the n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s i n B r i t a i n , 
as a remedy to o v e r - c e n t r a l i s a t i o n . H. Clegg, and 
T.F. Ch e s t e r s t a t e t h a t the c r i t i c s of the 
n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s have proposed the d e v o l u t i o n 
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of power from a higher a u t h o r i t y to a lower a u t h o r i t y . 
They go on to say t h a t most of the schemes put forward 
suggest the t r a n s f e r of power from n a t i o n a l to 
r e g i o n a l l e v e l or i n the extreme c a s e , the a b o l i t i o n 
of the c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y . ( 7 ) 
I n the B r i t i s h Gas i n d u s t r y , where the Gas 
C o u n c i l have much l e s s power than any c e n t r a l 
a u t h o r i t y , most of the f u n c t i o n s a r e d e c e n t r a l i s e d . 
The Headquarters i n the Area Boards have the power 
to purchase c o a l , to export the bulk of coke and 
products, the purchase of coke over gas and they 
have the power to decide on matters which a f f e c t more 
than one of the sub-areas i n c l u d i n g the f i x i n g of 
gas t a r i f f s and n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h organised l a b o u r . 
On the other hand, the B r i t i s h Coal i n d u s t r y was 
always d e s c r i b e d as having more c e n t r a l i s e d f u n c t i o n s . 
The f u n c t i o n s which have to be c e n t r a l i s e d 
or d e c e n t r a l i s e d are not easy to d e f i n e . Many 
economists are i n favour of d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n but a t 
the same time they i n s i s t t h a t some f u n c t i o n s have to 
be decided a t the c e n t r e . C h a r l e s R e i d suggests t h a t 
the a u t h o r i t y of the N a t i o n a l Coal Board should be 
c o n f i n e d to d i r e c t the n a t i o n a l p o l i c y of the i n d u s t r y . 
(7) Clegg, H., & C h e s t e r , T.F. The f u t u r e of 
n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n , Oxford 1953 p.158. 
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The N a t i o n a l Board would d e a l w i t h the o v e r a l l 
f i n a n c e and e x e r c i s e the s u p e r v i s i o n of the 
c o r p o r a t i o n s . However, he suggests more 
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n , i n the sense t h a t the i n d u s t r y 
should be d i v i d e d i n t o approximately t w e n t y - s i x 
c o r p o r a t i o n s . Each should be managed by a Board 
c o n s i s t i n g of a managing d i r e c t o r who would have 
f u l l e x t e n s i v e power and other n e c e s s a r y e x e c u t i v e 
as s a l e s managers. (8) A p r a c t i c a l d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n 
could be achieved not only by d i v i d i n g the i n d u s t r y 
i n t o more u n i t s under se p a r a t e management, but a l s o 
by the d e l e g a t i o n of f u n c t i o n s from higher to lower 
l e v e l s . 
A White Paper - Cmnd. 1248 December 1960 -
on t r a n s p o r t , proposed, as i t s a i d , a s t r u c t u r e based 
on more d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n . The White Paper e x p l a i n s 
t h a t the T r a n s p o r t commission should be a b o l i s h e d 
and t h a t s t a t u t o r y bodies are to be e s t a b l i s h e d f o r 
each of the major undertakings ( r a i l w a y s , London 
T r a n s p o r t , docks and I n l a n d Waterways.) But the 
a b o l i t i o n of the Commission may not completely s o l v e 
the problem, because each of the undertakings i s 
(8) The Times March 24th 1948, Hanson (Ed.) 
N a t i o n a l i s a t i o n , A book of r e a d i n g s London 1963 
p.121. 
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l a r g e - s c a l e , e s p e c i a l l y the r a i l w a y s . 
I f c e n t r a l i s a t i o n or d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n should 
only be r e l a t e d to f u n c t i o n s , and i f a c e r t a i n 
f u n c t i o n i s decided a t the r a i l w a y s c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y , 
the f u n c t i o n i s s t i l l c e n t r a l i s e d . To t r a n s f e r a 
f u n c t i o n from the o l d Transport Commission to the 
Railways C e n t r a l A u t h o r i t y i s not a d e l e g a t i o n . 
However, i t could be s t a t e d i n b r i e f t h a t 
f u n c t i o n s should be c e n t r a l i s e d or a t l e a s t approved 
by the c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y , i f they are of major 
importance to the whole i n d u s t r y . On the other hand 
i t i s p r e f e r a b l e to delegate f u n c t i o n s which i n the 
end would r e s u l t i n s m a l l s a v i n g should they be 
c e n t r a l i s e d ^ I n other words such matters as the 
problems of n a t i o n a l s t a f f wage n e g o t i a t i o n s , o v e r a l l 
c o n t r o l over f i n a n c e and investment p o l i c i e s , 
t r a i n i n g and r e s e a r c h and the r e - o r g a n i s a t i o n of the 
f u t u r e s i z e and shape of the i n d u s t r y ' s system would 
be r e s i d e d a t the c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y . On the other 
hand implementation of the g e n e r a l p l a n s i n a r e a s 
or r e g i o n s , the day-to-day a f f a i r s of the a r e a or 
r e g i o n , probably short-term planning, and problems 
which do not i n v o l v e l a r g e c a p i t a l expenses should 
be d e c e n t r a l i s e d . 
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I n the E g y p t i a n p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s t h e r e i s 
no c l e a r d i r e c t i o n as to whether there i s a tendency 
towards c e n t r a l i s a t i o n or d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of the 
P u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s ' a c t i v i t i e s . 
Two examples may be given f o r t h i s vagueness. 
I n the cotton export and purchasing p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e 
a tendency towards c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of the e n t e r p r i s e ' s 
a c t i v i t i e s , i t has been claimed, was due to the 
f a i l u r e of the o l d l a r g e number of companies, which 
f u l f i l l e d the same f u n c t i o n s , to c a r r y out a uniform 
p o l i c y r e q u i r e d i n a developing country. The cotton 
export and purchasing e n t e r p r i s e s were p r e v i o u s l y 
spread over a l a r g e number of m i l l s . As a r e s u l t of 
the d i f f e r e n t p o l i c i e s of these f i r m s , these two 
f u n c t i o n s have been t r a n s f e r r e d to the newly 
e s t a b l i s h e d E g y p t i a n Cotton Commission. 
I n other s e c t i o n s of the Egyptian p u b l i c 
s e c t o r i t had been claimed t h a t d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n was 
more a p p r o p r i a t e . For example, there was the 
Egyp t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r C o n t r a c t i n g and 
C o n s t r u c t i o n . The main f u n c t i o n of t h i s o r g a n i s a t i o n 
was c o n t r a c t i n g and c o n s t r u c t i o n of e n t e r p r i s e s i n 
the whole p u b l i c s e c t o r , e s t a b l i s h i n g of housing and 
p u b l i c b u i l d i n g s and of other p u b l i c u t i l i t i e s . Thes 
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f u n c t i o n s were afterwards d i v i d e d between t h r e e 
p u b l i c o r g a n i s a t i o n s . They were the E g y p t i a n 
P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r e n t e r p r i s e s ; f o r 'housing 
and p u b l i c b u i l d i n g s ' and f o r ' u t i l i t i e s * . I t has 
been s t a t e d t h a t such d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of a c t i v i t i e s 
would f o s t e r the development and execution of 
v a r i o u s housing and p u b l i c u t i l i t y p r o j e c t s . 
The l a t t e r example does not show t h a t t h e r e 
i s a tendency towards d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of f u n c t i o n s 
i n some Egy p t i a n p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s because the 
d i v i s i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y between th r e e 
a u t h o r i t i e s i s not a d e l e g a t i o n of f u n c t i o n s . 
Moreover i t appears from r e c e n t s o c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n 
and the f a c t t h a t Egypt i s a c e n t r a l l y planned 
country, t h a t a d i r e c t i o n towards more c e n t r a l i s a t i o n 
i n p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s i s f a v o u r a b l e . Most of the 
major f u n c t i o n s of the whole p u b l i c s e c t o r a r e 
r e s i d e d w i t h i n the d i s c r e t i o n of the Supreme C o u n c i l 
of P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n s . ( 9 ) 
C e n t r a l i s a t i o n and d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of f u n c t i o n s . 
A f t e r s t a t i n g the argument about c e n t r a l i s a t i o n 
or d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of f u n c t i o n s , i t i s n e c e s s a r y to 
a n a l y s e some of the f u n c t i o n s to see how f a r they are 
(9) See p.2k i n Chapter I . 
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c e n t r a l i s e d or d e c e n t r a l i s e d . I n examining these 
f u n c t i o n s i t should be noted t h a t f u n c t i o n s such 
as planning, i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s and r e s e a r c h f o r 
development may be s i m i l a r i n a l l p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s , 
but the e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y has d i f f e r e n t 
f u n c t i o n s which have to be examined s e p a r a t e l y . 
These are g e n e r a t i o n and main t r a n s m i s s i o n and 
d i s t r i b u t i p n of e l e c t r i c i t y . 
P l a n n i n g . 
Long and medium-term planning f o r the whole 
i n d u s t r y has to be c e n t r a l i s e d . The c e n t r a l 
a u t h o r i t y i n the i n d u s t r y must p l a n f o r the 
a l l o c a t i o n of the bulk of funds f o r investment and 
manpower f o r use i n the main branches of the whole 
i n d u s t r y . The c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y must decide upon 
the p a r t s of these sums to be spent f o r the 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t of new p l a n t s and f o r l a r g e - s c a l e 
e x t e n s i o n of e x i s t i n g p l a n t s . The c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y 
should decide which branches of the i n d u s t r y most 
r e q u i r e t e c h n i c a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . These matters 
need to be decided a t the c e n t r e and the d e c i s i o n s 
passed on to lower management l e v e l s . I n other 
words, i n c a r r y i n g out a l a r g e s c a l e programme of 
re-equipment and development, such programmes 
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cannot be c a r r i e d out without some i n t e r f e r e n c e 
w i t h the f r e e judgement and i n i t i a t i v e of l o c a l 
management• 
L e t us see now why only the c e n t r a l 
a u t h o r i t y can be e n t r u s t e d w i t h long and medium-
term p l a n n i n g . 
There are s e v e r a l r easons* 
F i r s t , i t may be only the c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y which 
can have the data about the a v a i l a b l e r e s o u r c e s of 
f i n a n c e , manpower and other f a c t o r s a f f e c t i n g the 
i n d u s t r y as a whole. Thus they are a b l e to formulate 
the most e f f i c i e n t method f o r the u t i l i s a t i o n of 
these r e s o u r c e s f o r the whole i n d u s t r y . 
Secondly, i t i s v i t a l t h a t a long and medium-term 
p o l i c y programme f o r s e v e r a l y e a r s ahead be decided 
w i t h the b e s t e x p e r t s and s p e c i a l i s t s . N a t u r a l l y 
these q u a l i f i c a t i o n s are found a t the c e n t r e . ( 1 0 ) 
T h i r d l y , where s t a n d a r d i s a t i o n of s e r v i c e s i s a 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e i t i s 
e s s e n t i a l t h a t long-term planning should be decided 
a t one l e v e l . - For example, i t i s t r u e t h a t the 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y i n B r i t a i n i s d i v i d e d 
i n t o a r e a s , but they a l l produce the same s e r v i c e 
to consumers. Also the design and c o n s t r u c t i o n of 
(10) C i t r i n e , Lord. Problems of n a t i o n a l i s e d 
i n d u s t r i e s Pufelic A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Vol.29 p.321. 
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a l l types of power s t a t i o n s , each f o l l o w the same 
l i n e s wherever they are e s t a b l i s h e d . 
F o u r t h . C e n t r a l i s e d planning i s e s s e n t i a l when new 
i n d u s t r i e s or t r a d e s are brought i n t o the p u b l i c 
s e c t o r . J . Baker s t a t e s t h a t s t a n d a r d i s a t i o n of 
network i n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y r e q u i r e s 
the c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of p l a n n i n g . The problem f a c e d 
the B r i t i s h e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y j u s t a f t e r 
n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n . For example, i n London where 
g r e a t e r m u l t i p l i c i t y of independent undertakings and 
n o n -standardised network r e q u i r e d c e n t r a l i s e d 
p lanning i n the London Area.(11) 
However, i n p r a c t i c e , long and medium-term 
planning i n most of the B r i t i s h n a t i o n a l i s e d 
i n d u s t r i e s i s p l a c e d i n the c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t i e s . 
I t i s mentioned i n Chapter I I I t h a t the E l e c t r i c i t y 
C o u n c i l i n B r i t a i n s e t s the whole planning f o r the 
i n d u s t r y f o r sux y e a r s ahead, and s i m i l a r l y the 
E g y p t i a n T e c h n i c a l Bureau of the U.A.R. E l e c t r i c i t y 
Commission plans f o r the whole i n d u s t r y . 
I f long and medium-term planning should be 
c e n t r a l i s e d , short-term planning could be c a r r i e d 
( l l ) Baker, R.J.S. The management of c a p i t a l 
p r o j e c t s . London 1962 p.111. 
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out s u c c e s s f u l l y a t lower l e v e l s , as they do not 
need the same t e c h n i c a l and f i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e s as 
long or medium-term plan n i n g . Moreover some of these 
s m a l l - s c a l e programmes r e q u i r e p a r t i c u l a r l o c a l 
knowledge which i s e s s e n t i a l f o r such programmes to 
be d e c e n t r a l i s e d , e.g. i n the B r i t i s h e l e c t r i c i t y 
supply i n d u s t r y , a t sub-area l e v e l , some planning 
work ta k e s p l a c e . J . Baker remarks t h a t planning 
a t sub-area l e v e l seems to have been a r e s u l t of 
the p r o g r e s s i v e b u i l d i n g up of planning s t a f f and 
t h e i r a c q u i s i t i o n of e x p e r i e n c e . ( 1 2 ) But i s must 
be noted t h a t short-term planning can only be 
delegated when the c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y i s a s s u r e d 
t h a t experiences r e q u i r e d are a v a i l a b l e a t the 
lower l e v e l . 
F i n a n c i a l c o n t r o l . 
F i n a n c i a l c o n t r o l , t h a t i s , the estimated 
c a p i t a l expenditure, the r a i s i n g of t h i s c a p i t a l 
and the s a n c t i o n of methods of expenditure are some 
f u n c t i o n s which are f a i r l y c e n t r a l i s e d i n p u b l i c 
e n t e r p r i s e s . Most of the c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t i e s i n 
B r i t i s h p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s are r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the 
r a i s i n g of c a p i t a l r e q u i r e d by the whole i n d u s t r y 
(12) I b i d . p.14. 
f o r development. For example, the Tr a n s p o r t Act of 
1953 has r e s e r v e d g e n e r a l f i n a n c i a l c o n t r o l and 
g e n e r a l c o n t r o l of charges to be made f o r the 
r a i l w a y s s e r v i c e s i n the province of the o l d 
T r a n s p o r t Commission.(13) 
I n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y the 
19^7 Act empowered the C e n t r a l E l e c t r i c i t y A u t h o r i t y 
to r a i s e c a p i t a l f o r the whole i n d u s t r y by i s s u i n g 
e l e c t r i c i t y stock or Exchequer Advances or by 
borrowing t e m p o r a r i l y from the banks. A f t e r 1956 
when borrowing powers had been r e s t r i c t e d to 
Exchequer Advances, they were only a u t h o r i s e d by 
the C.E.A. According to the Herbert Report of the 
r e - o r g a n i s a t i o n of the e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y , 
i n 1956, which recommended more d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of 
borrowing money to Area Boards, the 1957 Act 
departed r a d i c a l l y from the 19^7 Act. I t made a l l 
Area Boards f i n a n c i a l l y autonomous. Each Board has 
to ensure t h a t revenues are not l e s s than s u f f i c i e n t 
to meet outgoings of the Board p r o p e r l y chargeable 
to revenue account t a k i n g one year w i t h another. 
But, though Area Boards have been granted by the 
Act of 1957 a degree of f i n a n c i a l autonomy, the 
(13) Grunfeld, C. The T r a n s p o r t Act 1953 
P o l i t i c a l Q u a r t e r l y 1954 p.45. 
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f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n f o r the whole i n d u s t r y i s 
decided by the E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l . The E l e c t r i c i t y 
C o u n c i l i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the c o - o r d i n a t i o n and 
o v e r a l l f o r m u l a t i o n of f i n a n c i a l p o l i c y and i s 
r e s p o n s i b l e t o the M i n i s t e r of Power.(lA) The 
important r e a s o n f o r c e n t r a l i s e d f i n a n c i a l c o n t r o l 
i s t h a t p u b l i c funds a r e used and Par l i a m e n t i s 
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r c o n t r o l l i n g these funds. Thus i t 
does seem n e c e s s a r y t h a t the Government should 
give only the C e n t r a l A u t h o r i t y the f i n a n c i a l 
c o n t r o l over the whole i n d u s t r y . 
But i f i t i s appropriate t h a t g e n e r a l 
f i n a n c i a l c o n t r o l should be c e n t r a l i s e d , t h e r e are 
a l s o some f i n a n c i a l problems which need to be 
d e c e n t r a l i s e d due to urgent l o c a l problems. There 
should be the r i g h t to spend money on l o c a l 
p r o j e c t s . H. Clegg remarks t h a t c e n t r a l i s a t i o n 
of f i n a n c i a l c o n t r o l i s inadequate f o r l o c a l 
problems. He says ' i n a c e n t r a l i s e d system the 
o p e r a t i o n a l manager's a u t h o r i t y i n expenditure may 
be a b s u r d l y l i m i t e d . A l l the s u p e r i o r s t a g e s r i g h t l y 
want in f o r m a t i o n before they make d e c i s i o n s and the 
( l 4 ) Panniket, H.O. The f i n a n c e of e l e c t r i c i t y 
supply, Summer school E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l 
1963 p.62. 
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o p e r a t i o n a l manager may be r e q u i r e d to f i l l i n an 
absurd number of r e t u r n s . Higher managers r i g h t l y 
w ish to l e t t h e i r subordinates know of t h e i r 
d e c i s i o n s and give them some id e a of the 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s which swayed them. A l a r g e number 
of documents then s t a r t s to flow down. No stage 
i n the h i e r a r c h y may be by-passed. A matter t h a t 
r e q u i r e s the d e c i s i o n of the h i g h e s t a u t h o r i t y w i l l 
have a long d i s t a n c e to t r a v e l both ways before i t 
r e t u r n s to the po i n t of departure and t h i s means 
d e l a y . ' ( 1 5 ) 
I n p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s managed by Government 
departments, f i n a n c i a l c o n t r o l i s c e n t r a l i s e d i n 
the T r e a s u r y Headquarters. T h i s o v e r - c e n t r a l i s a t i o n 
of f i n a n c e could be c r i t i c i s e d as being incompatible 
w i t h commercial a c t i v i t i e s of the e n t e r p r i s e 
concerned. There should be f i n a n c i a l autonomy to 
ensure the e f f i c i e n c y of the e n t e r p r i s e . 
I n Egypt a p a r t from p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s run 
d i r e c t l y by the M i n i s t r y concerned, whose f i n a n c e s 
are n a t u r a l l y c o n t r o l l e d by the T r e a s u r y , there are 
those whose accounts are s u b j e c t e d to the c o n t r o l 
of the S t a t e Audit Department.Cl6) Also c e n t r a l i s e d 
(15) Clegg, H. I n d u s t r i a l Democracy and 
N a t i o n a l i s a t i o n Oxford 1951 pp. 56 - 57» 
(16) P r e s i d e n t i a l Decree No. 258 1959 p.57. 
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f i n a n c i a l c o n t r o l i s e x e r c i s e d by the Economic 
Development O r g a n i s a t i o n of Egypt over i t s group of 
a f f i l i a t e d p u b l i c o r g a n i s a t i o n s . T h i s was c l e a r l y 
s t a t e d by law No. 20 of 1957. By t h i s law the E.D.O. 
was to be e n t r u s t e d w i t h the s u p e r v i s i o n and c o n t r o l 
of the a f f i l i a t e d p u b l i c o r g a n i s a t i o n s designated by 
P r e s i d e n t i a l Decree, i f i t i s deemed n e c e s s a r y t h a t 
the c a p i t a l of these o r g a n i s a t i o n s should be d i r e c t e d 
i n conformity w i t h the g e n e r a l economic p o l i c y l a i d 
down by the E.D.O. 
Economists who are i n favour of t h i s 
c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of f i n a n c i a l c o n t r o l t h i n k ' i t i s the 
most e f f e c t i v e way to achieve s o c i a l j u s t i c e , 
i n c r e a s i n g production, r a i s i n g the standard of 
l i v i n g and u t i l i s i n g c a p i t a l f o r the promotion of 
n a t i o n a l economy.'(17) 
I t i s tr u e t h a t c e n t r a l i s e d f i n a n c i a l c o n t r o l 
may be e s s e n t i a l i n newly e s t a b l i s h e d p u b l i c 
e n t e r p r i s e s , which were for m e r l y operated by a 
number of companies w i t h d i f f e r e n t f i n a n c i a l 
p o l i c i e s . But a f t e r a p e r i o d of time, l i m i t e d 
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n , as mentioned above, i s n e c e s s a r y 
f o r e n t e r p r i s e s ' e f f i c i e n c y . 
(17) Egyptian Economic and p o l i t i c a l r e v i e w 
J u l y 196l p.24. 
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However, i t may be concluded, as n o t i c e d 
from examples given above t h a t c e n t r a l i s e d f i n a n c i a l 
c o n t r o l i s e s s e n t i a l when t a k i n g the whole i n d u s t r y 
as a u n i t . On the other hand l i m i t e d d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n 
of t h i s f u n c t i o n i s important where l o c a l c o n d i t i o n s 
a r e to be taken i n t o account f o r speedy d e c i s i o n s . 
L a s t l y , an a d d i t i o n a l p o i n t could be 
mentioned i n t h i s r e s p e c t . That i s , f i n a n c i a l 
c o n t r o l may be more d i f f i c u l t to d e c e n t r a l i s e i n 
p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s than i n p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e s . I n 
p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e s i t i s p o s s i b l e to c a r r y 
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of f i n a n c i a l c o n t r o l to the p o i n t 
of d i v i d i n g a company i n t o a number of p r o f i t -
making u n i t s and a s s i g n i n g to each u n i t a manager 
who has the a u t h o r i t y to make whatever d e c i s i o n s a r e 
n e c e s s a r y to r e t u r n an adequate p r o f i t . I n p u b l i c 
e n t e r p r i s e s , i t i s t r u e f o r example, t h a t the 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y i s d i v i d e d i n t o a r e a s 
as i n B r i t a i n or i n t o Departments as i n Egypt. But 
each of these a r e a s or departments should not be 
c o n s i d e r e d as an independent profit-making u n i t , 
because a l l a r e a s or departments have a c l o s e l i n k 
w i t h the n a t i o n a l p o l i c y which i s wholly c o n t r o l l e d 
and d i r e c t e d by the c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y . 
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I n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . 
There i s much evidence t h a t wages and 
c o n d i t i o n s of employment, i n B r i t i s h p u b l i c 
e n t e r p r i s e s , a r e mostly decided a t the c e n t r e . T h i s 
i s , f i r s t of a l l , obvious from the terms of the 
v a r i o u s n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n A c t s . I n the gas i n d u s t r y , 
however, though the Gas C o u n c i l conducts n e g o t i a t i o n 
terms and c o n d i t i o n s of employment on a n a t i o n a l 
b a s i s , the Gas Area Boards have the r i g h t to 
n e g o t i a t e w i t h labour o r g a n i s a t i o n s i n wage d i s p u t e s . 
But, on the whole, c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t i e s c a r r y the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of t h i s f u n c t i o n . The E l e c t r i c i t y 
C o u n c i l i s an example. 
There a r e s e v e r a l reasons why i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s are u s u a l l y considered by the c e n t r a l 
a u t h o r i t y . 
F i r s t , and most important f a c t o r , i s t h a t t r a d e 
unions are organised n a t i o n a l l y . So i n order to 
pr e s e n t a u n i t e d f r o n t to union s t r e n g t h i t i s 
important t h a t the separate components of 
e n t e r p r i s e s have to a c t as one body. T h i s w i l l 
g i v e a powerful i n f l u e n c e over n e g o t i a t i o n 
p r o c e s s e s . Hynes s t a t e s t h a t the i n d u s t r y must 
have a c e n t r a l body to n e g o t i a t e w i t h the trade 
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unions' r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and there i s no a l t e r n a t i v e 
to c o n s i d e r i n g labour r e l a t i o n s i n the c e n t r e . The 
drawbacks of t h i s c e n t r a l i s a t i o n , as Hynes t h i n k s , 
a r e t h a t the worker may f e e l t h a t t r a d e unions are 
not p r a c t i c a l l y h e l p f u l , and he may f e e l as remote 
from t h a t union as from the c e n t r a l b o a r d . ( l 8 ) 
Second, as mentioned i n the pre v i o u s chapter (19) 
demands f o r wage u n i f o r m i t y f o r s i m i l a r grades of 
workers and employees i n d i f f e r e n t a r e a s of the 
i n d u s t r y make c e n t r a l i s e d n e g o t i a t i o n s n e c e s s a r y . 
I n other words c e n t r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s on wages and 
other c o n d i t i o n s of employment may give employees 
and workers a sense of being t r e a t e d f a i r l y . 
T h i r d , i f the government has to i n t e r v e n e i n 
wage-disputes, i t i s p r a c t i c a l t h a t the M i n i s t e r 
i s l i k e l y to a d v i s e or to be a d v i s e d only by the 
c e n t r a l body. 
Bourth, c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of wage-negotiations may 
av o i d d i s t u r b a n c e s i n the are a s of the i n d u s t r y . 
I f wage n e g o t i a t i o n i s d e c e n t r a l i s e d and assuming 
t h a t one a r e a has been granted an i n c r e a s e i n wages 
f o r a p a r t i c u l a r grade of workers, t h i s w i l l o f t e n 
have an impact on s i m i l a r or even u n r e l a t e d grades 
(18) Hynes. N a t i o n a l i s a t i o n i n p r a c t i c e London 1953 
p.327. 
(19) See p. 3^2 
i n other a r e a s . Thus i t i s e s s e n t i a l f o r t h i s 
f u n c t i o n to be c a r r i e d out by s t a f f who a r e 
aquainted w i t h c o n d i t i o n s of a l l a r e a s . C.G. 
Hancock s t a t e s t h a t the major problem i n l o c a l 
s e t t l e m e n t s i s the c l o s e l i n k between d i f f e r e n t 
a r e a s . T h i s w i l l r e s u l t i n a c h a i n e f f e c t on l o c a l 
s e t t l e m e n t s i n other a r e a s . He goes on to say t h a t 
the chance of a p u r e l y l o c a l s e t t l e m e n t which takes 
i n t o account j u s t the people concerned and l o c a l 
c i rcumstances becomes i m p o s s i b l e . ( 2 0 ) The 
i m p o s s i b i l i t y of l o c a l s e t t l e m e n t s i s , of course, 
a g a i n s t the p r i n c i p l e of the d i f f e r e n c e s i n c o s t 
of l i v i n g between a r e a s which should be taken i n t o 
account. The d i f f i c u l t y of l o c a l s e t t l e m e n t of 
wages d i s p u t e s may a r i s e from the c o n f l i c t between 
the trade unions headquarters and the branch i n 
the a r e a . Such c o n f l i c t may strengthen the 
conception of the c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of wage n e g o t i a t i o n s . 
A point f o r the d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of wage 
n e g o t i a t i o n i s t h a t sometimes there are sudden 
changes i n workers' demands which r e q u i r e quick 
d e c i s i o n by top management, otherwise walkouts i n 
(20) Hancock, C.G. Trends i n I n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s 
Summer sc h o o l , E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l 1963 p.38* 
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the i n d u s t r y w i l l occur. I f the wage-negotiation 
f u n c t i o n i s d e c e n t r a l i s e d , i . e . i f personnel 
manager's at the lower l e v e l have the freedom to d e a l 
w i t h t h i s f u n c t i o n , r e p e r c u s s i o n s of sudden changes 
would be avoided. The a w a i t i n g of d e c i s i o n s from 
the top l e v e l i n such circumstances and consequently 
the d e l a y i n t a k i n g f i r m d e c i s i o n s would c e r t a i n l y 
complicate the problem. I t may be claimed t h a t 
these circumstances are not frequent; and so wage 
n e g o t i a t i o n s should be c e n t r a l i s e d . 
C o n d i t i o n s of employment other than wages 
may be d e c e n t r a l i s e d i n a l i m i t e d form. T h i s means 
t h a t , f o r example, the E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l makes 
the long-term p l a n s f o r education and t r a i n i n g f o r 
the whole i n d u s t r y , and i t would be the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
of the Area Boards to implement these p l a n s and 
perhaps to make the n e c e s s a r y m o d i f i c a t i o n s according 
to t h e i r l o c a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s . I n t e r n a l w e l f a r e f o r 
employees and workers should be wholly d e c e n t r a l i s e d , 
assuming t h a t t h i s f u n c t i o n does not r e q u i r e a 
l a r g e c a p i t a l . 
The i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s f u n c t i o n s i n c l u d e 
s e v e r a l a c t i v i t i e s other than those s t a t e d above. 
However, i t may be s a i d , t h a t as a r u l e i n d u s t r i a l 
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r e l a t i o n s problems which a f f e c t the whole i n d u s t r y , 
such as wage n e g o t i a t i o n s , should be c e n t r a l i s e d , 
and c o n d i t i o n s of employment which are o b v i o u s l y 
r e l a t e d to l o c a l c ircumstances and do not i n v o l v e 
heavy c a p i t a l requirements should be d e c e n t r a l i s e d . 
L e t us now t u r n to some of the t e c h n i c a l 
f u n c t i o n s of the E l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y to see 
how f a r they a r e c e n t r a l i s e d or d e c e n t r a l i s e d . 
Generation and main t r a n s m i s s i o n and d i s t r i b u t i o n 
of e l e c t r i c i t y . 
As f a r as generation i s concerned the 
que s t i o n i s whether i t i s to be c e n t r a l i s e d i n one 
a u t h o r i t y of the whole i n d u s t r y or whether to give 
Area Boards, i n B r i t a i n , f u l l freedom to generate 
e l e c t r i c i t y . 
The f u n c t i o n s r e l a t e d to the ge n e r a t i o n s i d e 
i n the e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y can be broadly 
d i v i d e d i n t o , f i r s t , the g e n e r a l planning and 
c o n s t r u c t i o n of power s t a t i o n s , second, the 
a p p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s g e n e r a l p o l i c y and the d e t a i l e d 
work concerning the process of g e n e r a t i o n . With 
r e g a r d to the former f u n c t i o n , and before the 
r e - o r g a n i s a t i o n of the B r i t i s h E l e c t r i c i t y supply 
i n d u s t r y i n 1#57, the C e n t r a l A u t h o r i t y ' s Headquarters 
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were concerned w i t h the o v e r - a l l planning, g e n e r a l 
c o - o r d i n a t i o n , b a s i c design and some d e t a i l e d 
d e s i g n . (2.1} The Herbert Report on the r e - o r g a n i s a t i o n 
of the i n d u s t r y , 1956, recommended the c e n t r a l i s a t i o n 
of g e n e r a l planning and c o n s t r u c t i o n of power 
s t a t i o n s w i t h i n the a u t h o r i t y of the C e n t r a l 
E l e c t r i c i t y Generating Board. The Report s t a t e s 
t h a t the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the Generating Board 
should be concerned w i t h ( a ) system l o a d c o n t r o l , 
(b) planning the g e n e r a l development of power 
supply ( c ) the s i t i n g of s t a t i o n s (d) the design 
and p o s s i b l y the c o n s t r u c t i o n of s t a t i o n s of 
advanced design i n c l u d i n g n u c l e a r s t a t i o n s 
( e ) planning the s u p e r - g r i d and main t r a n s m i s s i o n . ( 2 2 ) 
As mentioned above these f u n c t i o n s as a 
p a r t of the long and medium term planning f o r the 
whole i n d u s t r y could be d e s i r a b l y c e n t r a l i s e d . The 
other f u n c t i o n , i . e . the a p p l i c a t i o n of the g e n e r a l 
p o l i c y and the d e t a i l e d work concerning generation, 
was, i n f a c t , d e c e n t r a l i s e d i n the o l d o r g a n i s a t i o n 
of the i n d u s t r y . T h i s i s obvious from the s e t t i n g 
up of the f o u r t e e n Generating D i v i s i o n s . Each 
(21) B.E.A. F i r s t Report and statement of accounts, 
1948 para 127. 
(22) Op.Cit. para 264 & 79. 
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D i v i s i o n was under the charge of a D i v i s i o n a l 
C o n t r o l l e r who had a g r e a t measure of p e r s o n a l 
a u t h o r i t y and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r c o n s t r u c t i o n , 
o p e r a t i o n and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the g enerating 
s t a t i o n s and main t r a n s m i s s i o n system of h i s 
D i v i s i o n . T h i s i s c l e a r from the f i r s t Report on 
the i n d u s t r y . The Report s t a t e s ' i n planning t h e i r 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e arrangements the C e n t r a l A u t h o r i t y 
had to decide what measure of d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n was 
d e s i r a b l e and p r a c t i c a b l e , when, a t v e s t i n g day, 
the generating s t a t i o n s and the G r i d came under 
t h e i r s i n g l e o p e r a t i o n . ' The Report observed t h a t 
t h ere appeared to be c o n s i d e r a b l e advantages i n 
having o p e r a t i o n a l u n i t s f o r g e n e r a t i o n and main 
t r a n s m i s s i o n which corresponded t e r r i t o r i a l l y to 
the Area Boards.(23) The Herbert Committee 
recommended more d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of the d e t a i l e d 
work of the design and c o n s t r u c t i o n of power 
s t a t i o n s and the main t r a n s m i s s i o n system. The 
Committee emphasised the need f o r complete freedom 
to D i v i s i o n a l C o n t r o l l e r s without the need f o r 
e x t e r n a l support. The Committee s t a t e t h a t the 
maximum power and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y should be delegated 
(23) B.E.A., F i r s t Report, 19^9 para 77. 
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r e s p o n s i b l e to the Generating Board. I n other 
words, as a conception towards d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n 
Area Boards would be f r e e to generate e l e c t r i c i t y . 
The d e l e g a t i o n of the g e n e r a t i o n f u n c t i o n to 
the Area Boards i s c r i t i c i s e d by the Herbert 
Committee except i n unusual c i r c u m s t a n c e s . The 
c r i t i c i s m i s based on the grounds t h a t there are 
no important economies to be secured by g i v i n g the 
Area Boards the t a s k of a c t u a l l y operating the 
generating s t a t i o n s on b e h a l f of the Generating 
Board. The economies i n bulk c o u l d be achieved by 
the c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of g e n e r a t i o n . T h i s would 
r e s u l t i n a cheaper supply than i f Area Boards were 
to produce t h e i r own e l e c t r i c i t y . I n unusual 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of g e n e r a t i o n could 
be a cheaper method. There a r e f i v e c o n d i t i o n s 
f o r t h i s , ( a ) i f the bulk supply p r i c e o f f e r e d by 
the Generating A u t h o r i t y were higher than the c o s t 
of g e n e r a t i o n i n the Area, (b) A combination of 
d i s t r i b u t i o n and g e n e r a t i o n by the Area Board may 
provide r e a l economics of s c a l e , ( c ) I f the Area 
Board i s a b l e to use more modernised p l a n t s than 
the Generating Board i s w i l l i n g to provide, (d) ' I f 
s m a l l - s c a l e e l e c t r i c i t y g e n e r a t i o n could be coupled 
4 i 8 
•with the s a l e of power s t a t i o n s ' heat, thus 
s e c u r i n g high thermal e f f i c i e n c y , l: ( e ) I f Area 
Boards want to be independent i n c a r r y i n g out the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of generation even when the economics 
are a g a i n s t them. P o i n t 'd' i s regarded as 
important because 'as bulk g e n e r a t i o n moves towards 
l a r g e r and l a r g e r s t a t i o n s , i t i s i n c r e a s i n g l y 
u n l i k e l y t h a t these s t a t i o n s w i l l be l o c a t e d i n 
such p l a c e s t h a t use can be made of much of t h e i r 
h e a t . TEet a s m a l l s t a t i o n w i t h a low e f f i c i e n c y 
i n terms of e l e c t r i c i t y but which i s a b l e to s e l l 
i t s heat w i l l have a higher thermal e f f i c i e n c y 
than the l a r g e s t s t a t i o n which generates 
e l e c t r i c i t y o n l y . ( 2 6 ) 
D e l e g a t i o n of the ge n e r a t i o n f u n c t i o n to 
Area Boards i n these e x c e p t i o n a l c a s e s should be 
l i m i t e d i n the sense t h a t g i v i n g Area Boards the 
power to generate should be used s u b j e c t to 
approval of the p a r t i c u l a r scheme.(27) T h i s i s a 
second c o n c l u s i o n . 
E. Thompson regards the unusual c o n d i t i o n s 
of g i v i n g Area Boards freedom to generate, as they 
(26) Op.Cit. para 236. 
(27) I b i d , para 238. 
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could h a r d l y ever use the powers granted. He says 
• t h i s i s s u r e l y s a c r i f i c i n g the economics of s c a l e 
to the ideology of d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n . At b e s t i t i s 
a r a t h e r empty g e n s t u r e . 1 ( 2 8 ) 
I n f a c t , i t could not be understood from the 
Herbert Report's recommendations t h a t they a r e i n 
favour of d e c e n t r a l i s e d g e n e r a t i o n i n the Area 
Boards. The c o n s t i t u t i o n of a separate a u t h o r i t y 
(C.E.G.B.) to undertake the f u n c t i o n of g e n e r a t i o n 
does not mean th a t t h i s f u n c t i o n i s d e c e n t r a l i s e d , 
because i t i s operated by one a u t h o r i t y and i s not 
d elegated to Area Boards. The Herbert Report makes 
i t c l e a r t h a t 'the c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
of g e n e r a t i o n and t r a n s m i s s i o n under n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n 
enabled s u b s t a n t i a l g a i n s i n e f f i c i e n c y to be made.(29) 
While c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of g e n e r a t i o n i s 
d e s i r a b l e , i t i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
e l e c t r i c i t y be d e c e n t r a l i s e d . By d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n 
of d i s t r i b u t i o n i t i s meant t h a t Area Boards should 
have complete freedom i n o p e r a t i n g the networks i n 
the Area served. More d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n could be 
(28) Thompson, E. A l l e n . The o r g a n i s a t i o n of two 
n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s . F l e c k v e r s u s Herbert 
S c o t t i s h J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l Economy June 
1957 p.97. 
(29) Op.Cit. para 98. 
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achieved by d e l e g a t i n g the f u n c t i o n to other lower 
l e v e l s such as Sub-areas and D i s t r i c t s . 
D e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of d i s t r i b u t i o n i s p r a c t i c a b l e 
because each Area has i t s l o a d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which 
may be ve r y d i f f e r e n t from other a r e a s . I n t h i s case 
l o c a l knowledge r e q u i r e d n e c e s s i t a t e s the 
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of t h i s f u n c t i o n . Also the c l o s e 
connection between consumers and areas i s o b v i o u s l y 
much g r e a t e r than w i t h the ce n t r e which r e q u i r e s 
l o c a l d e c i s i o n s , to ensure the f u l l e s t f l e x i b i l i t y 
to meet l o c a l needs. 
Perhaps the main o b s t a c l e i n d e l e g a t i n g t h i s 
f u n c t i o n to the p o s s i b l e lower l e v e l i s the l a c k of 
s u f f i c i e n t t e c h n i c a l t a l e n t f . 
Advantages and disadvantages of c e n t r a l i s a t i o n 
and d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n . 
Apart from the r e l a t i v e advantages and 
disadvantages of e i t h e r c e n t r a l i s a t i o n or 
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of f u n c t i o n s given above, t h e r e 
are some ge n e r a l advantages and disadvantages of 
the two concepts. The advocates of c e n t r a l i s a t i o n 
c o n s i d e r t h a t the c o n c e n t r a t i o n of f u n c t i o n s to be 
decided a t the top would enable the i n d u s t r y to 
achieve an e f f e c t i v e c o - o r d i n a t i o n of a c t i v i t i e s 
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because d e c i s i o n s r e g a r d i n g these f u n c t i o n s a r e 
taken by experienced men a t the top. 
The obvious c r i t i c i s m of t h i s advantage i s 
t h a t there must be a l i m i t to the extent to which 
a few people can be aware of a l l f a c t o r s connected 
w i t h the problems they have to cope w i t h . I t i s 
u n l i k e l y t h a t s m a l l groups of people could know 
enough about the d i f f e r e n t problems o c c u r r i n g i n 
the v a r i o u s a r e a s of the i n d u s t r y . For example, 
i n the B r i t i s h e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y , i t i s 
not expected t h a t the E l e c t r i c i t y C o u n c i l , where 
the Area Boards' Chairmen are s i t t i n g , can be aware 
of a l l problems of Sub-areas and D i s t r i c t s . I n 
a d d i t i o n i t i s known t h a t the e l e c t r i c i t y supply 
i n d u s t r y must f a c e competition w i t h other f u e l 
i n d u s t r i e s such as gas. I n such circumstances i t 
seems impo s s i b l e t h a t few people a t the top could 
manage the a f f a i r s of the whole i n d u s t r y i n a 
comp e t i t i v e market. The main i d e a here i s based 
on the b e l i e f t h a t the c e n t r e must have a l a c k of 
knowledge about l o c a l problems. Thus where l o c a l 
knowledge i s r e q u i r e d there must be a g r e a t e r degree 
of d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of f u n c t i o n s to f a c e the need 
f o r speedy d e c i s i o n s adapted to v a r y i n g l o c a l 
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c o n d i t i o n s . These l o c a l c o n d i t i o n s are numerous, 
f o r example, the employment of p e r s o n n e l , the 
purchase of equipment to meet unexpected peak loads 
or consumers com p l a i n t s . Another c r i t i c i s m a g a i n s t 
g i v i n g the power - to operate most of the f u n c t i o n s 
i n the i n d u s t r y - to a few people a t the top i s 
t h a t such c e n t r a l i s a t i o n would f r u s t r a t e i n d i v i d u a l 
i n i t i a t i v e . T h i s i s , i n f a c t , the i n h e r e n t 
o b j e c t i o n to c e n t r a l i s a t i o n . I n t h i s context 
H. Clegg s t a t e s t h a t the subordinate manager may 
be a man who i s content to be w e l l p a i d , but i f he 
has i l l u s i o n s about managing he w i l l be unhappy.(30) 
And i f c e n t r a l i s a t i o n i s j u s t i f i e d by the f e a r of 
m istakes made by lower management, i t may be argued 
t h a t i t would be u s e f u l to l e a v e l o c a l managers to 
make t h e i r m i s t a k e s . T h i s would t r a i n them f o r 
higher management l e v e l s and i t would i n t r o d u c e a 
degree of emulation between l o c a l managers. The 
Herbert Committee found t h a t most of the Area 
Boards f e l t s t r o n g l y t h a t they were s u b j e c t to too 
much i n t e r f e r e n c e from the C e n t r a l A u t h o r i t y , ( 3 1 ) 
and the p o s i t i o n of D i v i s i o n a l C o n t r o l l e r i n the 
(30) Clegg, H.A. I n d u s t r i a l Democracy and 
n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n Oxford 1957 p.54. 
(31) Op.Cit. para 23O. 
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o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e was co n s i d e r e d to be 
s i m i l a r l y u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . ( 3 2 ) I n another p l a c e the 
Committee p r a i s e d the sense of p e r s o n a l 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and p r i d e which e x i s t e d under the 
'old system' and blamed the new system of l a r g e -
s c a l e e n t e r p r i s e f o r l e s s e n i n g the enthusiasm of 
D i s t r i c t Managers. Ac c o r d i n g l y they suggested 
t h a t D i s t r i c t Managers should be f r e e d from d i r e c t 
c o n t r o l and given the f u l l e s t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r 
a l l n e c e s s a r y s e r v i c e . ( 3 3 ) T h i s would i n c l u d e the 
i n t r o d u c t i o n of some k i n d of f i n a n c i a l y a r d s t i c k 
such as the normal p r o f i t and l o s s account which 
provides f o r measuring the s u c c e s s of t h e i r u n i t s . 
A c e r t a i n degree of f i n a n c i a l autonomy i n , f o r 
example, the Area l e v e l i s the most important 
f e a t u r e of p r a c t i c a l d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n . 
I n c o n t r a s t w i t h the B r i t i s h ^ e l e c t r i c i t y 
i n d u s t r y , Department managers i n the E g y p t i a n 
i n d u s t r y are l e s s f r e e i n t h e i r e x p e n d i t u r e . ( 3 4 ) 
To encourage i n d i v i d u a l i n i t i a t i v e of managers of 
( 3 2 ) I b i d , para 2 3 9 , 2.87 ( a ) 2 6 5 , 5 0 1 . 
( 3 3 ) para 2 6 6 , 2 8 8 , 2 7 5 , 2 9 7 . 
( 3 4 ) S p e c i a l Report on the work of the C.E.G.A. 
departments, unpublished data C a i r o ( i n A r a b i c ) . 
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the E g y p t i a n E l e c t r i c i t y supply Departments one 
may suggest the p r o v i s i o n of freedom i n some or 
a l l of the f o l l o w i n g f i e l d s : 
( i ) freedom to r e c e i v e and r e t a i n o p e r a t i n g revenues, 
( i i ) freedom from c e n t r a l purchasing or c o n t r a c t i n g 
requirements ( i i i ) freedom from g e n e r a l r e s t r i c t i o n 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the f i e l d of c a p i t a l expenditure, 
and ( i v ) freedom to borrow money ( w i t h i n more 
l i m i t s ) to c o n t r o l the d e c e n t r a l i s e d planning i n 
the a r e a s e r v e d . 
The p r a c t i c a l s t e p which may be taken to 
implement the p o i n t s suggested above i s t h a t the 
Government should give the e n t e r p r i s e complete or 
r e l a t i v e freedom from the e x e c u t i v e f u n c t i o n of 
the Government, the f i n a n c i a l and budget departments 
of the Government, the Government personnel and 
planning a g e n c i e s , the Government accounting and 
a u d i t i n g a g e n c i e s , which may be con s i d e r e d as most 
important, and from some of the l e g i s l a t i o n . These 
freedoms would c e r t a i n l y encourage Department 
Managers and make them more p r o d u c t i v e . 
Another c r i t i c i s m a g a i n s t the ideaology of 
c e n t r a l i s a t i o n , as mentioned e a r l y i n t h i s chapter 
i s t h a t the top l e v e l could be i n v o l v e d i n too 
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many r o u t i n e m a t t e r s . By t h i s they l i m i t the 
extent to which they can be f r e e to p l a n and to 
in t r o d u c e i n n o v a t i o n . I n b r i e f i t i s a l o s s of 
time. 
F i n a l l y , o v e r - c e n t r a l i s a t i o n would r e s u l t 
i n some uneconomic consequences. For example, i f 
the f u n c t i o n s which have to be d e c e n t r a l i s e d 
because they d e a l w i t h consumers c l o s e to the 
lower l e v e l , are d i f f e r e n t l y c e n t r a l i s e d , the 
consumers w i l l complain about the de l a y of s e r v i c e s . 
I n a r e l a t i v e l y c o m p e t i t i v e market the bad 
consequences of such c e n t r a l i s a t i o n w i l l be to make 
other competitive i n d u s t r i e s quick to take 
advantage of the s i t u a t i o n . S i m i l a r l y employees 
and workers may a l s o complain and unions may take 
a c t i o n r e s u l t i n g i n s t r i k e s which have uneconomic 
r e s u l t s i n a p u b l i c u t i l i t y c o r p o r a t i o n . 
I f d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n i s the remedy f o r the 
disadvantages of c e n t r a l i s a t i o n thus i t i s important 
to show the advantages of d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n . I n 
f a c t , the ideology of d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n becomes 
i n c r e a s i n g l y important as the e n t e r p r i s e s grow up-
Many of the modern o r g a n i s a t i o n s , p r i v a t e and 
p u b l i c , are convinced t h a t c e r t a i n f u n c t i o n s should 
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be delegated as f a r as operating c o n d i t i o n s may 
permit. 
Some of the g e n e r a l advantages of 
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of f u n c t i o n s may be summed up i n 
the f o l l o w i n g : 
( i i As mentioned before, e x t e n s i v e d e l e g a t i o n of 
f u n c t i o n s to lower l e v e l s of management 
would l e a v e s e n i o r personnel f r e e r to p l a n 
and a s s e s s t h e i r e x t e r n a l environment so 
t h a t more time could be spent on lonf-range 
planning and matters of s t r a t e g y , 
( i i ) D e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n i s e f f e c t i v e f o r 
g e o g r a p h i c a l l y widespread o r g a n i s a t i o n s and 
f o r s i t u a t i o n s where s p e c i a l i s e d or l o c a l 
knowledge i s important. 
( i i i ) More f l e x i b i l i t y i n handling the i n d u s t r y ' s 
a c t i v i t i e s can r e s u l t from more freedom 
given to j u n i o r people. They can take 
prompt d e c i s i o n s without a w a i t i n g the 
approval of the a c t i o n from the c e n t r a l l e v e l . 
( i v ) D e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n would i n c r e a s e i n i t i a t i o n 
and development of lower managers• By 
i n c r e a s i n g t h e i r a u t h o r i t y and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
they w i l l have more p e r s o n a l p r i d e i n t h e i r 
work. T h i s w i l l e v e n t u a l l y a l l o w them a f t e r 
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being expert, f o r promotion to p o s i t i o n s 
i n the top ex e c u t i v e l e v e l . , 
D e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of f u n c t i o n s may a l s o have 
some disadvantages which would be overcome by 
c e n t r a l i s a t i o n . For example, sometimes more 
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n may harm the economy of the whole 
country. For i n s t a n c e , assuming t h a t we have 
completely independent Area Boards i n the 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y , each having i t s own 
l e g i s l a t i o n . T h i s would r e s u l t i n a c o n f l i c t 
between Area Boards which i n the end i s a g a i n s t 
the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . Even where l e g i s l a t i o n i s 
s i m i l a r i n a l l Area Boards but where they are f r e e 
from p r a c t i c a l c o n t r o l by a c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y , i t 
may r e s u l t i n uneconomic consequences. The B r i t i s h 
Gas i n d u s t r y which i s c o n s t i t u t e d of twelve Area 
Boards g i v e s such an example, where shortcomings 
of d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n made the S e l e c t Committee on 
N a t i o n a l i s e d I n d u s t r i e s i n 196l suggest the 
esta b l i s h m e n t of a t h i r t e e n t h board. The Report 
s t a t e d t h a t the pre s e n t s t r u c t u r e of the i n d u s t r y 
was not s u i t a b l e f o r developing and e s t a b l i s h i n g 
l a r g e - s c a l e production and d i s t r i b u t i o n f a c i l i t i e s . 
T h i s was due to the p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t y of g e t t i n g 
a number of independent chairmen to cope w i t h the 
l e a d of the Gas C o u n c i l of l i m i t e d power. The 
economics of s c a l e r e s u l t a n t from the est a b l i s h m e n t 
of a t h i r t e e n t h board would produce gas more 
cheaply. T h i s board, s i m i l a r to the Generating 
Board of the e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y would 
s t o r e and s e l l to a l l or some Area Gas Boards the 
r e q u i r e d gas supply.(36) The Committee s t a t e d 
t h a t the t h i r t e e n t h Board would be able to o f f e r 
more p o s i t i v e l e a d to the i n d u s t r y i n developing 
and undertaking l a r g e new p r o j e c t s r e s u l t i n g i n a 
cheaper supply of gas. F i n a l l y , they concluded 
t h a t t here was a need f o r the interdependence of 
the Area Boards and not f o r t h e i r independence of 
the Gas C o u n c i l . 
Another disadvantage of d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n i s 
th a t there i s a d e s i r e f o r n a t i o n a l u n i f o r m i t y of 
p r i c e s and wages. D e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of these two 
f u n c t i o n s may r e s u l t i n anomalies and d i f f e r e n c e s . 
L a s t l y , t h e r e i s a human tendency to r e s i s t change 
and to delegate f u n c t i o n s to lower l e v e l s of 
management. Some of the s e n i o r personnel holding 
important a c t i v i t i e s do not l i k e these a c t i v i t i e s 
(36) Report from the Committee on N a t i o n a l i s e d 
i n d u s t r i e s , the Gas i n d u s t r y , H.C. 280 
J u l y 1961, Report para 467. 
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to be s c a t t e r e d arid some do not want others to do 
the work they were doing b e f o r e . 
To overcome the d i f f i c u l t i e s of 
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n , c e n t r a l i s a t i o n i s the remedy. 
Advantages of c e n t r a l i s a t i o n may be i l l u s t r a t e d by 
examples of the s i t u a t i o n i n some of the n a t i o n a l i s e d 
i n d u s t r i e s before and a f t e r n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n . When 
c o a l , r a i l w a y s and e l e c t r i c i t y supply c o n s i s t e d of a 
l a r g e number of undertakings, each w i t h an 
independent management, th e r e was an absence of any 
c e n t r a l o r g a n i s a t i o n to p l a n and c a r r y out f u t u r e 
development and modernisation of the i n d u s t r y 
concerned. There was no c e n t r a l agency r e s p o n s i b l e 
f o r c a p i t a l investment, r e s e a r c h , the maintenance 
of labour f o r c e and other matters of fundamental 
importance to the i n d u s t r y . With re g a r d to the 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y , t h e r e was a c h a o t i c 
p o s i t i o n of g e n e r a t i o n and t r a n s m i s s i o n before 
n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n . Hundreds of m u n i c i p a l and 
commercial undertakings e x i s t e d to generate, t r a n s m i t 
and d i s t r i b u t e e l e c t r i c i t y and t h e r e was an immense 
d i v e r s i t y of v o l t a g e types or c u r r e n t . Robson 
remarks ' i n a g r e a t c i t y l i k e London t h e r e was a 
v e r i t a b l e j u n g l e of t i n y overlapping j u r i s d i c t i o n . ( 3 7 ) 
(37) Robson, W„ N a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r y and p u b l i c 
ownership p.113. 
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I t i s t r u e t h a t , as mentioned above, t e c h n i c a l 
o p e r a t i o n of the e l e c t r i c i t y supply, i . e . gen e r a t i o n 
and main t r a n s m i s s i o n should be a t l e a s t s u p e r v i s e d 
by a c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y . 
To sum up the d i s c u s s i o n , i t seems to be 
d i f f i c u l t to give a d e f i n i t e answer about whether 
c e n t r a l i s a t i o n or d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n would be the 
b e s t method. But when s p e c i f i c f u n c t i o n s a r e under 
examination, the philosophy or p r i n c i p l e of 
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n seems to be a goal r a t h e r than a 
d e s c r i p t i o n of c u r r e n t p r a c t i c e . On the other hand, 
i f the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the conduct of an 
i n d u s t r y i s p l a c e d upon a c e n t r a l body th e r e are 
l i m i t s to the extent to which f u n c t i o n s c e n t r a l i s e d 
can be delegated without f e a r of i n c u r r i n g 
u n d e s i r a b l e and s e r i o u s consequences.(38) Thus a 
compromise between the two methods of management 
should be a t l e a s t formed through l i n e s of 
communication. 
L i n e s of communication. 
A connection between the v a r i o u s l e v e l s of 
management may be understood as the r e l a t i o n 
(38) C i t r i n e , Lord. Problems of N a t i o n a l i s e d 
i n d u s t r i e s P u b l i c a d m i n i s t r a t i o n V o l . 29 
1951 p.321. 
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between the top l e v e l of management and other 
lower l e v e l s through a v e r t i c a l tube. But l i n e s 
of communication are a l s o meant to be, i n a d d i t i o n , 
h o r i z o n t a l i n c h a r a c t e r . 
There are some q u a l i f i c a t i o n s f o r the 
p r i n c i p l e of ' l i n e s of communication 1 i n order to 
get s u c c e s s f u l r e s u l t s . 
F i r s t , a c l e a r d e f i n i t i o n of the term 
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n and the way of d e l e g a t i o n . 
F u n c t i o n s delegated must be known by the two ends 
of the l i n e . C l e a r i n s t r u c t i o n s from the top to 
the lower l e v e l s a r e n e c e s s a r y . Second, t h e r e 
must be some k i n d of c o n s u l t a t i o n , say between the 
c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y and Area Boards' Chairmen, before 
the f u n c t i o n has to be c e n t r a l i s e d or d e c e n t r a l i s e d . 
The F l e c k Report on the c o a l i n d u s t r y recommended 
the s e t t i n g up of a N a t i o n a l Advisory Committee 
f o r t h i s purpose. 
T h i r d , d e l e g a t i o n of f u n c t i o n s can work w e l l 
i f t h e r e are s u f f i c i e n t s t a f f to get the work done. 
Also at sense of common purpose i s e s s e n t i a l i n 
order to avoid any c o n f l i c t s . 
Fourth, a s u c c e s s f u l l i n e of communication 
could be achieved i f the C e n t r a l A u t h o r i t y a p p r e c i a t e s 
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the s p e c i a l c i rcumstances surrounding the Area 
where i n s t r u c t i o n s are c a r r i e d out. Any r i g i d 
d e f i n i t i o n of c e n t r a l d e c i s i o n s i s working a g a i n s t 
the p r i n c i p l e . 
I n the B r i t i s h E l e c t r i c i t y Supply I n d u s t r y 
an e f f e c t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between the c e n t r a l 
a u t h o r i t y and other l e v e l s of management can be seen 
i n the F i r s t Report of the B.E.A. which s t a t e s 
1 the g e n e r a l o p e r a t i o n a l and development p o l i c y 
and planning * are determined by A u t h o r i t y 
Headquarters, but a t r e g u l a r conferences of the 
D i v i s i o n a l C o n t r o l l e r s and the f u l l - t i m e members 
and C h i e f O f f i c e r s and by other c o n t a c t s and 
communication, the C o n t r o l l e r s are c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d 
w i t h the f o r m u l a t i o n of p o l i c y and p l a n i n the 
execution of which they n e c e s s a r i l y p l a y as l a r g e 
a p a r t . Where i t i s d e s i r a b l e to e s t a b l i s h a 
common p r a c t i c e throughout the D i v i s i o n s , 
Headquarters i s s u e i n s t r u c t i o n s a c c o r d i n g l y a f t e r 
c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the C o n t r o l l e r s . The 
Departmental o f f i c e r s a t A u t h o r i t y Headquarters 
maintain f u n c t i o n a l c o n t a c t w i t h the corresponding 
O f f i c e r s i n the D i v i s i o n s . ( 3 9 ) Such a v e r t i c a l 
(39) B.E.A. F i r s t Report 19k§ para 79. 
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communication between Headquarters a t the top and 
Area Boards or D i v i s i o n s would r e a l i s e the aim of 
the c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y i n d e l e g a t i n g f u n c t i o n i n a 
s u c c e s s f u l procedure. 
H o r i z o n t a l communications are a l s o n e c e s s a r y 
i n the same l e v e l of management. T h i s means t h a t 
Departments i n one l e v e l must work together towards 
the same o b j e c t i v e of the i n d u s t r y . T h i s c o u l d be 
achieved through in f o r m a l c o n t a c t s . O f f i c i a l s 
from d i f f e r e n t Departments can meet i n non-working 
hours a t l u n c h times i n the canteen. 
By t h i s simple o u t l i n e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between 
d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s could be formed, and hence the 
p r i n c i p l e of l i n e s of communication can work w e l l * 
But why are c e n t r a l i s e d f u n c t i o n s , i f they were to 
be delegated not p r o p e r l y c a r r i e d out by lower l e v e l s 
of management? The main reasons a r e ; the d i f f i c u l t y 
j u n i o r managers have i n a d j u s t i n g themselves to new 
c o n d i t i o n s once a f u n c t i o n i s found to be 
p r e f e r a b l y d e c e n t r a l i s e d . Lower management l e v e l s 
may be i l l s t a f f e d , thus i t would be d i f f i c u l t to 
implement economic d e c i s i o n s taken by s p e c i a l i s t s 
a t the c e n t r e . For example, i f Area Boards are 
not e f f i c i e n t i n adopting methods of r e s e a r c h 
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experimented a t the c e n t r e . I n a d d i t i o n , i t may 
happen t h a t the top l e v e l s of management are not 
i n s i s t i n g t h a t t h e i r p o l i c i e s be c a r r i e d out. 
The F l e c k Report on the c o a l i n d u s t r y found 
u n w i l l i n g n e s s among the top management to i n s i s t 
on t h e i r p o l i c i e s being c a r r i e d out. The Report 
remarks t h a t from the outset the Board ( c e n t r e ) 
has t r i e d to c o n t r o l t h e i r s u bordinates w i t h a 
ve r y l i g h t touch. Some D i v i s i o n s have taken 
advantage of t h i s . ( 4 0 ) H. Clegg agrees w i t h the 
F l e c k Report, s t a t i n g t h a t the o r g a n i s a t i o n 
would work w e l l i f i n s t r u c t i o n s and frame of 
p o l i c i e s are ensured to be c a r r i e d out. For t h i s 
the C e n t r a l Board should narrow i t s f i e l d to 
s u p e r v i s e e f f e c t i v e l y f u n c t i o n s d e l e g a t e d . ( 4 l ) 
(40) N.CB. Report of the Advisory Committee on 
O r g a n i s a t i o n Feb. 1955 par a 298, 318. 
(41) Clegg, H.D. The F l e c k Report. P u b l i c 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n V o l . 33 1955 pp. 244 - 5. 
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C o n c l u s i o n . 
An attempt has been made i n t h i s chapter to 
giv e an o u t l i n e of the problems of c e n t r a l i s a t i o n 
and d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s ' 
a c t i v i t i e s and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the e l e c t r i c i t y 
supply i n d u s t r y . I t was made c l e a r t h a t the 
d e f i n i t i o n of the two terms c e n t r a l i s a t i o n and 
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n has to be p r e c i s e . I t i s thought 
that, i f we r e l a t e the d e f i n i t i o n only to f u n c t i o n s 
of the i n d u s t r y concerned, i . e . i f we say t h a t a 
c e r t a i n f u n c t i o n i s c e n t r a l i s e d when i t i s decided^ 
a t the top or d e c e n t r a l i s e d when i t i s c a r r i e d out 
at a lower l e v e l we w i l l a v o i d the confusion of 
other d e f i n i t i o n s . 
D e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of f u n c t i o n s i s not only 
to r e l i e v e the top l e v e l by p a s s i n g some f u n c t i o n s 
to lower l e v e l s , but d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n may take three 
forms. Complete d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n i . e . to delegate 
f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s to lower l e v e l s , or l i m i t e d 
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n , i . e . to delegate c e r t a i n f u n c t i o n s , 
or p e r s o n n e l d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n , i . e . to delegate 
p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n to a c e r t a i n i n d i v i d u a l . L i m i t e d 
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n proved to be the app r o p r i a t e method 
i n the B r i t i s h e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y . The 
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whole argument about c e n t r a l i s a t i o n or 
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of f u n c t i o n s arose because of a 
tendency towards more d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n i n the 
B r i t i s h p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s . I n Egypt the wvidence 
shows t h a t a tendency to c e n t r a l i s e more f u n c t i o n s , 
e i t h e r i n Government Departments or p u b l i c 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s , i s a t work. The main reason f o r 
t h i s phenomenon i s t h a t most of the E g y p t i a n p u b l i c 
e n t e r p r i s e s are newly e s t a b l i s h e d ' and t h e r e must be 
a c e r t a i n degree of c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of f u n c t i o n to 
cope w i t h the g e n e r a l p l a n i n the whole economy. 
When de c i d i n g whether f u n c t i o n s should be 
c e n t r a l i s e d or d e c e n t r a l i s e d , the d i s c u s s i o n may 
demonstrate t h a t w i t h i n one f u n c t i o n c e n t r a l i s a t i o n 
may be d e s i r a b l e i n one p a r t and d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n 
i n another p a r t of the same f u n c t i o n as i s shown 
i n planning, f i n a n c i a l c o n t r o l and i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s . 
With r e g a r d to the e l e c t r i c i t y supply 
i n d u s t r y i t i s concluded t h a t g eneration and main 
t r a n s m i s s i o n should be c o n t r o l l e d by the C e n t r a l 
A u t h o r i t y . D i s t r i b u t i o n of e l e c t r i c i t y , where 
l o c a l problems make up the g r e a t e r p a r t of the 
f u n c t i o n , should be d e c e n t r a l i s e d . 
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Of course, t h e r e a r e s p e c i a l advantages or 
disadvantages i n the c e n t r a l i s a t i o n or d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n 
of a p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n , but there a r e a l s o some 
g e n e r a l advantages and disadvantages of the two 
methods. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to say whether the 
advantages of c e n t r a l i s a t i o n outweigh the advantages 
of d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n or v i c e v e r s a . What i s 
important i s to have a s u c c e s s f u l l i n e of 
communication between v a r i o u s l e v e l s i n the i n d u s t r y 
v e r t i c a l l y as w e l l as good r e l a t i o n s between 
employees and workers i n the same l e v e l i . e . 
h o r i z o n t a l l y . I f l i n e s of communication work w e l l 
i t would c e r t a i n l y l e s s e n the disadvantages of 
e i t h e r c e n t r a l i s a t i o n or d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of 
f u n c t i o n s . The main f a c t o r i n a s u c c e s s f u l 
compromise between the two methods, c e n t r a l i s a t i o n 
and d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n , i s t h a t a l l l e v e l s i n the 
i n d u s t r y and i f p o s s i b l e a l l important departments 
on the same l e v e l , should know c l e a r l y why f u n c t i o n s 
are c e n t r a l i s e d or d e c e n t r a l i s e d . 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
The i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the managerial and 
economic problems of p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s i n B r i t a i n 
and Egypt, shows t h a t the s t a t e takes pver an 
i n d u s t r y when i t i s s u f f e r i n g from bad management, 
t e c h n o l o g i c a l backwardness, a shortage of a b l e 
e x e c u t i v e s and t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t s or c a p i t a l 
s t a r v a t i o n , 
While the B r i t i s h Government took some 
measures to c o n t r o l e s s e n t i a l i n d u s t r i e s i n the 
country i n the middle f o r t i e s , i n Egypt these 
measures were not so e f f e c t i v e u n t i l 1956. I n the 
pre s e n t o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of p u b l i c 
e n t e r p r i s e s i n B r i t a i n and Egypt there are some 
s i m i l a r i t i e s as w e l l as d i f f e r e n c e s . Some 
Egyptian p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s are governed by p u b l i c 
boards more or l e s s s i m i l a r to the B r i t i s h p u b l i c 
c o r p o r a t i o n . The E.D.O., the E l Nasr O r g a n i s a t i o n 
and Misr O r g a n i s a t i o n are examples. 
With re g a r d to the e l e c t r i c i t y supply 
i n d u s t r y , i t i s governed i n Egypt by Government 
Departments but i n B r i t a i n i t i s managed by p u b l i c 
c o r p o r a t i o n s • 
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I t i s the author's opinion t h a t , i n order to 
s a t i s f y the aims of supplying e l e c t r i c power to 
v a r i o u s consumers on commercial terms as w e l l as i n 
the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t , i t may be u s e f u l to modify 
the present E g y p t i a n s t r u c t u r e on s i m i l a r l i n e s to 
t h a t of the B r i t i s h system. T h i s w i l l ensure the 
b u s i n e s s f l e x i b i l i t y aimed a t by the p u b l i c 
c o r p o r a t i o n ' s d e v i c e . I t i s w e l l known th a t the 
p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n i s by f a r the b e s t organ so f a r 
devi s e d f o r a d m i n i s t e r i n g p u b l i c u n d e r t a k i n g s . " I t 
i s f a r b e t t e r than the j o i n t s t o c k company owned 
and c o n t r o l l e d by the S t a t e , or than Government 
Departments engaged i n b u s i n e s s a c t i v i t y . " ( 1 ) 
The establishment of autonomous Area Boards 
i n s t e a d of Government Departments may have u s e f u l 
economic r e s u l t s . I t i s t r u e t h a t Government 
Departments O f f i c i a l s , ordered by binding 
i n s t r u c t i o n s , cannot ensure the b u s i n e s s 
f l e x i b i l i t y n e c e s s a r y f o r the major i n d u s t r i e s i n 
the economy. 
As a consequence of t h i s proposed 
r e - o r g a n i s a t i o n , the s t r u c t u r e of the Boards would 
( i l l Robson, W. N a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r y and p u b l i c 
ownership London 1962 p.493* 
have to be r e c o n s t i t u t e d . Board's members should 
be s e l e c t e d , e i t h e r f u l l - t i m e or p a r t - t i m e , on 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n b a s i s without r e g a r d to t h e i r 
i d e o l o g i c a l views. Though the author agrees w i t h 
the B r i t i s h system i n matters concerning the 
procedures of appointment, the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s and 
other problems of the Boards' members, the i d e a 
of e i t h e r d i r e c t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the workers on 
the Boards or the appointment of ex-trade union 
o f f i c i a l s should have f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n . I t 
may be u s e f u l to appoint those who show a 
p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t i n the problems of i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s p r o v i d i n g t h a t workers would be s a t i s f i e d 
w i t h such appointment. 
From the study of economic planning i n the 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y , i t was made c l e a r t h a t 
the main aim i s to r a i s e consumption per c a p i t a . 
I n a comparison between B r i t a i n and Egypt, the 
evidence shows t h a t the whole consumption as w e l l 
as consumption per c a p i t a are much higher i n 
B r i t a i n than i n Egypt. T h i s i s , of course, a 
n a t u r a l r e s u l t i n a comparison between ft developed 
and under-developed c o u n t r i e s . But i t i s 
i n t e r e s t i n g to note t h a t the average annual r a t e of 
i n c r e a s e i n e l e c t r i c i t y production i n Egypt i s 
h i g h e r than i n B r i t a i n during the p e r i o d of 1958 
to 196k. That i s because of the comprehensive 
i n d u s t r i a l schemes and the new establishment of a 
l a r g e number of generating u n i t s . As a r e s u l t the 
average annual i n c r e a s e i n consumption per c a p i t a 
i n Egypt proceeds a t a reasonable r a t e . 
Consumption of e l e c t r i c i t y between v a r i o u s 
c l a s s e s of consumers i n Egypt i s not balanced. 
The i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r consumes most of the supply. 
I t i s t r u e t h a t t h i s i s e s s e n t i a l i n a newly 
developing country, but more e f f e c t i v e measures 
should be taken to i n c r e a s e the average annual 
growth of consumption of other c a t e g o r i e s e s p e c i a l l y 
domestic and a g r i c u l t u r e . Towards the planning f o r 
the i n d u s t r y ' s f u t u r e two main problems need to be 
taken i n t o account., i . e . manpower and f i n a n c i a l 
requirements. With r e g a r d to manpower planning the 
problems i n v o l v e d are the p r o v i d i n g of the 
n e c e s s a r y s k i l l and the t r a i n i n g of the employees. 
I t i s shown i n the study t h a t s k i l l s r e q u i r e d i n 
E g y p t i a n p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s and i n the e l e c t r i c i t y 
supply i n d u s t r y could be provided by s p e c i f i c 
t r a i n i n g schemes somewhat s i m i l a r to t h a t adopted 
i n the B r i t i s h e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y but w i t h 
n e c e s s a r y m e d i f i c a t i p n s such as the c o n c e n t r a t i o n on 
the job t r a i n i n g method f o r workers, and the 
n a t i o n a l education s e s s i o n s f o r middle men. One 
aim of such planning i s to r a i s e p r o d u c t i v i t y per 
man i n the i n d u s t r y . Though i t i s t r u e t h a t 
comparison of p r o d u c t i v i t y per man i n the 
e l e c t r i c i t y supply i n d u s t r y i s d i f f i c u l t , the 
i n d i c a t i o n s are t h a t p r o d u c t i v i t y per man i n the 
E g y p t i a n i n d u s t r y i s lower than i n B r i t a i n owing 
to the d e f e c t s of the socio-economic s t r u c t u r e i n 
the country. 
F i n a n c i a l requirements are provided i n 
B r i t i s h p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s by t h r e e s o u r c e s ; the 
market, the Exchequer agd by the i n d u s t r y ' s 
s u r p l u s e s . Borrowing from the market was r i g h t l y 
abandoned by the B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t i e s , because i t 
was proved t h a t n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s should not 
compete i n the market. The main reason i s the 
f a c t t h a t they h e l d a m o n o p l i s t i c p o s i t i o n would 
enable them to o f f e r a high r a t e of i n t e r e s t which 
would be passed to the consumer. The r a t i o of 
s e l f f i n a n c i n g i n p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s should depend 
on the economic s i t u a t i o n of the i n d u s t r y , such 
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as t h e r a t e o f g r o w t h . I t i s c o r r e c t t h a t 
f i n a n c i a l r e q u i r e m e n t s h o u l d be drawn f r o m t h e 
Exchequer as i s now t h e p r a c t i c e . I n Egypt t h e 
s t u d y shows t h a t some p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e e l e c t r i c i t y s u p p l y i n d u s t r y depend 
much on f o r e i g n l o a n s and t$Je h i g h p r o p o r t i o n o f 
s e l f - f i n a n c i n g . T h i s i s a r e s u l t o f t h e s m a l l 
p r o p o r t i o n o f n a t i o n a l s a v i n g s . One o f t h e 
p r o j e c t s w h i c h r a i s e s a p a r t i c u l a r d i f f i c u l t y i n 
f i n a n c i n g , i s r u r a l e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n . I t i s t r u e 
t h a t i n B r i t a i n r u r a l consumers s h o u l d c o n t r i b u t e 
i n p r o v i d i n g t h e c a p i t a l r e q u i r e d , w h i l e i n Egypt 
t h e t a x p a y e r and p a r t i c u l a r l y u r b a n p o p u l a t i o n 
s h o u l d c o n t r i b u t e i n p r o v i d i n g t h e c a p i t a l f o r 
r u r a l e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n . Once t h e c a p i t a l i s 
p r o v i d e d i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o c a r r y o u t a c o r r e c t 
i n v e s t m e n t p o l i c y . The p r o b l e m o f t h e e l e c t r i c i t y 
s u p p l y i n d u s t r y , i n t h i s r e s p e c t , i s t o choose t h e 
b e s t method o f g e n e r a t i o n . The s t u d y shows t h a t 
h y d r o - e l e c t r i c p r o j e c t s i n Egypt s h o u l d be 
implemented p r i o r t o o t h e r p l a n t s . The High-Dam 
p r o j e c t , f o r i n s t a n c e , s h o u l d n o t be s u b s t i t u t e d 
by e q u i v a l e n t t h e r m a l p l a n t s . T h i s w o u l d ensure 
t h e economic u t i l i z a t i o n o f n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s . 
I f t h e a p p r o p r i a t e method o f g e n e r a t i o n i s 
chosen, t h e c o s t p e r KWh w i l l be a t a minimum and 
c o n s e q u e n t l y t h e p r i c e c h a r g e d t o consumers w o u l d 
be t h e l o w e s t p o s s i b l e . T h i s r e s u l t cannot be 
a t t a i n e d w i t h o u t a c o r r e c t p r i c e p o l i c y . I t i s o f 
i n t e r e s t t o n o t e t h a t p r i c i n g p o l i c i e s i n t h e 
e l e c t r i c i t y s u p p l y i n d u s t r y i n B r i t a i n and Egypt 
a r e w i d e l y d i f f e r e n t . T h i s i s c l e a r l y shown f r o m 
t h e t a r i f f s t r u c t u r e i n each c o u n t r y . The main 
c r i t i c i s m i n t h e B r i t i s h system i s t h e a p p l i c a t i o n 
o f a u n i f o r m t a r i f f w h i c h i s a l s o a n a t i o n a l t r e n d 
i n E g y p t . T h i s i s m a i n l y b e c a u s e ' u n i f o r m t a r i f f 
does n o t t a k e i n t o account t h e d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e 
economic p o s i t i o n o f each area i n t h e c o u n t r y . I n 
t h e c o n t r o v e r s y o f a v e r a g e - m a r g i n a l c o s t / p r i c i n g , 
i t appears t o be d i f f i c u l t t o s e l e c t one or a n o t h e r , 
b u t t h e method o f c h a r g i n g a p r i c e e q u a l t o 
m a r g i n a l c o s t a t o f f - p e a k t i m e s and a p r i c e e q u a l 
t o average c o s t o f s u p p l y a t peak t i m e s needs 
f u r t h e r s t u d i e s . I n p r a c t i c e p r i c i n g p o l i c i e s i n 
a p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e , such as t h e e l e c t r i c i t y s u p p l y , 
a r e n o t based on p u r e l y economic p r i n c i p l e s , 
because o f Government i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t h e n a t i o n a l 
i n t e r e s t • 
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W h i l e i n B r i t a i n Government i n t e r e s t i n 
p r i c i n g p o l i c i e s has f r e q u e n t l y a p p e a r e d ^ i n wages 
f 
p o l i c i e s t h e Government r o l e i s d e s c r i b e d by b e i n g 
moderate* 
However, as i n p r i c e s , t h e s t r u c t u r e o f 
wages does n o t depend on p u r e l y economic p r i n c i p l e s . 
S o c i a l f a c t o r s , c o m p a r a b i l i t y o f wages between 
d i f f e r e n t r e g i o n s o f t h e i n d u s t r y and among t h e 
whole p u b l i c s e c t o r have c o n s i d e r a b l e e f f e c t on 
wages p o l i c i e s i n B r i t a i n . I t i s n o t d e s i r a b l e 
t o have more Government i n t e r v e n t i o n i n wage 
p o l i c i e s . But i n some cases i t seems n e c e s s a r y 
t h a t t h e Government r o l e s h o u l d be i n c r e a s e d t o 
keep wage c l a i m s i n l i n e w i t h p r o d u c t i v i t y , t h u s 
r e d u c i n g t h e p r e s s u r e o f i n f l a t i o n . . 
The l a s t p r o b l e m i n v e s t i g a t e d i n t h i s s t u d y 
i s c e n t r a l i s a t i o n and d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n . I t i s 
f e l t i n d i s c u s s i n g t h i s p r o b l e m t h a t much o f i t s 
c o m p l e x i t y a r i s e s f r o m d i f f e r e n t d e f i n i t i o n s . I t 
i s s uggested t h a t t h e t e r m c e n t r a l i s a t i o n o r 
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n s h o u l d be d e f i n e d i n r e l a t i o n t o 
f u n c t i o n s o f t h e i n d u s t r y c o ncerned. To i l l u s t r a t e 
t h i s d e f i n i t i o n some f u n c t i o n s have been 
i n v e s t i g a t e d and i t was shown t h a t i n most o f t h e s e 
f u n c t i o n s p a r t s o f them s h o u l d be c e n t r a l i s e d and 
o t h e r s s h o u l d be d e c e n t r a l i s e d . T a k i n g t h e whole 
i n d u s t r y as a u n i t , i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o have l i n e s 
o f communications between a l l l e v e l s i n t h e i n d u s t r y 
and between t h e d e p a r t m e n t s on t h e same l e v e l . T h i s 
w o u l d r e s u l t i n a s u c c e s s f u l compromise between t h e 
two methods o f c e n t r a l i s a t i o n and d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n . 
L a s t l y , as p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s a r e u s u a l l y 
v e r y l a r g e , o r g a n i s a t i o n a l and m a n a g e r i a l problems 
a r e a l m o s t of u n i q u e k i n d . I t i s n o t p o s s i b l e i n 
every case to f i n d the b e s t s o l u t i o n f o r these 
problems. Also the f a c t t h a t the ronixang of* 
i n d u s t r i e s a r e i n any case answerable to P a r l i a m e n t , 
d i r e c t l y s u p e r v i s e d by a M i n i s t e r and s e v e r e l y 
c r i t i c i s e d by t h e p r e s s i f something goes wrong, 
•frfarercso-E-^ ao t o r e adds more d i f f i c u l t i e s t o t h e 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s . 
T h i s s t u d y i s a c o n t r i b u t i o n t o s o l v e 
p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s ' problems w i t h p a r t i c u l a r 
r e f e r e n c e t o t h e e l e c t r i c i t y s u p p l y i n d u s t r y . 
APPENDIX I . 
From t h e b r i e f i n f o r m a t i o n r e c e i v e d thee 
new s t r u c t u r e o f t h e E g y p t i a n e l e c t r i c i t y s u p p l y 
i n d u s t r y i s as f o l l o w s : 
A M i n i s t r y o f E l e c t r i c Power has been 
* 
c r e a t e d i n March, l$6k, t o s u p e r v i s e and c o n t r o l 
t h e f o l l o w i n g O r g a n i s a t i o n s : : 
1• The General Commission o f t h e E l e c t r i f i c a t i o n 
o f t h e U.A.R. 
I t i s e x a c t l y t h e U.A.R. E l e c t r i c i t y Commission 
i n v e s t i g a t e d Chapter I . I t s f u n c t i o n s a r e 
b r i e f l y : 
( a ) p l a n n i n g and p r o v i s i o n o f new p r o j e c t s and 
t o c a r r y o u t r e s e a r c h f o r t h e whole i n d u s t r y * 
( b ) r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e g e n e r a l budget and i t s 
f i n a n c e s • 
( c ) t h e d e c i s i o n s o f p r i c e p o l i c y and t h e 
t a r i f f s t r u c t u r e * 
2. E g y p t i a n O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n 
o f E l e c t r i c i t y P r o j e c t s . 
I t s main f u n c t i o n i s t o ex e c u t e t h e p l a n n e d 
p r o j e c t s w h i c h were c a r r i e d o u t by f o r e i g n 
a g e n c i e s . 
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3. . E g y p t i a n O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r G e n e r a t i o n and 
T r a n s m i s s i o n , 
I t s main f u n c t i o n i s t h e management o f a l l 
e l e c t r i c i t y power s t a t i o n s and H.V. g e n e r a l 
n e t w o r k s • 
4 . E g y p t i a n O r g a n i s a t i o n o f E l e c t r i c i t y 
D i s t r i b u t i o n . 
I t s main f u n c t i o n i s t o c o n t r o l v a r i o u s 
a u t h o r i t i e s s u p p l y i n g e l e c t r i c i t y t o consumers. 
A l s o t h e r e p a i r and maintenance o f t h e 
d i s t r i b u t i o n n e t w o r k s and t h e e x e c u t i o n o f l o w 
v o l t a g e schemes and r u r a l e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n 
p r o j e c t s . ( 4 2 ) 
( 4 2 ) The Arab S t u d e n t s S a t . l 6 . 1.. 1965 No. 1 2 3 . 
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APPENDIX II,» 
Law No. 20 1957 Amended by Law No. 138 1957 r e l a t i n g 
t o t h e Economic O r g a n i s a t i o n . 
A r t i c l e 1. 
A g e n e r a l o r g a n i s a t i o n named t h e 'Economic 
O r g a n i s a t i o n ' w i l l be e s t a b l i s h e d . I t w i l l be a 
l e g a l body and w i l l be a t t a c h e d t o t h e P r e s i d e n c y 
o f t h e R e p u b l i c . 
A r t i c l e 2 , 
The c a p i t a l o f t h e s a i d f o u n d a t i o n w i l l be 
composed o f t 
( a ) The share o f t h e Government i n t h e c a p i t a l 
o f t h e j o i n t s t o c k companies* 
( b ) C a p i t a l o f p u b l i c e s t a b l i s h m e n t s whose 
o b j e c t i v e s a r e t h e p r a c t i s i n g o f c o m m e r c i a l , 
i n d u s t r i a l , a g r i c u l t u r a l o r l a n d a c t i v i t i e s 
whose d e f i n i t i o n has been d e t e r m i n e d by a 
d e c i s i o n o f t h e P r e s i d e n t o f t h e R e p u b l i c . 
The c a p i t a l may be i n c r e a s e d by a d e c i s i o n 
o f t h e P r e s i d e n t o f t h e R e p u b l i c . 
A r t i c l e 3 . 
O b j e c t i v e s o f t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t ? 
( a ) Development o f n a t i o n a l economy t h r o u g h 
c o m m e r c i a l , i n d u s t r i a l , a g r i c u l t u r a l and 
f i n a n c i a l a c t i v i t i e s . 
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(b) L a y i n g down t h e p o l i c y o f i n v e s t i n g t h e 
f u n d s o f t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n and d i r e c t i n g 
them t o t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n r e f e r r e d t o i n 
A r t i c l e 2 above. 
( c ) A c t i n g f o r t h e Government i n g u i d i n g and 
s u p e r v i s i n g o t h e r p u b l i c e s t a b l i s h m e n t s 
formed by d e c i s i o n o f t h e P r e s i d e n t o f t h e 
R e p u b l i c on b e h a l f o f t h e w e l f a r e o f t h e 
n a t i o n a l economy. P l a n n i n g t h e n e c e s s a r y 
programmes f o r r e g u l a t i n g Government 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n as w e l l as t h a t o f p u b l i c 
and p r i v a t e o r g a n i s a t i o n i n t h i s a c t i v i t y . 
A r t i c l e 4« 
T h i s o r g a n i s a t i o n on b e h a l f o f t h e s e 
o b j e c t s may use e v e r y n e c e s s a r y means t o secure 
them, i n p a r t i c u l a r t h r o u g h : 
( a ) The e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f c o m m e r c i a l , f i n a n c i a l , 
i n d u s t r i a l , a g r i c u l t u r a l o r l a n d companies. 
( b ) The i n c r e a s e o r r e d u c t i o n o f f u n d s i n v e s t e d 
i n p r o j e c t s w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e t o t h e r i g h t s 
and g u a r a n t e e s g i v e n by laws i n w h i c h i t 
p a r t i c i p a t e s • 
( c ) The a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f s t o c k s and shares 
t h r o u g h purchase o r s u b s c r i p t i o n . 
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( d ) The c o n t r a c t i n g o f l o a n s w i t h Government, 
banks f o r e i g n Governments and o r g a n i s a t i o n s 
and i n t e r n a t i o n a l e s t a b l i s h m e n t s . The 
i s s u i n g o f s t o c k s i n Egypt o r abroad w i t h a 
v i e w t o f i n a n c i n g i t s p r o j e c t s . 
( e ) G r a n t i n g l o a n s t o companies s h a r i n g i n i t s 
c a p i t a l , g u a r a n t e e i n g them f o r l o a n s , 
c o n t r a c t i n g l o a n s and i s s u i n g s t o c k s and 
s h a r e s , t h e s e a r e t o be d e t e r m i n e d by 
d e c i s i o n o f t h e P r e s i d e n t o f t h e R e p u b l i c * 
A r t i c l e 5 . 
The o r g a n i s a t i o n has t h e r i g h t t o f o r m 
j o i n t s t o c k companies a l o n e w i t h o u t o t h e r p a r t n e r s 
and t h e shares o f such companies may be p u t i n t o 
c i r c u l a t i o n d i r e c t l y a f t e r t h e i r e s t a b l i s h m e n t . 
A r t i c l e 6 . 
The Economic O r g a n i s a t i o n s h a l l have 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s on t h e b o a r d o f d i r e c t o r s o f t h e 
companies i n whose c a p i t a l i t has s h a r e s . The 
number o f such r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i s d e t e r m i n e d by 
and s h o u l d be l e s s t h a n t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e 
f o u n d a t i o n share i n t h e c a p i t a l , i t b e i n g s t i p u l a t e d 
t h a t i n a l l cases t h e E s t a b l i s h m e n t must have a t 
l e a s t one r e p r e s e n t a t i v e on t h e b o a r d o f d i r e c t o r s 
452 
o f companies i n whose c a p i t a l i t s shares a r e no 
l e s s t h a n 25%. The r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e 
O r g a n i s a t i o n on t h e b o a r d o f d i r e c t o r s s h a l l have 
t h e same r i g h t s and a u t h o r i t y as th o s e o f t h e 
o t h e r members o f t h e b o a r d . They have t h e r i g h t 
a l s o t o submit t o t h e b o a r d o f d i r e c t o r s and t h e 
G e n e r a l Assembly any s u g g e s t i o n s o r a d v i c e r e l a t i n g 
t o t h e management o f t h e a f f a i r s o f t h e company. 
A r t i c l e 7« 
The r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e O r g a n i s a t i o n on 
t h e b o a r d o f d i r e c t o r s and t h e g e n e r a l assembly o f 
companies s h o u l d a c q u a i n t t h e P r e s i d e n t o f t h e 
Board o f t h e O r g a n i s a t i o n w i t h t h e d e c i s i o n i s s u e d 
by such boards and a s s e m b l i e s w i t h i n t h r e e days 
f r o m d a t e o f t h e i r i s s u e . 
A r t i c l e 8 . 
I f t h e share o f t h e O r g a n i s a t i o n i n t h e 
c a p i t a l o f any company i s n o t l e s s t h a n 23% t h e 
P r e s i d e n t o f i t s Board s h a l l have t h e r i g h t t o 
r e q u e s t t h e r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f e v e r y d e c i s i o n 
i s s u e d by t h e Board o r t h e Ge n e r a l Assembly o f 
such companies w i t h i n a week f r o m t h e d a t e o f 
n o t i f i c a t i o n o t h e r w i s e t h e d e c i s i o n w i l l be 
c o n s i d e r e d v a l i d u n l e s s i t i s passed by t h e Board 
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o r t h e General Assembly as t h e case may be by a 
m a j o r i t y o f a t l e a s t two t h i r d s o f t h e v o t e . 
A r t i c l e ft. 
The r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e Economic 
O r g a n i s a t i o n i n t h e Ge n e r a l Assembly o f t h e 
companies s h a l l n o t p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e e l e c t i o n o f 
t h e members o f t h e Board who r e p r e s e n t p r i v a t e 
c a p i t a l * 
A r t i c l e 10. 
The r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e Economic 
O r g a n i s a t i o n on t h e Board o f D i r e c t o r s o f 
companies s h a l l n o t be o b l i g e d t o o f f e r g u a r a n t e e 
shares f o r t h e i r membership. 
A r t i c l e 1 1 . 
The sums due t o t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e 
Economic O r g a n i s a t i o n on t h e Board o f D i r e c t o r s o f 
companies s h a l l be t h e p r o p e r t y o f t h e Economic 
O r g a n i s a t i o n , i n whatever f o r m t h e s e sums may b e . 
I t i s t h e O r g a n i s a t i o n i t s e l f t h a t d e t e r m i n e s t h e 
s a l a r i e s o r t h e r e m u n e r a t i o n s t h a t a r e t o be p a i d 
by i t s t r e a s u r y t o i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . The a s s e t s 
o f t h e O r g a n i s a t i o n s are c o n s i d e r e d p r i v a t e f u n d s 
e x c e p t t h o s e t h a t a r e c o n s i d e r e d o f p u b l i c u t i l i t y 
b y a d e c i s i o n by t h e P r e s i d e n t o f t h e R e p u b l i c o r 
by t h e i r s t a t u s . 
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A r t i c l e 1 2 . 
The n o m i n a t i o n o f t h e P r e s i d e n t o f t h e 
b o a r d o r t h e managing d i r e c t o r o r t h e d i r e c t o r 
g e n e r a l i n t h e companies i n whose c a p i t a l t h e 
E s t a b l i s h m e n t s h a r e s by a t l e a s t 25%, s h a l l be 
done t h r o u g h a d e c i s i o n by t h e P r e s i d e n t o f t h e 
R e p u b l i c f r o m among t h r e e c a n d i d a t e s chosen by 
t h e b o a r d o f t h e company a f t e r t a k i n g t h e o p i n i o n 
o f t h e Board o f t h e O r g a n i s a t i o n . I n t h e ev e n t 
o f t h e absence o f t h e P r e s i d e n t o f t h e b o a r d o r 
t h e managing d i r e c t o r he w i l l be r e p l a c e d 
t e m p o r a r i l y by one o f t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e 
O r g a n i s a t i o n o f t h e Board. 
A r t i c l e 1 3 . 
The Economic O r g a n i s a t i o n s h a l l have a 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e on each o f t h e boards o f p u b l i c 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s when t h e Economic O r g a n i s a t i o n 
d i r e c t s t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s i n accordance w i t h t h e 
p r o v i s i o n s o f A r t i c l e 6 . The r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f 
t h e Economic O r g a n i s a t i o n s h a l l have r i g h t s and 
a u t h o r i t y as t h o s e o f t h e o t h e r members o f t h e 
b o a r d . They s h a l l have t h e r i g h t t o o f f e r t o t h e 
b o a r d d i r e c t i o n s r e l a t i n g t o t h e p u b l i c a f f a i r s 
o f t h e E s t a b l i s h m e n t . The r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e 
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Economic O r g a n i s a t i o n must n o t i f y t h e p r e s i d e n t o f 
t h e b o a r d o f t h e d e c i s i o n s t a k e n by t h e b o a r d o f 
t h e O r g a n i s a t i o n i n t h e b o a r d o f w h i c h t h e Economic 
O r g a n i s a t i o n shares membership w i t h i n t h r e e days 
f r o m t h e d e c i s i o n . The P r e s i d e n t o f t h e b o a r d o f 
t h e Economic O r g a n i s a t i o n s h a l l have t h e r i g h t t o 
o b j e c t t o t h e d e c i s i o n s o f t h e s a i d o r g a n i s a t i o n 
w i t h i n one week f r o m d a t e o f n o t i f i c a t i o n f a i l i n g 
w h i c h t h e d e c i s i o n i s c o n s i d e r e d v a l i d . I n t h e 
case o f any o b j e c t i o n to t h e d e c i s i o n s i t s h a l l 
n o t be v a l i d , u n l e s s i t i s passed by t h e b o a r d by 
a m a j o r i t y o f t w o - t h i r d s o f t h e v o t e a t l e a s t . 
T h i s without p r e j u d i c e t o t h e r u l e s r e g u l a t i n g t h e 
work o f t h o s e p u b l i c e s t a b l i s h m e n t s . 
A r t i c l e 14. 
The Board o f t h e O r g a n i s a t i o n s h a l l be 
composed o f a number o f members whose number and 
s a l a r i e s and n o m i n a t i o n s h a l l be by a d e c i s i o n o f 
t h e P r e s i d e n t o f t h e R e p u b l i c . 
The P r e s i d e n t and t h e members o f t h e Board 
o f t h e O r g a n i s a t i o n s h o u l d f u l f i l l t h e f o l l o w i n g 
c o n d i t i o n s : . 
( a ) They s h a l l be E g y p t i a n by b i r t h . 
( b ) They s h a l l n o t have p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t i n 
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any o f t h e companies i n w h i c h t h e 
O r g a n i s a t i o n i s s h a r i n g . 
( c ) They must e n j o y t h e i r c i v i l and p o l i t i c a l 
r i g h t s . 
A r t i c l e 15. 
The m e e t i n g o f t h e Board s h a l l be by a 
summons by i t s P r e s i d e n t , and w i l l n o t be 
v a l i d u n l e s s i t be a t t e n d e d by more t h a n 
h a l f o f t h e members. The d e c i s i o n s a r e 
t a k e n by a m a j o r i t y o f v o t e s and i n cases 
o f p a r i t y t h e s i d e t h a t has t h e p r e s i d e n t 
w i l l g a i n t h e d e c i s i o n s . The P r e s i d e n t 
o f t h e Board n o t i f i e s t h e d e c i s i o n s o f t h e 
b o a r d t o t h e P r e s i d e n t o f t h e R e p u b l i c who 
has t h e r i g h t o f c a n c e l l a t i o n o r amendment 
w i t h i n one week f r o m t h e d a t e o f n o t i f i c a t i o n , 
o t h e r w i s e t h e d e c i s i o n i s v a l i d . 
A r t i c l e 1 6 , 
The Board o f D i r e c t o r s o f t h e O r g a n i s a t i o n 
has f u l l r i g h t t o manage t h e work o f t h e 
O r g a n i s a t i o n and i n p a r t i c u l a r t o r 
( a ) P r a c t i c e a l l a c t i v i t i e s f o r managing t h e 
f u n d s o f t h e O r g a n i s a t i o n and t o d e t e r m i n e 
t h e means o f i n v e s t m e n t . 
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( b ) C o n t r a c t l o a n s and i s s u e s t o c k s i n 
c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t h e l a w . 
( c ) Choose t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e O r g a n i s a t i o n 
i n t h e b o a r d o f t h e companies i n whose 
c a p i t a l i t shares and t o s t u d y t h e r e p o r t s 
s u b m i t t e d by them and t o i s s u e t h e 
n e c e s s a r y i n s t r u c t i o n s . 
( d ) A p p o i n t t h e o f f i c i a l s o f t h e O r g a n i s a t i o n 
and d e t e r m i n e t h e i r s a l a r i e s and r e m u n e r a t i o n s . 
A r t i c l e 17* 
The Board p r e p a r e s e v e r y y e a r a b a l a n c e 
s h e e t and a p r o f i t s and l o s s e s a c c o u n t . I t must 
a l s o p r e p a r e a r e p o r t o f t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e 
O r g a n i s a t i o n d u r i n g t h e f i n a n c i a l y e a r and o f i t s 
f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n a t t h e end o f t h e same y e a r . 
A r t i c l e l 8 . 
The A u d i t A d m i n i s t r a t i o n t a k e o v e r t h e 
c h e c k i n g o f t h e a c c o u n t s o f t h e O r g a n i s a t i o n and 
s u b m i t s an a n n u a l r e p o r t o f t h e r e s u l t o f a u d i t i n g 
t o t h e Board. 
A r t i c l e 1 9 . 
The P r e s i d e n t o f t h e Board o f t h e 
O r g a n i s a t i o n w i l l s u b m i t t o t h e P r e s i d e n t o f t h e 
R e p u b l i c a r e p o r t on t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e 
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O r g a n i s a t i o n a t t h e end o f t h e y e a r . T h i s r e p o r t 
w i l l be accompanied by a copy o f each o f t h e 
a n n u a l r e p o r t s and t h e r e p o r t o f t h e A u d i t 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 
A r t i c l e 20. 
The b a l a n c e sheet and t h e p r o f i t and l o s s e s 
a c c o u n t a r e r a t i f i e d by a d e c i s i o n o f t h e P r e s i d e n t 
o f t h e R e p u b l i c . The n e t p r o f i t s o f t h e O r g a n i s a t i o n 
a r e added t o t h e S t a t e T r e a s u r y a f t e r d e d u c t i n g t h a t 
p o r t i o n d e s t i n e d f o r f o r m i n g a r e s e r v e c a p i t a l f o r 
t h e O r g a n i s a t i o n o r f o r t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f new 
p r o j e c t s i n t h e development o f t h e n a t i o n a l economy 
or f o r t h e s u p p o r t o f e x i s t i n g p r o j e c t s . 
A r t i c l e 2 1 . 
The P r e s i d e n t o f t h e R e p u b l i c i s s u e s t h e 
s t a t u t e s o f t h e O r g a n i s a t i o n w h i c h comprise t h e 
f o l l o w i n g : 
( a ) The r u l e s and r e g u l a t i o n s t o be f o l l o w e d i n 
managing t h e E s t a b l i s h m e n t i n c l u d i n g t h e 
f i n a n c i a l and a c c o u n t s r u l i n g s w h i c h a r e 
n o t bound by t h e Government r e g u l a t i o n s i n 
f o r c e . 
( b ) The f o r m i n w h i c h t h e b a l a n c e sheet o f t h e 
O r g a n i s a t i o n and t h e r e l a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s a r e 
i s s u e d . 
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( c ) The r e g u l a t i o n s g o v e r n i n g t h e a p p o i n t m e n t and 
p r o m o t i o n o f o f f i c i a l s as w e l l as t h e i r 
r e m u n e r a t i o n i n c r e a s e o f pay and punishment 
w i t h o u t b e i n g bound by t h e Government 
r u l i n g s i n f o r c e . 
A r t i c l e 22. 
A l l laws a u t h o r i s i n g t h e c r e a t i o n o f 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s under t h e c o n t r o l and s u p e r v i s i o n o f 
t h e Economic O r g a n i s a t i o n by a d e c i s i o n o f t h e 
P r e s i d e n t o f t h e R e p u b l i c a r e c o n s i d e r e d v a l i d as 
t h o s e i s s u e d by t h e P r e s i d e n t h i m s e l f . They may 
be c a n c e l l e d o r amended by p r e s i d e n t i a l d e c i s i o n . 
( P u b l i s h e d i n t h e O f f i c i a l G a z e t t e i n No. 5 o f 
14. 1. 1957.) 
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APPENDIX I I I . 
The A f f i l i a t e d Companies o f t h e E.D.Q.; 
Banking Share o f E.D.O-
Bank o f A l e x a n d r i a 100% 
Bank du C a i r e 45.4% 
Bank L. Goumberiah 25.2% 
Bank de 1*Union Commerciale 25.1% 
Le C r e d i t H y p o t h e c a i r e 56.9% 
Le C r e d i t A g r i c o l e e t C o - o p e r a t i v e 50% 
I n s u r a n c e 
The N a t i o n a l I n s u r a n c e Company o f Egypt 60.4% 
AL MOTTANIDA I n s u r a n c e Company 100% 
The M i s r I n s u r a n c e Company 29% 
La S o c i e t e AL CHARK pour l e s Assurances 86.7% 
The C a i r o I n s u r a n c e Company 25% 
I n d u s t r y 
The General P e t r o l e u m Company 100% 
S o c i e t e E g y p t i e n n e pour l a R a f f i n a g e 
e t l e commerce du P e t r o l e 49.4% 
The S i n a i Manganese Company 100% 
The Safaga Phosphate Company 100% 
S o c i e t e Generale d ' l l i m e n i t e 100% 
The A s s o c i a t e d Mines Company 87% 
The M i n e r a l W e a l t h Company 62.23%; 
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The E g y p t i a n B l a c k Sands Company 25%. 
The G e n e r a l Company f o r r e s e a r c h and 
ground w a t e r 100% 
S o c i e t e Generale E g y p t i e n n e de M a t e r i a l 
de Chemins de Fer (Semaf) 79*7% 
E l e c t r i c Cable Egypt 52% 
The S m e l t i n g Company 98.8% 
The General Company f o r l a n d 
r e c l a m a t i o n 100% 
S o c i e t e pour l a c o n s t r u c t i o n e t l e s 
h a b i t a t i o n s p o p u l a i r e s 20% 
The G e n e r a l I n t e r i o r Trade Company 100%. 
The M i s r F o r e i g n Trade Company 55% 
The T r a c t o r and E n g i n e e r i n g Company 57.4% 
The General Company f o r P h a r m a c e u t i c a l s 100% 
B a s s i l i Timber Company 23«7% 
S o c i e t e Generale pour l a n a v i g a t i o n 
m a r i t i m e 100% 
U n i t e d Arab A i r l i n e 51.85% 
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APPENDIX I V . 
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NATIONALISING BANKS 
AND INSURANCE COMPANIES IN THE U.A.R. 
A r t i c l e 1. 
A l l banks and i n s u r a n c e companies s h a l l be 
n a t i o n a l i s e d , and t h e companies and e s t a b l i s h m e n t s 
s p e c i f i e d . 
A r t i c l e 4. 
Companies and banks r e f e r r e d t o i n A r t i c l e 1 
s h a l l m a i n t a i n t h e i r l e g a l f o r m and c o n t i n u e t h e i r 
a c t i v i t i e s and f u n c t i o n s . Amalgamation o f any o f 
t h e s e banks, companies or e s t a b l i s h m e n t s w i t h 
a n o t h e r can o n l y t a k e p l a c e on t h e s t r e n g t h o f a 
R e p u b l i c a n Decree. 
A r t i c l e 
The P r e s i d e n t o f t h e R e p u b l i c s h a l l i s s u e a. 
R e p u b l i c a n Decree i n d i c a t i n g t h e competent 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a u t h o r i t y t h a t s h a l l be concerned 
w i t h t h e s u p e r v i s i o n o f each o f t h e companies o r 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t s r e f e r r e d t o . 
A r t i c l e 6. 
The competent a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a u t h o r i t y 
e n t r u s t e d w i t h s u p e r v i s i o n o f companies and banks 
a f f e c t e d by t h i s l a w s h a l l be a u t h o r i s e d t o r e l i e v e 
t h e managing d i r e c t o r s , chairman o f t h e b o a r d o f 
d i r e c t o r s and some or a l l members o f t h e b o a r d o f 
any o f t h e s e e s t a b l i s h m e n t s and a p p o i n t a 
p r o v i s i o n a l b o a r d , a managing d i r e c t o r o r a d e l e g a t e 
h a v i n g t h e powers o f a b o a r d o f d i r e c t o r s p e n d i n g 
t h e a p p o i n t m e n t o f a new b o a r d . As f o r o t h e r 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t s r e f e r r e d t o , t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
a u t h o r i t y s h a l l be a u t h o r i s e d t o r e l i e v e t h e 
d i r e c t o r o f any o f th e s e e s t a b l i s h m e n t s and a p p o i n t 
a n o t h e r . A l l d e c i s i o n s by t h e p r o v i s i o n a l b o a r d , 
t h e managing d i r e c t o r o r t h e d e l e g a t e s h a l l n o t be 
r e g a r d e d as f i n a l u n l e s s a p p o i n t e d by t h e competent 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a u t h o r i t y . 
APPENDIX V, 
CLASSIFICATION OF THE EGYPTIAN PUBLIC 
ENTERPRISES. 
I n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t h e P r e s i d e n t i a l Decree 
No. 1899/1961 p r o m u l g a t e d on t h e l6th o f December, 
a Supreme C o u n c i l f o r P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n s was 
e s t a b l i s h e d under t h e Chairmanship o f t h e P r e s i d e n t 
o f t h e R e p u b l i c w i t h t h e V i c e - P r e s i d e n t o f t h e 
R e p u b l i c and t h e competent M i n i s t e r s as members. 
A c c o r d i n g t o a l i s t a t t a c h e d t o t h e s a i d 
Decree, t h e p u b l i c b u s i n e s s s e c t o r i s t o be grouped 
i n 38 p u b l i c o r g a n i s a t i o n s . Each group o f 
i n d u s t r i e s , concerned w i t h one economic a c t i v i t y , 
i s s u p e r v i s e d by a competent M i n i s t e r . 
1 . M i n i s t e r o f I n d u s t r y . 
1„ The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r Minding. 
2. The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r F o o d s t u f f s . 
3. The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r T e x t i l e s . 
k. The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r Chemical 
I n d u s t r i e s • 
5. The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r B u i l d i n g 
M a t e r i a l s and Ceramics. 
6. The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r 
M e t a l l u r g i c a l I n d u s t r i e s . 
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7. The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r E n g i n e e r i n g 
I n d u s t r i e s • 
8. The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r P e t r o l e u m . 
9. The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r 
C o - o p e r a t i v e P r o d u c t i o n and S m a l l I n d u s t r i e s . 
II„ M i n i s t e r o f War. 
The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r t h e 
M i l i t a r y F a c t o r i e s . 
I I I . M i n i s t e r o f A g r i c u l t u r e . 
The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r 
C o - o p e r a t i v e A g r i c u l t u r e . 
I V . M i n i s t e r o f Communication. 
1. The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r I n t e r n a l 
T r a n s p o r t . 
2. The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r M a r i t i m e 
T r a n s p o r t . 
V. M i n i s t e r o f Housing and P u b l i c U t i l i t i e s . 
1. The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r 
C o - o p e r a t i v e H ousing. 
2. The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r C o n t r a c t s 
and C o n s t r u c t i o n . 
3. The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r P u b l i c 
B u i l d i n g s . 
4. The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r Housing 
and R e c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
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V I . M i n i s t e r o f A g r a r i a n Reform and Land 
Reclamation.. 
1. The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r D e s e r t 
R e c l a m a t i o n . 
2. The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r Land 
Development. 
3. The Eg y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r Land 
Reclamation. 
V I I . M i n i s t e r of Labour. 
The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r S o c i a l 
I n s u r a n c e . 
V I I I . M i n i s t e r o f S t a t e . 
1. The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r 
B r o a d c a s t i n g and T e l e v i s i o n . 
2* The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r T o u r i s m 
and H o t e l s . 
3. The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r News, 
P u b l i c i t y , D i s t r i b u t i o n and P r i n t i n g . 
I X . M i n i s t e r o f Supply. 
1. The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r Consumption* 
2. The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c C o - o p e r a t i v e O r g a n i s a t i o n 
f o r Consumption. 
3. The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r S i l o s 
and S t o r a g e . 
4. The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r F i s h e r i e s . 
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X. , M i n i s t e r o f H e a l t h , 
1, The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r 
P h a r m a c e u t i c a l P r o d u c t s , Chemical and M e d i c a l 
Equipment, 
X I . M i n i s t e r o f Economics, 
1, The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r T r a d e , 
2, The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r C o t t o n 
T r a d e , 
3, The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r Banks, 
4, The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r Insurance»-
5, The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r S a v i n g s . 
X I I . M i n i s t e r o f C u l t u r e and N a t i o n a l Guidance, 
1, The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r 
S u p p o r t i n g t h e F i l m I n d u s t r y , 
2, The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r 
T h e a t r i c a l and M u s i c a l A r t s , 
3, The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r 
C o m p o s i t i o n T r a n s l a t i o n , P r i n t i n g and 
P u b l i c a t i o n , 
X I I I . M i n i s t e r o f P u b l i c Works. 
The E g y p t i a n P u b l i c O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r 
E l e c t r i c i t y (U.A.R.. E l e c t r i c i t y Commission)* 
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APPENDIX 6, 
Organisation Chart of the C.E.G.A. 
The Board 
General Manager 
General Inspector of General Inspector of Deputy-General Manager Deputy-General Manager General Inspector of 
E l e c t r i c i t y Power Stations Incomes and Expenditures 
The 'Administration' Headquarters Main Departments 
General Technical Cost Secretaries Dept. S t a t i s t i c a l 
Account- Bureau accountancy for the Board & planning 
ancy Dept. Employees for General Whole & production Calculations Archives Dept. Dept. 
Dept. General Commercial Secretaries Accounts Dept. Machines Dept. Legal 
Manager Dept. Dept. Dept. for Dept. 
consumers 
These Departments are under the dire c t supervision of the two Deputy-General Managers* 
General Inspector of E l e c t r i c i t y 
Departments i n the Headquarters. 
Transport Drawing Maintenance of Controlling Connection & Safety Stores & 
Bureau main transformers Dept. executing purchases 
Networks Technical Bureau Contracts for Meters Dept. 






overhead l i n e s 
& cables Maintenance of low voltage networks Workshops Building & survey 
General Inspector of Power Stations 




Bureau for projects 
E l e c t r i c a l Engineers 
Bureau for projects 
C i v i l Engineers 
Bureau for projects 
Accountancy 
Bureau for projects 
Drawing 
Bureau 
Power Station Headquarters i s divided into the following Departments 
S h i f t Dept. Mechanical 
maintenance 




Managerial Maintenance of 
general character 
i n the Area served 
Stores 
General Inspector of Incomes Expenditure 
He controls seven branches i n Cairo and i t s suburbs* 
Each branch i s divided into the following Departments* 
Applications for 
connections 





PLAN OF ELECTRIFICATION OF U.A.R. 
A. P r o j e c t s f i n a n c e d t h r o u g h t h e E l e c t r i c i t y Commission. 
(Thousands o f pounds) 
Name o f p r o j e c t 
E s t i m a t e d i n v e s t m e n t 
T o t a l F o r e i g n 
G e n e r a t i n g s t a t i o n s 
A s s y u t g e n e r a t i n g s t a t i o n 
C a i r o South g e n e r a t i n g s t a t i o n 
( E x t e n s i o n ) 
C a i r o West g e n e r a t i n g s t a t i o n 
T a l k h a g e n e r a t i n g s t a t i o n 
( E x t e n s i o n ) 
Damanhour g e n e r a t i n g s t a t i o n 
( E x t e n s i o n ) 
A l e x a n d r i a g e n e r a t i n g s t a t i o n i n S i u f 
H i g h V o l t a g e Networks 
D e l t a i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n scheme) 
Asssrut & Minya s u b s t a t i o n ) 
Upper Egypt n e t w o r k s 132 kV: l i n e s 
s u b s t a t i o n s 
C a i r o area e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n 63 kV 
l i n e t o E l - T a h r i r 
e r e c t i o n & e x t e n s i o n o f s u b s t a t i o n s 
Lower Egypt e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n p r o j e c t s 
Upper Egypt e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n p r o j e c t s 
Medium V o l t a g e Systems 
Low V o l t a g e Systems 
E x t e n s i o n o f d i s t r i b u t i o n n e t w o r k s 
S t u d i e s & Research 
Network A n a l y s e r 
H i g h V o l t a g e t e s t i n g p l a n t 
S t u d i e s o f Q u a t t a r a power s t a t i o n 
S t u d i e s 
























PLAN OF ELECTRIFICATION OF U.A.R. 
B.. P r o j e c t s f i n a n c e d by t h e Power P r o d u c i n g A u t h o r i t y . 
(Thousands o f pounds) 










1969 126 6 
4838 2278 






G e n e r a t i n g s t a t i o n s 
C a i r o South g e n e r a t i n g s t a t i o n 
( E x t e n s i o n ) 
Damanhur g e n e r a t i n g s t a t i o n 
( E x i s t i n g ) 
Suez g e n e r a t i n g s t a t i o n 
A l e x a n d r i a g e n e r a t i n g s t a t i o n 
( E x i s t i n g ) 
S t a t i o n s f o r i n d u s t r i a l e n t e p r i s e s 
H i g h V o l t a g e Networks 
C a i r o Area e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n p r o j e c t s 
63 kV l i n e s and s u b s t a t i o n s 
E x t e n s i o n o f e x i s t i n g s u b s t a t i o n s 
A l e x a n d r i a Area e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n 
p r o j e c t s 
Medium V o l t a g e Systems 
Low V o l t a g e Systems 
E x t e n s i o n o f d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c s t a t i o ] 
S t u d i e s & Research 
E l e c t r i c i t y - m e t e r l a b o r a t o r y (CEGA) 
H y d r o - e l e c t r i c p r o j e c t s 
Aswan g e n e r a t i n g s t a t i o n 
High-Dam g e n e r a t i n g s t a t i o n & 
t r a n s m i s s i o n system 
N u c l e a r p r o j e c t s 
N u c l e a r g e n e r a t i n g s t a t i o n 
T o t a l 185517 110142 .5 
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APPENDIX 8. 
AVERAGE COSTS AT THE MAIN POWER STATION I N EGYPT, 
( l ) The C a i r o E l e c t r i c i t y and Gas A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 
M i l l i & e s p e r KWh 
F u e l c o s t s 2,6 
Average g r o s s c o s t 5.15 
E s t i m a t i o n o f t h e g e n e r a t i n g c o s t s i n t h e new 
Cairo-West power s t a t i o n s p l a n n e d t o be 
commissioned i n 1964 are as f o l l o w s . 
A t 50% a n n u a l l o a d f a c t o r . 
M i l l i m e s p e r KWh 
F u e l c o s t s 1.7 
T o t a l g r o s s c o s t s 2,76 
A t 80% a n n u a l l o a d f a c t o r 
M i l l i m e s p e r KWh 
F u e l c o s t s 1.66 
T o t a l g r o s s c o s t s 2.30 
A l e x a n d r i a E l e c t r i c i t y and Gas O r g a n i s a t i o n . 
M i l l i m e s p e r KWh 
F u e l c o s t s 3.0 
Average g r o s s c o s t s 5.45 
(3) Average c o s t s i n t h e hydro-power s t a t i o n s i n 
Aswan and t h e e s t i m a t e d c o s t s a t t h e H i g h Dam 
ar e l e s s t h a n 1-J m i l l i m e s . 
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APPENDIX 9* 
TARIFF STRUCTURE IN EGYPTIAN ELECTRICITY AUTHORITIES, 
( i ) The C a i r o E l e c t r i c i t y and Gas A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 
For t h e purpose o f l i g h t i n g . I n t h i s a r e a t h e 
n o r m a l s u b s c r i b e r s a r e c harged f o r e v e r y k i l o w a t t 
hour t h e sum o f 24 m i l l i m e s . For o t h e r c l a s s e s such 
as Governmental consumers, c h a r i t y s o c i e t i e s , p u b l i c 
h o s p i t a l s , r e l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s , orphanages and 
s i m i l a r i n s t i t u t i o n s , and s p o r t i n g c l u b s , t h e 
t a r i f f i s 21.6 m i l l i m e s p e r k i l o w a t t h o u r . 
For motive power and a p p l i a n c e s , the a u t h o r i t y 
c l a s s i f i e d the consumers i n t o two main c a t e g o r i e s , 
( i ) Home a p p l i a n c e s or consumers who use 
e l e c t r i c a l equipment a p a r t from Governmental 
ones, t h e r e a r e two t y p e s o f t a r i f f s . 
( a ) S i n g l e t a r i f f , f o r t h e whole c o n s u m p t i o n , a t 
any t i m e , t h e t a r i f f i s 14 mms/KWh. 
(b ) Double t a r i f f ; t h i s t a r i f f has two r a t e s 
v a r y i n g between day and n i g h t . Days r a t e i s 
10 mms/KWh. N i g h t r a t e i s 24 mms/KWh. * 
( i i ) M o t i v e power f o r Governmental consumers. 
The t a r i f f h ere i s a t h r e e b l o c k one a c c o r d i n g 
t o t h e number o f hours u s i n g e l e c t r i c i t y , i t 
* "Day t i m e s t a r t s a t 11 p.m. and ends a t 5 p.m. t h e 
f o l l o w i n g day; n i g h t t i m e s t a r t s a t 5 p.m. and 
ends 11 p.m. t h e same n i g h t . 1 1 
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d i f f e r s a l s o between day and n i g h t . We can sum i t 
up i n t h e f o l l o w i n g t a b l e . . 
Day Rate Mras/KWh N i g h t Rate Mms/KWh 
F i r s t 200 h o u r s 12 F i r s t 400 hours 21.6 
F o l l o w i n g 1800 h o u r s 8.7 F o l l o w i n g 600 h o u r s 15.4 
Rest o f Energy 7*7 Rest o f Energy 8.7 
Secondly; t h e A u t h o r i t y d e s i g n e d a t a r i f f w i t h two t y p e s 
a c c o r d i n g t o t h e consumer's c a p a c i t y z f i r s t consumers w i t h 
i n s t a l l e d c a p a c i t y l e s s t h a n 500 K.W.. There a r e a g a i n t h r e e 
t y p e s . 
( a ) Consumers whose consumption i s l e s s t h a n 10,000 KWh. 
per y e a r . I t i s a f o u r b l o c k t y p e a c c o r d i n g t o t h e number 
o f h o u r s u t i l i s e d a t day t i m e p e r ye a r and t h r e e b l o c k t y p e 
a t n i g h t t i m e . I t can be t h u s shown i n a t a b l e : 
Consumption l e s s t h a n 10,000 KWh per y e a r . 
Day Consumption Mms/KWh N i g h t Consumption MMs/KWtf 
F i r s t 200 hours l6 F i r s t 400 hours 24 
F o l l o w i n g 800 h o u r s 11.6 F o l l o w i n g 600 h o u r s 19.2 
Next 1000 h o u r s 9.6 Rest o f Energy 11.6 
Rest o f Energy 7.7 
"Power f a c t o r i s u s u a l l y 0.8, b u t i t i s s u b j e c t t o any 
change by t h e a u t h o r i t y . " 
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Consumption l e s s than 1000 hours and more than 
200 hours per year* 
"Block t a r i f f r e l a t e d to load f a c t o r . " 
T h i s type of t a r i f f i s designed to the 
d i f f e r e n t consumption a t day time and n i g h t time. 
The day time i s d i v i d e d between the f i r s t 200 hours 
u t i l i s e d and the r e s t of the 1000 hours. At n i g h t 
time i t i s assumed t h a t the consumer a t any 
p a r t i c u l a r grade of c a p a c i t y w i l l be charged f o r 
the whole 1000 hours even i f he i s not, but the 
d i f f e r e n c e here i s between summer and w i n t e r , as 
shown i n the next t a b l e . 
Consumption l e s s than 1000 hours and more than 
200 hours per y e a r . 
C a p a c i t y Day Night 
K.W,. 200 hours Rest Winter Summer 
10-13 16 7.9 24 16 
14-19 16 7 24 16 
20-26 15 6.2 24 15 
27-57 14 5.5 24 14 
38-51 13 4.9 24 13 
52-72 12 4.5 24 12 
73-100 11 4.2 24 11 
101 & above 10 3.9 24 10 
CONSUMERS WITH CONSUMPTION OF MORE THAN 1000 HOURS PER YEAR 
Ca p a c i t y Day N i K h t 
K.ra. Millim/K .FJti 





5 p.m. -8 8 p.m.,-11 5 P .m.—11 p.m. 
4- 5 16 11.6 5 24 24 16 
5.5- 7 14 11 4.4 2.4 24 14 
7.5- 9 12 9 4.,2 24 24 12 
10 - 13 10 7.9 4. 20 20 10 
l4 - 19 8.5 7 3.8 20 20 8.5 
20 - 26 7.7 6.2 3.6 20 20 7.7 
27 - 37 7 5.5 3.5 20 20 7 
38 - 51 6.7 4.9 3.5 20 6.7 6.7 
52 - 72 6.3 4.5 3.5 20 6.3 6.3 
73 - 100 5.9 4.,2 3.5 20 5.9 5.9 
100 & over 5.8 3.9 3.5 20 5.8 5.8 
The d i f f e r e n c e s between t h i s type of t a r i f f and the l a t e r a r e : 
(a) The c a p a c i t y s t a r t e d from 4 K.W, 
(b) Day time d i v i d e d i n three b l o c k s . 
( c ) Night time i n w i n t e r i s d i v i d e d between two p e r i o d s ? the f i r s t p e r i o d 
from 5 p.m. to 8 p.m. which i s de f i n e d as the peak time, the second 
p e r i o d between 8 p.m. to 11 p.m. 
(d) I n summer a t n i g h t times the t a r i f f i s s i m i l a r to t h a t of the f i r s t 
block a t day times; a l s o i n wi n t e r a t n i g h t from 8 p.m. to 11 p.m. ^ 
s t a r t e d from c a p a c i t y 38 K.W. to 101 and above. cr. 
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Consumers f o r maximum demand more than 500 K.W, 
"Big consumer t a r i f f " as i t i s c a l l e d . These 
consumers are charged a two-part t a r i f f . 
( a ) F i x e d annual charge of £E 3 per c o n t r a c t e d K.W., 
(b) Step t a r i f f : * 
F i r s t 750 u t i l i z a t i o n hours a t 4.8+3.4 Mms/KWh 
f o l l o w i n g 250 u t i l i z a t i o n hours a t 2.8*3.4 Mms/KWh 
f o l l o w i n g 500 u t i l i z a t i o n hours a t 1.8*3.4 Mms/KWh 
f o l l o w i n g 500 u t i l i z a t i o n hours a t 1.3+3.4 Mms/KWh 
f o l l o w i n g 1000 u t i l i z a t i o n hours a t 1.05*3.4 Mms/KWh 
excess u t i l i z a t i o n hours at 0.8+3.4 Mms/KWh 
I t should be noted t h a t ( i ) the f u e l f a c t o r 
of 3»4 i s r e v i s e d every 6 months, ( i i ) f o r 
v a r i a t i o n s of the annual power f a c t o r above or 
below 0.8 the t a r i f f i s a c c o r d i n g l y decreased or 
i n c r e a s e d by + 0,5% f o r every - 1%. v a r i a t i o n of 
the power f a c t o r . For a power f a c t o r l e s s than 
0.6 the t a r i f f i s i n c r e a s e d by 0 . 1 % f o r every 12£ 
decrease, ( i i i ) the consumer has to pay f o r the 
f i r s t 1000 u t i l i z a t i o n hours of the c o n t r a c t e d 
power even i f not u t i l i z e d . 
* "Step t a r i f f - a t a r i f f s i m i l a r to a block t a r i f f 
except t h a t when each block i s exceeded a l l the 
K.W.h, not merely the a d d i t i o n a l ones, are 
charged a t the lower r a t e . " 
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A l e x a n d r i a E l e c t r i c i t y and Gas O r g a n i s a t i o n ^ 
A Governmental o r g a n i s a t i o n of the M i n i s t r y of 
Housing and P u b l i c U t i l i t i e s supplying the c i t y 
of A l e x a n d r i a and some of i t s suburbs. The 
s t r u c t u r e of the t a r i f f of t h i s o r g a n i s a t i o n 
has i t s own f e a t u r e s v a r y i n g from the C a i r o 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , The scheme i s d i v i d e d i n t o 
four c a t e g o r i e s according to the purpose of 
us i n g e l e c t r i c i t y w i t h i n t h i s a r e a . 
L i g h t i n g T a r i f f , 
The c e i l i n g p r i c e f o r l i g h t i n g i s f i x e d a t 
l 6 mms/KWh., The consumer pays the sum of 
1,2 m i l l i m e s which r e p r e s e n t s a p a r t of the 
"Coal item" which i s 3,6 m i l l i m e s and which 
cannot be t o t a l l y a p p l i e d by the o r g a n i s a t i o n 
s i n c e the maximum p r i c e per u n i t i s l 6 mms/KWh, 
Moreover the consumer pays f o r every KWh a 
munic i p a l t ax of 6 m i l l i m e s and a Governmental 
stamp of 2 raillimes. T h i s makes the p r i c e 
24 mms/KWh. 
( l 4 . 8 * 1.2) + 6 * 2 = 2 4 mms/KWh.) 
The item 14.8 m i l l i m e s i s the f i x e d p a r t of 
the t a r i f f . 
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Mixed T a r i f f f o r l i g h t i n g and other domestic 
purposes (one meter). 
T h i s t a r i f f i s i n two types of block t a r i f f s . 
( 1 ) Block T a r i f f . 
I t i s dependant upon the va l u e of the b l o c k s 
w i t h r e s p e c t to the number of the rooms of the 
f l a t (Appendix 9A ) . For a 5 room f l a t or l e s s , 
a 5A. meter a t 115 v. i s used, or f o r more than 
5 room f l a t s a 10 A. meter a t 115 v. i s used. 
The t a r i f f i s d i v i d e d i n t o three b l o c k s . 
F i r s t block a t 24 mras/KWh. Second block a t 
13.4 mms/KWh. (.18.4 = 8.8 ( f i x e d c h a r g e ) * 3.6 
t c o a l item) +> 4 ( m u n i c i p a l i t y t a x ) * 2 
(Governmental stamp) ) . The excess charged a t 
a f i x e d charge of 2.3 m i l l i m e s and the other 
items are the same as the second b l o c k . 
( 2 ) Block Hourly T a r i f f . 
Applied to s u b s c r i b e r s w i t h c o n t r a c t e d power 
exceeding those a p p l i c a b l e i n t a r i f f ( l ) . 
Consumers a r e charged a t d i f f e r e n t r a t e s 
according to the time of t h e i r consumption. 
The three types under t h i s t a r i f f a r e : 
(a) Peak t a r i f f s from 5 p.m. to 11 p.m. d i v i d e d 
i n t o two b l o c k s . 
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F i r s t block charged a t 24 mms/KWh. 
Second block i s 18.4 mms/KWh (8.8 + 3.6 + 4 + 2) 
Under the r u l e s of the O r g a n i s a t i o n , the f i r s t 
block s h a l l not exceed the double of the 
consumption of the f i r s t block i n t a r i f f ( l ) 
( Block t a r i f f ) . 
(b) Night t a r i f f r from 11 p.m. to 8 a.m. and from 
11 a.m. to 2 p.m. The t a r i f f i s 8.9 mms/KWh 
(a.3 + 3.6 *- 1 + 2).. 
( c ) Day t a r i f f : from 8 a.m. to 11 a.m. and from 
2 p.m. to 5 p.m. at a charge of l 8 . 4 mms/KWh 
(8.8 + 3.6 + 4 + 2 ) . 
T a r i f f f o r commercial purposes. 
Applied to commercial s u b s c r i b e r s w i t h a c e r t a i n 
c o n t r a c t e d power i . e . 
For l i g h t i n g ; the f i r s t block of 1000 hours the 
t a r i f f i s 24 mms/KWh. the s u r p l u s i s a t the p r i c e 
18.4 mms/KWh (8.8 + 3.3 + 4 + 2 ) . 
For other purposes: 
( a ) Peak hours from 5 p.m. to 8 p.m. i n w i n t e r , 
24 nuns per k i l o w a t t hour. 
( I t i s not a p p l i e d i n summer). 
(b) Day hours from 8 a.m. to 11 a.m. and from 
2 p.m. to 5 p.m. i n w i n t e r and from 2 p.m. to 
8 p.m. i n summer, the consumer pays a t a r a t e 
of 18.4 mms/KWh (8.8 + 3.6 + 4 + 2 ) . 
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( c ) Night hours from 8 p.m. to 8 a.m. and from 
11 a.m. to 2 p.m. a t 8.9 mms/KWh. (2.3 + 3.6 + 
1 + 2 ) . 
T a r i f f f o r i n d u s t r i a l purposes. 
Motive power: i n a two p a r t t a r i f f w i t h a f i x e d 
charge of £E 2 per subscribed! KW. A running charge 
w i t h s i x b l o c k s according to the number of hours 
i n which the consumer uses e l e c t r i c i t y . 
F i r s t b l o c k r f i r s t 750 hours a t 4.8 * 3.6 = 8.40 
mms/KWh.. 
Second block: next 250 hours a t 2.8 -e 3.6 = 6.40 
mms /K tJh . 
T h i r d block: next 500 hours a t 1.8 +> 3.6 = 5.40 
mms/KWh. 
Four t h b l o c k : next 500 hours a t 1.3 + 3.6 = 4.9 
mms/KWh. 
F i f t h b l o c k r next 1000 hours a t 1.05 + 3.6 = 4.65 
mms/KWh.. 
Rest a t 0.80 + 3.6 = 4.40 
mms/KWh. 
L i g h t i n g I n two bl o c k s 
F i r s t block of 1000 hours 24 mms/KWh. 
Rest = 18.4 mms/KWh. 
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( 3 ) The Mechanical and E l e c t r i c a l Department (M.E.D.) 
A Governmental Department of the M i n i s t r y of 
P u b l i c Works supplying a l l the e l e c t r i f i e d 
i r r i g a t i o n and drainage pumping s t a t i o n s , some 
m u n i c i p a l i t i e s 9 i n d u s t r i a l p l a n t s , and water-
works and p u b l i c u t i l i t y p r o j e c t s . The method 
of charging these undertakings f o r e l e c t r i c i t y 
s u p p l i e d to them from the M.E.D, i s defined i n 
the f o l l o w i n g t a b l e . 
U t i l i z e d KWh/annum Mms/KWh 
Up to 50,000 16.6 
From 50,001 to 100,000 14.2 
From 100,001 to 150,000 11.1 
From 150,001 to 200,000 9.9 
From 200,001 to 300,000 9.2 
From 300,001 to 400,000 8.5 
From 400,001 to 500,000 8.2 
From 500,001 to 600,000 7.9 
From 600,001 to 700,000 7.8 
From 700,001 to 800,000 7.7 
From 800,001 to 900,000 7.6 
From 900,001 to 1200,000 7.5 
From 1200,000 to 1500,000 7 r 3 
More than 1500,000 7.1 
The t a r i f f d e creases w i t h the i n c r e a s e of the 
number of u n i t s consumed by the consumer during 
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account y e a r . The M.E.D. made some statements to 
t h e i r consumers: 
1. T h i s t a r i f f i s based on a f u e l c o s t of 
£E 7 per ton of mazout ( f u e l ) . 
2. For annual power f a c t o r l e s s than 0.8 the 
t a r i f f i s i n c r e a s e d by the f o l l o w i n g 
percentage: 
\ (o.8 - P . F . ) . For annual power f a c t o r 
more than 0.8 the t a r i f f i s decreased by 
the f o l l o w i n g percentage: 1. CP.F. - 0 . 8 ) . 
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3. An a d m i n i s t r a t i v e charge of 10% i s a l s o 
added. 
(4) The H y d r o - E l e c t r i c Power Department (H.E.P.D.) 
The A u t h o r i t y i s a Department of the M i n i s t r y 
of P u b l i c Works i n charge of the Aswan Hydro-
e l e c t r i c power s t a t i o n s . I t i s mainly 
supplying the KIMA f e r t i l i z e r f a c t o r y , and the 
High Dam C o n s t r u c t i o n s i t e . The t a r i f f of 
energy s o l d to the KIMA f e r t i l i z e r f a c t o r y i s 
designed a t a s p e c i a l r a t e which i s much lower 
than any other t a r i f f . T h i s i s because of the 
lower c o s t s of producing and t r a n s m i t t i n g 
e l e c t r i c i t y i n t h i s a r e a and the s h o r t d i s t a n c e 
k8k 
between the f a c t o r y and the power s t a t i o n . . The 
t a r i f f i s i n three b l o c k s as f o l l o w s . 
1.2 mms/KVJh f o r the f i r s t 1000 hours. 
1.0 mms/KWh f o r the next 500 hours. 
0.8 mms/KWh f o r the excess energy,. 
I n a d d i t i o n the KIMA f a c t o r y pays £E 1.2 m i l l i o n 
per year as a f i x e d charge. I t had been agreed 
t h a t t h i s t a r i f f was to be r e v i s e d a t the end of 
the year 1961/62. 
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APPENDIX 9 A. 
Value of the b l o c k s w i t h r e s p e c t to the number of 
rooms of the f l a t . 
No. of rooms. F i r s t b lock i n kwh. Second block i n kwh, 
1 - 2 - 3 l 8 0 90 
4 240 120 
5 300 150 
6 360 180 
More than 6 60 kwh. more per room 30 kwh. more per room 
k i t c h e n s , bathrooms, t o i l e t s and passages are not 
co n s i d e r e d . 
The entrance h a l l i s considered as one room i f i t s a r e a 
2 
exceeds s i x square meters (6 m )• 
I f the a r e a of a room exceeds the v a l u e s i n the 
f o l l o w i n g t a b l e , i t i s considered as a number of rooms 
equal to a whole m u l t i p l e of the given v a l u e : 
1 to 5 rooms f l a t 80 m 
r 2 
o rooms f l a t 90 m 
2 
7 rooms f l a t 100 m 
8 rooms f l a t 110 m 
2 
9 rooms f l a t 125 m 
o 
10 rooms f l a t 140 m 
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APPENDIX ( 9 B ) . 
M u n i c i p a l t a x e s and governmental stamp. 
Muni c i p a l Government 
L i g h t i n g Tax m i l l i m stamp m i l l i m 
F i r s t block 6 2 
Second block 4 2 
Other uses 
F i r s t block 6 2 
Second block 4 2 
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